Jump to content

S7arf

Member
  • Content Count

    60
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Community Reputation

43 Good

About S7arf

  • Rank
    Varsity

Profile Information

  • Name
    TAS
  • Biography
    I'm who I am. No more, no less. Who I am? Well, that's up to you. I guess.
  1. LDer here. Agreeing with Dancon and Squirreloid for the most part. Only thing I would add is: The value/value criterion structure is silly. Very, very silly. At least, from the perspective of a case that tries to affirm the resolution's ought as ought = moral obligation. For instance, I'm very invested in Kantian philosophical approaches to resolutions, and broadly constructivist/anti-realist approaches to metaethics. In my cases, particular values like beauty or liberty are often dealt with in a way that avoids the v/vc structure. An example: If certain things are required by the nature of action in general, then it's possible that I value something like "freedom" but the particular justifications of the framework aren't so easily separable into "justifications for the value" and "justifications for the value criterion"--instead, the framework makes sense more often when it's taken holistically. Value/value criterion as a case structure is useful only insofar as your framework is separable into those two components. The oddity described above (utilitarian frameworks with Utility as the value and a consequentialist standard) seems to be a symptom of debaters not understanding the way in which they justify their frameworks sufficiently. The holistic model is more overtly complicated because debaters actually have to understand their opponent's arguments well to grasp all the nuances of justification, but it avoids the farcical "I'm winning the values debate so I win" that is unfortunately so common in my--and I'm certain others' too--local circuit. On the subject of the Lexington NC: The Kinsella coercion bad arguments are very obviously silly. If you're interested in libertarianism, check out Varun Bhave's circuitdebater profile, or Salim Damerdji's from a couple years ago. Those two are much better framework debaters--and don't make weird role of the ballot arguments that have odd substantive implications (it seems odd that you can't argue for the goodness of coercion simply because you need a certain degree of non-coercion [which seems different in kind from the coercion you are justifying] to utter words. Non sequitur?). PM me if I can help with anything--I don't often go on here, but when I do, I'd be happy to help if I can.
  2. Premier Debate put out a (freely available) file recently. Some arguments from the NSA topic will be applicable (I imagine free-speech arguments for a deontological NC). Premier Debate Briefs ND14.pdf
  3. It seems a pretty good way to get to death. Not the best section (this one's more about dance music and bodily deterritorializations but there's a hint of cybernetics in it), but the earliest that came to mind. in "No Future" (Fanged Noumena p. 398): Desocialization waves desolate telecommercial space, until impending human extinction becomes accessible as a dance-floor. What is the scale of now? It isn't a matter of informing the mind, but of deprogramming the body. Amongst the strobes, artificial cool, and inorganic attack beat, dark-side K-war machinery resiliently persists, luring the forces of monopolism down into free-fire zones of fatal intensity, where promiscuous anorgasmic sexualities slide across tactile space, meandering fractally into wet electric distributed conflicts continuous with their terminal consequences. Dropping endlessly tracks the passage of evaporating subjectivity on the zero-degree plane of neuroelectronic continuity. Also, taking the position of a Luddite is probably detrimental to accelerating, especially taking capitalism as a starting point. in "Cyberspace Anarchitecture . . ." (Fanged Noumena pp. 407-408): When technophobia becomes frictional it operates K-positively, as an inertial immuno-reflex folding the security datascape into a metric cyberspace reconstruction, neuromantic nuclear mono-mind twisted into self-apprehension, configuring its source in machinic commerce as positive technomic nonlinearity, auto-propelled into terrestrial hypermedia-fusion. Cross-cumulative trends to interconnection, digitalisation, and simulation plot forward the interexcitation-trajectories of electronic cash and market-oriented software to their convergence in commoditechnic intelligent-money. Time-compression infinitises. No future. Am I just interpreting this incorrectly? It seems a pretty fluid progression from intensifying and accelerating to embracing the means of doing so (haha Principle of Moral Substitutability for all you Sinnot-Armstrong hacks)
  4. But cyberspace... Nick Land's pretty great. Well, Fanged Noumena is. As a work of philosophy. Dat Ray Brassier Nihil Unbound stuff doe. Honestly, I just want there to be a vaguely food-related topic so I can cut Vol. VII of Collapse: "Culinary Materialism."
  5. That presupposes foreseen consequences are relevant to your ethical judgments. Or it's just descriptive. Or it begs the question. Or something like that.
  6. the feel when your coach forces you to run util so you get more tech. "it's not like it's true, but, cummiskey?"
  7. http://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Palos+Verdes/ has a bunch of fulltext article sections for xeno and general LARP stuffs. Wouldn't advise it, uniqueness is terrible, and the solvency is "we increase organ supplies" which is basically what the organs advantage says. You're just asking to get counterplanned.
  8. Which comments are you referring to? On that specific article, or elsewhere? Seconded. Mr. Adler's comments at the bottom of the article (and his referenced back-and-forth with Mr. Alston) also seem to discount this.
  9. We don't disagree on permissibility. It remains but one of many strategic outs. The best answer seems to be some advantage that follows from presuming consent rather than ignoring it altogether (because the PIC would have to say "take the organs anyway" or something like that, no?). I don't know if there exist sources in the topic literature that make these arguments, but: "Ignoring consent causes more backlash" "Presuming consent means their consent is still legitimating" then faux-deontological reasons why having the ability to consent to things is good in a utilitarian system. Defend a marginally abusive system of presuming consent that is basically taking the organs anyway (at least mitigatory defense on the PIC's net benefit) then perm the heart out of it (quite literally). Reasons similar in structure to responses to lie perms on consult X counterplans (not v familiar with either of the latter so this might be wrong) Probably the most util-trutil thing to do would be taking terminally-ill patients' organs and other living peoples' organs as well, so if you want to go extratopical offense and intrinsic perm on that, go ahead. Run your own theory shell to leverage against the 2NR. Probably more, that's all I could think of for now.
  10. Thanks, LDr, I obviously hadn't read that passage closely enough. re: "A just society ought" That's why it's probably strategic to develop deontological arguments that don't rely on specific states of affairs, if one is planning to run that argument. I haven't come up with (m)any complete ideas in that arena, but I'm sure some general claim about the state's duty to provide public health services could be adapted. I don't see how the two interpretations "if a society is just, it ought" or "a society that is just ought, because it is just" exclude this argument at all. Neither of them presuppose (or justify) restricting the resolution to actually-existing societies (and I think that'd be horrible ground because any aff that discussed specific instances in countries could be rendered untopical by the argument "that society's just not just"). But I'm not sure my interpretation is even necessarily treating "a" as an existential quantifier--after all, I don't need to say "there exists a just society such that the need for organs outweighs"--the claim is "presuming consent is [generally] permissible and [possibly] in potential specific instances obligatory." Again, this argument probably doesn't exclude the same claim by the negative, and it might fall short altogether of proving an obligation, but I don't see the strategic harm to substantively (and theoretically) justifying taking more ground. "Permissibility aff" was disingenuous--you should be able to trigger permissibility in the 1/2AR and extend permissibility affirms, but delimiting your strategic options at the beginning of the AC seems shortsighted at best. tl;dr The theory arguments are probably better than the substantive ones, but if there's not some argument you're dying to include, why not do both?
  11. It would probably be more strategic to positively justify a framework that excludes utilitarian/individual rights offense. For example, check out this Korsgaard aff that is just positively bursting with reasons why util is false (go Ryan!). Obviously developing independent arguments to weigh against util frameworks is key as well, but you can just make those analytically (saves time and since they're just defense anyway, gives you a better time tradeoff). For example: There's an infinite chain of consequences for every action we take, so util can't ever make a definite moral judgment because it's impossible to predict the effects an action has. [triggers presumption--no way to evaluate offense under util] The none-such problem: the pleasure of eating an apple is qualitatively different from that of eating an orange, so we can't compare pleasures under utilitarianism[--and just saying "life is the prerequisite to pleasure" commits the fallacy of origin so that doesn't solve]. There's no one agent who can experience ten headaches, so aggregation is nonsensical--even if we can aggregate, it's arbitrary to say ten headaches equals one migraine, so there's no way to compare between harms [xapply "life doesn't solve"]. Util commits the is/ought fallacy: even if pleasure is good, there's no link between that and maximization/aggregation/comparison. etc. etc. etc. N.B.: These short defensive arguments are just leverage to weigh your framework arguments against theirs. You should also preclude on higher levels of the framework debate, like a metaethical claim or theoretical framework justifications (or both). Blocks are never wholly sufficient on their own. How familiar are you with framework debate?
  12. Apologies, I was loose with terms. By "violation of outer freedom" I meant to refer to offense under a standard of e.g. "maintaining a system of equal freedom." I don't think we're in too much re: strateg(er)y: Permissibility affs are hella cool. Pretty sure "a just society" means insofar as it's generally permitted, the infinitude of potential just societies would include one in which external circumstances compel an obligation, if even for reasons that satisfy an imperfect duty the AC doesn't speak to (this seems like a problematic argument but I haven't considered it in its entirety, so if I'm making a huge mistake here, let me know). Just win theory, also insert random permissibility affirms args: "absent permissibility flowing aff the neg has a 3-1 structural skew with prohibition, permissibility, and skep. Even if permissibility is qualitatively easier to prove, a) structural skews outweigh substantive ones because [substantive abuse is unverifiable while structural skews aren't], skep is also qualitatively easier than proving a prohibition so giving me permissibility ground is the only way to solve" ^hella inefficient but I think you get the point. re: Ripstein: Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems very problematic to equate Ripstein's use of "person and reputation" with specific organs that exist in one's body. This is also responsive to the side note. Your last sentence says a body can stand in "relation to [one's] person"--which seems to undercut equivocating between the two terms. If the body is the instantiation of one's person, then it's impossible to speak of a body existing in relation to a person which does not exist (any longer). In which case, the "violation of outer freedom" I'm speaking about is in the same vein as the state's obligation to support those who are unable to support themselves (which private right can't encompass because "nobody has a right to means that are not already his or her own, and, as Kant coldly remarks, "need or wish" is irrelevant." [F&F p25]). The only way I see a possible "relation" between person and body after death is if the body is merely the person's physical exemplification--which is problematic because that approach strays close to discarding the inner/outer freedom split. Also ew it sounds old-school mind-body dualism. I agree that insofar as the body is the physical instantiation of agency, or the only possible means through which an agent can act, then the violation would be of rightful honor--but it'd still be offense under the Ripstein framework. Again, apologies for the irresponsible philosophizing.
  13. True, if a Rawlsian framework didn't justify any mechanism that indicates a rightful condition would be one in which there were enough organs. And it'd probably be overstepping theoretically as well. Which isn't to say that it's a bad argument from a strategic perspective--I'm sure the time tradeoff is in your favor. Solved by the framework debate (if justice is consequentialist...) and, additionally, this objection only matters if this concept of justice-having-something-to-do-with-a-state-of-affairs delimits all the possible meanings of the word--merely saying that "a" just society would (probably) have x state of affairs as the case (due to whatever mechanism) seems inclusive, not exclusive, however. Only if you consider "inanimate objects" to be "a certain state of affairs"--like the state of having roads available, or the state of not having oppressive power structures (I believe your term was "America, but without the structural racism!"). Perhaps justice as contained inextricably within a bipolar relationship between agents would exclude my interpretation, but that seems wrong. For one thing, it restricts relations of right to whatever constitutes an agent, and its exclusionary force comes from not interpreting (or ontologically assigning in some manner) nonhuman actors as agential (OOO anyone?). But more powerfully, that bipolar relationship begs the question of a framework. This objection is also solved by the framework debate--there's undoubtedly some ethical theory out there where justice is the state of e.g. maximizing everyone's life. tl;dr: It works best against util. Obviously Kant is truth and Kant is life so no argument works against Kant.
×
×
  • Create New...