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CoachMel

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  1. Taking a look at the 14th amendment, the only citizen requirement is for the privileges and immunities clause. This Rights K only links to plans that grant rights to citizens only. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment apply to all persons in the US and do not discriminate between aliens and citizens. Thus, the Bosniak 02 card doesn't link.
  2. Here it is (hopefully it attached this time) 2AC Anwer to Settler Colonalism 1. Native Americans are Citizens of the United States This Date in Native History: On June 2, 1924, Congress granted United States citizenship to Native Americans born in the United States. But even after the Indian Citizenship Act passed, some Native Americans weren’t allowed to vote because the right to vote was governed by state law. Until the Indian Citizenship Act, some had married white men to become citizens, or served in the military. As the National Park Service says, the act was a move by the federal government to absorb Indians into mainstream American life. 2. The 14th Amendment applies to all citizens and persons born in the United States. US Const. Amend 14, Section 1; https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 3. A right to education interprets the 14th Amendment to include education as a fundamental right, giving children right to sue when the educational system fails them. Joshua E. Weishart, 2016, Visiting Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. Reconstituting the Right to Education, Alabama Law Review. I do not wish to add another voice to this dissonant chorus by attempting to blueprint an entirely new edifice for the right. Rather, in this Article I deconstruct the right's present, much-maligned composition to gain clarity about the legal architectures that have already been conceived and operationalized. In so doing, I show how two strands of the right to education once thought to be diametrically opposed--equality of educational opportunity and educational adequacy--are interlocked through the right's forms and functions. Coding the right to education's forms only reveals part of its nature, however. n26 The form provides a descriptor of the right's "internal structure." n27 But to fit our ordinary understanding of what it means to have a legal right, we also need a descriptor of "what rights do for those who hold them," i.e., their function. n28 Leif Wenar identifies six functions--exemption, discretion, authorization, provision, performance, and protection--which, when paired with one or more forms, provide a complete description of the right's "complex 'molecular' . . . structure." n29 The practical implications of this description are quite serious because the right's forms and functions dictate the scope of judicial review and the remedial measures that courts can undertake. Put simply, they predetermine the right's potential strength and viability. My analysis in Part I concludes that the right to education held by children has taken the form of both a claim-right and an immunity. Where the two forms overlap--the protection function--the claim-right denotes a right to educational adequacy, and the immunity is one of equality of educational opportunity. n30 Although the protection function has not attracted much scholarly attention, the right has long been justified and invoked to protect children from political, economic, and social inequalities and more generally to protect their capabilities to be responsible, productive citizens. Broadly construed, such equality and liberty interests are underwritten by the equality and adequacy principles I explore further in Part II. At the core of the principle of educational adequacy is the notion that we must cultivate children's positive liberties. Whereas the distributive principle of equality of educational opportunity has been utilized to negate resource inequities and social inequalities. Despite the potential of adequacy and equality intertwined, n31 education clauses in state constitutions do not fix standards for their mutual enforcement, leaving the right to education vulnerable to the charge that it is judicially unmanageable. Disjoined, equal protection and substantive due process offer little recourse, each being jurisprudentially flawed: equal protection demanding substantive equality poses its own intractable manageability problems, rendering it inadequate. Substantive due process, as a noncomparative right, tolerates and potentially exasperates, objectionable inequities. Conjoined, the egalitarian principles of equal protection and the substantive demands of due process might overcome these flaws, but exactly how they can be integrated remains unclear, even after the Court's recent application in Obergefell v. Hodges. n32 I make no pretense that a grand unifying theory is viable or even desirable. Nevertheless, the right to education--an immunity-claim-right imparting a protection function vis-à-vis children's liberty and equality [*923] interests--presents a configuration that could make unifying substantive due process and equal protection more palpable. That union could, in turn, ameliorate the standards for enforcing the right to education. On the one hand, substantive due process advancing positive liberty interests reinforces the adequacy threshold from which resource inequities can be judicially measured and adjusted; on the other hand, equal protection can infuse equal educational opportunity principles in translating adequacy as a relational demand. 4. Under our interpretation, Native students will have a right to bring an action against the BIE for mismanaging funds, underfunding schools, and not providing acquedate resources to the schools. 5. BIE is mismanaged Brenna 14, Why are Native Students Being Left Behind https://www.teachforamerica.org/one-day-magazine/why-are-native-students-being-left-behind Apart from Department of Defense schools, schools for American Indian students are the only ones in the country operated and totally funded by the federal government under treaty agreements that promise federally-supported schooling in perpetuity in exchange for tribes giving up lands (which are not subject to property taxes and generate no tax revenue to support schools). And no group of students in America fails to graduate or achieve proficiency at such disproportionate rates. (Editor’s Note: This article ran in the Fall 2014 edition.)The failure of the U.S. to deliver on its treaty obligations to educate American Indian students first came to light in 1928, when the 847-page Merriam Report documented the disastrous effects of federal policies that forced American Indian children into boarding schools. These schools imposed manual labor and worked to eradicate students’ “Indianness” by teaching that their cultures and languages were inferior. In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act, or “Indian New Deal,” granted self-determination rights to tribes that extended to education and later created new funding streams for schools on and off reservations. But 35 years later, a Senate report declared a near-total lack of high-quality education on reservations, calling Indian education “a national tragedy.” This was followed by the National Academy of Public Administration report in 1999 that condemned the management of schools in tribal areas by the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the U.S. Department of the Interior; then by the Bronner Report in 2012, citing poor coordination among all the offices in the Interior Department responsible for Native education; and then by a Government Accountability Office report in 2013. The GAO found the Interior Department’s Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) had so mismanaged schools that it had given them permission to use assessments that failed to meet federal requirements because the BIE “does not have procedures that specify who should be involved in key decisions.” “If we had systems of schooling in Indian country that were primarily locally and tribally controlled, would that mean different outcomes for kids?” Angelina Castagna From the standpoint of scale, improving Native students’ education would seem manageable. Of the nearly 50 million students in American public schools, just more than one percent, or around 700,000, identify as American Indian, Alaska Native, or Native Hawaiian (though only American Indian tribes and Alaska Native Villages are federally recognized, with tribes maintaining a historical treaty trust relationship as sovereign nations within the United States). But the smallness of Native students’ numbers (divided among 566 federally recognized tribes with 170 indigenous languages) is directly tied to the lack of drive to reform systems. To most Americans, the educational and social issues that challenge Native students in rural villages, homelands, and reservations are invisible. And when it comes to creating the conditions for reform—by reorganizing federal agencies or redistributing power in tribal communities where control of government jobs sometimes equals control of the economy—the political reward is minimal, while the potential fallout is immense. The vast majority—93 percent—of Native students don’t go to the schools cited in those reports. They attend other public schools on or near reservations or in cities away from their home reservations. Contributing to low achievement and lack of opportunity in these schools is that many fail to collect all the federal Impact Aid, Title VII, or supplemental federal Johnson-O’Malley funds to which they’re entitled. This stems not just from Congressionally-imposed funding cutbacks, but also from federal agencies undercounting Native kids, or from Native families failing to self identify because they’re unwilling to face bias, uninformed of their rights, or not enrolled in any federally recognized tribe. The BIE supports 183 schools on 64 reservations in 23 states. Some 59 are operated directly by the BIE (teachers and leaders are employees of the federal government) and 124 are operated by local tribal school boards and superintendents under the Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988. Nationwide, BIE-funded school buses—like this one outside of the St. Francis Indian School on the Rosebud Reservation—travel nearly 15 million miles each year across rural terrain. A shortage of federal funds means BIE schools can be on the hook for as much as $100,000 in gasoline and maintenance expenses. Kristina Barker. The approximately 48,000 students who attend the BIE-operated or tribal grant schools underperform Native students in other public schools. In one study of fourth graders, BIE students on average scored 22 percentile points lower for reading and 14 points lower for math than American Indian students attending public schools. Like almost all isolated rural schools in America, BIE schools struggle to attract and keep qualified teachers and principals. But the problems that make it hard for these schools to attract talent go deeper, to their structure and finances. To begin with, the principals of these federally- supported schools must navigate Byzantine, overlapping BIE regulations to execute the most basic functions, such as purchasing textbooks and school lunches. This gets in the way of “focusing on their primary mission of instructional leadership,” a federal study group reported to the Department of Interior. The same study group noted that tribally-controlled schools are funded by the federal government at just 67% of their administrative costs, leaving principals to dip into instructional budgets to cover those. Many of these schools are in such extreme states of disrepair—with leaking roofs and walls, asbestos, mold, and aging bus fleets traveling roads that become impassable in bad weather —that the backlog repair bill for the 68 highest-risk facilities is $1.3 billion. Some 60 percent of schools also lack the bandwidth or computers to support online learning and assessments, with most dependent on outdated T1 connectivity. Language classes are critical to the culturally responsive instruction that many Native educators believe is key to better student outcomes. At the Native American Community Academy in Albuquerque, New Mexico, middle and high school students can take Navajo, Keres, and Lakota (shown here). Brian Leddy Since the 1970s, tribes have advocated passionately for their rights as sovereign nations to control and operate their own schools and teach their languages and culture—to be as accountable to their tribal nations as to states and the federal government. That change may be imminent. This past summer, the Obama administration released a blueprint for reform that lays out a vision for the BIE to turn over control of schools to tribal nations. Under the blueprint, the Department of the Interior and the BIE would eventually stop operating schools, as would local tribal councils. Instead, the BIE would become essentially a school support organization that would fund and support tribal nations to run their own schools. As an example, the Navajo Nation would take over the operation of all 66 schools now run by either the BIE or local tribal school boards. Whether this can potentially break the cycle of dysfunction depends partly on whether Congress appropriates the funds to bring schools up to 21st-century standards and creates the conditions to attract and develop talent, particularly from within Native communities. It also depends on local and national tribal leaders navigating the balance of local and national control. Many local tribal councils have been criticized for how they spend school funds and practice patronage hiring in communities where schools are among the few stable employers. “Anyone who knows Indian country would say that certainly happens, but at the same time, corruption and unethical things happen everywhere, and that’s part of the story that’s not told,” says Angelina Castagno, who does research on indigenous education and teacher preparation in the College of Education at Northern Arizona University. “That contributes to the standard narrative and deficit perspective that says indigenous people and communities are somehow inherently inferior or have more problems than other communities, instead of focusing on the structural problems in many communities.” Scholarship by Castagno, as well as colleagues who coauthored a report on promising practices in Native education for the BIE, indicates that tribal leaders are correct to assert that better outcomes for students rest on culturally responsive teaching and Native language immersion. In a study of the K-5 Puente de Hózhó (PdH) Public Magnet School in Flagstaff, Arizona, for example, Teresa McCarty and Tiffany Lee found that PdH students equaled or surpassed their Native peers in English mainstream schools. And in recent years, PdH has ranked among the district’s top-performing schools. “If we had systems of schooling in Indian country that were primarily locally and tribally controlled, would that mean different outcomes for kids? We have lots of research that says yes,” says Castagno, who conducted a research review with her colleague Brian McKinley Jones Brayboy for the American Educational Research Association. “But until it happens on a large-scale basis, it’s hard to say with any certainty.” 6. A fundamental right to education enables Natives to sue the BIE for mismanagement. The Supreme Court will look at the BIE’s actions under the guise of strict strutiny instead of rational basis. Under a strict strutiny level of review, the Court will find that the BIE’s actions are not narrowly tailored to an important governmental interest, because there are less discriminatory alternatives. Empowering Natives to take action to sue the BIE solves the settler colonialism K. 2AC Anwer to Settler Colonalism.docx
  3. Attached is what I came up with for an answer to Settler Colonialism. The premise is that Native Americans are citizens and the right to education is extended to Natives. If Natives have a RTE, then they are empowered to sue the BIE for the mismanagement and lack of resources to native schools. In short, plan solves K b/c plan empowers natives. On a different note, plan solves K b/c plan ignores the geopolitical boundaries that define district funding. Plan redistributes money from wealthy districts and gives it to the poor districts where minorities are concentrated.
  4. Anyone have a response to this Bosniak 02 card? Expanding citizens’ rights through the 14th amendment is predicated on hyper-nationalist protection of insiders, turning non-citizens into national threats and human waste Bosniak 02 Linda Bosniak, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Camden. This article was written when the author was a Faculty Fellow, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University. Ohio State Law Journal Volume 63, Number 5, 2002 Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/03/63.5.bosniak.pdf But even if citizenship for aliens is not objectionable in the way that second-class citizenship is, there remains the question of whether the notion of “alien citizenship” is coherent by its own terms. Can Ely, Bobbit, Karst, and the others persuasively maintain that persons constitute the rightful subjects of most constitutional rights, while at the same time characterizing the substance of those rights as a form of citizenship?[118] How far can the claim of citizenship for aliens extend? At one level, answering this question is a matter of constitutional interpretation. Certainly, the scholars I have focused on see themselves as making interpretive arguments about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; they are interested precisely in how that amendment accommodates (or fails to accommodate) the mandates of personhood rights and citizenship. Should the Constitution, after the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, be read as “now identif[ying] personhood with United States citizenship,”[119] or did the Amendment intend a sharp divide between them? There are various aspects to the debate in the constitutional literature. Much of the debate has taken the form of a dispute over the relationship between the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses (which speak of persons), on the one hand, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, on the other. Scholars have asked, among other things: Are these clauses to be read as overlapping in meaning?[120] If so, is the Privileges or Immunities Clause redundant? If not, what does its reference to “the rights of citizens” add to the mix (read both in light of and in spite of Slaughterhouse)?[121] Are the rights referred to narrower than the rights guaranteed to persons in the other clauses?[122] Much ink has been spilled on these and related questions in the constitutional commentary, and scholars remain widely divided on these issues. But assessing the coherence of the idea of alien citizenship is a matter that requires going beyond a parsing of constitutional history and text; it requires us to consider, as well, questions of normative constitutional theory. As Karst has written, citizenship—equal citizenship—is not merely a technical constitutional concept; it is also “an ideal, a cluster of value premises.”[123] To evaluate the plausibility of the concept of alien citizenship, therefore, we need to consider it in light of these premises. I have argued that any claim to the effect that aliens do and should enjoy aspects of substantive citizenship effectively amounts to a claim that the constitutional tradition which accords rights to persons is perfectly compatible with an understanding of rights conceived as a form of citizenship. The question we are faced with, therefore, is whether the claim is true: whether the constitutional commitments of rights-to-persons and the constitutional conception of rights-as-citizenship are indeed complementary. The answer, it seems to me, is that their compatibility only goes so far. This is because rights-citizenship is usually conceived as embodying not only universalist values, but nationalist values as well. On first reading, the ideal of equal citizenship seems inextricably linked to an ethic of rights based on personhood. As many commentators have argued, the principle of equal citizenship embodies a commitment to universality. Kenneth Karst writes that under this principle, “[e]very individual is . . . presumptively entitled to treatment in our public life as a person . . . deserv[ing of] respect.”[124] The ideal of equal citizenship is grounded in a commitment to justice and recognition “for all.”[125] It is this grand universalism, which accords rights to persons by virtue of their common humanity, that accounts for much of the concept’s powerful political resonance. Yet upon further review, it becomes clear that “everyone” does not quite mean everyone. For despite equal citizenship’s professed commitment to universality, the universality championed is, in fact, a circumscribed one. The constraints on universality’s scope are the result of the other core animating ideal of the equal citizenship principle—that of community membership, or “belonging,” in Karst’s term. The notion of belonging is insistently inclusive within the community. Yet the value of “belonging” also presupposes community boundaries—boundaries which ultimately divide insiders from outsiders.[126] “By drawing a circle and designating those within the circle as sovereign and equal,” Alex Aleinikoff has written, “the concept of citizenship perforce treats those outside the circle . . . as less than full members.”[127] Most theorists of equal citizenship have tended to disregard citizenship’s exclusionary aspect in their work. Like many social and political theorists, they “tend[ ] to take the existence of a bounded national ‘society’ for granted and to focus on institutions and processes internal to that society.”[128] Their focus on citizenship within the national community, in turn, allows them to treat citizenship as a universalist ideal with an inherently expansive logic. Karst, for instance, writes of equal citizenship’s “expanding . . . circle of belonging,”[129] though he has always acknowledged that the process of inclusion remains incomplete. This expansive conception of citizenship was expressed by political theorist Michael Walzer, who similarly posits a citizenship that progressively incorporates outsider groups. He writes: “Slaves, workers, new immigrants, Jews, Blacks, women—all of them move into the circle of the protected, even if the protection they actually get is still unequal or inadequate.”[130] This statement captures the predominant conception of citizenship among mainstream constitutional scholars. Focusing on the nation’s interior, they approach citizenship—at least ideally—as a source of progressively inclusive and egalitarian values.[131] It has thus fallen to those scholars specifically concerned with the community’s threshold to attend to citizenship’s nationally-exclusionary dimension.[132] Most often, it is the analysts concerned with immigration and with the law’s constraints on access to citizenship status who acknowledge and examine citizenship’s boundary-enforcing aspect.[133] Yet while most scholars who champion the concept of equal citizenship tend to ignore citizenship’s exclusionary face, it is ultimately presupposed in their project. First of all, as I have said, constitutional scholars often characterize equal citizenship not merely as the universal enjoyment of rights but also as the experience of community belonging or membership. Communities, of course, have insides and outsides which are constituted by some sort of boundary, however permeable it may be. Furthermore, many constitutional theorists make their case on behalf of equal citizenship by linking it to a particular form of community belonging which they express through the concept of “national union” or “national unity.”[134] Karst, for instance, writes that “[t]he union of the American people is a constitutional value of the first importance.”[135] And it is a value that is inextricably linked with the value of equal citizenship; national unity is seen as a precondition for the practice of equal citizenship, and equal citizenship, in turn, is viewed as a necessary condition for the continued well-being of the community.[136] In Karst’s view, “constitutional equality can be seen as part of the social cement that holds our nation together,”[137] while the “interdependence of citizens that is the foundation for the national union” likewise serves to “strengthen the material and moral foundations of equal citizenship.”[138] A number of other constitutional scholars have similarly linked equal citizenship with a normative conception of “national unity.”[139] None of these scholars appears to see any inherent tension between the normative commitments associated with national unity and equal citizenship’s universalist commitments. On the contrary, they regard equal citizenship and national unity as mutually necessary and mutually reinforcing parts of a whole. And they are surely right that citizenship’s dual commitments are often productively complementary within the ambit of the nation. In particular, it seems indisputable that schisms internal to the nation along class or caste or state lines have thwarted struggles for universal and equal rights within the nation; and conversely, it is clear that a sense of national identification and community solidarity has animated many efforts to give content and effect to the equal citizenship principle in this country. Yet while these constitutional scholars apparently regard the ideal of national unity as an antidote to divisiveness and fragmentation internal to the nation,[140] I would contend that the practice of ensuring the “belonging” and “unity” of the nation’s members simultaneously, and inevitably, signals the existence of a sharp divide between insiders and outsiders to the nation. For one thing, the very rhetoric of national unity rather unavoidably serves to conjure up the specter of foreign threat. In general, political and scholarly discourse rallying to a position of “national unity” is quite often meant to evoke a defensive posture in relation to a danger posed by non-national outsiders—at least as often as (and in the recent period, far more than)—to evoke a domestic campaign against internal fragmentation and divisiveness.[141] While I am quite certain that those scholars who link equal citizenship with the ideal of national unity have no intention of conveying any such defensive and nationalist message, the term’s reverberations are hard to deny. And even if we discount such paranoiac associations, the ideal of “national unity” remains essentially a nationalist construct in ethical terms. Describing national unity as a foundation of the equal citizenship principle at the very least conveys the message that we maintain a special commitment to the well-being of members of our own national community—that we feel a kinship with them and maintain moral obligations to them above all others.[142] In this ethical nationalist formulation, we still presume a class of foreigners whose existence defines a national “us,” and although they are not constructed as overtly dangerous, their experiences and interests are nevertheless assumed to be of lesser significance to us than those of our compatriots.[143] In sum, while constitutional scholars thus tend to avoid direct attention to citizenship in its bounded aspect and focus on the community’s interior, their substantive accounts of equal citizenship within the nation often presuppose such boundaries. Citizenship’s universalism is, in this regard, a circumscribed universalism, constrained by a concurrent commitment to ethical nationalism. That the normative ideal of equal citizenship in constitutional thought is, in the end, a nationally-bounded universalist project of course poses important questions at the level of political theory—including questions about the moral justifiability of preferring the interests of national insiders over national outsiders in a world characterized by vastly unequal life chances.[144] While these are pressing matters, I am concerned for the moment not so much with the legitimacy of nationalism per se as with understanding the relationship between citizenship’s nationalist and universalist commitments in the first instance. How can citizenship be both universalist and bounded simultaneously? To the extent that the division between citizenship’s dual commitments is acknowledged by scholars at all, the usual assumption is that each applies to a different jurisdictional sphere or domain.[145] It is presumed, as a rule, that citizenship’s nationalist commitments are relevant at the borders, facing outward, and that citizenship’s universalist commitments are relevant within the community, facing in. It is presumed, in other words, that while citizenship embodies a universalist ethic within the community, it is exclusionary at the community’s edges.[146] This Janus-like image of citizenship is often accurate—but not always. On the one hand, citizenship’s universalist commitments are sometimes brought to bear at the nation’s borders. Humanitarian admissions policies, and rules requiring due process in deportation proceedings, are powerful examples.[147] On the other hand, and more significant here, citizenship’s exclusionary commitments are not always confined to the state’s territorial perimeter, but are sometimes brought to bear even within the nation’s territory. When this happens, principles of universal citizenship and bounded citizenship occupy the same (internal) terrain.[148] The case of aliens makes this clear—and here we come full circle. On the one hand, the equal citizenship principle regards aliens as entitled to equal regard and recognition as persons residing in our community. Karst argues that “it is important to extend most of the content of the equal citizenship principle to aliens . . . because for most purposes [aliens] are members of our society.”[149] This is the universalist strand of the equal citizenship principle at work, and it has been highly influential, for aliens do enjoy many fundamental rights as members. At the same time, however, Karst also suggests that aliens—even lawful permanent resident aliens—may be properly regarded as outsiders to the nation’s “political community” by virtue of the primary allegiance they maintain to their home states. As a consequence, he maintains, they may legitimately be denied political rights, including the right to vote.[150] The principle of equal citizenship, in this context, permits and perhaps even requires, the exclusion of outsiders from the political community—the same community in which universal equal citizenship is practiced. The condition of undocumented immigrants pointedly illustrates the dynamic. The equal citizenship principle is usually understood to demand the extension of core constitutional rights to the undocumented. The Supreme Court expressed the point plainly: “Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [basic] constitutional protection.”[151] Yet many proponents of equal citizenship also tolerate the exclusion of these immigrants—particularly the culpable adults[152]—from other core benefits of membership,[153] and most seem to regard as acceptable, and perhaps even necessary, their subjection to deportation on grounds of unlawful entry or presence.[154] Significantly, the threat or actuality of deportation works to undercut equal citizenship not merely directly but also indirectly: these immigrants are often unwilling to invoke the rights they are formally entitled to for fear of coming to the attention of the immigration authorities.[155] The result, once again, is that while equal citizenship requires rights for everyone, it also tolerates, and perhaps even demands, the exclusion of certain territorially-present non-nationals—with the effect that the inclusive force of the principle of equal citizenship is both directly and indirectly compromised. The ambiguous status of aliens under an equal citizenship regime makes clear that the marriage of personhood with equal citizenship proposed by Karst and the others is bound to be a partially unstable union. However compatible the idea of equal citizenship is with rights for persons qua persons in most cases, the idea of citizenship also presupposes a bounded national community. This is a community characterized by exclusionary commitments—political and territorial commitments—that will inevitably clash with a pure personhood rights approach. And it is precisely in the context of aliens’ rights where that tension is most likely to emerge. For all of these reasons, the claim by Karst, Bobbit, Ely, and the others to the effect that aliens can be the subjects of citizenship, and their suggestion that the revitalization of the idea of constitutional citizenship need not, in principle, result in a total diminution of rights for aliens, each seem quite plausible. There is, nevertheless, an intrinsic limit to the citizenship that aliens can enjoy. Theirs is something of a second-class citizenship—though this is not second-class citizenship in its classical form, pursuant to which those afforded the formal status of citizenship are nevertheless denied many of the rights of citizenship in law and in practice. This is, instead, a second-class citizenship in which the individuals involved enjoy many of the substantive rights of citizenship even in the absence of formal citizenship status; and yet the scope of the rights they enjoy is, at the same time, constrained by virtue of citizenship’s other substantive commitments which include a commitment to national exclusivity and closure.
  5. Focus on high-magnitude impacts perpetuates structural violence Jackson 12—Director of National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies @ uni of otago; Prof on International Politics @ Aberystwyth Uni, editor-in-chief of Critical Studies on Terrorism (Richard, “The Great Con of National Security,” 8/5/12, https://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/)//JLE It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others. The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious. And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world. More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate. Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence. Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along. Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact. Prioritize high probability impacts – worst-case scenario framing only distorts rational decision making skills and leads to social gridlock and fear. Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, and Stewart, Professor of Civil Engineering, 2011 (John, and Mark G., “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY,” March 20, 2011, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//MID11TSM.PDF, accessed July 15, 2016) DDI-BL Focusing on worst case scenarios Cass Sunstein, who seems to have invented the phrase, “probability neglect,” assesses the version of the phenomena that comes into being when “emotions are intensely engaged.” Under that circumstance, he argues, “people’s attention is focused on the bad outcome itself, and they are inattentive to the fact that it is unlikely to occur.” Moreover, they are inclined to “demand a substantial governmental response—even if the magnitude of the risk does not warrant the response.”16 It may be this phenomenon that Treverton experienced. Playing to this demand, government officials are inclined to focus on worst case scenarios, presumably in the knowledge, following Sunstein’s insight, that this can emotionally justify just about any expenditure no matter how unlikely the prospect the dire event will actually take place. Accordingly, there is a preoccupation with “low probability/high consequence” events such as the detonation of a sizeable nuclear device in midtown Manhattan even though the vast bulk of homeland security expenditures is focused on comparatively low consequence events like explosions set off by individual amateur jihadists. It is sometimes argued that conventional risk analysis breaks down under extreme conditions because the risk is now a very large number (losses) multiplied by a very small number (attack probability). However, it is not the risk analysis methodology that is at fault here, but our ability to use the information obtained from the analysis for decision-making. Analyst Bruce Schneier has written penetratingly of worst case thinking. He points out that it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. It leads to bad decision making because it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. It also assumes “that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible,” and it “can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy.” And worst, it “validates ignorance” because, “instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know—and what we can imagine.” In the process “risk assessment is devalued” and “probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking."17 What is necessary is due consideration to the spectrum of threats, not simply the worst one imaginable, in order to properly understand, and to coherently deal with, the risks to people, institutions, and the economy. The relevant decision-makers are professionals, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that they should do so seriously. Notwithstanding political pressures, the fact that the public has difficulties with probabilities when emotions are involved does not relieve those in charge of the requirement, even the duty, to make decisions about the expenditures of vast quantities of public monies in a responsible manner.
  6. What are some common K's on right to education, and how do I answer them? Thanks, Coach Mel
  7. Excellent! Just what I'm looking for. Thanks.
  8. This is a midterms argument that republicans are good, and plan causes dems to win seats, and dems cause impeachment and impeachment bad b/c Trump will cause war with Russia if impeachment happens. The missing link is plan is a win for dems.
  9. Hi, I'm looking for a card that says plan is a win for dems. Anyone willing to point me in the right direction? Thanks!
  10. CoachMel

    Fiat

    For example, it is sufficient to state that the USFG will substantially increase funding for x, and will use normal means to implement i.e. fiat. Then clarify in cx, and have cards for the 2AC about what normal means means? I would like to avoid over specifying, and toeing the line of extra-topicality. At the same time I would like to specify to avoid FSPEC.
  11. CoachMel

    Fiat

    What enables the aff to fiat funding? Do I need theory to back up the right to fiat or is it sufficient in round to say "aff reserves the right to fiat"?
  12. CoachMel

    Fiat

    I'm asking if the aff can fiat a $12 million funding increase without specifying the funding mechanism.
  13. CoachMel

    Fiat

    Hi, How much does an aff need to specify funding before becoming extra topical? How much can an aff fiat? Can an aff specify the amount of funding increase and fiat mechanisms to make that funding happen. It seems like affs are in a double bind between FSPEC and Extra-T. What is the balance between specifications, and what role does fiat play? What theory supports the idea that affirmatives can fiat the mechanisms of their funding? Thanks, Coach Mel
  14. Snowball, Could you clarify how to beat a kritik? I'm an old school 4 person policy debater debater who never faced kritiks. A scenario that I am faced with often is that my novice debaters go up against a kritik, and freeze. They have no response to the link, alt, impact, or framework. Is there a basic strategy or theory to use against a K when you have nothing else on the K? Thanks, Coach Mel
  15. Another version of zizek alt: Finally, the Affirmative falls victim to the temptation to “directly intervene” and attempt to “change things.” The Affirmative’s reforms are tolerated by the Capitalist system because it doesn’t approach the limit – the actual solution is to reject the idea that action is required to solve problems. Our alternative is to say NO. ZIZEK 2001 Slavoj, “Repeating Lenin”, http://www.lacan.com/replenin.htm One is therefore tempted to turn around Marx's thesis 11: the first task today is precisely NOT to succumb to the temptation to act, to directly intervene and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul de sac of debilitating impossibility: "what can one do against the global capital?"), but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. If, today, one follows a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space - it will be an act WITHIN the hegemonic ideological coordinates: those who "really want to do something to help people" get involved in (undoubtedly honorable) exploits like Medecins sans frontiere, Greenpeace, feminist and anti-racist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated, but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly enter the economic territory (say, denouncing and boycotting companies which do not respect ecological conditions or which use child labor) - they are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. This kind of activity provides the perfect example of interpassivity: of doing things not to achieve something, but to PREVENT from something really happening, really changing. All the frenetic humanitarian, politically correct, etc., activity fits the formula of "Let's go on changing something all the time so that, globally, things will remain the same!"
  16. This is close to a K. You need an alternative. The implied alternative is reject aff plan, and imbrace human extinction. You also need a link. Pretty obvious in this case that the link is the aff seeks to avoid human extinction. Next is the impact which you have laid out already with the existing cards. In sum, the main args are no alternative, no reason to prefer K over plan. No link. Good luck with this arg! I can see teams struggling to counter this argument with solid evidence.
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