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Everything posted by HyperRhizome

  1. the whole point of debate is to give context to facts and use them to develop an argument. The card is also super power tagged. Also, most people dont read flat statistics as their card; tags usually have connection to a broader point, like econ decline = war, etc.I don't see how this could ever be used in a debate round lmao. If you wanna throw a round, just read the squirrel case. Works every time.
  2. They HAVE to specify that in cx. If they change the status of the cp after specifying something different in cx, it warrants abuse theory in the 1AR
  3. Just drop the CP and say "drop the arg, not the team". It doesn't seem problematic enough to down yall. Prolly don't use that comparison though, the language is mildly problematic. Just say that the US can't support immigrants. Also, I don't see how the CP is mutually exclusive.
  4. What was the context of the drop the team arg? It was probably a kritik of your impact framing, but I don't see how that would be a drop the team arg.
  5. NUQ ev for Base DA 1-21-19.docx
  6. On the pure capitalism argument, you could say that capitalism coopts any change by the USFG to perpetuate its agenda, lobbying proves that practically every aspect of the govt. is thoroughly controlled by capitalist systems.
  7. All you honestly need to do is make analytical claims to prove that new arguments in the 1NR are good/bad. Also, evidence is different from arguments. Reading new cards is totally legit as long as it's an extension of an existing argument. If it's some totally new case answers in the 1NR, then it's probably abusive. Just read whatever new arguments you want in the 2NC, CX checks abuse anyways. http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=802.5;wap2 has some cool stuff too
  8. 1-19-19.docx Sorry Lacan
  9. http://www.continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/viewArticle/91 is a much meme-d explanation of Baudrillard, plus it's accurate. Honestly, when I started out with baudrillard, I just read the intro to Simulacra and Simulation. It's pretty good.
  10. Definitely what @seanarchy said. Also, you could probably argue that the judge should reject the argument and not the team. Rejecting the team leads to bad norm creation because teams are then practically excluded from debate even if they won the other flows.
  11. It can be argued in terms that assuming that a plan will happen is bad for education, because, as you noted, things don't work like that in the real world. A debate should be focused on how we can learn the most and what we can best translate into real-world skills. If we continuously debate in the magical political vacuum of fiat, we hurt our ability to effectively learn real world skills. Plus, breadth over depth leads to better topic education and better-informed policies because affirmatives can then add planks and stuff for future rounds. I'm not saying that we shouldn't debate under the shutdown though, that's a pretty bad argument to make tbh.
  12. I mean, if the aff fiats the plan passing and also fiats funding, you could pretty easily read fiat bad theory. It doesn't take too long to read, and, even if you lose the theory flow, you could still argue that the aff should specify where funding comes from. Worst case scenario, you don't win that flow, but it'd still be a major time skew for the aff. So, unless they argue that its a time skew and that it's bad, reading it prolly still helps you.
  13. Reopening with a banger for the end of the 2018-19 topic and the rest of 2019-20 1-17-19.docx
  14. "Counterplan: The EU should Insert Pl... do the plan" Everyone's done this at some point.
  15. Due to the utter lack of people wanting to do policy at my school, I'm transitioning to LD. Planning to go to camp, but I'm still unsure (heard VBI, TDC, and NSD were good). I'm a more K oriented debater, but anything goes. I have a few questions: 1. What should I expect in terms of common arguments? 2. Anything specific I should probably work on? 3. How progressive is the Texas circuit? 4. Spreading is chill, right? 5. Which camps would you recommend? 6. Which K's are most common? 7. What ON HELL is a spike? (Balsas 6) Thanks!
  16. Going to survivors this summer
  17. Lets just ignore the TRUSTED US intelligence community and the worldwide TRUSTED news organizations and let's agree… https://t.co/UrP9hrdazw

  18. Price has been lowered, thank god
  19. So I just got into some Agamben lit after being crushed at UT by an Agamben K with the alt of embracing impotentiality. The link was teleology (?) and the impact was bare life through biopolitical determination. Can someone explain to me what this K is saying and where I should start when cutting an Agamben K? Thanks! 1NC R5 UT.docx
  20. I'd definitely love to debate If you are lacking judges, I'd love to judge as well My paradigms are: Decently versed in K lit, but you should explain decently why it's a voter Basically read whatever you want I won't vote exclusively on T just because you say it's a voter in the 1NC and never bring that up again in the later speeches Theory is great, but please don't bring the whole debate round to a muddy theory debate Read anything and I'll vote on it if you're winning on the flow and if you explain it well I'll genuinely consider any performance and/or squirrely arguments if they have any merit Pronouns are they/them
  21. I'm really thinking about a Cosmopolitan K like the one on openev from 2016-17 Codifying distinctions between national and foreign is the constitution of otherness – it’s what allows enemy creation //OR SPECIFIC LINK Neocleous, 8 - Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (Mark, Critique of Security, p. 122 In other words, the ideology of (national) security served and continues to serve as a means of delineating, framing and asserting identity. Security functions as a means not just for identifying and dealing with potential military threats, but also as a mechanism for the political constitution and cultural production of identity and, as such, for the unity of political community. Thus the struggle for security against the enemy – be it the communist menace or global terrorism – becomes a reaffirmation of the historical burden of a distinctive identity around which the nation must unite. And yet we might equally say that the ideology of national identity serves to delineate, frame and assert national security: identity becomes a mechanism for the constitution of security. This is a double-edged process. On the one hand, it involves simultaneously distancing this identity from the Other, often through distinguishing the values central to this identity from the values of the enemy (or, more usually, the ‘lack’ of values of the enemy).60 In Michael Shapiro’s terms, as a key dimension of foreign policy, national security involves the making of the ‘foreign’ and the constitution of ‘Otherness’. The making of the Other as something foreign is not simply an exercise in differentiation, but is integrally linked to how the self is understood. A self constructed with a security-related identity leads to the constitution of Otherness in terms of the level of threat the Other is said to offer to that security.61 On the other hand, this reasserts and reinforces the acceptability of only certain forms of behaviour, modes of being, and political subjectivities. In so doing it steers us away from other alliances – those which might encourage us to contemplate a possible society not organised around security, private property and bourgeois order – and impresses on us the importance of loyalty. By criticizing reliance on the idea of methodological nationalism we can open up space for cosmopolitanism Delanty 06 (Gerard Delanty, Professor of Sociology in the University of Liverpool 2006, “The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory,” The British Journal of Sociology, Volume 57, Issue 1, http://www.oneworlduv.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/cosmopolitan_imagination.pdf] IQ The micro dimension of cosmopolitanism concerns individual agency and social identities, that is aspects of cosmopolitanism reflected in internal societal change. This is the dimension of cosmopolitanism that is most commonly commented on, but the examples that are generally given tend to focus on trans-national or post-national phenomena. The conclusion of this paper is that this dimension must not only be looked at in the wider context of the macro and historical framework of modernity, but it must also be seen as more than a simple empirical condition, as in the frequently given example of a shift from national community to transnational community or the replacement of national identities by cosmopolitan ones. The micro dimension of cosmopolitanism is exemplified in changes within, for example, national identities rather than in the emergence in new identities. So cosmopolitanism is not to be equated with transnationalization, as is the tendency in political cosmopolitanism as discussed above. The relativizing of cultural values in contemporary society and the experience of contingency has led to a greater self-scrutiny within national identity: there are few national identities that do not contain self-problematizing forms of self-understanding. Rather than find cosmopolitanism embodied in a supra-national identity it makes more sense to see it expressed in more reflexive kinds of self-understanding. Taking the example of Europeanization, a cosmopolitan European identity can be seen less as a new supra identity rather than as a growing reflexivity within existing identities, including personal, national and supranational identities, as well as in other kinds of identities (see Delanty 2005). In addition to the transformation in identity, there is also the transformation in communication and in cultural models. The indicators of cosmopolitanism go beyond shifts in identity to wider discursive and cultural transformation. In methodological terms, cosmopolitan indicators are necessarily ones concerning socio-cultural mediation. If the cosmopolitan moment arises in the construction and emergence of new identities or forms of self-understanding, cultural frames and cultural models, then mediation is the key to it. This emphasis on mediation between, for example, competing conceptions of the social world accords with the cosmopolitan idea in all its forms: the desire to go beyond ethnocentricity and particularity. In this sense then critical cosmopolitanism is an open process by which the social world is made intelligible; it should be seen as the expression of new ideas, opening spaces of discourse, identifying possibilities for translation and the construction of the social world. Following Bryan Turner’s analysis, it can be related to such virtues as irony (emotional distance from one’s own history and culture), reflexivity (the recognition that all perspectives are culturally conditioned and contingent), scepticism towards the grand narratives of modern ideologies, care for other cultures and an acceptance of cultural hybridization, an ecumenical commitment to dialogue with other cultures, especially religious ones, and nomadism, as a condition of never being fully at home in cultural categories or geo-political boundaries (Turner 2001; Turner and Rojek 2001: 225). This is also reiterated in the arguments of other social theorists, such as Calhoun (2003), Gilroy (2004) and Kurasawa (2004) that cosmopolitanism does not entail the negation of solidarities, as liberal cosmopolitan theorists, such as Nussbaum (1996) argue, but is more situated and, as Appiah (2005) argues, it is also ‘rooted’. This notion of cosmopolitanism goes beyond conventional associations of cosmopolitanism with world polity or with global flows. The article stresses the socially situated nature of cosmopolitan processes while recognizing that these processes are world-constituting or constructivist ones. Such processes take the form of translations between things that are different. The space of cosmopolitanism is the space of such translations. While the capacity for translation has always existed, at least since the advent of writing, it is only with modernity that translation or translatability, has itself become the dominant cultural form for all societies. Translation once served the function of communication and was not the basis of a given culture. It is only becoming fully apparent today what the logic of translation has extended beyond the simple belief that everything can be translated to the recognition that every culture can translate itself and others. The most general one is the translation of inside/outside as a solution to the problem of inclusion and exclusion. Other dynamics of translation are those of the local and global, self and other, particular and universal, past and present, core and periphery. It is the nature of such translations that the very terms of the translation is altered in the process of translation and something new is created. This is because every translation is at the same time an evaluation. Without this dimension of self-transcendence, cosmopolitanism is a meaningless term. Conceived of in such terms, cosmopolitanism entails the opening up of normative questions within the cultural imaginaries of societies. The research object for critical cosmopolitan sociology concerns precisely this space, the discursive space of translations. Conclusion Cosmopolitanism does not refer simply to a global space or to post-national phenomena that have come into existence today as a result of globalization. The argument advanced in this paper is that it resides in social mechanisms and dynamics that can exist in any society at any time in history where world openness has a resonance. Clearly cosmopolitanism has become relevant today, due not least to the impact of globalization. Cosmopolitanism concerns processes of self-transformation in which new cultural forms take shape and where new spaces of discourse open up leading to a transformation in the social world. The cosmopolitan imagination from the perspective of a critical social theory of modernity tries to capture the transformative moment, interactive relations between societies and modernities, the developmental and dialogic. For these reasons, methodologically speaking, a critical cosmopolitan sociology proceeds on the assumption that culture contains capacities for learning and that societies have developmental possibilities. The article has highlighted translations as one of the central mechanisms of cosmopolitan transformation and which occurs on macro-societal and on micro dimensions as well as being played on in the continued transformation of modernities. Cosmopolitan sociology is a means of making sense of social transformation and therefore entails an unavoidable degree of moral and political evaluation. To this extent, cosmopolitanism is a connecting strand between sociology and political discourse in society and in political theory. It has a critical role to play in opening up discursive spaces of world openness and thus in resisting both globalization and nationalism. Cosmopolitanism is a mind set that acknowledges borders as accidents of history that should be morally irrelevant, and thus priorities loyalty to all of humanity above loyalty to a portion of it, checking things like Nazi Germany. Appiah 06 2006 by Kwame Anthony Appiah. “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers” Kwame Akroma-Ampim Kusi Anthony Appiah is a British-born Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural theorist, and novelist whose interests include political and moral theory, the philosophy of language and mind, and African intellectual history. http://management-revue.org/papers/mrev_4_08_Appiah_Review.pdf //QM Yet the impartialist version of the cosmopolitan creed has continued to hold a steely fascination. Virginia Woolf once exhorted “freedom from unreal loyalties”—to nation, sex, school, neighborhood, and on and on. Leo Tolstoy, in the same spirit, inveighed against the “stupidity” of patriotism. “To destroy war, destroy patriotism,” he wrote in an 1896 essay—a couple of decades before the tsar was swept away by a revolution in the name of the international working class. Some contemporary philosophers have similarly urged that the boundaries of nations are morally irrelevant—accidents of history with no rightful claim on our conscience. But if there are friends of cosmopolitanism who make me nervous, I am happy to be opposed to cosmopolitanism’s noisiest foes. Both Hitler and Stalin—who agreed about little else, save that murder was the first instrument of politics—launched regular invectives against “rootless cosmopolitans” and while, for both, anti-cosmopolitanism was often just a euphemism for anti-Semitism, they were right to see cosmopolitanism as their enemy. For they both required a kind of loyalty to one portion of humanity—a nation, a class—that ruled out loyalty to all of humanity. And the one thought that cosmopolitans share is that no local loyalty can ever justify forgetting that each human being has responsibilities to every other. Fortunately, we need take sides neither with the nationalist who abandons all foreigners nor with the hard-core cosmopolitan who regards her friends and fellow citizens with icy impartiality. The position worth defending might be called (in both senses) a partial cosmopolitanism National identity is invoked to prop up the national security state and is responsible for millions of deaths and widespread structural violence Neocleous, 8 - Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (Mark, Critique of Security, p. 101-105) Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991, ‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism flowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new ‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock - well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than confirmed by events in the twentyfirst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justification for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’- type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.
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