Royal 10 is a fantastic piece of evidence, in that it cites specific examples and has a clear line of reasoning. It is well detailed and written by a person with great qualifications. The part normally cut as saying 'economic decline leads to war' is a review of other literature, but the authors referenced are also very well qualified.
In short, the part of Royal people read is referencing diversionary theory, which says that leaders will be more inclined to start "diversionary wars" to distract their constitutents when the economy declines. The wars are called diversionary because they distract people from the economy and focus on "dummies".
This card is not a terminal impact card. I think you can win a spillover claim - that smaller regional wars can spillover into larger, worldwide nuclear conflicts. Harris and Burrrows comes to mind as a terminal impact.
I like the Tir 10 card personally. You might also want to answer "trade solves war."
I think that Phantom's card is good to read. It doesn't say anything about "balancing" unless you have a completely different understanding than I do of it. My version of Phantom's card is longer and goes into more depth about how interdependent states (in times of economic growth) are not suited to share risk. Economic decline can also reduce saber-rattling, which may also be a cause of diversionary wars.
I also have this card in a backfile - perhaps this will help:
Their part of the Royal evidence is just a review of other peoples arguments- the conclusion votes neg
Royal â€˜10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, â€œEconomic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,â€ in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer)
The logic of ECST supports arguments for greater economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conï¬‚ict. This chapter does not argue against the utility of signalling theory. It does, however, suggest that when considering the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises, ECST logic is dubious as an organising principle for security policymakers. The discussion pulls together some distinct areas of research that have not yet featured prominently in the ECST literature. Studies associating economic interdependence, economic crises and the potential for external conï¬‚ict indicate that global interdependence is not necessarily a conï¬‚ict suppressing process and may be conï¬‚ict-enhancing at certain points. Furthermore, the conditions created by economic crises decrease the willingness of states to send economic costly signals, even though such signals may be most effective during an economic crisis. These two points warrant further consideration in the debate over ECST and, more broadly, theories linking interdependence and peace. The debate takes on particular importance for policymakers when considering the increasingly important US-China relationship and the long-term prospects for peace in the Asia-Paciï¬c. Recent US policy towards China, such as the â€˜responsible stakeholderâ€™ approach, assumes that greater interdependence with China should decrease the likelihood for conï¬‚ict. Some have even suggested that the economic relationship is necessary to ensure strategic competition does not lead to major war (see, e.g., Kastner, 2006). If US or Chinese policymakers do indeed intend to rely on economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conï¬‚ict, much more study is required to understand how and when interdependence impacts the security and the defence behaviour of states. This chapter contributes some thoughts to that larger debate. NOTES I. Notable counterarguments include Barbieri (1996). Gowa (I994), and Levy and Ali I998 . 2.â€˜ Ofï¬<):ial statements have focused on this explanation as well. See, for example, Bernanke (2009). 3. For a dissenting study. see Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). 4. Note that Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) argue that states will have a greater incentive to arm against those with which it is interdependent to hedge against coercion. This argument could be extended to include protectionism in extreme cases. Creseenzi (2005) both challenges and agrees with Copelandâ€™s theory by suggesting that a more important indicator is the exit costs involved in terminating an economic relationship. which could be a function of the availability of alternatives. 5. There is also substantial research to indicate that periods of strong economic growth are also positively correlated with a rise in the likelihood of conï¬‚ict. Pollins (2008) and Pollins and Schweller (I999) provide excellent insights into this body of literature.