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Everything posted by ARGogate

  1. Two questions then I should be done. Sorry for the long CX, it's a new topic 1. Most of this NSA nonsense comes from a loose reading of Article II powers. Does the aff redefine those, or is the argument that the statutory conditions imposed above serve as restrictions on the scope of interpretation of Article II? 2. I get that other countries will use models, but what's the internal link between giving everyone models and convincing everyone to adapt? Are you defending that every country wants to adapt right now? If not, will this cloud computing stuff give the US the climate leadership ability to convince other nations to adapt? Or will you defend status quo leadership as sufficient?
  2. Really quick: so is it only the US that adapts? Or is there some climate leadership shenanigans hidden in that I/L chain? Fair enough. I'm only asking this because it's a new topic and the law isn't exactly clear. I'll just ask the specifics: 1. Executive Order 12333 - there's a provision that bans assassinations. This XO is not something the courts can get rid of. Does the aff have congress repeal the entire bill or revise the existing text? 2. Section 214 and 215 of the PATRIOT act aren't the only two sections that allow the NSA to work. The reason I feel this is important is that the NSA will just re-apply other provisions to continue its operations post-plan even if you have the courts rule certain provisions as unconstitutional, for example (and that's a hard fight in and of itself). Most of the lit seems to say congress can either solely repeal/revise those two sections or just pass a sweeping bill that ends data collection/monitoring. Which one is the aff? Or is it both? 3. What kind of restrictions/reform would be placed on the FISA court? Specifically, does the aff change the review process or does the court just reject bills by virtue of all the other laws the 1AC passes (so, does the court look at things differently or does it just reject NSA shit under all the revisions/restrictions made above)? These questions come from me quickly researching ways to restrict the NSA. If I'm mischaracterizing the aff please do correct me.
  3. I know the legal mess is incredible. I'm just trying to figure out whether or not the aff does anything since there is no solvency card in the 1AC detailing any form of restriction as necessary. Does the aff statutorily change the parts of the bills you've identified? What would these alterations look like? I feel like these questions are necessary on a topic about the law underpinning domestic surveillance.
  4. List out every means by which the aff would curtail the NSA. Does the aff end the NSA?
  5. ARGogate

    Find me at NDCA

    I'm in the policy pool
  6. ARGogate

    U.S. Bad Stats

    Also, defense spending Was 3.8% of GDP (678 billion?) In 2013. Not sure how that helps
  7. ARGogate

    U.S. Bad Stats

    Can we cut your article?
  8. There's a funny conversation bw Helen Caldicott and George Monbiot where you can learn the full conspiracy theory
  9. CX: Is this an AIK? Me: Why yes it is Wins anyways Defend your shit, people
  10. ARGogate

    NDCA 2015

    Who will I see?
  11. I wish to perform the negation. WHO WILL BE MY OPPONENT???
  12. I feel like the appropriate response to "are you topical?" is always "yes" or "don't front that genocide shit"
  13. This was the alt card for a specific aff. It probably applies. Our alternative is to reject the symbolic value of the womb as center for reproduction – this is a prerequisite to transforming the social – their “reaffirmation of the life-giving power of their own wombs” is the same discursive ploy utilized by dominant masculine culture to sacrifice women for reproduction while mystifying women’s bodies as the receptacle for male desireJennings 07 [Associate Professor of English and Director of Women's Studies at Wright State University, Summer, “Dystopian Matriarchies: Deconstructing the Womb in Angela Carter’s Heroes and Villains and The Passion of New Eve,” http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/dystopian-matriarchies-deconstructing-the-womb-in-angela.pdf?c=mfsfront;idno=ark5583.0021.104] The “reproductive function” derives much of its power from the cultural myths or religious texts that elevate motherhood, or the womb, to a sacred status, which illogically is used to justify the subjugation of women: They are viewed as sacred because they possess the womb, yet that “is why they are treated so badly for nothing can defile the sacred” (SW: 109). In other words, women’s assigned place in the symbolic order is this maternal role. To deviate from the “norm,” for a woman to play with or reject the reproductive positioning in which she has been situated, is to transgress the paternal law, requiring punishment and repression of her desires. If women are not “natural-born mothers,” and if the womb is merely “an organ like any other organ,” relatively useful but not much use at all if one does “not wish to utilize its sole function, that of bearing children” (SW: 109), then the rationale behind a patriarchal order begins to crumble. Thus, when a feminist discourse continues to rely on the “imaginary construct” of a mother goddess as the first and last refuge of female identity, this further mystifies women’s bodies as the receptacle and repository for phallocentric desires (SW: 110). For Carter, matriarchal myths are more often than not equally as oppressive as their patriarchal counterparts, since those feminisms that express a desire for the maternal as a source of inherent female power do not so much grant women freedom from phallocentric parameters but, in fact, help keep them in place. Overall, Carter challenges the ways in which women’s reproductive status has been used to define and oppress them through deconstructive tactics and subversive irony. Her dystopian texts invest women with power precisely because they are in possession of a womb, yet the very thing that grants them potency also makes them slaves to a patriarchal ideology, subjects only in relation to their reproductive roles. This is not to say, however, that when Carter insists on refuting maternal myths or archetypes she is calling for the rejection of motherhood, or denying the significance of the mother’s role in the process of subject identification. Carter forces us to question the values that have been invested in motherhood; instead of it being only one of many possible identifications, the female subject rarely has been permitted any other role in the symbolic order. Luce Irigaray claims this is due to the fact that in a patriarchal society women’s bodies function as objects of exchange, and so children become their sole form of currency “in exchange for a market status for themselves,” ultimately revealing that the “value underpinning our societies for thousands of years has been procreation” (1993: 84–6). Although Irigaray acknowledges how women have been able to undermine patriarchy through persistently challenging and subverting the maternal function, she remains wary of a tendency in feminist discourses toward nostalgia when returning to the old myths, stories, and sacred texts surrounding mother figures or goddesses (ibid). The inherent discursive danger is located in those feminist narratives that invoke maternal archetypes without retaining a critical distance from them, which is necessary to achieving a transformation of the social order or founding a new sexual ethics of identity (ibid). Or rather, as Carter argues, a feminist critique of women’s reproductive positioning in a patriarchal order is at risk of undermining itself when it continues to rely nostalgically on “the invocation of hypothetical great goddesses” (SW: 5), as if this might automatically confer upon women a means of socio-political empowerment. This form of feminist nostalgia engages in a fantasy that evades a confrontation with women’s present-day, lived realities, which have not been entirely emancipated from a patriarchal order (irrespective of those who claim we now live in a “post-feminist” age).
  14. ARGogate


    I feel like it's really hard to win 1. Your truth is the right truth 2. Your alt is actually indigenous epistemology (whatever that means) 3. The aff does not incorporate indigenous epistemology in some sense (again, no idea what that means) I think that this probably comes from my misunderstanding of what exactly "indigenous epistemology" is. Either you essentialize or I can just google 2 groups who ideologically disagreed with each other regarding method...
  15. This isn't cultural imperialism. It's cultural genocide. Different argument. EDIT: Don't read said and spivak at the same time
  16. ARGogate


    Well, sort of. It seems to me that a problem with characterizing this as an epistemological argument is that there is more than one theory of knowledge. I have no idea what "truth" you're talking about.
  17. ARGogate


    truth doesn't matter
  18. wat? EDIT: http://ruby.fgcu.edu/courses/twimberley/EnviroPhilo/Zimmerman1.pdf
  19. If you do a Google search for irigaray and the womb, there's good results
  20. Increased growth and integration makes armed conflict more likely – also causes overspecialization which leads to financial collapse – prefer robust statistical backingRoyal 11 [Jedidiah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Integration, Vulnerability and Risk: A New Framework for Understanding the Economic-Security Nexus,” Idiosyncratic Risk and Mitigation, Chapter 3, pg. 55/AKG] Here it is worth noting an important thematic divergence in the literature at the covariant and the idiosyncratic levels. As noted, nearly all research theories covered in chapter 2 are based on static ‘snapshots’ of a dyadic relationship. Volume of trade at a point in time tends to be the primary variable used to determine the likelihood of conflict between an integrated dyad. The theories covered in this chapter tend to focus more on transition, acknowledging that levels of integration and total growth change. They express viewpoints on how these transitions either increase or decrease incentives for states to engage in military conflict. As will be discussed in the case studies following, the notion of transition in an important element to a comprehensive view of the economic-security nexus. Theories that Suggest Idiosyncratic Shifts Resulting from Integration Lead to Conflict Our survey here first highlights a Marxist/realist tradition that suggests that as states become wealthier, they will increasingly be likely to translate that wealth into military capacity. Once the state owns a strong military advantage, it is likely to use it. Choucri and North (1975) pioneered this argument, known as ‘lateral pressure theory’, as a means of explaining correlation between growth and conflict. They suggest that ‘the combination of demand and capabilities will create the predisposition to reach beyond national boundaries to satisfy demands’ (Choucri and North 1975, 17). As such, Choucri and North believe that as a country becomes individually wealthier, its willingness to undertake foreign military commitments increases simultaneously. Realists also find a relationship between economic integration and idiosyncratic risk that results in a greater likelihood of conflict. Pollins (2008) argues that economic integration leads to a transnational reorganisation of production and accelerates the transitions between ascending and descending powers. This occurs on a global level with system-wide shifts in the distribution of power, but manifests itself in terms of security conditions primarily at a state level. As new states gain wealth and power, they begin to look outward. This ‘war chest’ theory is similar in character and consequence to ‘lateral pressure theory’, though the motivations differ. According to the former theory, a state becomes more conflict prone because it has the resources to be more successful in military conflict. According to the latter theory, proclivity towards conflict is due to a perceived requirement to fuel a growing economy. Others have argued that absolute, or individual, growth is less important than relative growth. Organski’s (1958) theory of ‘power transition’ relies on this concept. Major wars result from the preponderance of power transitioning from one primary state to another. Werner finds a measure of support for this theory, and concludes that ‘leaders make demands and initiate a process of negotiations that may ultimately result in conflict when they perceive that what they can rationally obtain via the threat of force differs from what they currently have’ (Werner 1999, 723). The creation of wealth winners and losers through integration provides a point of transition where domestic perceptions of the likelihood of victory change. This can reduce the overall potential for a mutually acceptable bargain to be struck prior to the use of military force. The bargaining theory of war suggests that asymmetry provides an obvious outcome that both parties can perceive, which brings the less powerful party to the negotiating table. Instead, parity between powers leads to miscalculation, because those parties are less able to perceive a clear winner. The existence of private information denies either side the ability to fully know the capabilities of the other, resulting in a greater opportunity for conflict. Reaching a negotiated alternative is less likely when miscalculation is more likely.4 Here again, domestic economic growth resulting from economic integration can change a national-level view of the potential for victory. According to this line of thinking, economic integration, specifically the process of economic growth through comparative advantage, redistributes wealth between and among nations. Those winners out of this process develop new needs for resources that naturally expand their interests further afield. Hegre has recently provided some statistical evidence that would appear to support this concept. Using a gravity model to determine how trade volumes between countries impact their absolute or individual level of economic wealth, Hegre finds that growth in power by any one state increases its likelihood to enter into inter-state disputes. He writes, ‘I show that a set of size variables – based on countries’ population and their military capabilities – significantly and strongly increases the probability of militarized dispute between countries’ (Hegre 2008, 586). When applied to the topic of this paper, the main point drawn out by the Choucri and North, Pollins, Organski and Hegre findings is that winners from economic integration are more likely to enter into foreign military disputes. Pollins and Schweller (1999) look specifically at the experience of the United States from 1790-1993, and found support for this conclusion. They find that US power has grown in sync with the extent to which it has integrated its economy within the global economy. This growth, at an individual level, has coincided with increases in US military engagements overseas. They suggest that ‘diversionary theory’, ‘war chest theory’, and ‘lateral pressure’ theory are all potential reasons for why this has occurred, acknowledging that the underlying rationale which may differ between administrations and global power conditions.5 These political science themes are not new to the economic-security nexus debate, yet the attention they have received in the past two decades has paled in comparison to the theories addressed in chapter 2. This lack of attention from the political science community is surprising, as national-level characteristics remain an active theme of political science research in other areas of international relations theory. Even more surprising is that the economic-security nexus debate has not yet considered the impact of economic integration on a state’s domestic economic conditions. Here a great wealth of economic research remains unexploited. One new area that is worthy of consideration within this context pertains to the theme of economic specialisation. The reordering of national economies in accordance with principles of competitive advantage encourages states to develop specialised industries. The process of specialisation is important for nations to obtain the greatest possible efficiency in order to maximise profit. However, it also creates vulnerability through a lack of diversification. For example, as technology advances, states with a particularly heavy reliance on an old technology will become losers in direct contrast to states that introduce the new technology. Specialisation increases any one state’s dependency on the system and on its specific partners. In parallel with realist thinking already highlighted, increased dependency generally leads to insecurity. States relatively less dependent can exploit the situation of states relatively more dependent, leading to increased opportunity for conflict. There is also growing evidence that specialisation is a primary determinant of whether a state is contagious to a broader financial crisis. Gande, et al. (2008) provide evidence to support three relevant conclusions for this paper. First, they conclude that an increase in the level of specialisation leads to an increase in the probability of financial crisis. Indeed, they even suggest that specialisation is the primary root of financial crises. Second, access to external finance decreases this probability, though it also creates incentives for debt induced risk-shifting that can lead to risky overinvestment and minimise the overall palliative effect. Third, government safety nets such as subsidies and bailouts lead to higher debt concentration of bank loans that further increase the likelihood of financial crisis.
  21. Irigaray and a critique of equating the oceans with the womb
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