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swagondeck

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Everything posted by swagondeck

  1. Late but go to SDI before your sophomore year!
  2. i think this "discussion" was mainly problematic for a few reasons. first, why didnt these teams do it round 1, and not a round where both of them knew they wouldnt break? second, why did it take like 30 minutes for a woman or person of color to talk in this video? and why was this discussion group mainly comprised of white males with the exception of a few on video chat? why did they need someone to tell them to talk about the issue of minority participation in debate? and why did they keep making the incorrect, universalizing claim "debate is good, debate is good, debate is good"? especially when for many who are NOT totally included in the activity/are basically excluded on a structural level
  3. lol you dont need to read anything for such a substance-less K (not meant to be a shot i just dont think theres much depth to this arg- i guess it can be strategic tho)
  4. try reading Irigaray- its pretty complex and requires some background in gender studies as well as (sorta) psychoanalysis but her arguments on the masculine economy are some of the most nuanced
  5. yeah this doesn't really exist in a coherent sense- the only way that it might is that they both share the theory of inherent transgression but their reasoning for why it's true is totally different (zizek says split in the superego compels desire to transgress and obey the law simultaneously, while baudrillard uses his theories of power to explain it) so just stick with one or the other and zizek is a lot better than baudrillard for that stuff
  6. this is a very good, albeit simplistic K- i think the strongest part of it is the floating pik argument, (also) in the words of spurlock "its not what you do, but how you do it"... dont read it for this year's topic though, i agree with ktg that the links are weak. i DO think that the Dark Mountain card is super good for any sort of "human progress" link and can also go along really well with an ecomanagerialism k.
  7. judge choice beats reps ks that only take out one advantage
  8. psychoanalysis of what? there isnt just one "psychoanalysis k", there are tons of args from psychosecurity to Zizek's ks of ecological sustainability
  9. find a card saying normal means is quiet diplomacy, and make the rhetoric v. reality distinction.
  10. just came across this, and i think while it's true that we need to be sure that we keep identity autonomous and not a tool for winning a ballot, but i think you can advocate for others without assuming the Other's identity. my partner and I won jv state running a q theory aff and while neither of us identify as LGBTQ, we think that it's still acceptable and possible to advocate for them while not eroding their autonomy... maybe i'm taking your argument out of context but yeah.
  11. okay, this should go without saying, but when someone asks for a file it's not an invitation for what the community thinks about it. I wasn't even planning on running it, it's a team joke, but i wanted a file. i've been successful enough this year and i'm not a fucking idiot, so please keep your opinions to yourself.
  12. looking for this, or plagiarism pic, or whatever its called. pm me, thanks
  13. What? Either the aff is QPQ in which case it's obviously not competitve because the CP would hafta be double conditions OR it wasn't which means the aff isn't T... that's silly. Aditionally, Perm do CP ground is definitely not a reason conditions CPs are bad. Here's how affs work- if it doesnt lift Cuba embargo, it's solved by Intl Actor If it does, the PIC solves even if there isnt a specific solvency advocate because i think the net benefit is functionally a reason why the CP is a good idea, checks any offensive reason why CPs need a solvency advocate. PICS are bad but if you defend embargo its the only CP that solves your aff which means its justified
  14. Susanne Kappeler? i have two pm me
  15. the only way you'd ever do this is with a hypotesting truth-claims aff and those havent been successful ever and even if nobody knows how to handle it you'll get your speaks trashed
  16. zizek and only zizek Humanitarianism is the ultimate example of capitalist coercion- justifies intervention in the name of “saving†people and opens the gates for economic imperialism even if the plan doesn’t directly result in it- your link turns are dead on arrival Zizek 6 (Slavoj, Half-philosopher, half-bear, half-cocaine, “The Obscenity of Human Rights: Violence as Symptomâ€, http://libcom.org/library/the-obscenity-of-human-rights-violence-as-symptom, 11.23.6, [CL]) This acceptance of violence, this "political suspension of the ethical," is the limit of that which even the most "tolerant" liberal stance is unable to trespass - witness the uneasiness of "radical" post-colonialist Afro-American studies apropos of Frantz Fanon's fundamental insight into the unavoidability of violence in the process of effective decolonization. One should recall here Fredric Jameson's idea that violence plays in a revolutionary process the same role as worldly wealth in the Calvinist logic of predestination: although it has no intrinsic value, it is a sign of the authenticity of the revolutionary process, of the fact that this process is effectively disturbing the existing power relations. In other words, the dream of the revolution without violence is precisely the dream of a "revolution without revolution"(Robespierre). On the other hand, the role of the Fascist spectacle of violence is exactly opposite: it is a violence whose aim is to PREVENT the true change - something spectacular should happen all the time so that, precisely, nothing would really happen. But, again, the ultimate argument against this perspective is the simple encounter of excessive suffering generated by political violence. Sometimes, one cannot but be shocked by the excessive indifference towards suffering, even and especially when this suffering is widely reported in the media and condemned, as if it is the very outrage at suffering which turns us into its immobilized fascinated spectators. Recall, in the early 1990s, the three-years-long siege of Sarajevo, with the population starving, exposed to permanent shelling and snipers' fire. The big enigma here is: although all the media were full of pictures and reports, why did not the UN forces, NATO or the US accomplish just a small act of breaking the siege of Sarajevo, of imposing a corridor through which people and provisions could circulate freely? It would have cost nothing: with a little bit of serious pressure on the Serb forces, the prolonged spectacle of encircled Sarajevo exposed to ridiculous terror would have been over. There is only one answer to this enigma, the one proposed by Rony Brauman himself who, on behalf of the Red Cross, coordinated the help to Sarajevo: the very presentation of the crisis of Sarajevo as "humanitarian," the very recasting of the political-military conflict into the humanitarian terms, was sustained by an eminently political choice, that of, basically, taking the Serb side in the conflict. Especially ominous and manipulative was here the role of Mitterand: The celebration of 'humanitarian intervention' in Yugoslavia took the place of a political discourse, disqualifying in advance all conflicting debate. /.../ It was apparently not possible, for Francois Mitterand, to express his analysis of the war in Yugoslavia. With the strictly humanitarian response, he discovered an unexpected source of communication or, more precisely, of cosmetics, which is a little bit the same thing. /.../ Mitterand remained in favor of the maintenance of Yugoslavia within its borders and was persuaded that only a strong Serbian power was in the position to guarantee a certain stability in this explosive region. This position rapidly became unacceptable in the eyes of the French people. All the bustling activity and the humanitarian discourse permitted him to reaffirm the unfailing commitment of France to the Rights of Man in the end, and to mimic an opposition to Greater Serbian fascism, all in giving it free rein. 2 From this specific insight, one should make the move to the general level and render problematic the very depoliticized humanitarian politics of "Human Rights" as the ideology of military interventionism serving specific economico-political purposes. As Wendy Brown develops apropos Michael Ignatieff, such humanitarianism "presents itself as something of an antipolitics - a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defense of the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals." 3 However, the question is: "what kind of politicization /those who intervene on behalf of human rights/ set in motion against the powers they oppose. Do they stand for a different formulation of justice or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects?" 4 Say, it is clear that the US overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, legitimized in the terms of ending the suffering of the Iraqi people, not only was motivated by other politico-economic interests (oil), but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions that should open up the perspective of freedom to the Iraqi people (Western liberal democracy, guarantee of private property, the inclusion into the global market economy, etc.). The purely humanitarian anti-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus effectively amounts to the implicit prohibition of elaborating a positive collective project of socio-political transformation. And, at an even more general level, one should problematize the very opposition between the universal (pre-political) Human Rights which belong to every human being "as such," and specific political rights of a citizen, member of a particular political community; in this sense, Balibar argues for the "reversal of the historical and theoretical relationship between 'man' and 'citizen'" which proceeds by "explaining how man is made by citizenship and not citizenship by man." 5 Balibar refers here to Hannah Arendt's insight apropos he XXth century phenomenon of refugees: The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still human. 6 This line, of course, leads straight to Agamben's notion of homo sacer as a human being reduced to "bare life": in a properly Hegelian paradoxical dialectics of universal and particular, it is precisely when a human being is deprived of his particular socio-political identity which accounts for his determinate citizenship, that he, in one and the same move, is no longer recognized and/or treated as human. In short, the paradox is that one is deprived of human rights precisely when one is effectively, in one's social reality, reduced to a human being "in general," without citizenship, profession, etc., that is to say, precisely when one effectively becomes the ideal BEARER of "universal human rights" (which belong to me "independently of" my profession, sex, citizenship, religion, ethnic identity...). We thus arrived at a standard "postmodern," "anti-essentialist" position, a kind of political version of Foucault's notion of sex as generated by a multitude of the practices of sexuality: "man," the bearer of Human Rights, is generated by a set of political practices which materialize citizenship - is, however, this enough? Jacques Ranciere 7 proposed a very elegant and precise solution of the antinomy between Human Rights (belonging to "man as such") and the politicization of citizens: while Human Rights cannot be posited as an unhistorical "essentialist" Beyond with regard to the contingent sphere of political struggles, as universal "natural rights of man" exempted from history, they also should not be dismissed as a reified fetish which is a product of concrete historical processes of the politicization of citizens. The gap between the universality of Human Rights and the political rights of citizens is thus not a gap between the universality of man and a specific political sphere; it, rather, "separates the whole of the community from itself," as Ranciere put it in a precise Hegelian way. 8 Far from being pre-political, "universal Human Rights" designate the precise space of politicization proper: what they amount to is the right to universality as such, the right of a political agent to assert its radical non-coincidence with itself (in its particular identity), i.e., to posit itself - precisely insofar as it is the "surnumerary" one, the "part with no part," the one without a proper place in the social edifice - as an agent of universality of the Social as such. The paradox is thus a very precise one, and symmetrical to the paradox of universal human rights as the rights of those reduced to inhumanity: at the very moment when we try to conceive political rights of citizens without the reference to universal "meta-political" Human Rights, we lose politics itself, i.e., we reduce politics to a "post-political" play of negotiation of particular interests. - What, then, happens to Human Rights when they are reduced to the rights of homo sacer, of those excluded from the political community, reduced to "bare life" - i.e., when they become of no use, since they are the rights of those who, precisely, have no rights, are treated as inhuman? Ranciere proposes here an extremely salient dialectical reversal: /.../ when they are of no use, you do the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor. Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes, and rights. It is in this way, as the result of this process, that the Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no rights, the rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and inhuman conditions of existence. They become humanitarian rights, the rights of those who cannot enact them, the victims of the absolute denial of right. For all this, they are not void. Political names and political places never become merely void. The void is filled by somebody or something else. /.../ if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to enact Human Rights that are their last recourse, then somebody else has to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place. This is what is called the "right to humanitarian interference" - a right that some nations assume to the supposed benefit of victimized populations, and very often against the advice of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The "right to humanitarian interference" might be described as a sort of "return to sender": the disused rights that had been send to the rightless are sent back to the senders. 9 So, to put it in the Leninist way: what today, in the predominant Western discourse, the "Human Rights of the Third World suffering victims" effectively mean is the right of the Western powers themselves to intervene - politically, economically, culturally, militarily - in the Third World countries of their choice on behalf of the defense of Human Rights.
  17. That theory argument is mostly irrelevant, look up Gijs Van Oenen, he uses Zizekian political frames to talk about focusing on process focus...being bad
  18. My partner and I are going... who else is?
  19. never thought of that, and yeah, i'll look in camp files. also joseph im a fan of the signature
  20. so im running a conditions aff, and i'm wondering what some good arguments are against T: can't be QPQ. *not asking for people to write blocks for me- i already have- i just want to know if i can make mine better*
  21. you're assuming its in the plan text.
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