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Everything posted by lolwut5

  1. lolwut5

    Going 1 off

    There are judges who vote on nietzsche?
  2. some more good cards by Judy Butler are below austin brittenham and cj queirolo have an awesome trans rage k on open source @ http://opencaselist.paperlessdebate.com/download/Puget+Sound/Brittenham-Queirolo+Neg/Puget%20Sound-Brittenham-Queirolo-Neg-UPS-Round4.docx and a trans abolition k with a wonderful gender self-determination alt that could help http://opencaselist.paperlessdebate.com/download/Puget+Sound/Brittenham-Queirolo+Neg/Puget%20Sound-Brittenham-Queirolo-Neg-UPS-Round1.docx The universality of the affirmative’s claims re-enforces the masculine/feminine binaries making the power structures it wishes to eliminate inevitable Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 6-8 The political assumption that there must be a universal basis for feminism, one which must be found in an identity assumed to exist cross-culturally, often accompanies the notion that the oppression of women has some singular form discernible in the universal or hegemonic structure of patriarchy or masculine domination. The notion of a universal patriarchy has been widely criticized in recent years for its failure to account for the workings of gender oppression in the concrete cultural contexts in which it exists. Where those various contexts have been consulted within such theories, it has been to find “examples” or “illustrations” of a universal principle that is assumed from the start. That form of feminist theorizing has come under criticism for its efforts to colonize and appropriate non-Western cultures to support highly Western notions of oppression, but because they tend as well to construct a “Third World” or even an “Orient” in which gender oppression is subtly explained as symptomatic of an essential, non-Western barbarism. The urgency of feminism to establish a universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the appearance of feminism’s own claims to be representative has occasionally motivated the shortcut to a categorial or fictive universality of the structure of domination, held to produce women’s common subjugated experience. Although the claim of universal patriarchy no longer enjoys the kind of credibility it once did, the notion of a generally shared conception of “women,” the corollary to that framework, has been much more difficult to displace. Certainly, there have been plenty of debates: Is there some commonality among “women” that preexists their oppression, or do “women” have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone? Is there a specificity to women’s cultures that is independent of their subordination by hegemonic, masculinist cultures? Are the specificity and integrity of women’s cultural or linguistic practices always specified against and, hence, within the terms of some more dominant cultural formation? If there is a region of the “specifically feminine,” one that is both differentiated from the masculine as such and recognizable in its difference by an unmarked and, hence, presumed universality of “women”? The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive framework in which that specificity can be recognized, but in every other way the “specificity” of the feminine is once again fully decontextualized and separated off analytically and politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity, and other axes of power relations that both constitute “identity” and make the singular notion of identity a misnomer.4 My suggestion is that the presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from “women” whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of identity politics. The suggestion that feminism can seek wider representation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own representational claims. This problem is not ameliorated through an appeal to the category of women for merely “strategic” purposes, for strategies always have meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are intended. In this case, exclusion itself might qualify as such an unintended yet consequential meaning. By conforming to a requirement of representational politics that feminism articulate a stable subject, feminism thus opens itself to charges of gross misrepresentation. Calls to ‘help’ women or advance feminist notions are self-defeating. By eliminating the fluidity of identity and sex the affirmative locks the individual into a power structure produced by juridical formation of language and politics. This makes the identity a part of gender as a stable structure re-enforcing heternormative thought and disempowering movements it seeks to help Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature) 1999 “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” p. 3-5 i. “Women” as the Subject of Feminism For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only initiates feminist interests and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom political representation is pursued. But politics and representation are controversial terms. On the one hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects; on the other hand, representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women. For feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed necessary to foster the political visibility of women. This has seemed obviously important considering the pervasive cultural condition in which women’s lives were either misrepresented or not represented at all. Recently, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist theory and politics has come under challenge from within feminist discourse. The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms. There is a great deal of material that not only questions the viability of “the subject” as the ultimate candidate for representation or, indeed, liberation, but there is very little agreement after all on what it is that constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women. The domains of political and linguistic “representation” set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before representation can be extended. Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent.1 Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms—that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, control, and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, then the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as “the subject” of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation. This becomes politically problematic if that system can be shown to produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce subjects who are presumed to be masculine. In such cases, an uncritical appeal to such a system for the emancipation of “women” will be clearly self-defeating. This re-entrenches gender binaries Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 5) For gender to “belong to philosophy” is for Wittig to belong to “that body of self-evident concepts without which philosophers believe they cannot develop a line of reasoning and which for them go without saying, for they exist prior to any thought, any social order, in nature. Wittig’s view is corroborated by that popular discourse on gender identity that uncritically employs the inflectional attribution of “being” to genders and to “sexualities.” The unproblematic claim to “be” a woman and “be” heterosexual would be symptomatic of that metaphysics of gender substances. In the case of both “men” and “women,” this claim tends to subordinate the notion of gender under that of identity and to lead to the conclusion that a person is a gender and is one in virtue of his or her sex, psychic sense of self, and various expressions of that psychic self, the most salient being that of sexual desire. In such a pre-feminist context, gender, naively (rather than critically confused with sex, serves as a unifying principle of the embodied self and maintains that unity over and against an “opposite sex” whose structure is presumed to maintain a parallel but oppositional internal coherence among sex, gender, and desire. The articulation “I feel like a woman” by a female or “I feel like a man: by a male presupposes that in neither case is the claim meaninglessly redundant, although it might appear unproblematic to be a given anatomy. Although we shall later consider the way in which that project is also fraught with difficulty) the experience of a gendered psychic disposition or cultural identity is considered an achievement. Thus, “I feel like a woman” is true to the extent that Aretha Franklin’s invocation of the defining other is assumed: “You make me feel like a natural woman” This achievement requires a differentiation from the opposite gender. Hence, one is one’s gender to the extent that one is not the other gender, a formulation that presupposes and enforces the restriction of gender within that binary pair. Relying on “gender” as a category for mobilization forces us to ignore the complexities of identity. Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 3) A part from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion the subject, however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common identity Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, women, even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety. As Denise Riley’s title suggests, Am I That Name? is a question produced by the very possibility of the name’s multiple significations. If one “is” a woman that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pre-gendered “person” transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced. Gender must be rejected as a category for mobilization. Emancipatory gender models can only reify existing power relations. Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 94) In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the univocal construct of “sex (one is one’s sex and, therefore, not the other) is (a) produced in the service of the social regulation and control of sexuality and ( conceals and artificially unifies a variety of disparate and unrelated sexual functions and then © postures within discourse as a cause, an inferior essence which both produces and renders intelligible all manner of sensation, pleasure and desire as sex-specific. In other words, bodily pleasures are not merely casually reducible to this ostensibly sex-specific essence, but they become readily interpretable as manifestations or signs of this “sex.” In opposition to this false construction of sex as both univocal and casual, Foucault engages a reverse-discourse which treats sex as an effect rather than an origin. In the place of “sex” as the original and continuous case and signification of bodily pleasures, he proposes “sexuality” as an open and complex historical system of discourse and power that produces the misnomer of “sex” as part of a strategy to conceal and, hence, to perpetuate power-relations. One way in which power is both perpetuated and concealed is through the establishment of an external or arbitrary relation between power, conceived as repression or domination, and sex, conceived as a brave but thwarted energy waiting for release or authentic self-expression. The use of this juridical model presumes that the relation between power and sexuality is not only ontologically distinct, but that power always and only works to subdue or liberate a sex which is fundamentally intact, self-sufficient, and other than power itself. When “sex” is essentially in this way, it becomes ontologically immunized from power relations and from its own historicity. As a result, the analysis of sexuality is collapsed into the analysis of “sex,” and any inquiry into the historical production of the category of “sex” itself is precluded by this inverted ad falsifying causality. According to Foucault, “sex” must not only be contextualized within the terms of sexuality, but juridical power must be reconceived as a construction produced by a generative power which, in turn, conceals the mechanism of is own productivity. The notion of sex brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it possible to invert the representation of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as being rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to dominate. Foucault explicitly takes a stand against emancipatory or liberationist models of sexuality in The History of Sexuality because they subscribe to a juridical model that does not acknowledge the historical production of “sex” as a category, that is, as a mystifying “effect” of power relations. His ostensible problem with feminism seems also to emerge here: Where feminist analysis takes the category of sex and, thus, according to him, the binary restriction of gender as its point of departure. Foucault understands his own project to be an inquiry into how the category of “sex” and sexual difference are constructed within discourse as necessary features of bodily identity. The juridical model of law which structures the feminist emancipatory model presumes, in his view, that the subject of emancipation, “the sexed boy” in some sense is not itself in need of a critical deconstruction. As Foucault remarks about some humanist efforts at prison reform, the criminal subject who gets emancipated may be even more deeply shackled than the humanist originally thought. To be sexed, for Foucault, is to be subjected to a set of social regulations, to have the law that directs those regulations reside both as the formative principle of one’s sex, gender, pleasures and desires and as the hermeneutic principle of self-interpretation. The category of sex is thus inevitably regulative, and any analysis which makes that category pre-suppositional uncritically extends and further legitimates that regulative strategy as a power knowledge regime.
  3. Butler writes a lot about how first and second-wave feminism's static binary between the male and female sex/gender is problematic for people who don't fit into that framework. Here is an example: A focus on feminine bodies fails to account for a plurality of gender identities; their mode of analysis can’t account for everyone and constructs an excess population of trans people who they exclude.Butler '4 -- Judith, Prof. of Rhetoric and Comp. Lit. @ UC Berkeley, "Undoing Gender," p. 6 If a decade or two ago, gender discrimination applied tacitly to women, that no longer serves as the exclusive framework for understanding its contemporary usage. Discrimination against women continues —especially poor women and women of color, if we consider the differential levels of poverty and literacy not only in the United States, but globally—so this dimension of gender discrimination remains crucial to acknowledge. But gender now also means gender identity, a particularly salient issue in the politics and theory of transgenderism and transsexuality. Transgender refers to those persons who cross-identify or who live as another gender, but who may or may not have undergone hormonal treatments or sex reassignment operations. Among transsexuals and transgendered persons, there are those who identify as men (if female to male) or women (if male to female), and yet others who, with or without surgery, with or without hormones, identify as trans, as transmen or transwomen; each of these social practices carries distinct social burdens and promises.
  4. lolwut5

    Semiocaptialism K

    seconded--i cannot view the file which is sad hopefully it will be fixed
  5. read the reinhard in 4 evidence in the 2ac it makes the enmity good/otherization necessary argument as long as it doesn't contradict with the affirmative tag me <3 Reinhard, 04 (Kenneth, prof at UCLA, “Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor,” pg. 4-5, http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards_Political_Theology.pdf) If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous –forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).
  6. Aw. That sucks. You should get a enormous bag of cocoa, stock up on milk, and pretend you're captain james cook
  7. More interesting would be his Master's Thesis at the University of New South Wales, published a year later. It's much more well-warranted and dives into the lit base, considering it's work for a degree. Jedidiah is more concerned with economic globalization and dependence/interdependence than "hurr durr economic decline means GLOBAL THERMONUCLEAR WAR", eg. he talks more about the effects of interdependence on peace and conflict than economic conditions explicitly. That mean's he's a better author for globalization = more or less war. Yet when he does mention economic conditions, he's usually explicitly ambivalent and careful to mention both sides. It's titled. "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus". This would be a good paper to cut b/c it includes two case studies, Russia (1998-1999) and Indonesia (1997-1998). It also discusses hegemonic stability theory and capitalist peace theory, a good place to cut cards from if you want to answer/support Gartzke like ev, or heg prevents conflict authors. Here are some preliminary cards i cut tonight. TL;DR: royal isnt a econ decline author, he's a heg + neolib = ? -> conflict author, and you should cut his masters thesis from a year later Possible cite for it: Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 ECON GROWTH = WAR Cards from Royal '11 Lateral pressure theory means that as states become wealthier, their military grows, and makes them more likely to use that power Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 3, "Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation," p. 48-49, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 Our survey here first highlights a Marxist/realist tradition that suggests that as states become wealthier, they will increasingly be likely to translate that wealth into military capacity. Once the state owns a strong military advantage, it is likely to use it. Choucri and North (1975) pioneered this argument, known as ‘lateral pressure theory’, as a means of explaining correlation between growth and conflict. They suggest that ‘the combination of demand and capabilities will create the predisposition to reach beyond national boundaries to satisfy demands’ (Choucri and North 1975, 17). As such, Choucri and North believe that as a country become individually wealthier, its willingness to undertake foreign military commitments increases simultaneously. War chest theory means that wealthier countries focus more on international affairs and gaining control, increasing conflict Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 3, "Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation," p. 49, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 Realists also find a relationship between economic integration and idiosyncratic risk that results in a greater likelihood of conflict. Pollins (2008) argues that economic integration leads to a transnational reorganisation of production and accelerates the transitions between ascending and descending powers. This occurs on a global level with system-wide shifts in the distribution of power, but manifests itself in terms of security conditions primarily at a state level. As new states gain wealth and power, they begin to look outward. This ‘war chest’ theory is similar in character and consequence to ‘lateral pressure theory’, though the motivations differ. According to the former theory, a state becomes more conflict prone because it has the resources to be more successful in military conflict. According to the latter theory, proclivity towards conflict is due to a perceived requirement to fuel a growing economy. USA proves that richer nations are more conflict prone. Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 3, "Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation," p. 51, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 When applied to the topic of this paper, the main point drawn out by the Choucri and North, Pollins, Organski and Hegre findings is that winners from economic integration are more likely to enter into foreign military disputes. Pollins and Schweller (1999) look specifically at the experience of the United States from 1790-1993, and found support for this conclusion. They find that US power has grown in sync with the extent to which it has integrated its economy within the global economy. This growth, at an individual level, has coincided with increases in US military engagements overseas. They suggest that ‘diversionary theory’, ‘war chest theory’, and ‘lateral pressure’ theory are all potential reasons for why this has occurred, acknowledging that the underlying rationale which may differ between administrations and global power conditions. While economic growth can be linked with greater incentives to engage militarily, and in some cases has been shown to result in actual use of force, the decision to go to war appears to be more complex. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1997) show that the relationships between capabilities and escalation is nonmonotonic. That is, a continued increase in capabilities does not necessarily indicate an increase in the occurrence of conflict. ECON DECLINE = WAR Cards from Royal '11 Economic decline --> war Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 3, "Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation," p. 53-54, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 On an idiosyncratic level, crisis can lead to domestic unrest and large population movements, both of which have historically exacerbated cross-border tensions. Blomberg and Hess find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during period of economic downturn. They write: If this study is to convince reader and policy makers of anything, it is that the linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. However, the ability of government organizations to stop the spread of internal conflict to external conflict and vice versa by helping to reduce the incidence of recessions may be quite limited. Economic aid that is to improve a nation’s productive capacity is likely to be difficult to identify and implement in just such circumstances. (Blomberg and Hess 2002, 89) Further, crises often reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity rising from economic decline, sitting governments, particularly in democracies, have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts in order to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Miller (1999) suggests that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. Wang (1996) and DeRouen Jr. (1995) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Argentina’s war in the Falkland Islands is an oft-cited example of a diversionary tactic (Boehmer 2007; Oakes 2006). Similar to the earlier discussion on lateral pressure theory, specialisation may also lead to asymmetric growth between countries, impacting their respective appetites for conflict as growing economies search for new resources to drive future growth. This particular notion has grown popular among some US commentators sceptical of China’s global search for resources in recent years. This topic will be explored in later chapters. Two examples: Indonesia, Russia Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 7, "Conclusion," p. 145, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 The final theme that is clearly brought out through the analytical chapters is domestic economic and political conditions. Domestic economic weakness in Indonesia and Russia resulted in political weakness and the removal of standing leaders. For Indonesia, that allowed for the military apparatus to undertake destabilising operations in and around East Timor, bringing Indonesia into confrontation with Australia and other regional neighbours. For Russia, domestic weakness laid the foundation for a diversionary war in Chechnya. Indonesia proves that economic decline intensifies secessionist conflicts Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 4, " Indonesia and Russia Case Studies," p. 63-66, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 By 1998, the Indonesian crash had become a political event as much as an economic event; economic flaws do not hold a sufficient explanation for such a massive meltdown. Economic and political consequences began to undermine each other and exacerbated the severity of the crisis by orders of magnitude. The International Labor Organization assessed that from 1996 to 1998 Indonesia’s poverty level rose roughly 65% leaving upwards of 33% of the total population in poverty (Feridhanusetyawan 1999). The ensuing domestic unrest and political instability began to weaken Suharto’s standing Jakarta. An official Australian government publication describes the rapidly eroding public confidence:With the economy in tatters, Soeharto was increasingly on shaky ground. Student protest grew and the middle class was shaken from its complacency. Demands for major reform became louder. Unemployment and rising prices provoked attacks on factories and food distribution networks, usually owned and run by ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Some Muslim activists, including within the military elite, promoted poorly rationalised explanations for the economic crisis that put the blame on Western capitalism and Chinese entrepreneurs. Confidence continued to erode. (Parliament of Australia 1999, 15) The increased willingness of Suharto to use force against the bubbling unrest animated the already largely independent armed forces of Indonesia. In May of 1998, snipers shot and killed four students during a peaceful protest at Trisakti University, which led to mass riots and over 1000 deaths in Jakarta (Parliament of Australia 1999). Despite the dire predicament, Suharto continued to resist foreign influence in Indonesia’s economy, most likely due to his close relationships with those who profited from the Suhartoled economic growth program. However, external pressure from the IMF, the US and Australia overcame his resistance. As Murphy writes, ‘Suharto had battled against globalization and lost’ (in Kim 2000, 221). It is in this context that B. J. Habibie assumed the Presidency in 1998. Habibie was viewed sceptically for a variety of reasons. He had been a close friend and confidante of the disgraced Suharto for some 40 years, he had no economic credentials, his relations with the military were soured by suspicious military procurement through his businesses, and he was generally regarded as eccentric. The result was that Habibie lacked legitimacy upon entering office. Without legitimacy, he was unable to manage the basic functions of the Presidency and extend control over its bureaucracies, namely the TNI and its Kopassus special forces element. Upon Habibie’s assumption of the Presidency, the Jakarta Post issued an editorial stating: The greatest hurdle yet facing President Habibie is his own public image… [His] primary task is to establish integrity and credibility of his own and regain public confidence in the government. Public confidence is crucial for soliciting full co-operation and understanding on the part of the people, who will have to endure many hardships within the next two to three years at least before the nation’s economy, already paralysed, stabilises and recovers. (Jakarta Post 1998) The structural weaknesses Habibie inherited from Suharto were crippling. This handicap led to severe mismanagement of domestic uprisings in Aceh and East Timor. In East Timor, pro-independence elements were sensing weakness in Jakarta and were looking for an opportunity to either negotiate independence or, if necessary, fight for independence. The weakness of Habibie led to a vacuum that began to be filled by tensions between the pro-independents and the pro-integrationists. ‘The first months of the Habibie presidency saw politics polarise in East Timor and an unstable situation threatened to spin out of control’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001, 17). Habibie had only two real options for East Timor: either grant it some measure of, if not total, independence, or control it through brutal and repressive methods. Habibie’s first attempt was for the former, offering ‘special status’ to East Timor and high degree of autonomy, but negotiations could not be completed. The Australian Government cites the growing costs associated with East Timor management in the wake of the AFC as an influence on Habibie’s eventual decision to grant full independence:Some influence Indonesians began to argue openly that the price paid for East Timor was too high. At the end of 1998, Indonesia’s economy was still in dire straits and the government ill afford to squander resources or undermine much-needed international support. (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001, 40) This was also the topic of the 19 December 1998 letter from Australian Prime Minister John Howard to Habibie, in which it is reported that he suggested ‘Indonesia might find itself subsidising East Timor for 10 more years or more, only to be obliged to let it go its own way at the end of that time’ (Bell 2000, 171). Further, growing reliance on outside financial support, particularly by the IMF, constrained Jakarta’s options for how to deal with East Timor, knowing that the support could dry up if Habibie were to sanction the repression of East Timor (Cotton 2004). Jakarta was edging closer and closer to full independence, due at least in part to the succession of events cascading from the financial crisis. At the same time, rogue elements of the security forces were undertaking unauthorised intimidation tactics, including through supporting proxy militia groups, against pro-independent elements.Habibie announced a new deal for East Timor in January 1999, offering either autonomy under Indonesian rule or full independence for East Timor. The offer emboldened the proindependents, and escalated the stakes for pro-integrationists. Bursting tensions meant that violence spiralled out of control leading to full scale guerrilla warfare between TNI and the militia groups it supported, and FALINTIL, the Timorese independence force, culminating in the Liquica and Dili killings of April 1999. In May 1999, agreements were completed that released East Timor from Indonesian rule and opened the door for the UN Security Council to establish a security and diplomatic foothold to quell violence and establish governance (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001).Since 1999, the UN, led by the Australia military, has been providing peacekeeping troops to East Timor through to the present day. While it is not fair to say that the East Timor crisis can simply be boiled down to the economics of the AFC – certainly the full story is much more complicated and reflects a broader historical retelling than this paper can provide – the financial crisis was certainly the precipitating event that opened the door for the cascading events between 1997 and 1999 (Napier 1999). Economic instability led to unrest, central government weakness, and constrained options for the management of East Timor. This led to domestic violence and a security crisis that the UN has been wearing for the past decade. Systemic risk from integration is directly linked with the East Timor crisis of 1998-1999. Economic decline in Russia led to a diversionary war in Chechnya, collapse of US-Russian relations, and Putin's re-election. Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 4, " Indonesia and Russia Case Studies," p. 78-79, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 It is difficult to come to a conclusion that the second war in Chechnya was singularly a result of Putin’s (and Yeltsin’s) political ambitions. Other factors were also in play. However, it is equally clear that Putin saw great political opportunity in the war, and he sought to exploit it as much as possible. It is entirely possible that in better economic and political times, the war in Chechnya may never have occurred. Further, it is unarguable that Putin owes his Presidency, and now Prime Ministership, to the political boost that Chechnya provided. In 2007, former economic adviser to Yeltsin, notes that Putin campaigned on the war in Chechnya in 2000, and then on the confiscation of Yukos in 2004. He writes: It would be natural if he chose a new topic for his third campaign, and one that could justify a state of emergency. Russian television has recently shown how World War II forced Roosevelt to stay on for a third and fourth term because of national emergency. Foreign policy involving military action appears Putin’s most obvious choice, and our worry today should be what ‘national emergency’ Putin may invent. (Åslund 2008, 23) Comments This case study explores the economic-security nexus that played out in Russia during 19989. Russia’s swift and dramatic movement into the global economic system brought with it high levels of systemic and idiosyncratic risk. Systemic risk was associated with procyclical capital flows, market imperfections, and financial crisis contagion. Idiosyncratic risk was associated with specialisation. Risk gave way to consequence in 1998 when Russia announced that it was unable to meet its debt obligations. The collapse of the Russian economy had two primary security impacts. First, Russia felt betrayed by the Western system, which exacerbated imbalances in Russia’s economy, fled when Russia’s economic outlook became suspect, and declined to provide Russia with a sufficient level of crisis lending to prevent a hard landing. As a result, Russia’s foreign policy towards the US and the West became more assertive, relying more on military preparations to resist the vulnerability it had come to feel. A second security impact was the prosecution of a second war in Chechnya as a diversionary strategy to consolidate political support behind the ruling party. Strong incentives created by the 1998 economic crisis clearly impacted Putin’s thrust towards war. It remains uncertain how Russia and its economic and security relations with the West will emerge from the Putin era. Given that ‘the Russian state’s vision of a market economy is different from Western concepts’ (Steinherr 2006, 250), the long term compatibility will be an outstanding issue in coming years, particularly as it appears Russia and the US have both been hit hard by the Global Economic Crisis of 2008-9. Russia Example = (Econ decline -> diversionary war in Chechnya) Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 7, "Conclusion," p. 144, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 A second theme that emerges from the analytical chapters is precisely this idea of future expectations, though I believe Copeland limits himself too much by simply focusing on trade expectations. Such expectations today are just as important in terms of financial flows as they are in trade flows. In the Russia case study, Russia’s expectation of future western financing dropped precipitously when procylcical financial flows resulted in a dramatic withdrawal of western capital in 1998. This led to a Russian calculation that it would be unlikely to rely upon the global economic system to gain security. This drop in future expectation resulted in a deliberate turn away from warm relations with many western countries and the United States in particular. Peaceful conditions have yet to return to the pre-1998 level. Further, I argue that there is a causal connection between the drop in future expectations, the decline of relations with the West, and the initiation and long-term prosecution of war in Chechnya. BOTH SIDES/WHAT ROYAL ACTUALLY BELIEVES He mentions the two biggest opposing theories here, (diversionary theory, econ decline -> war, and war chest/lateral pressure theory, econ growth = war) Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 3, "Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation," p. 55, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 Conclusion The literature review indicates a strong bias towards a sceptical view of idiosyncratic risk as a result of economic integration. The relevant economic theory at this level suggests that economically integrated states are not necessarily individually stable. Economic instability can lead to political instability and an increase in the likelihood of conflict-inducing behaviour. This relationship will be explored further in the following chapter. Further, the decision by political leaders to use force also appears to be linked to relative economic health of the nation. Here, political science seems to suggest a no-win situation. Economic growth leads to a greater likelihood for political leaders to use force simply because they can (war chest theory) or to seek out new opportunities to sustain growth (lateral pressure theory). But economic decline may also increase a political elite’s decision to use force if doing so can cauterize decreasing popularity emanating from the economic decline (diversionary theory). He sort of concludes that there is no definitive answer... Jedidiah Royal 11, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, "Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus," From Chapter 7, "Conclusion," p. 146-147, Master's Thesis in Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2011, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:10112/SOURCE01 The economic-security nexus debate is far from over. There are no ‘silver bullet’ answers, but instead a variety of threads in this these interwoven relationships. Going forward, the economic-security nexus remains a rich and promising field of both political science and economic study. Further work in this regard could focus on discerning the discrete interactions between the levels of risk, or developing quantitative models that capture the entirety of the broadened framework. As economic structures and technologies propel globalisation in new directions, it is hard to imagine a more important and worthwhile discipline of security studies than the economic-security nexus.
  8. has it really become common to think that acknowledging the results of science = leftist?
  9. So since anti-cap movements failed to intensify the movement of the squo, we need to now focus on cap in order to produce a world post-cap? i suppose, but land doesn't find anything wrong with a "cap world" per se, it's just that he sees it more conducive to the process of intensification/deintensification discussed above, that is also basically verbatim the position of leftist accelerationists Doesn't all this assume a future? yes, it does, for the left, they believe that inbuilt cap crisis presents an opportunity for left hegemony to take power, and i'd guess that land's response to this arg is dependent on political systems -> neoreactionary forms of govt I'm pretty sure Nick Land is all about The Singularity in which the anthropocene is decentered...is this what he's hoping to achieve? probably, if you read his blog he posts articles about advancements in electronics and technology often, and meltdown seems to point towards that. idk why though.
  10. lol @ k to english translator. we need more of those. this is a super long post b/c this is some crazy shit ideas going on here, feel me, and it takes a lot of explaining right: nick land's argument for cap good isn't cap good per se. its that the process of intensification as history moves forward is a good thing and that capitalism happens to be system at the moment in time that we inhabit. i posted brassier's explanation of land's philosophy below because i think he's super on point here. you kind of have to have some sort of understand of D&G and Marx to get land b/c that is where a lot of land's thought derives from 1. thinking = material, and materialism = thinking: "matter generates its own representation" 2. no longer question of whether your thinking = material world (true/false), question of whether your thinking intensifies/accelerates or deintensifies/inhibits generative processes of the world, ie change, transformation 3. death generates production, ie. finitude --> causes us to think, produce, change the world 4. history = process of intensification, cap just a historical point in that process 5. human subject must end as the agent of production, ie. we've set such large historical processes in motion (eg. the Anthropocene) that the next stage = intensification of all matter 6. anticap revolution failed, not the next stage of intensification, eg. the alternative is intensification of cap to intensify the world (leftism = end of destratification/stratification, cap = continuation of those processes) left: capitalism's contradictions ensure that the system is self-destructive. why? look at 2008, the way our financial system works, the way our production/consumption/waste system consumes 3 times a worlwide sustainable amount, etc. their arg is that the current left is trapped within 'folk politics,' ie. on one side of the spectrum we have seattle 1999, occupy, and on the other academics who theorize far too much without ever accomplishing anything. williams and srnicek (leftist accelerationists) argue, as bobby said above, that we need to take the tools of modernity that capitalism has produced (they cite technology, modern mathematics, economic modelling, applied science) and use it to create a 'left hegemony,' ie. a system in which the world is more equitable and not capitalist, but still keeps the trappings of modernity. Ray's explanation of Nick Land's philosophy. And critique of it. Brassier '10 (Ray, bae, best philosopher ever, PhD from U of Warwick in Philosophy, Associate Prof of Philosophy @ American U of Beirut, Lebanon, "Accelerationism: Ray Brassier," Transcribed from the Backdoor Broadcasting Company, September 30, 2010, http://moskvax.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/accelerationism-ray-brassier/) First of all, Land is operating under the aegis of Deleuze and Guattari’s work. He proposes to radicalise critique, to convert the ideal conditioning of the representation of matter to the material conditioning of ideal representation. In the Landian apparatus, materiality is construed solely as the production of production. Transcendental materialism in its Landian version becomes a materialization of critique. The critique of the Kantian critique of metaphysics, of which there are several versions, supplemented in various configurations by 20th century continental philosophy, is converted into a materialist metaphysics of critique, by collapsing the hierarchy of the transcendental and the empirical. The first move, the really interesting move, and in fact, the key to understanding the Deleuzoguattarian concept of destratification in Landianism, is that the first thing that needs to be destratified is the empirical/transcendental difference. This is seen to be the enabling condition for critical philosophy. But it’s no longer a Hegelian or dialectical sublation of this difference. It’s non-dialectical. It’s a reduction of the difference to matter, because Land claims thinking is a function of materiality, and representational thought, that is to say, conceptual categorization and even, on this account, the logic of the dialectic itself, is simply a circumscribed or depotentiated version of a functional potency generated by matter itself. The claim is that matter itself is synthetic and productive. Matter is primary process, and everything that unfolds at the level of conceptual representation is merely secondary and derivative. Synthesis is primary and productive, and all synthesis is the conjoining of heterogeneous terms. What Land proposed to retain from Kant was the emphasis on the transcendental efficacy of synthesis, the primacy of transcendental synthesis, but no longer as the synthesis of empirical items, objects of experience anchored in a constituting subject. It’s the self-synthesising potency of what he called intensive materiality. This becomes the key term. It’s a brilliant explication of the logical operation that Deleuze and Guattari carry out vis-a-vis Kantianism in Anti-Oedipus. Matter is nothing but machinic production, self-differentiation, and the fundamental binary that organizes this materialist metaphysics is that between intensive materiality, which he identifies with the body without organs, and death, this moment of absolute indifference as absolute difference. Land is quite explicit about the link to a certain version of Schellingianism here. He explicitly links Deleuze and Guattari to Schelling. The binaries between what he calls intensive zero as matter in itself and every kind of conceptual binary between concepts and objects, or representing and represented: the claim is that by levelling this fundamental dualism, the dualism of transcendental form and empirical content, you get this materialist monism where you explain how matter itself generates its own representation. It generates its own representation, and by this account, representation itself is relegated to the status of a transcendental illusion. It’s a misprision of primary processes; it’s at the level of merely secondary processes. But this materialist critique of transcendental critique, I argue, reproduces the critical problem of the connection between thought and reality. Why? Because the problem then becomes: how can you simply circumvent representation, and talk about matter itself as primary process, about reality in itself? This process, which is obviously the problem which underlies Kantian critique in the first place, re-emerges in an exacerbated form in this materialist subversion of Kantianism. But the problem is particularly acute, and this is where the Landian elimination of the Bergsonian component in Deleuze’s thought becomes awkward, and generates a difficulty for him. Why? In many ways, you can align the Deleuzian critique of representation with the Bergsonian critique of representation. Much of what Deleuze says is problematic about the categories of representation, about representation as the mediating framework that segments and parcels out the world, the flux of duration, into discretely individuated objects… the claim is that you have a sub-representational layer of experience which it is possible to access through intuition. The Bergsonian critique of metaphysics and the destitution of representation intuits the real differences in being, you can intuit the real nature of matter, time; duration in the Bergsonian register. There’s a problem here for Landianism, because he can’t do this. He’s supplanted representation, but he wants to supplant this kind of Bergsonian vitalist phenomenology for an unconscious thanatropism. The point is: how do you access the machinic unconscious? It’s not simply given. Land insists time and time again, nothing is ever given, everything is produced. The problem is that Land’s materialist liquidation of representation, because it doesn’t want to reaffirm, allegedly, the primacy of sub-representational experience, which Bergson and phenomenology do in various ways… he has to explain what it is he’s talking about. He’s doing a kind of materialist metaphysics, and there’s an issue about what kind of traction this extraordinarily sophisticated conceptual apparatus can gain upon the process of primary production, the real as intensive difference, matter in itself, whatever you want to call it. This is an initial philosophical difficulty, which interestingly Land himself in conversation tried to dismiss by saying “well, you have to understand that thinking itself is no longer about representational congruence between concepts and objects, ideas and things, but is itself a productive process.” The discussion of machinic mapping versus representational tracing in the opening plateau of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari claim that schizoanalysis, or rhizomatics, or whatever you want to call it, is itself a praxis, a doing. There’s a positive feedback loop between what you are thinking about and your thinking. So that your conceptual practice is no longer tracing intelligible structures from a pre-existing, readymade reality, it’s actually tracing movements and tendencies in material processes. It becomes self-legitimating in this sense. The question then becomes one of intensification. It’s no longer an epistemological question of the legitimacy or the validity of your thinking vis-a-vis an allegedly independent reality, it’s simply a question of how your schizoanalytical practice accentuates or intensifies primary production, or on the contrary, delays and inhibits it. Truth or falsity becomes subordinate to the dyad intensificatory/deintensificatory. This is the conceptual trope which becomes translated into a political register. At the level of what it is you’re doing as a machinic materialist, intensifying primary production; all your practices become governed by the imperative to intensify and accelerate. To ruthlessly demolish any obstacle that threatens to delay or inhibit this. I think there’s a problem here, and the problem is this: the concept of intensity becomes fatally equivocal in this register. There’s an equivocation between the Kantian talk of intensities at the level of appearances, and the Bergsonian talk of intensive difference as qualitative difference of experience of duration. When Bergson is talking about intensity, he means a difference in quality which can never be mapped on to magnitude or extensity. But this experience of intensity has a phenomenological correlate. Hence, vitalism is hence all about having intense experiences. But Landianism can’t avail itself of this register of intensification, because he’s not interested in phenomenological subjectivity and he’s not interested in experiences insofar as they are experiences of a subject in the Deleuzoguattarian register: an organism, with a face and a personal identity, etc. These are all the things that are supposed to require destratification. The claim that you can dispense with the need of any epistemological legitimation for your metaphysics by simply saying it’s not about truth or falsity, it’s just about the intensification of the primary process, is incoherent, because matter itself as primary production, or death, is not translatable into any register of affective experience or affective intensity. This is why I find this move unconvincing, the claim that you can just keep on intensifying and intensifying. The second problem arises here: a kind of imperative to affirm re-emerges, because the claim is that, in mapping the process of movements of deterritorialization and partial reterritorialization, you’re mapping activity itself, because it’s nested upon the strata, it occupies an immanent position vis-a-vis these material processes; you no longer have the transcendent exteriority between theory and world. Theory itself is implicated in the reality it’s describing. Then things become unclear. There is a substitution, of a sublimated materialist eschatology, for all forms of rationalist teleology. Why keep intensifying? Because there is always a surplus of stratification. One wouldn’t need to deterritorialize and destratify unless there was always a complement of reterritorialization and restratification. You only need to deterritorialize because there are strata. Why is there stratification in the first place? Because there is an organising dualism. The claim is that, although the real itself is absolutely deterritorialized, the degree zero of absolute intensity, it’s always differentiated and stratified, sedimented in various complex ways. Once thinking itself becomes subordinated to the imperative to intensify and destratify, it’s clear that there must be a limitrophic point of absolute deterritorialization towards which the process of affirmation or acceleration tends. If you’re accelerating, there are material constraints upon your capacity to accelerate, but there must also be a transcendental speed limit at some point. The ultimate limit is not a limit at all for him, it’s death, or cosmic schizophrenia. That’s the ultimate horizon. Land unabashedly endorses this remarkable thesis of Anti-Oedipus, but strips it of all its palliatives, about how this might generate new forms of creative existence, etc. For him it’s just: “at the end of the process is death”. The title of one of Nick’s papers is called “Making It With Death”, a brilliant title. Because death is inherently productive, it’s the motor, the mode of antiproduction which generates all production, the production of production. This is not simply Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, where life itself and all vital differences are unilateral deviations from intensive death. The claim is that you can have a moment of convergence with absolute intensity, or absolute deterritorialization. What is this, who would be the bearer, what vehicle would continue to exist to be the bearer of this thanatropic acceleration? Not the human species, certainly. The claim is that all terrestrial history is a history of intensification, of human social organisation and the developments of advanced technological capitalist society are just a moment or a phase in the process. The continuation or intensification of the process demands the elimination of humanity as a substrate for the process. The question is then, under what conditions? Here I think a fundamental contradiction, a conceptual incoherence emerges: how can you intensify when there is no longer anything left to intensify? If your schizoanalytical practice is fuelled by the need to always intensify and deterritorialize, there comes a point at which there is no agency left: you yourself have been dissolved back into the process. Once secondary production has been re-integrated or feeds back into primary production, ironically what you have is a bizarre mimesis of the serpent of absolute knowledge, except this time, it’s the serpent of absolute production. The point is that organically individuated human subjects cannot position themselves vis-a-vis this circuit or this process. It’s happening without you anyway. It doesn’t need you. The very concept of agency is stripped out. There’s a quote of Land’s: “it’s happening anyway and there is nothing you can do about it.” Something is working through you, there is nothing you can do about it, so you might as well fuse. This is a philosophical problem. It’s a retention of this romantic, Schopenhauerian idea of fusion between the personal and impersonal, the individuated subject and cosmic schizophrenia, the impersonal primary process. But for Schopenhauer it still makes sense to postulate that. The moment at which the will turns against itself governs Schopenhauer’s whole ethical and practical philosophy. For Land, there is no longer any kind of fulcrum for the point of reversion, the conversion from secondary to primary process, because there are no individuated bearers left any more. This convergence does not unfold at the level of experience. In that regard, the whole vocabulary of intensification and disintensification becomes redundant. The paradox is simply this: under what conditions could you will the impossibility of willing? How could you affirm that which incapacitates all affirmation? This is a conceptual problem with interesting practical and political consequences. It has a political valence, because I think it explains Nick’s political trajectory from a kind of radical ultra-left anarchism. From a point when, in a paper called “Kant, Capital and the Prohibition of Incest: a polemical introduction to the configuration of philosophy and modernity”, he says “the state apparatus of an advanced industrial society can certainly not be defeated without a willingness to escalate the cycle of violence without limits.” Interestingly, in this paper, it’s radical guerrilla militant lesbian feminists who are the only revolutionary subjects. He moves from this moment, where he’s perfectly willing to endorse or affirm radicals, where his critique of the Marxist left is that it’s not radical, revolutionary, or critical enough, and then five or six years later he seems to realize there is no bearer of revolutionary intensification left. Therefore politics must be displaced, it must be deputized, and all you can do is endorse or affirm impersonal processes which at least harbour the promise of generating or ushering in the next phase of deterritorialization. What does this mean? It means affirming free markets, deregulation, the capitalist desecration of traditional forms of social organization, etc. Why? Not because he thinks it’s promoting individual democracy and freedom. He has to instrumentalize neoliberalism in the name of something allegedly far darker and more potentially corrosive, but in the process it seems you end up… if your enemy’s enemy is your friend, there comes a dangerous point where you forget the conditions under which you made this strategic alliance, because you can no longer see, you can no longer identify what the goal is any more. You end up endorsing and embracing a kind of neoliberal politics or ideology, and the pretence of instrumental distance, that this could just be the cunning of schizophrenic reason, quickly evaporates because it’s not possible to dissociate praxis from identifiable ends any more. In other words, once you dissociate tactics and strategy–the famous distinction between tactics and strategy where strategy is teleological, transcendent, and representational and tactics is immanent and machinic–if you have no strategy, someone with a strategy will soon commandeer your tactics. Someone who knows what they want to realize will start using you. You become the pawn of another kind of impersonal force, but it’s no longer the glamorous kind of impersonal and seductive force that you hoped to make a compact with, it’s a much more cynical kind of libertarian capitalism.
  11. http://deontologistics.tumblr.com/post/91953882443/so-accelerationism-whats-all-that-about courtesy pete wolfendale big players nonpartisans: benjamin noys (k of land), ray brassier (k of land), antonio negri (k of williams/srnicek) left: alex williams and nick srnicek, they have their own critique of land, pete wolfendale, various marxists, mark fisher right: nick land, https://therealmovement.wordpress.com, http://pogoprinciple.wordpress.com/2013/05/08/clever-monkey-versus-the-accelerationists-1/ "The argument is that the collapse of capitalism is inevitable. In face of that, should we let it enslave and kill people or should we overload it until it collapses" As Alex Williams has noted before, this is not a position that anyone has ever held. Okay, let’s qualify that a bit. It might be the case that some people have held this position, and that some of them now even think of themselves as ‘accelerationists’. So let’s limit it to the claim that it is not a position thatanyone in the #Accelerate reader has ever held. Not even Nick Land? No. Not even Nick Land. He likes capitalism. He wants to accelerate it, but not because it will collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. What about Deleuze and Guattari? No. According to them ‘nothing has ever died of contradictions’, and so whatever deterritorialising force they aim to accelerate, and whatever end they aim to accelerate it towards, neither is a contradiction or its inevitable collapse. What about Srnicek and Williams? No. Much of what they do can be seen as breaking with D&G (and a fortiori with Land), and returning to a much more Marxist position, but they explicitly refuse to see the transition between capitalism and post-capitalism as a dialectical sublation brought about by the intensification of contradictions. Well, what about Marx then?! Just how much Marx is invested in a substantive notion of contradiction as the metaphysical driving force of history is a question up for debate, and I’m not about to stumble into that particular hermeneutic hornets’ nest. Nevertheless, it’s clear that even if we take the strongest historical determinist (e.g., dialectical-materialist) reading of Marx we can find, he would still reject the inference from the claim that the increasing self-evidence of capitalist parasitism will bring about the expropriation of expropriation all on its own to the claim that we should therefore attempt to ‘speed the system towards its inevitable doom’. None of these canonical figures, and nobody else within the collection, wants inevitable doom(although, admittedly, Nick Land’s vision might look like this to everyone but him). Indeed, the emerging left-accelerationist strand is motivated by a recognition that capitalism will not auto-destruct once the mask slips, on the one hand (see the incredible retrenchment of neoliberalism after the 2008 financial crisis), and a recognition that we need to plan and act to avoid inevitable doom, on the other (e.g., environmental crisis, economic crisis, cultural crisis, etc.). So, just to repeat: accelerationism is not about accelerating the contradictions of capitalism in any sense. Whatever is being accelerated, and there are severe and significant disagreements about this, it is not contradictions, and whatever transition this acceleration aims towards, it is not societal collapse. Got that? Can we move on? Good. "Left" vs "Right" Accelerationism No mention of this would be complete without a denunciation of Nick Land’s turn to neoreaction, which I have elsewhere described as ‘sillier than fascism’ (your move internet). There is a genuine sense in which Land’s current views are continuous with his CCRU era work, and it is important to identify this continuity and dissect it, precisely in order to avoid the absurd conclusions to which it has led him (IMHO). I won’t go into this in depth, as Alex Williams has written a better critique of Land than I can provide here. However, I will point out an important symmetry between the left-accelerationist views of those like myself, and what are increasingly being referred to as the ‘right-accelerationist’ views of those like Land. We agree on this much: modernity and capitalism are ultimately incompatible. We disagree on which one should/will go: the left actively supports the project of modernity against capitalism, the right passively supports capitalism’s inevitable victory over modernity. The right thinks that the accelerative emancipatory force is nothing other than capitalism itself, whereas the left thinks that capitalism is an adaptive and plastic obstacle suppressing a deeper emancipatory dynamic. It is in essence a disagreement about freedom: what it is to have it, what it is to enhance it, and whether there is anything we can do about it.
  12. Re: lenny Love ya bud but A. anyone can find those cards easily online. Its not like disclosure vs opensource is hurting anyone here who has 5 minutes to research B. antonio 95 ev is in every nietzsche file ever, wark 4 ev was cut by dml and is opensource, t cards are dictionary cited (i mean you didnt want me posting defs?), land, fernando and lindsey ev you cut but is easy to find and cut online. You'll notice i cut the land and fernando ev myself. Consider it my own. C. If you like your aff so much why is it exclusive, this kid is 99% likely not on ur circuit D. You and luisa are more than capable of beating teams who are prepped out against you E. Congrats on making it to finals @ new trier! F. I'm sorry, i won't ever post your cards again <3 and peace out
  13. this should be enough to give a 2ar on. if you want more, pm me.
  14. lolwut5

    Cap Alt

    zizek writes the best cap bad cards. he's also the cutest/funniest/most clever cap bad author. here are some nice cards: Their focus on subjective flashpoints of violence creates a stop-gap in thought which distracts us from attempts to solve the root cause of all violence - CapitalZizek, ’08 (Slavoj, senior reseacher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and a professor at the European Graduate School, Violence, p. 1-4) If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict. But we should learn to step back, to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible “subjective” violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance. This is the starting point, perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a “symbolic” violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call “our house of being.” As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious—and extensively studied—cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call “systemic” violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems. The catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the “normal,” peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious “dark matter” of physics, the counterpart to an all-too- visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be “irrational” explosions of subjective violence. When the media bombard us with those “humanitarian crises” which seem constantly to pop up all over the world, one should always bear in mind that a particular crisis only explodes into media visibility as the result of a complex struggle. Properly humanitarian considerations as a rule play a less important role here than cultural, ideologico-political, and economic considerations. The cover story of Time magazine on 5 June 2006, for example, was “The Deadliest War in the World.” This offered detailed documentation on how around 4 million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo as the result of political violence over the last decade. None of the usual humanitarian uproar followed, just a couple of readers’ letters—as if some kind of filtering mechanism blocked this news from achieving its full impact in our symbolic space. To put it cynically, Time picked the wrong victim in the struggle for hegemony in suffering. It should have stuck to the list of usual suspects: Muslim women and their plight, or the families of 9/11 victims and how they have coped with their losses. The Congo today has effectively re-emerged as a Conradean “heart of darkness.” No one dares to confront it head on. The death of a West Bank Palestinian child, not to mention an Israeli or an American, is mediatically worth thousands of times more than the death of a nameless Congolese. Do we need further proof that the humanitarian sense of urgency is mediated, indeed overdetermined, by clear political considerations? And what are these considerations? To answer this, we need to step back and take a look from a different position. When the U.S. media reproached the public in foreign countries for not displaying enough sympathy for the victims of the 9/11 attacks, one was tempted to answer them in the words Robespierre addressed to those who complained about the innocent victims of revolutionary terror: “Stop shaking the tyrant’s bloody robe in my face, or I will believe that you wish to put Rome in chains.”1 Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject’s report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content “contaminated” the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 The only appropriate approach to my subject thus seems to be one which permits variations on violence kept at a distance out of respect towards its victims. ***Insert Link*** It is not possible to solve any situation without solving them all - only a criticism which attacks the universality of capitalism can solve inevitable extinction Zizek, ’89 (Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, The Sublime Object of Ideology, page 3-4) It is upon the unity of these two features that the Marxist notion of the revolution, of the revolutionary situation, is founded: a situation of metaphorical condensation in which it finally becomes clear to the everyday consciousness that it is not possible to solve any particular ques­tion without solving them all - that is, without solving the fundamental question which embodies the antagonistic character of the social totality. In a 'normal', pre-revolutionary state of things, everybody is fighting his own particular battles (workers are striking for better wages, feminists are fighting for the rights of women, democrats for political and social freedoms, ecologists against the exploitation of nature, participants in the peace movements against the danger of war, and so on). Marxists are using all their skill and adroimess of argument to convince the partici­pants in these particular struggles that the only real solution to their problem is to be found in the global revolution: as long as social relations are dominated by Capital, there will always be sexism in relations between the sexes, there will always be a threat of global war, there will always be a danger that political and social freedoms will be suspended, nature itself will always remain an object of ruthless exploitation. . . . The global revolution will then abolish the basic social antagonism, enabling the formation of a transparent, rationally governed society. Our alternative is to completely withdraw from the ideology of capital - this opens up the space for authentic politics Johnston ’04 (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society) Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Žižek’s recent writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance ( Žižek, 2001d, pp 22–23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Žižek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of ‘‘magic,’’ that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The ‘‘external’’ obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, ‘‘internally’’ believe in it – capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism’s frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic’s fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Žižek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the ‘‘desert of the real’’): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction (‘‘Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism’’).
  15. Thx bobbytables, great explanation. On a completely unrelated sidenote, i see the same robinson 12, baudrillard 76, mcgowan 13 and raszinsky 9 cards deployed on every wiki's fear of death 1nc--> did everybody just find and cut these cards themselves or are they from a camp file/opensource that i can find somewhere?
  16. Its a def i just saw a lot on fw wikis and idk what the arg is. For ex, this team: http://debatecoaches.wikispaces.com/2012+TOC+-+Little+Rock+Central+SW#Round%201-AT%20FW If you look around its on more wikis. Thx to anyone who can explain this def -> arg.
  17. Hey y'all quick question here: i noticed some teams say that the context of the resolution comes before the colon, and read a definition like this one: The colon focuses the reader’s attention on what to follow, and as a result, you should use it to introduce an idea that somehow completes the introductory idea. What does this mean? Like, what is this argument and what is the point? Thanks so much
  18. files that may be of use to you. last year ddi wrote (somewhat) of an ooo k based on bryant, with links to discursive analyses: http://openev.debatecoaches.org/bin/download/2013/DDI/OOO%20Kritik%20-%20DDI%202013%20SS.docx Michigan put out a Anthro file with an OOO k of extinction impacts based on Morton's hyperobjects, available at http://openevidence.debatecoaches.org/bin/download/2014/Michigan7/Anthro%20K%20-%20Michigan7%202014%20BEFJR.docx UTNIF and DDI put out similar files with links premised on engaging the materiality of the ocean as opposed to discursive/historical/societal analyses of the ocean: Utnif's file: http://openev.debatecoaches.org/bin/download/2014/UTNIF/Oceanic%20Ontology%20Critique%20-%20UTNIF%202014.docx DDI's file: http://openev.debatecoaches.org/bin/download/2014/DDI/Hydrorelationality%20Kritik%20generic%20-%20DDI%202014.docx Trinity ran OOO last year versus both Anthro and Heidegger, i uploaded both of their opensource speech docs. shirley rd 6 is v anthro, unt rd 5 is versus heidegger. in a similar but not entirely related vein, hss put out a K of critique without concrete strategies this year based on bryant's blog post about academic gnomes, available at http://openev.debatecoaches.org/bin/download/2014/HSS/Carpentry%20Critique%20-%20HSS%202014.docx if you have any questions/want more cards, feel free to pm me. :3 Trinity-Solice-Rothenbaum-Neg-Shirley-Round6.docx Trinity-Solice-Rothenbaum-Neg-UNT-Round5.docx
  19. Why do you assume that we are all guys? That's A. Obviously not the case and B. Offensive to those who aren't guys.
  20. Text: Vote negative to refuse the speciesist ethic of the 1AC. The aff’s ethical insufficiency is prior to its consequential benefits. Rejecting speciesism is essential to opening better ways of relating to other beings Smith ’11 Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2011, p. 44-45 Leaving aside for the moment the question of how far Murdoch’s and Levinas’s understandings might be compatible, or at odds, with claims about the ethicopolitical stewardship of nature (questions that, as the next section illustrates, are closely connected with the manner in which their metaphysics is thought of as providing a "guide for mor- als”), it is still necessary to ask what it means to “join the world as it really is" and how this might relate to a potential ecological ethics. In other words, how far might such approaches be capable of recognizing the ethical import of nonhuman others given that both Murdoch and Levinas speak of the other as a human being? In Levinas’s terms, the Other (Autrui often, but not always consistently, capitalized) is exclu- sively and explicitly so, as, for example, with regard to the face-to-face encounter. Certainly, if such an ethics can be understood as being relevant to the more—than-human world, it offers the possibility of paying concerned attention to patterns of difference in nature without reducing these differences to representational codes (taxonomies) and systems (axiologies) that might claim to, but cannot, capture essential moral distinctions between categories of beings (Smith 2001a). Such an ethics would be a much more suitable response to a natural world that is alien, purposeless, and independent of human interests. Animals, birds, stones, trees really are alien in the sense that they are other than human, that they exhibit radically different and sometimes extraor- dinarily strange ways of being-in-the-world. Humanistic approaches, indebted to the anthropological machine, tend to emphasize and use these differences as reasons for excluding such things from moral con- sideration. They are not like our-human-selves, and so, they argue, in their anthropocentric self-obsessed ways, can consequently be of no ethical (as opposed to instrumental) interest to us. The unfortunate response of environmental ethics to such claims has often been to try to minimize differences and find essential similarities or common purpose or to establish mutual dependencies by extending these same self-centered patterns (Taylor 1986; Attfield 1991). Certain aspects of the environment are deemed morally considerable because they share some supposedly key aspect of human selfhood that makes them as "intrinsically" valuable as ourselves, for example, as subjects- of-a-life. Our self-concern becomes the basis for a (supposedly) ethical concern for those others deemed sufficiently like us. An alternative, more expansive strategy, which still retains this same self-centered form, is to suggest that the whole of nature might be deemed valuable insofar as it is reconceptualized (via, for example, ecology, quantum physics, or non-Western metaphysics) as part of our extended selves (see, for example, Callicott’s [1985] early work). Some even combine both strategies, for example, by espousing a form of “contemporary panpsychism” whereby the universe is reenvisaged as a "self-realizing system," which “possesses reflexivity and to this extent . . . is imbued with a subjectival dimension" (Mathews 2003, 74).14 However, in adopting these strategies, these purportedly biocentric approaches change the content but retain the form, the same anthro- pocentrically self-obsessed locus, of the dominant ethical held (Smith 2001a). These forms of axiological extensionism, while often well in- tentioned, are not only philosophically artificial (constructed largely in order to justify certain already predetermined ends) and ecologically impractical but also tend to replicate, rather than fundamentally challenge, the presuppositions of the anthropological machine. For all their egalitarian rhetoric, they tend to ethically favor those things most like, or closest to, that defined as properly human. The real differences that an alien nature presents are overlooked and human alienation fantasized away.15 By contrast, Murdoch and Levinas can be understood as arguing that ethics exists as a non-self-centered response to the recog- nition of such alienation from the world and from others. Indeed, there is no real ethics without recognizing such differences, An ecological difference ethics thus potentially offers a radical alternative to all attempts to enclose the nonhuman in an economy of the Same.
  21. here are some general cards, but if there is a specific impact you have in mind perhaps we could help you find more specific cards. Structural violence outweighs their impacts – it’s a threat multiplier because it creates latent resentment and ruins bonds of cooperation necessary for responding to future crises – causes escalation and environmental collapseNixon ’11 (Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3) Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded. Prioritizing everyday violence is key - responding to it later causes error replication and movement burn out, only re-orienting focus away from macro-level violence produces sustainable political coalitionsCuomo 96 (Chris, Prof. of Political Science @ U of Cincinnati, “War is not just an event: reflections on the significance of everyday violence”, Hypatia, vol. 11, no. 4 Fall (1994)) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalationScheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4 (Nancy, Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Philippe, Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn “Introduction: Making Sense of Violence,” in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization). Prefer structural violence impacts: Toleration of evil in the name of survival destroys the value to lifeCallahan 73 [Daniel J. Callahan, The Tyranny of Survival: And other pathologies of civilized life. Pg 91-93] That individuals, tribes, communities and nations have committed so much will, energy and intelligence to survival has meant that they have survived, and their descendants are present to tell the tale. Nothing is so powerful a motive force, for self or society, as the threat of annihilation, nothing so energizing as the necessity to live. Without life, all else is in vain. Leaving aside the question of whether we need more enlightened attitudes toward suicide in our society, which we may. it is still not for nothing that suicide has been looked upon with abhorrence, whether from a religious or a psycho- logical perspective. It seems to violate the most fundamental of human drives, and has always required a special explana- tion or justification. The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power.2 But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domina- tion has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Ameri- cans were herded, without due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise bla- tantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival.3 For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, sur- vival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system.4 In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such com- mon genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to starving populations of nations which have not enacted popu- lation-control policies. For all these reasons, it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights. liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other funda- mental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life-then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival? To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories. Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly manage their need to survive, they suc- ceeded in not doing so. Either way, then, would represent a failure, and one can take one's pick about which failure would be worse, that of survival at the cost of everything decent in man or outright extinction.
  22. Some strong answers to the Baudrillard K with recent, well-warranted cards. AT Baudrillard.docx
  23. He seems to be under the impression that the terrorists were from poor backgrounds. That is not the case—these terrorists were middle class ideologues and most of them weren't from Iraq...? All but one of them were from Saudi Arabia, the other was from lebanon. None of them experienced violence directed against Iraq... They were given a lot of $$$ to complete these hijackings from AQ affiliates... Some of them went to college abroad.... Sure you can rant against the war but you're comparing apples and oranges.... In addition I think it's disrespectful to those who died on 9/11 to call them little Eichmanns... :-/ this article deserves the hate that it gets... Shame on you for posting it Background of terrorists http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&the_alleged_9/11_hijackers=otherHijackers Finance http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_App.pdf
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