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Everything posted by Stirner

  1. For the most part, people I've been judging are reading a cyber advantage and either Internet of Things k2 warming and/or some a competitiveness advantage (either heg or econ impact). I don't understand why teams don't just advantage CP warming/heg+econ, and read an Internet of Things disad (IoT cause cyberterror - ev is fairly good on this, and it isn't hard to win u/q no cyberterror now for the turn) as a net benefit. NB to the CP is straight-turned cyberterror adv, which I doubt the aff has link defense to other than backdoors solves (protip: it doesn't). Overall - this isn't unique to this year - it's just the amount of garbage advs not intrinsic to affs that make me wish people deployed advantage CPs more. 90% of the time, the specificity of the aff's internal link doesn't matter.
  2. EU offshoring is quite good. Other offshoring scenarios (I know links exist for Australia) may be worth researching as well.
  3. Export controls is total garbage, imo. Have judged far too many backdoors/encryption affs, and I don't think they're very good either.
  4. I don't understand why we're predicting people won't run neolib/cap variants next year (or why they won't be common). Yes, Latin America was a particularly fertile ground for neolib, but not markedly more than oceans. Next year's high school topic is US development (and/or exploration... that might be problematic for neolib, idk) of the oceans. Wind farm affs, oil affs, affs that bolster shipping routes/the navy... basically every aff on the topic I can think of has some sort of plausible link to neolib. I didn't run neolib much, but I had some success by running a framework-heavy K. I say this because most of my experience debating neolib comes from being a 2A answering the K, and partly because I don't like dealing with the complexities of a framework debate and partly because I was running an aff very susceptible to neolib (a trade aff with a heg impact), I just impact-turned the K to avoid what I think can quickly become an uphill battle for the aff. So, on the Latin American topic, many teams ran the standard "neolib DA" - Neolib collapsing now (Pineo), aff revives it, that's bad. I think that a more strategic way of running neolib (especially on this topic, where you don't have Latin America specific UQ ev, and you'll have to go for "world revolution" nonsense to win the DA) is as a K of the aff's method and assumptions - the DA scenario is problematic because: (1) Your uniqueness is going to be garbage (Latin America was different because of the Pink Tide and US SOI/retrenchment scenarios - oceans are not) (2) The internal link threshold is difficult to quantify (neolib collapsing and aff is neoliberal - that doesn't prove that the aff is significantly neoliberal enough to actually make a difference between neolib's structural decline or survival. It will be incredibly difficult to find any sort of internal link differential specific to an aff/advantage on this topic - maybe sea routes/shipping lanes k2 global capitalism? - which pretty much kills the neolib DA). The more successful strat that I've used occasionally and that I found more difficult to answer (not really, because impact turns, but it can become a fuzzy framework debate) is: - Aff relies on neoliberal way of thinking (insert markets, heg, state link) - Neoliberalism is bad, the neoliberal mindset is bad, (the aff's agent is bad...), etc. - Utopian thought good Read indicts of state engagement and turn this into a role of the ballot debate - alternative is to think about counter-neoliberal intellectual strategies, aff is a neoliberal intellectual strategy (this sets up clear competition for the perm debate, if you can refocus the debate from competing policies to competing methodologies). Clearly, fiat is illusory + policy roleplaying fails (evidence on state engagement ceding the political if you want) which takes out the aff's offense on the framework debate, which means the only productive use of the ballot is to reward speech acts that produce the better form of pedagogy in the round. This alt is intentionally ambiguous because it renounces fiat - it's essentially an indict of the aff's presuppositions and a desire for "something else". You shouldn't be required to clearly articulate what that "something else" is if you can make a case that either: (a) neolib is fundamentally immoral, that's a d-rule - the judge has a prima facia obligation to reject it or ( neolib is really terrible and we can probably figure out something that's better (The analogy when asked "what does the alternative look like" that I always gave is that "we could never possibly predict what the alternative looks like - we just know that neolib is bad. If I were an American in 1830, I wouldn't know what the alternative to slavery looks like, but that doesn't mean slavery isn't wrong and should not be rejected. asking 'how will the world function' in the absence of neoliberalism is like asking 'who will pick the cotton' in the absence of slavery". It's a good way of rhetorically demonstrating how the d-rule should override alt solvency and why utopian thought is good - that is, why ethics/the impact debate should form the basis of the judge's endorsement of the alternative) An alternative that endorses an intellectual approach is probably most strategic, unless, again, you have a very specific neolib DA to the aff (squo collapse of shipping lanes kills global trade kills global capitalism, aff props them up - neg controls uq, alternative is decentralized economic socialism, w/e). It insulates you fairly well from the standard "alternatives fail - Mao and Stalin" impact turns, UQ debate ("slavery's happening now" isn't a reason why it's inevitable - thinking about counterstrategies is more important in the long term than imagining hypothetical scenarios for making slavery more efficient, a la the plan), and aff impacts (via the framework debate and Role of Ballot) - you really only have to win the link and impact, which should not be hard given that both of these could conceivably be the same for every topic (USFG bad, causes poverty).
  5. Just to be clear, Paul Craig Roberts is by no means a legitimate heg impact author. He's a conspiratorial crackpot. There are way better (even more recent) heg impact turns for you to read that do not involve a guy who writes for Lew Rockwell.
  6. This is a possible impact of the oil DA. Scotland is a major oil-producting nation (well, oil constitutes a major part of the Scottish economy). Low oil prices tank the Scottish economy, results in nationalism, Scotland secedes from the UK. Impact-level, I've heard that most of the UK's nukes are in Scotland. Scotland is also very anti-nuke. I've heard some people say that there's ev that independent Scotland would dismantle UK's nuclear arsenal and trigger a global move against proliferation ----> prolif good, prevents conventional war. But I don't see why you'd want to run this unless you want to catch someone off-guard with a weird internal link scenario, but the impact is so conventional and impact-turnable that there's no real point. Ultimately I think Scottish nationalism is a no-go DA.
  7. Midterms. I was doing research a while ago and there was a pretty awesome IMF reform politics DA during May, but I'm not sure what the uniqueness will look like come nationals. It had amazing globalization impacts, though. Other than that... idk. Maybe another immigration push? What happened to that transportation bill?
  8. Here's my version of the Guterl card. Reposting because the formatting is prettier: Best methodology shows positive feedbacks will push us past the tipping point – causes extinction.Guterl 12 – Executive Editor of Scientific American, expert in Climate and Environment, Science Policy, citing James Hanson, a NASA scientist (Fred, “Climate Armageddon: How the World’s Weather Could Quickly Run Amokâ€, 5/25/12; < http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-worlds-weather-could-quickly-run-amok>)//Beddow The world has warmed since those heady days of Gaia, and scientists have grown gloomier in their assessment of the state of the world's climate. NASA climate scientist James Hanson has warned of a "Venus effect," in which runaway warming turns Earth into an uninhabitable desert, with a surface temperature high enough to melt lead, sometime in the next few centuries. Even Hanson, though, is beginning to look downright optimistic compared to a new crop of climate scientists, who fret that things could head south as quickly as a handful of years, or even months, if we're particularly unlucky. Ironically, some of them are intellectual offspring of Lovelock, the original optimist gone sour. The true gloomsters are scientists who look at climate through the lens of "dynamical systems," a mathematics that describes things that tend to change suddenly and are difficult to predict. It is the mathematics of the tipping point—the moment at which a "system" that has been changing slowly and predictably will suddenly "flip." The colloquial example is the straw that breaks that camel's back. Or you can also think of it as a ship that is stable until it tips too far in one direction and then capsizes. In this view, Earth's climate is, or could soon be, ready to capsize, causing sudden, perhaps catastrophic, changes. And once it capsizes, it could be next to impossible to right it again. The idea that climate behaves like a dynamical system addresses some of the key shortcomings of the conventional view of climate change—the view that looks at the planet as a whole, in terms of averages. A dynamical systems approach, by contrast, consider climate as a sum of many different parts, each with its own properties, all of them interdependent in ways that are hard to predict. One of the most productive scientists in applying dynamical systems theory to climate is Tim Lenton at the University of East Anglia in England. Lenton is a Lovelockian two generations removed— his mentors were mentored by Lovelock. "We are looking quite hard at past data and observational data that can tell us something," says Lenton. "Classical case studies in which you've seen abrupt changes in climate data. For example, in the Greenland ice-core records, you're seeing climate jump. And the end of the Younger Dryas," about fifteen thousand years ago, "you get a striking climate change." So far, he says, nobody has found a big reason for such an abrupt change in these past events—no meteorite or volcano or other event that is an obvious cause—which suggests that perhaps something about the way these climate shifts occur simply makes them sudden. Lenton is mainly interested in the future. He has tried to look for things that could possibly change suddenly and drastically even though nothing obvious may trigger them. He's come up with a short list of nine tipping points—nine weather systems, regional in scope, that could make a rapid transition from one state to another. I haven't actually cut many positive feedback cards - you can go through old warming files or, better yet, do more research of your own if you want to run warming (I have very rarely, if ever, gone for warming - all my affs are heg). Here's an answer to adaptation, though, that implicitly refers to positive feedbacks: it should provide some weight when answering the impact turns/defense: Adaptation fails – warming is just too extreme. Stabinsky 12 – Professor at College of the Atlantic USA, compiled for WWF International Global Climate and Energy Initiative (Doreen, “Tackling the Limits to Adaptation: An International Framework to Address ‘Loss and Damage’ From Climate Change Impactsâ€, November 2012; < http://www.careclimatechange.org/files/Doha_COP_18/tackling_the_limits_lr.pdf>)//Beddow When mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by responsible countries is insufficient to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate systemâ€, 22 countries are forced to undertake disaster risk reduction and adaptation measures to prevent permanent loss and damage. There are, however, limits to how far disaster risk reduction and adaptation can reduce loss and damage. In the case of disaster risk reduction, some types of disasters will increase in frequency and severity (see Box 1 on the latest intergovernmental panel on climate Change (IPCC) findings regarding extreme events), overwhelming both risk reduction measures and generally the ability of most developing countries to cope with the impacts of those disasters. Moreover, loss and damage from extreme events extend beyond immediate losses of property and life. In St. Lucia, damage from hurricane Tomas was estimated at about 34% of total gdp. 23 Such devastating impact has a serious effect on long-term prospects for sustainable development. 24 Adaptation to 2°C of warming will be more difficult than for 1.5° c . Adapting to 4° c or 6° c of warming may be impossible. Moreover, given the changing nature of the global climate, adaptation will always be insufficient, requiring a continuous learning process towards a constantly moving boundary. The greater the warming, the more loss and damage that can be anticipated from the adverse effects of climate change. Similarly, the less support for adaptation in terms of finance, technology and capacity, the more loss and damage will result. A country’s level of development will also affect how its population experiences loss and damage, as poverty and related socio-economic and infrastructure weaknesses exacerbate the impacts and adverse effects of climate change. But a country’s lack of development or status of development is not an excuse for inaction by the global community to help them respond to severe climate loss and damage. There are very real limits to how far human systems and ecosystems can adapt to most of the slow-onset processes identified in UNFCCC decision 1/CP.16. This is true particularly for rises in temperature and sea levels, ocean acidification, loss of biodiversity, salinization and desertification. Because such processes progress and increase their impact over time – and often at large scale, adaptation gradually becomes less possible. As temperatures and sea levels rise, territory will become uninhabitable and unproductive. s oil moisture levels will decrease to the point that cultivation of crops is no longer viable in entire regions. Groundwater sources in coastal areas will become too saline to be used as drinking water. Adaptation will become impossible on low-lying islands, in settlements close to sea level, and in the most arid regions. This will lead to permanent loss of lands, livelihoods and cultural resources. 26 Permanent loss and damage from slow-onset disasters will go far beyond economic loss – livelihoods will be lost, territory will have to be abandoned, and migrants from non-productive lands will lose their homes, culture and community.
  9. I don't remember the specifics of the article (so it might not function as an impact), but this article by Zakaria ( http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?nocache=1 ) seems to impact partisanship in heg. Then again, this is probably extremely non-unique, especially because Zakaria is making a predictive claim about status quo partisanship's effect on American grand strategy. Still, if you're able to find warrants for a sufficient internal link threshold that ocean policy triggers, heg seems like a legitimate impact. If you're able to generate that degree of internal link uniqueness for a partisanship disad, that's probably better than a politics disad, tbh (way more intrinsic to the plan, so averts annoying theory debate altogether).
  10. 1) Negative feedbacks are natural phenomena that warming causes that, in turn, reduce the actual effect of warming. Here's a common one: Warming increases heat/sunlight hitting earth. That increases the amount of water vapor in the earth's atmosphere (because of accelerated evaporation). That increased water vapor (cloud cover) is very reflective. That increased reflection of sunlight reduces the effect of warming. This is essentially a resiliency argument - as warming increases, negative feedbacks check the effects of warming, so each new marginal amount of warming actually impacts the environment in incrementally smaller ways. 2) I'd answer both by claiming that there exists a difference in the hypothetical magnitude of warming that their authors fail to take into account (read, like, Guterl 12. Guterl uses a different method for calculating warming impacts than do most authors, and this method lends itself to very inflated impacts that occur very rapidly). This sounds silly, but essentially just say "no, warming is very, very big". Resiliency authors are answering claim that warming will be harmful, but not that it will be an extinction-level event. Provide reasons for why warming will be devastating - positive feedbacks, for example (things that warming triggers that, in turn, accelerate warming. Ex: warming melts arctic ice caps, causes release of methane, which ramps up warming). As for effect distribution, the above sort of answers that (they say warming occurs mostly in cold climates, we say warming is so devastating that any distribution of its effects is unacceptable... even if cold climates are disproportionately effected, we're all gonna melt anyway). But I'd also indict their studies with the opposite claim (there are authors who claim that the effects are mostly concentrated in warm areas with a gradient running the opposite way - this means it'll be extremely devastating to the places where most people live). And say that warming in cold areas is just as bad (due to global flooding, etc.).
  11. Side note: I actually think biodiversity/other environmental impact scenarios will be way better on this topic than warming. At least, better than the 1 advantage warming aff. A 1 advantage biodiversity aff can probably defend a specific internal link chain (that X plan is the only way to ensure environmental stability in the Indian Ocean, Caribbean, etc.) that advantage counterplans don't take out. It might be a 'smaller' impact than warming (oceans bio-d probably only accesses a couple internal links to extinction - maybe you can access some fishing/resource war scenarios?), but that shouldn't be a problem, because it's insulated enough from advantage counterplans that your no war contention should be enough to beat the DA/'any risk' framing.
  12. No war – great powers are responsible, nukes deter, and conflicts remain local. Kennedy 13 - Dilworth Professor of History and director of International Security Studies at Yale University (Paul, “The Great Powers, Then and Nowâ€, 8/13/13; < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/opinion/global/the-great-powers-then-and-now.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>)//Beddow All of these Great Powers are egoistic, more or less blinkered, with governments chiefly bent upon surviving a few more years. But none of them are troublemakers; nor are they, in any really significant sense, a source of trouble. Would they but realize it, they all have a substantial interest in preserving the international status quo, since they do not know what negative consequences would follow a changed world order. The troublemakers, and the sources of trouble, lie elsewhere: in the unpredictable, overmilitarized lunatic asylum that is North Korea; in an Iran that sometimes seems to be daring an Israeli air strike; in a brutal and autistic Syrian regime; in a Yemen that both houses terrorists and pretends to be killing them off; and, far less purposefully, in the conflict-torn, crumbling polities of Central Africa, Egypt and Afghanistan, and many nations in between. Here are the world’s problem cases. If there are neurotic Kaiser Wilhelms or bullying Mussolinis or murderous Stalins around today, they are not — thank heavens — to be found in Beijing, Moscow or New Delhi. If this thesis is correct, and the Great Powers, while sometimes complaining about one another’s actions, generally act in a restrained manner, then perhaps we may look forward to a long period without a major war, rather like the unprecedented peace among the Great Powers that existed after 1815 under the Concert of Europe. Many wars would still take place, but they would be local conflicts, not cause enough, despite their atrocities and inhumanity, to drag a major actor directly into the fighting. The Great Powers, in turn, would set aside their own differences to keep the bloodshed local, putting pressure upon their own client states if necessary to stop them from upsetting the international apple cart. In no way would this be a “democratic peace.†Rather, it would continue to be an Old Boys’ club, even if it has new members like India and Brazil. The myth of the equality of all nation-states would indeed remain a myth. Such is the price that liberal internationalists would have to pay to ensure the avoidance of a Third World War. The price the Great Powers have to pay is self-restraint, year after year, decade after decade. If this is forgotten, then another 1914-like crisis could occur. At that time, it will be remembered, Russia failed to rein in its “trouble-making†satellite, Serbia. Austria-Hungary recklessly sent Belgrade an impossible-to-accept ultimatum. Berlin, forgetting Bismarck’s cautions, foolishly supported Vienna. A weak czar lost control of his country’s military plans. The Prussian army struck westwards, occupying Belgium, and bringing in the British Empire. Are we sure some equivalent follies will never happen again, even though nuclear weapons surely help keep governments from going over the brink? When you say your prayers, spare one for the leaders of the Great Powers. They may not be attractive individuals — some are nasty, blinkered and devious. But so long as they realize their responsibilities to prevent any actions that might lead to a world war, we should all be happy. Their job is simply to hold firm the iron frame that keeps the international system secure. It is our job, not theirs, to work within that frame, to advance the dignity and prosperity of humanity. But that will never be achieved without the Great Powers acting reasonably well.
  13. I still can't find any damn militarization ev for this topic though
  14. Yup. If you have a robust defense of your solvency mechanism that somehow kills counterplan solvency then, by all means, go ahead. I'd just caution this route if you don't 1) Right, but these are long-term scenarios, and it is more of a case of warming "subsuming" than "turning" the impact. Take, for example, a heg aff that hits a Ukrainian dipcap disad (impact is a Ukrainian civil war). The aff (assuming we "get" the benefits of heg prior to the DA's link being triggered) can use heg to effectively mitigate the neg's offense. The US could leverage its various sources of influence to deescalate a DA, and military heg raises the cost of going to war through deterrence which solves the terminal impact to the DA (I'm not really in hegemony's batting corner, here, I'm just saying that it has a lot of utility in this regard). Whereas, a big laundry list warming impact (like the Takacks 96 environment impact) mentions a lot of impact scenarios that result from warming, but there's no reverse causal relationship that the aff can wield against the neg's offense. While a Ukrainian civil war might be a long-term consequence of warming, solving warming does not prevent that scenario from occuring as a result of the DA. So warming might be a very "big" impact (in that it will subsume the negative's offense), but it doesn't "turn" the neg's scenarios because it doesn't mitigate the risk of the DA's terminal impact. 2) Yeah, this is a definitely a strategic benefit of the 1 adv warming aff. If you're good at defending no war and you have up-to-date evidence, then go for it. But this has diminishing utility when not hitting novices. A good team will have yes war prepped decently well (with answers to specific warrants - i.e., nuclear deterrence fails, liberal ir wrong, etc.), and they won't have to win a tremendous risk of the DA in order to justify voting for the advantage counterplan (again, if you have adv cps figured out, it's another story - warming+no war suddenly becomes way more of a downhill debate). And idk about Ks. I always impact turned ks with imperialism good when I was the 2a, so I guess this is a consideration if you don't want to, lol. 7) squo solves (natural gas) 8) Negative feedbacks check 9) No warming (modelling fails, cooling now, no tipping point,etc.) 10) Not anthro 11) Effect distribution 12) Resiliency/Decreased sensitivity 13) You covered this with "warming good", but remember just how many impact turn scenarios there are (ice age, russia econ, canada econ, arctic resources good, desertification/greening, agriculture, etc. etc.) Probably other no warming args, but I can't science I'm sure every warming debater is prepped against all of those (well... probably not, but most of them), but that's not the point. The point is that, contrary to what OP would lead us to believe, negs don't just roll over when they hit warming advantages. There are a variety of arguments to be read against warming - that doesn't make it a weak impact, but my point is that there's nothing special about warming that makes it a particularly strong impact. Relations scenarios, for example, are not easily impact turnable (credible authors generally don't write things like "Russia relations bad" or "EU relations bad"). As I explained in the previous section, there's not a huge amount of offensive utility against DAs for warming (you can inflate your impact all you want - e.g. warming subsumes Arctic war et al -, but that doesn't mitigate the risk of the DA very much. You don't get to really "turn" the disad by taking out the internal link chain escalation to war). And it's not something 'surprising' that negs won't know how to answer (I read a European centralization scenario this year - European economic decline causes political integration, leads to hegemonic security competition in Eurasia, intercivilizational nuclear war. Good teams obviously don't just give up against this, but they don't really have the evidence to attack this advantage on the terminal impact level. The point being, this advantage had strategic utility because it was something nobody had any substantive defense to - warming doesn't have that utility). The point is not that warming's a garbage impact and everyone should be running heg (but, seriously though, you all should be running heg). The point is that there's no overwhelming strategic benefit to warming as an impact. The real benefit is the ability to "no war" all the neg's offense away, but that doesn't pay off when you A) hit a good team hit an advantage CP you aren't prepared for Now, if you can competently beat every conceivable advantage counterplan (then you've found a good aff...) and you are very good on the no war debate, then you get to reap the benefits of the 1 advantage warming aff (you get to lazily disregard the technics of the disad debate and basically win rounds based on impact-heavy overviews... not a bad thing at all: also the main benefit of the heg adv!). I'd just caution against this route if you don't think this is the case of your aff, because then you leave yourself open to a few critical vulnerabilities. It's not so simple as OP suggests: "Just pick a technology that is developed in the ocean and reduces or reverses global warming. Cut a few cards saying the technology works, attach your favorite GW cards from camp. Boom, you have a throwaway 1AC for quarterfinals against that team that sucks at warming debates." The fact that, as OP reminds us, "There are dozens of reasonable cases to choose" is probably reason to be very concerned with these vulnerabilities - there are dozens upon dozens of advantage counterplans you're susceptible to. Rambling done, I'd basically sum up my objections to the warming aff with: 1) Advantage counterplan problems 2) Disutility against DAs If you're prepped for these, then you're good to go.
  15. Stirner

    Ocean DA's/CP's

    1-up'ing the oil da ANY reduction in current oil prices will crash Russian economy, triggers state collapse and expansionism – brink is now.Blackwill and O’Sullivan 14 – International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs/Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (Robert D. and Meghan L., “America’s Energy Edgeâ€, March/April 2014; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140750/robert-d-blackwill-and-meghan-l-osullivan/americas-energy-edge>)//Beddow A sustained drop in the price of oil, meanwhile, could destabilize Russia’s political system. Even with the current price near $100 per barrel, the Kremlin has scaled back its official expectations of annual economic growth over the coming decade to around 1.8 percent and begun to make budget cuts. If prices fall further, Russia could exhaust its stabilization fund, which would force it to make draconian budget reductions. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s influence could diminish, creating new openings for his political opponents at home and making Moscow look weak abroad. Although the West might welcome the thought of Russia under such strain, a weaker Russia will not necessarily mean a less challenging Russia. Moscow is already trying to compensate for losses in Europe by making stronger inroads into Asia and the global LNG market, and it will have every reason to actively counter Europe’s efforts to develop its own resources. Indeed, Russia’s state-run media, the state-owned gas company Gazprom, and even Putin himself have warned of the environmental dangers of fracking in Europe -- which is, as The Guardian has put it, “an odd phenomenon in a country that usually keeps ecological concerns at the bottom of its agenda.†To discourage European investment in the infrastructure needed to import LNG, Russia may also preemptively offer its European customers more favorable gas deals, as it did for Ukraine at the end of 2013. More dramatically, should low energy prices undermine Putin and empower more nationalist forces in the country, Russia could seek to secure its regional influence in more direct ways -- even through the projection of military power. <LINK – PLAN REDUCES PRICES> A weakened Russia lashes out – triggers war.Karatnycky and Motyl 09 ­– Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States, Managing Partner of the Myrmidon Group LCC, contributor to Foreign Affairs and Council on Foreign Relations / Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University and contributor to the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs (Adrian and Alexander J., “The Key to Kiev: Ukraine’s Security Means Europe’s Stabilityâ€, May/June 2009; <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64953/adrian-karatnycky-and-alexander-j-motyl/the-key-to-kiev>)//Beddow Under another scenario, a weak Russia with a flagging economy, a decrepit military, and a brittle state would become aggressive either because it believed it was stronger than it really was or because it thought that a quick little crisis might enhance the government's popular legitimacy at home. Russia would then run the very serious risk of engaging in imperial overreach. Despite Putin's bluster and the Russian army's quick victory over tiny Georgia last summer, Russia is at root a flawed, corrupt, and potentially unstable petrostate. And with its propensity for belligerent and nationalist propaganda, such a Russia may continue to engage in militaristic adventurism and experience internal turmoil. Russia resembles more a Third World country that has a nuclear bomb and raw materials than a mature postindustrial state. The more it extends its reach, the more it will get embroiled in military adventures -- and the greater the likelihood of economic, military, or political disaster. If nothing else, more adventurism on Russia's part would be an invitation to its own repressed minorities, such as the Chechens, to reactivate their struggles.
  16. Yeah, this seems to be a major strategic weakness: warming affs defend one, broad impact, so thousands of potential advantage counterplans can take it out. I would advise against the one advantage warming aff - unless your aff defends a very specific internal link chain that only you access, it's advisable to spread advantages across a few issue areas to insulate your internal links from potential advantage counterplans. Unless you're really prepped out (and I suppose, given that you have one advantage, you probably should be... still, massive research burden, given the CP ground), I'd worry about being too vulnerable to advantage counterplans. There'd need to be some "trick" to the aff (like, reducing emissions is impossible/warming inevitable, only iron fertilization stops terminal impact... I know nothing about warming so don't call me on this) - some way of nuancing the impact debate so that the counterplan doesn't solve your specific warming scenario. Either that or be prepared to defend some good addons (which there... probably are for most of these affs?). Also, I don't think warming is difficult to answer, as OP seems to imply. I think that the single-adv warming aff is workable, but I don't understand why it's so strategically appealing. Warming and heg are probably the two most common aff impacts year-to-year. Everyone will have a huge amount of up-to-date impact defense, turns, solvency deficits, etc. against these advantages - the only difference is that heg is more easily leveraged against negative offense, whereas warming affs have to work with more impact-specific defense (e.g. it'll be harder to win warming turns whatever war impact to the politics disad comes up next year than to win heg turns the DA). That heg good digression aside, my point is that warming, as an advantage, doesn't have an incredible amount of strategic utility. It's not insulated from impact turns (like most relations scenarios), it's not something few people write defense to (like European centralization), it doesn't give case a huge amount of freedom in turning the DA (like heg), and it's not well insulated from negative counterplans (like a very specific war scenario - the China ASAT scenario from the space topic, for example). I'd worry that my warming-only aff would be hard-pressed to deal with a huge amount of negative case defense+turns (which'd constantly be updated, assuming you're hitting a good team) and spread out dealing with the remainder of the disads (can't leverage case against them) and advantage counterplans. The fatal flaw of the warming aff is that it's pidgeonholed into a very narrow position that can be taken out by a well-evidenced CP. I'm not saying it's an awful idea or that it can't be done very well, but I think it's a large research burden that would require a lot of in-round maneuvering, especially against new arguments.
  17. Stirner

    Ocean DA's/CP's

    I'd prep a few generic DAs with links to specific geographic areas of ocean development. Like a China lashout DA against South China Sea affs, for example (admittedly, a lot of these may end up just being impact turns, so offense might be problematic). Naval overstretch DAs or naval lashout DAs might be good, or bio-d disads, all depending on the aff. Oil will link to a lot of affs. It's not a military topic, but ocean militarization might be a decent disad depending on the aff's advantages. I can't imagine what politics links might look like... dipcap might have a (more) coherent link story if it's a treaty aff.
  18. Stirner

    Big affs

    Here's the marine spatial planning aff I cut for our novices next year. It's just an outline b/c I haven't found other advantages and I've just started it. I think MSP/oceans mapping has good biodiversity impact ground.Non-military is problematic for some of my aff ideas, but I think South China Sea/Arctic affs look very promising. Deepwater ports in the Arctic are probably non-military but have military applications with strong ground for Arctic cooperation/war scenarios (also, depending on definitions of development, legal frameworks might qualify, in whcih case an Arctic Council aff looks good. I have no idea what T looks like on his topic). 1AC Plan Plan – the United States Federal Government should adopt a comprehensive policy of Marine Spatial Planning. Here’s our solvency advocate:OPTF 10 – administration Council on environmental quality task force to develop new national policy on oceans, established by Barack Obama (Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, “Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Forceâ€, 7/19/10; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/OPTF_FinalRecs.pdf>)//Beddow Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning: Implement comprehensive, integrated, ecosystem-based coastal and marine spatial planning and management in the United States. Obstacles and Opportunities The ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes are host to countless commercial, recreational, scientific, energy, and security activities, which often occur in or near areas set aside and managed for conservation and resource protection goals. Overlapping uses and differing views, about what activities should occur and where, can generate conflicts and misunderstandings. Coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP) that fully incorporates the principles of ecosystem-based management will provide a means to objectively and transparently guide and balance allocation decisions for use of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes waters and resources. It would allow for the reduction of cumulative impacts from human uses on marine ecosystems, provide greater certainty for the public and private sector in planning new investments, and reduce conflicts among uses and between using and preserving the environment to sustain critical ecological, economic, recreational, and cultural services for this and future generations. The Plan Should Address: • Implementation and expansion of the Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning as described later in this document. Biodiversity Ocean biodiversity declining now, destroys entire ecosystem – only MSP can solve.Foley et al 10 – Stanford University Center for Ocean Solutions, Wood Institute for the Environment, University of California Santa Cruz Ecology and Evolutionary Biology (Melissa M., “Guiding Ecological Principles for Marine Spatial Planningâ€, 2/4/10; < micheli.stanford.edu/pdf/18-Foleyetal2010MarPol.pdf>)//Beddow The declining health of marine ecosystems around the world is evidence that current piecemeal governance is inadequate to successfully support healthy coastal and ocean ecosystems and sustain human uses of the ocean. One proposed solution to this problem is ecosystem-based marine spatial planning (MSP), which is a process that informs the spatial distribution of activities in the ocean so that existing and emerging uses can be maintained, use conflicts reduced, and ecosystem health and services protected and sustained for future generations. Because a key goal of ecosystem-based MSP is to maintain the delivery of ecosystem services that humans want and need, it must be based on ecological principles that articulate the scientifically recognized attributes of healthy, functioning ecosystems. These principles should be incorporated into a decision-making framework with clearly defined targets for these ecological attributes. This paper identifies ecological principles for MSP based on a synthesis of previously suggesed and/or operationalized principles, along with recommendations generated by a group of twenty ecologists and marine scientists with diverse backgrounds and perspectives on MSP. The proposed four main ecological principles to guide MSP—maintaining or restoring: native species diversity, habitat diversity and heterogeneity, key species, and connectivity—and two additional guidelines, the need to account for context and uncertainty, must be explicitly taken into account in the planning process. When applied in concert with social, economic, and governance principles, these ecological principles can inform the designation and siting of ocean uses and the management of activities in the ocean to maintain or restore healthy ecosystems, allow delivery of marine ecosystem services, and ensure sustainable economic and social benefits. The health of global marine ecosystems is in serious decline, and multiple stressors, including overfishing, pollution, invasive species, coastal development, and climate change, compromise the ability of ocean and coastal ecosystems to support and sustain the goods and services people want and need [1—4]. Uncoordinated expansion of existing uses of the ocean and the addition of emerging uses, such as renewable energy and large- scale aquaculture, along with a rapidly growing coastal human population, are likely to further exacerbate the decline of marine ecosystem health. Maintaining the well-being of ocean ecosystems, as well as their ability to provide essential ecosystem services for human populations [5,6], will require an alternative strategy to replace the current patchwork of complex, uncoordinated, and often disjointed rules and regulations governing use of coastal and ocean waters around the world [7]. The future of the oceans depends on successful, immediate implementation of a comprehensive governance framework that moves away from a sector-by-sector management approach to one that (1) balances the increasing number, diversity, and intensity of human activities with the ocean’s ability to provide ecosystem services; (2) incorporates appropriate ecological, economic, social, and cultural perspectives; and (3) supports management that is coordinated at the scale of ecosystems as well as political jurisdictions [1,7—9]. Each of these goals demands spatially explicit consideration of multiple human uses and their compat ibility, conflicts, and synergies with each other and with the ecosystem [10—14]. Such comprehensive, integrated management of marine uses and activities can be achieved in part through ecosystem-based marine spatial planning (MSP). Ecosystem-based MSP is an integrated planning framework that informs the spatial distribu tion of activities in and on the ocean in order to support current and future uses of ocean ecosystems and maintain the delivery of valuable ecosystem services for future generations in a way that meets ecological, economic, and social objectives [15]. In addition, this integrated planning process moves away from sectoral management by assessing and managing for the cumulative effects of multiple activities within a specific area [14]. An MSP process also emphasizes the legal, social, economic, and ecological complexities of governance, including the designation of author ity, stakeholder participation, financial support, analysis of current and future uses and ocean condition, enforcement, monitoring, and adaptive management (Fig. 1; [16]). Policy makers in the US have begun to consider MSP a viable strategy for managing human uses in federal waters. In June 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum calling for the development of a National Ocean Policy (NOP) that protects, maintains, and restores coastal, ocean, and Great lakes ecosystems [171. The President’s directive established an Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (OPW) to develop recommendations for a national ocean policy and framework for effective coastal and marine spatial planning. In its Interim Report [17], the OPTE identified ecosystem- based management (EBM) as a key element of the NOP, with MSP as a crucial approach to implementing EBM. The Interim Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (www.whitehouse. gov/oceans) was released on December 14, 2009, and the final report will be issued following a 60-day comment period. The Obama Administration’s efforts are one part of a larger trend toward the implementation of comprehensive marine spatial planning and management in coastal and ocean ecosystems. To date, multiple countries have undertaken MSP initiatives to spatially mange current or emerging human uses, including the United Kingdom’s part of the Irish Sea [181, Belgium’s part of the North Sea [19], the sea areas of China [20], Canada’s Eastern Scotian Shelf [21 ], the high seas [22], Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park [23] and, within the USA, the coastal waters of Massachusetts (Draft Ocean Plan 2009, http:J/www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docsjczmjvl -com plete.pdf), Rhode Island (http: //www.crmc.ri.gov/samp_ocean.html), and North Carolina [24]. However, many of these MSP efforts have a relatively limited scope and have not yet developed a comprehen sive planning process that includes all existing uses of the ocean. For example, the Massachusetts Ocean Plan has no authority over fishing or nearshore activities; in California, the Marine life Protection Act Initiative (http:J/www.dfg.ca.gov/m lpa) focuses on marine protected areas and fishing. In contrast others have explicitly addressed multiple sectors, including fishing, oil and gas development, aquaculture and shipping activities (e.g the inte grated management plan of the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea) [251. In addition, although nearly all planning efforts have outlined one goal of MSP as protecting marine ecosystem health, in many cases, ecological goals and objectives were not fully incorporated into the planning process. This paper focuses on articulating ecological ‘principles,’ or guiding concepts, that can be used to meet the goals and objectives of ecosystem-based MSP (Fig. 1). Although the importance of ecosystem health and functioning is implicit in most MSP processes (i.e. if an ecosystem is not functioning well, many services cannot be provided), it is not guaranteed to serve as a foundation of the process. In some cases, ecosystem health may not be the primary goal (e.g., siting multiple industrial uses in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea); in others, ecosystem goals may not be well defined. In either case, social and economic goals have often been prioritized to the detriment of ecological goals and objectives. Two notable examples of resource management processes that have incorporated ecological principles into a planning process are Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) [231 and Canada’s Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management project (ESSIM) [261. In the mid-1990s, the GBRMPA rezoned the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park through a process that included intense involvement of users, scientists, and the public in order to increase the number and types of species and habitats that were represented in either no-take or habitat protection zones. This rezoning process increased the spatial extent of protected zones, while maintaining a large portion of the park in general-use zones to minimize negative impacts on users. The ESSIM project used a multi-stakeholder approach to assess human uses, ecosystem features, and the interactions between these components to develop planning objectives based on the ecological well-being of the region and sustainable human use [271. The GBRMPA rezoning process and ESSIM project are examples that illustrate how specific ecological objectives can be incorporated into the planning process from the beginning to achieve the goals of ecosystem-based MSP. This paper does not seek to resolve the debate over the relative roles of social, economic, and ecological objectives in developing MSP, but argues that ecological principles should be at the foundation of any ecosystem-based MSP process. Since ecosys tem-based MSP is based on the notion that functioning ecosys tems support multiple ocean uses, such planning processes should include guiding principles to ensure that those eco system functions are in fact provided. These ecological principles should be carefully considered along with social, economic, and govern ance principles that are being developed through parallel and complementary efforts (Fig. 1). The goal of this paper is to present core ecological principles that represent a synthesis of the best current scientific understanding of the attributes of healthy, functioning ecosystems and that can guide ecosystem-based MSP regardless of scale or context. To achieve this goal, previous delineations and applications of ecological principles used for MSP and other ecosystem-based planning frameworks were synthesized and supplemented with input from an expert work shop held in Monterey, California, in March 2009. 2. Synthesis 2.1. Previously proposed ecological principles The biophysical characteristics of marine ecosystems and the nature of perturbations to these systems constrain the range, types, and intensities of human activities that can be conducted in a given area without impairing ecosystem function and services [10]. To fulfill the purpose of sustaining valuable ecosystem services, ecosystem-based MSP must be grounded in ecological principles that are based on the best readily available science so that activities can be reconciled with the objective of maintaining or restoring functioning, resilient ecosystems [10]. A variety of ecological attributes and principles have been used to guide the design of existing (e.g., MPA5) and emerging (e.g., MSP) area designation processes (Table 1). Although MPA designation and MSP have different goals (conservation vs. sustainable delivery of ecosystem services and human use, respectively), the goals are at least partially related and there is value in looking at both pro cesses for ecosystem-based principles, goals, and lessons learned. Two ecological attributes—connectivity and native species diversity—have been most commonly identified as essential for maintaining functioning marine ecosystems (Table 1). Connectivity, or the exchange of individuals among geographically separated subpopulations [28], is necessary for a wide range of ecological and evolutionary processes, including population replenishment, recovery from major disturbances, maintenance of genetic diversity, and persistence of species in the face of environmental change. Species diversity—the variety and abun dance of species within an area or ecosystem—tends to be positively correlated with ecosystem health by increasing the functioning of marine ecosystems [29J and the provision of several ecosystem services [30—321. Additional attributes identified in the literature as important to sustaining healthy marine ecosystems include habitat hetero geneity, habitat structure, and land-sea connectivity, which can be considered manifestations of diversity at the larger, landscape scale. These further recognize the fundamental importance of heterogeneity and spatial dynamics in promoting resilient and productive ecosystems (e.g., [10,33,34]). Uniqueness or rarity and vulnerable life stages or habitats were also identified to acknowledge the differential susceptibility of life stages, organ isms, and habitats to human uses and activities (Table 1). These attributes also play fundamental and often irreplaceable ecologi cal roles in maintaining populations and ecosystems [34—36]. Finally, some authors highlight the fundamental importance of biogeochemistry, biogeography, and water quality in recognition of key abiotic factors that structure ocean ecosystems (Table 1). These ecosystem attributes highlight the necessary overlap between conservation and MSP goals—many species and ecosys tem processes are essential for providing the services desired from the oceans. For ecosystem-based MSP to be effective, it must ensure that this suite of species is abundant and sustainable and important biotic and abiotic processes are maintained. In the MSP process, however, these ecosystem attributes will necessarily be incorporated into a larger framework that also involves main taining existing and future uses of the ocean. 2.2. Ecological principles for marine spatial planning To augment the review of proposed ecological principles for MSP (Table 1), a group of academic, government, and NGO scientists was convened for a 2-day workshop with the goal of producing a synthetic list of ecological principles for ecosystem- based MSP and operational guidelines for implementation. Based on this input and synthesis of information from the literature, four basic ecosystem principles are proposed to guide ecosystem- based MSP (Table 2)—maintain or restore (1) native species diversity, (2) habitat diversity and heterogeneity, (3) key species, and (4) connectivity. These four points are expanded below and highlight current scientific evidence that suggests maintaining or restoring these attributes is necessary for healthy marine ecosystems and the provision of services from those ecosystems. Although these principles are allied with conservation goals, they do not require conservation beyond the fundamental goal of maintaining those species and ecosystems that are necessary to support the activities that people pursue on and in the oceans. Two overarching guidelines are also outlined, the need to consider (1) context and (2) uncertainty, that should be addressed along with the four ecological principles in each planning and management area to ensure that temporal and spatial variability and non-linearities that characterize all ecosystems are adequately addressed. Although the four ecological principles and two overarching guidelines have been discussed before in different combinations and contexts, they are presented here in a unified synthesis and should (1) form the scientific foundation of any ecosystem-based MSP process; (2) inform the goals of the planning process; and (3) be incorporated into the operational decisions of MSP (Fig. 1). One potential application of these principles is presented for coastal California that, once integrated with socioeconomic and governance principles, could provide a framework for the implementation of MSP in California and other marine regions. 2.2.1. Maintain native species diversity Maintaining or restoring species diversity, composition and functional redundancy (e.g, the degree to which multiple species perform similar ecological functions) is essential for sustaining productive and resilient ecosystems 130—321. Species diversity, from local to global scales, can affect multiple ecosystem functions including maintenance of productivity [3137], resistance to and recovery from perturbations 138,391, capacity maintain functional redundancies within an ecosystem [40,41], and stable food web dynamics [42,43]. Although most experi mental work linking biodiversity to ecosystem functioning has not distinguished between native and exotic species, and in some cases exotic species perform essential functional roles and ecosystem functions formerly performed by native species [44,451, the focus here is on maintaining native species specifi cally in recognition of the unpredictable and highly deleterious impacts of some introduced alien species. Measurements of biodiversity can range from local (alpha diversity) to global (gamma diversity) scales [46] and can span multiple levels of biological organization from species richness and composition, to genetic diversity, to diversity of functional groups. Each biodiversity metric conveys different information about the structural and functional attributes of a particular ecosystem, and collectively they provide important information at different spatial scales. Despite the numerous scales and definitions of diversity, it is clear that, on average, more diverse assemblages support greater ecosystem function [47] and in turn, also provide more ecosystem services 130]. Species richness and composition are critical aspects of an ecosystem’s structure. These metrics are also the most commonly measured in ecological surveys allowing them to be compared across multiple temporal and/or spatial scales to reveal functional attributes of biological communities. Genetic diversity tends to be measured within populations on smaller spatial scales 148]. but there are a growing number of studies that measure genetic diversity and heterogeneity across latitudinal gradients. These large-scale measures of genetic diversity can help identify boundaries of biogeographic regions 1491. dispersal patterns of larvae [50], and differential responses changing climate conditions [51]. Although genetic diversity is important for ecological functioning 152], landscape-scale genetic data are rare, making it difficult to include this kind of diversity in ecosystem-based MSP. Functional diversity measures the variety of types of organ isms that serve different functional roles within a community irrespective of their taxonomic grouping [53,541. Functional diversity focuses on the guilds of species that are responsible for biological processes within ecosystems [55]. Species redundancy within functional groups can be low in marine communities suggesting that the loss of a single species could result in the loss of an entire functional group 156—58 ]. even in diverse ecosystems 159,60]. The strong positive correlation between species diversity and functional diversity suggests that functional diversity will be maintained if species diversity is maintained 156]. The loss of biodiversity, altered species composition, and subsequent loss of ecosystem functioning have been documented in marine habitats across the globe [61-65 1. Together with the documented examples of damage caused by some introduced non-native species 1661, these examples highlights the impor tance of maintaining high native species diversity as an ecological principle that underpins all other management goals and extends beyond traditional conservation goals [30]. Loss or reduction of native species diversity, coupled with changing environmental conditions, can push ecosystems beyond critical thresholds and drastically alter community structure, ecological functioning, and provisioning of services as has been seen in coral reef 1671, kelp forest 168,69], and coastal soft-bottom ecosystems [43]. In all of these examples, the type of ecosystem services that could be provided was altered by dramatic changes in species diversity and composition. 2.2.2. Maintain habitat diversity and heterogeneity Just as maintaining a variety of species can better sustain functioning ecosystems, maintaining habitat diversity—the num ber of different habitat types within a given area—is a crucially important component of healthy marine ecosystems. Diverse habitats promote species diversity by acting as refuge from competition and predation [70,71], providing multiple sources of prey [72] and settlement substrates [73], supporting species with specialized requirements, and ameliorating environmental stres sors [74]. Maintaining habitat heterogeneity—the spatial arrangement and relationships among habitat patches across the seascape—is also critical to ecosystem functioning. Habitat heterogeneity influences connectivity among habitats and facil itates the successful movement of individuals among multiple habitats throughout their lifetime 175.76]. Habitat diversity and heterogeneity are also important for supporting the exchange of organisms and materials among habitats [77—79]. Nevertheless, all habitats are not created equal, nor are they static. For example, upwelling circulation along the eastern margins of the world’s ocean basins brings nutrient-rich water from the deep ocean to nearshore surface waters, fueling high levels of primary production that form the base of species-rich and productive nearshore food webs [80,81]. Many animals visit these regions seasonally and form feeding, breeding, and aggregation habitats that only exist for a limited time each year. The development and persistence of these upwelling fronts are essential to the functioning of nearshore marine communities 182.83 1 and changes to these important habitat-forming features can have significant effects on the survival of adults and successful rearing of young [84,85]. In most ecosystems, increased species diversity is positively correlated with increased habitat diversity 134,861. Thus, main taining high habitat diversity and heterogeneity is an important and useful proxy for maintaining species diversity at multiple spatial scales [411. Because habitat data (e.g., mapping) are relatively easier to collect than species-level data, habitat diversity is often used as a proxy for species diversity 1871 for management and conservation planning purposes (e.g., 179]). To maintain the relationship between habitat and species diversity, however, it is necessary to protect habitats of sufficient size, proximity, and numbers so the habitat mix is viable and resilient, allows for individuals to move between habitats (e.g., habitat corridors), and increases the likelihood that all habitats of a given type will not be destroyed during catastrophic events 188,891. In addition, it is likely that the provision of multiple ecosystem services will be maintained with the protection of multiple habitat types 190]. 223. Maintain key species Although weak interactions among a large suite of species can have important stabilizing effects on community structure and functioning [91,921, the dynamics of marine ecosystems are often driven by a few key species that have disproportionately strong effects on community structure and function 1931. These key species are essential to marine ecosystem functioning, and fluctuations in their populations can drive high levels of variability in community structure and functioning. Maintaining populations of key species—such as keystone species, foundation species, basal prey species, and top predators—is especially important because there is typically limited functional redun dancy of their roles in the community. Such cascading trophic interactions are common in a wide variety of marine ecosystems 1941. Keystone species have community-level effects that are often disproportionate to their biomass 195,96]. For example, in temperate intertidal communities, the seas tar Pisaster achracecus maintains high levels of species diversity by consuming the dominant space competitor Mytilus californianos, thereby allowing competitively inferior species to persist 197,98]. Predators can also function as keystone species by driving community changes through trophic cascades [99,100]. Sea otters, for instance, promote the presence and persistence of kelp forest habitats around the Aleutian archipelago by consuming herbivorous sea urchins and releasing kelp from intense grazing pressure [69]. Foundation groups or species provide the template from which most additional species interactions and dynamics emerge by creating habitat and refuge for large numbers of other species 1101]. Foundation groups or species are dominant structure- forming organisms that create productive and complex habitats, and include mangroves, seagrass beds, salt marshes, oyster beds, and kelp forests, and enhance biodiversity through their facil itative effects 1102]. Particularly at the land—sea interface, these foundation species provide such services as coastal protection, erosion control, water catchment, and nutrient retention 1103]. Populations of many foundation species have seen massive declines over the last decade [63,104,105], 50 it is imperative both to recognize the importance of foundation species and the role they play in creating habitat, increasing species diversity, and structuring marine communities around the world 1106—108]. Additional key species can be found at either end of the food chain. Basal prey species, such as microbes, certain phytoplank ton, macroscopic algae, krill, and small pelagic ‘forage’ fishes such as anchovies and sardines, form important prey for higher consumers in the food chain and influence the structure and stability of food web dynamics 184,109]. These basal species can have limited redundancy and one species often dominates an entire trophic level 11101. Temporal and spatial variation in primary productivity can alter the type and species composition of basal species, which can have significant negative effects on higher trophic levels 1821. As noted above, top predators also tend to have strong effects on food web dynamics because they often drive trophic cascades in marine ecosystems 199,1111. However, the ecological role of top predators is diminished in many parts of todays ocean because of historical depletion of predator popula tions (e.g. [64,112J). Top predators may also play an important functional role in connecting distant ecosystems [1131 due to their mobility and tendency to move between specific areas 1114]. It will be important to continue to document the movement of these species through tagging and tracking programs, such as Tagging of Pacific Pelagics (TOPP, www.topp.org) and Pacific Ocean Shelf Tracking project ( POST, http:ffwww.postcoml.orgf), so that migration corridors, feeding grounds, and aggregation and breeding areas are accounted for in both the spatial planning process and in ongoing management. These four types of key species—keystone species, foundation species, basal prey, and top predators—should receive special consideration throughout the MSP process. These species are important drivers of community structure and functioning, and decline of their populations below functional thresholds will result in significant losses of ecosystem services. Because of their disproportionate importance in maintaining ecosystem functions and services, ecosystem-based MSP should aim at maintaining and, where necessary, restoring populations of key species. 224. Connectivity Connectivity among habitats and populations in marine ecosystems is critical for population and species persistence. Connectivity can occur through the movement of individuals (larvae or adults), nutrients, or materials (e.g., nutrient and detritus) across permeable habitat boundaries. The complex life cycle of most marine organisms involves a pelagic phase (i.e., open populations) in which the movement of individuals is controlled by oceanic currents and eddies and the swimming capability of larvae [115—117 ]. Across different life histories, dispersal distance may range from less than a meter to hundreds of kilometers 1118—1201. Most planlctonic larvae have been considered to have long-distance dispersal potential over evolu tionary and ecological time scales, but recent evidence for limited movement in coral reef fish and sharp genetic breaks (e.g. [121]) suggest that dispersal can be much shorter than expected [28,122,123]. These recent estimates of short dispersal range suggest that there are effective local retention mechanisms that may provide increased resilience of local populations through increased local reproduction. Recently, for example, a comparison of regional ocean model system (ROMS) modeling of ocean currents in central California and the strength of genetic gradients suggested that local larval retention may be 10—50 times higher in coastal populations than suggested by current models (Galindo et al., in review). The details of large and small-scale dispersal dynamics throughout a species’ life history are critical for maintaining metapopulation and metacommunity dynamics [124]. Individual populations are connected to one another across heterogeneous landscapes by the movement of individuals from one location to another. Due to population and ocean circulation dynamics, some sites may act as larval source populations, while others may be larval sinks that depend entirely on recruitment and migration from other sites for population persistence (see 1125] for examples). Successful recruitment and migration across the landscape is also tightly linked to the quality and suitability of available habitat. Reductions in cohort abundance may be as high as 100% in areas where suitable habitat is unavailable even though larval connectivity is high 173]. In addition, many large marine seas capes—over which spatial planning may be important—span environmental gradients that may exert strong natural selection on populations of larvae that settle in particular areas 1126]. Depending on whether populations have strong local retention or, conversely, if they are replaced each generation from a large larval pool, the populations may be locally adapted. The ability of local populations to recover from local perturbations may be limited if locally adapted species become extinct The flow of nutrients and other materials between species and habitats is another important aspect of connectivity that con tributes important subsidies to distant food webs 1127]. The delivery of allochthonous subsidies can increase primary and secondary productivity [109,128], alter predator—prey relation ships 1129], and change nutrient cycling dynamics [130] in the receiving habitat. Understanding the movement of organisms, nutrients, and materials throughout the marine landscape is necessary to determine the appropriate size, spacing, and location of use areas 1131 J and requires an understanding of the biology (i.e., larval duration) and physical transport properties of different water masses over time 128]. Recent studies also highlight the importance of connectivity in maintaining the structure and functioning of some ecosystems [132]. 23. Overarching guídelines—accounting for context and uncertainty While the preceding principles describe structural components that are essential for healthy, functioning marine ecosystems, there are also general, overarching guidelines—the consideration of the influence of context and the pervasiveness of uncertainty— that must also be accounted for in operational decisions of MSP (e.g., use location and distribution; Fig. 1). These guidelines are especially important to address across biogeographic regions and in the face of uncertainties regarding future changes induced by climate and human uses of the marine environment. 23. L Context Contextual factors, such as geomorphology and biogeography, as well as the type, distribution, frequency, and intensity of existing and contemplated ocean uses must be considered when applying the above ecological principles to be able to achieve the operational goals of ecosystem-based MSP (Fig. 1). Ecosystem structure can be visualized as a nested hierarchy, with processes occurring over a range of spatial scales from larger to smaller. For instance, each ocean basin can be subdivided into ecoregions based on oceanographic currents and latitudinal variation in temperature; these ecoregions can be further divided into biogeographic regions that are broadly categorized by different species assemblages and habitat types; and each biogeographic region is made up of multiple types of habitats that contain their own assemblages of species [1331. What is ‘natural’ for a particular location depends on where it sits within these different hierarchies. For example, the MLPA process in California spans several biogeographic regions, with the result that predicting natural levels of species and habitat diversity at any given location requires knowing which region it is in. Targets and reference points for the creation and assessment of area-based plans will necessarily vary across bioregions. To account for these nested hierarchies and processes, MSP efforts should explicitly address them from small to large scales. Moreover, management plans should be updated on a periodic basis to assess and address possible changes in native species diversity, habitat diversity and heterogeneity, key species or groups, and demographic connectivity, as discussed above, as well as changes associated with climate change and emerging ocean uses. 232. Uncertainty All ecosystems and ecosystem processes are characterized by complex interactions and non-linear dynamics that are not fully understood, resulting in uncertainty regarding future responses to perturbations and management interventions. Uncertainty about ecosystem dynamics and responses to current and emerging uses is inherent and should be reduced but is unlikely to ever be eliminated. Ecosystem uncertainty is compounded in important but largely unknown ways as a consequence of interactive effects of multiple stressors in marine ecosystems 11341 and by differential vulnerability of diverse habitat types to similar threats [1351. Moreover, future conditions are uncertain, both because of natural environmental variability and because of uncertainty surrounding the consequences of human activities. In particular, the precise effects of climate change on ocean circulation, temperature, wave energy, and acidification are still uncertain and scientists know little about the feedback loops that could enhance or ameliorate these impacts. Variability and uncertainty in ocean ecosystems make it imperative to take a precautionary approach within the planning and governance structure 11361, such that the absence of information on the effect of an activity is not interpreted as the absence of impact or harm to the ecosystem 11371. In the face of uncertainty, it is also critical to build redundancies (especially among key species, groups, and drivers of ecosystem structure) and buffer areas into the MSP framework that are akin to creating an insurance policy for environmental changes 1341 so that ecosystem functioning and services will be protected (Fig. 1)1101. Furthermore, uncertainty demands that monitoring of changing climate, ecosystem state, and key ecosystem characteristics be a central component of MSP so that adaptive management can be practiced [1381. 3. Application 3. Operationalizing ecological principles and overarching guidelines The ecological principles discussed above can be used as a foundation for ecosystem-based MSP to promote a healthy ocean, the delivery of ecosystem services, and sustainable human use of the ocean. These principles can also be used to identify manage ment strategies and build multi-objective solutions to achieve healthy ecological, social, and economic systems (Fig. 1). To create effective management objectives, it will be important to identify the role(s) of these ecological principles in sus mining ecosystem health and human well-being in each management region. Regional differences in ecological systems and ecosystem service values may result in trade-offs among the ecological principles, as well as among ecological, social, and economic principles to meet management objectives. However, defining objectives for each set of principles and examining them together will help to assess where trade-offs are appropriate and how the goals of the planning process can be met. How each ecological principle is used in the planning process may differ between regions based on the types of data that are available, the spatial resolution of those data, and the ecosystem processes of interest In all cases, however, the best readily available science should be used for translating ecological principles into operational decisions [139]. Where scientific information is not readily available, managers may rely on data that serve as proxies for the ecological attribute of concern (e.g., assessing connectivity using oceanographic circulation patterns when larval dispersal data are not available) or expert opinion that is supported by the weight of evidence, but should also invest in meaningful monitoring and manage adaptively as new information is gathered. 32. Using ecological principles to guide the development of a marine spatial plan There are multiple possible approaches to implement the ecological principles and modifying guidelines presented above. In a spatially explicit planning approach, the first steps should involve identifying existing and future conditions by assessing the vulnerability of species and habitats to activities, the cumulative impacts of multiple activities, local context and uncertainty, and areas where conflicts exist between users and the ecosystem and between multiple users (Fig. 1). Assessments can identify areas where ecosystem health and human well-being may be compro mised by the amount or type of activities. Within the planning area, spatial delineations of management measures, where appropriate, should be based on: (1) explicitly identified ecosys tem and socioeconomic goals; (2) an assessment of the ranges, types, and intensities of human uses that are compatible with those goals; and (3) use rules that favor compatible uses. The spatial distribution of management measures within each plan ning region would constitute a marine spatial plan with accompanying management goals and objectives. The ecological principles identified here can be used in an ecosystem-based MSP implementation framework by guiding the ecological goals and objectives of the process as well as making initial spatial delineations using the following information: (1) populations of native and/or key species, habitats, or connections that must be maintained within a region; (2) the amount of replication that is necessary to maintain populations of native and/or key species and habitat diversity and heterogeneity; (3) the spatial arrangement of areas that would ensure connectivity among populations of native and/or key species, habitats, or subsidies; and (4) adjacent areas are as complementary as possible (e.g., no industrial uses next to protected areas; Fig. 1). These areas would then be compared with social and economic goals to determine the spatial arrangement of human activities. This kind of comprehensive planning and implementation process, which is based on ecological and socioeconomic principles and objectives, is preferable over a sector-by-sector or activity-by-activity approach for two reasons. First, it addresses the challenge of integrating the many individual spatial planning processes needed for each activity by providing a comprehensive framework within which individual activities can be addressed. Second, it accounts for possible future uses and needs by specifying goals against which new activities can be evaluated. This system could yield explicit criteria and management objectives for identifying the types and combinations of human uses that can occur within different areas based on known or expected compatibility and impacts of different activities on each other and on key ecosystem attributes. It could also focus monitoring efforts, including the design of monitoring protocols and choice of ecological metrics, so that the effectiveness of spatial planning and management schemes can be evaluated over time and adjusted to better achieve management and policy goals (Fig. 1). 4. Discussion MSP has emerged as a framework for implementing an ecosystem-based, coordinated governance structure in the world’s oceans. Maintaining marine ecosystem health and human well-being requires a comprehensive assessment of the vulner ability of marine ecosystems to human activities and how the impacts of those activities can be best partitioned in ocean space. The ultimate goal of ecosystem-based MSP is to distribute human uses in the ocean in a way that allows for existing and emerging cultural, recreational, commercial, and industrial uses, while supporting healthy ecosystems and sustaining the provision of ecosystem services for current and future generations. Several planning processes and tools already exist to aid planning and implementing ecosystem-based MSP. Feasibility analyses can identify the best spatial placement of activities (e.g., determining possible locations for renewable wind projects; see Massachusetts Ocean Plan, www.mass.gov/ and Coastal Wind Energy for North Carolina’s Future, http :/fwww.climate.unc.edu/coastal-wind). Vul nerability analyses integrate spatial data on the distribution of marine habitats using expert assessments of the level of vulner ability of each habitat type to the suite of human activities that occur there [3,135]. Cumulative impact studies quantify the number, map the spatial extent, and assess the frequency of multiple human activities at multiple spatial scales 11401. The combination of vulnerability and cumulative impact maps can inform regional MSP by identifying areas where ecosystem vulnerability and cumulative impact levels meet the objective of maintaining healthy ecosystems or where they are mismatched. Existing and developing decision support tools, such as MARXAN 11411 arid MarineMap (http:f/www.marinemap.orgf), can be used to visualize how different configurations of use areas can reduce (1) the level of cumulative impacts in any one area, (2) the number of conflicts between users and between users and the ecosystem, and (3) the number of trade-offs that are necessary for each use sector. MarineMap, in particular, can build the ecological goals of a spatial planning project into the program so that it is easy to evaluate whether or not a particular planning scheme meets the ecological goals of the process. Dynamic models will need to be developed that use real-lime data ID forecast future ecosystem health conditions under diffèrent management strategies. To be effective, ecosystem-based MSP must also satisfy several other objectives. First, it must involve stakeholder participation and cooperation throughout the process. Given the comprehensive nature of ecosystem-based MSP, this goal will be challenging as the number of slakeholder groups could become very large. Second, MSP must also be implemented within a governance framework that: (1) ensures real public accountability, independent decision making, adaptive management, dependable funding, meaningful public and stakeholder participation, and public transparency; (2) conforms to clear decision-making rules and objectives 11391; and (3) has clearly articulated goals and a means of evaluating whether they are being met for EBM and MSP. Third, a thorough under standing and appreciation of the existing ocean policy, governance, and management structure are also impormnt for ecosystem-based MSP to be successful 1111. In some cases, MSP will fitwell into a pre existing legal, policy, and agency structure; in other cases, adjust ments to governance will need to be made (e.g., see [139] for a detailed analysis of California’s existing ocean policy, governance, and management framework for implementing ecosystem-based MSP in California and 11421 for multiscale governance using examples from the Gulf of Maine). In addition, all ecological and social systems are dynamic such that specific management decisions and tools that emerge from these guiding principles should be modified using an adaptive management process [143,144] that allows for the lessons learned and best available science to be incorporated into operational and governance frameworks in a timely manner 11391. The ecological principles and modifying guidelines proposed here for ecosystem-based MSP combine a number of ecosystem attributes recognized by other area-based planning processes (Table 1), address ecosystem attributes that are most likely to be affected by current and future human uses, and should guide siting and management of human uses. In addition, these principles directly pertain to two of the fundamental goals of MSP—maintenance of healthy ecosystems and continuedf restored delivery of ecosystem services. By identifying ecological attributes that are necessary to maintain ecosystem health, and putting them at the forefront, they advance the MSP process by providing a strong scientific foundation that can be coupled with socioeconomic and governance principles to achieve healthy, sustainable ecosystems and human communities. Triggers extinction, their defense doesn’t apply – adaptation fails, tipping points take out resiliency, and current efforts are ineffective.Howard 11 – Rural Sociologist, Political Ecologist, Ethnobotonist and Research Professor at Wageningen University, affiliate with University of Kent, article published by the Royal Society (Patricia, “Tipping Points and Biodiversity Change:Consequences for Human Wellbeing andChallenges for Science and Policyâ€, 3/13-15/11; < http://www.academia.edu/537857/Tipping_Points_and_Biodiversity_Change_Consequences_for_Human_Wellbeing_and_Challenges_for_Science_and_Policy>)//Beddow Biodiversity, in its broadest sense, is life on Earth. It has been characterised at one and the same time as ‘a concept, a measurable entity, and a social or political construct’ (Jax 2010) where the latter, at least, are charged with great religious, aesthetic, moral, and economic meaning that varies according to the human ob-server. For ecologists, the broad definition includes genetic diversity, species diversity, and ecosystem diversity, whereas a common narrower definition is the diversity of species (on Earth, in biomes, in ecosystems).Its relevance for biologists and ecologists is usually cast in evolutionary terms or in terms of ecosystem functioning, which some ecologists refer to as ecosystem services. Ecosystem services are also defined by economists and others as the benefits that humans derive from ecosystem functions or processes, and thus the relationship between biodiversity change, ecosystem functioning, and ecosystem services has become central to contemporary scientific understanding of biodiversity and human wellbeing, as well as to a multitude of policies that seek to assess and address human wellbeing, environmental degradation, and global environ-mental change. There is great debate and uncertainty about the relations between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning and about the significance of change in biodiversity for ecosystem functioning, and for evolution; this necessarily creates great uncertainty about the nature of the relationship between biodiversity and human wellbeing. In spite of such uncertainty, which affects all assessments of the actual and potential threats to human wellbeing from biodiversity change, there is much consensus that the implications of cur-rent and projected levels biodiversity change for human wellbeing are, in most instances, major and possibly dire, at local, regional, and global scales. In the 20 th century, we became aware that the fate of biodiversity and the fate of humans are intimately interconnected. Before this, only some religions (and a few philosophers) predicted the end of life on Earth or human extinction through different versions of Armageddon, which was generally caused by thedivine consequences of wayward human behaviour. Darwin’s theory of evolution provided the means to un-derstand continual species extinctions, and scientists began to unearth the evidence of previous mass extinc-tions. However, the idea that extinction might extend to the human species was not taken up until the 20 th century, when it was argued that all species invariably become extinct (Raup 1991). Scientists came to understand that the human species could disappear through catastrophic natural events, much as the dinosaurs disappeared, as a result of bolide impacts or large-scale volcanism. A secular concept of self-annihilation emerged less than 50 years ago with the spectre of global nuclear holocaust, which would also render much other life on Earth unviable (see e.g. Robock et al. 2007), and where the life that remained would be distinctly antithetical to humans. Many now argue that there are other catastrophic threats to the human species, some of which threaten life on Earth more generally (Rees 2003, Posner 2004, Bostrom & Cirkovic 2008,Al-Rodhan 2009). We can only speculate whether the sixth mass extinction of species that appears to be underway has implications for the continued evolution of the human species, but we do know that it is the synergies and feedbacks between global environmental change and biodiversity change, combined with maladaptive human responses to that change (e.g. global nuclear conflict; unintended effects of technological responses), that leads to the most catastrophic scenarios. Critical questions that arise when considering biodiversity change, the threats that it poses to human wellbeing, and the challenges that it presents for mitigation and human adaptation, are whether there are critical thresholds or ‘tipping points’ related to biodiversity change, and whether such tipping points can lead or contribute, directly or indirectly to global tipping points or whether they ‘only’ have implications at local or regional scales. If there are such tipping points, what types of implications do they have for human wellbeing? For whom, where, and when? Further, can such tipping points be avoided, and are we prepared to dealwith (adapt to) them if they cannot? With biodiversity change, there are a number of vulnerabilities to which the majority of the globe’s human population are exposed not only because they are impacted by this change at local level, but also because even local changes can have global repercussions due to global interdependencies. One is the rapid emergence and transmission of new infectious diseases and pests that both threaten plants and animals (andthus the humans that depend upon them), as well as humans directly (e.g. Chivian & Bernstein 2008, Pong-siri et al. 2009, Keesing et al. 2010, Sharma 2010). A second is invasive species, where species disperse be-yond their ‘normal’ range, invade many different regions on different continents, affecting the invaded eco-systems in highly unpredictable ways (e.g. GISP n.d., Walther et al. 2009, Perrings et al. 2010). Both maycontribute strongly to a third such vulnerability, which is addressed here, presented by tipping points thatmay emerge at regional scale, such as the loss of the Amazon rainforest or the collapse of coral reefs, thatcan have extra-regional or even global repercussions not only due to the loss of species and ecosystems, butas well due to the loss of some of the ecosystem services that these provide e.g. as CO 2 sinks, which creates 2synergies with phenomena such as climate change and ocean acidification. Finally, the fourth vulnerability is posed by human maladaptation to any of these dynamics, where maladaptation can exacerbate biodiversity change and can lead to other negative effects for human welfare and ecosystems. Conflict over dwindling biological resources and ecosystem services is likely to become pervasive, and conflict over the understanding of the causes and effects of such change are likely to be just as serious. The global security implications of climate change are of great concern and are being assessed (e.g. GACGC 2007) but, to our knowledge, nosuch assessment exists for biodiversity change. Many of the global, regional, and national institutions that in the past have evolved to manage human-biodiversity relations have so far been shown to be relatively ineffective in stemming biodiversity loss (see e.g. CBD 2010) and thus they are likely to be even more ineffective in dealing with surprises or with the large-scale repercussions of the loss of benefits, e.g. of food, and new institutions will have to emerge if such threats are not to translate into local, regional, and even global catastrophe. I argue that to successfully adapt to tipping points requires major changes in values, priorities, and institutions, particularly economic institutions: some of this change may be forthcoming but much is unlikely to change quickly or profoundly enough to avoid such tipping points. A first step is to recognise the implications of biodiversity change and potential tipping points for human wellbeing, which is currently impeded by cultural, cognitive and political barriers. A second is to prepare for such change, and a third is to prepare potential responses. II. Biodiversity Change and Tipping Points A. Types, magnitudes and drivers of biodiversity change Aside from numerous potential sources of global catastrophe that could have such implications for life on Earth, we also find ourselves in a period when rates of species extinctions are estimated at 50-500 times background, which is the highest rate in the past 65 million years. The effects of ongoing rapid decline of biomes and homogenisation of biotas have been summarised as changes in species geographic ranges, genetic risks of extinction, genetic assimilation, natural selection, mutation rates, the shortening of food chains, the increase in nutrient-enriched niches permitting the ascendancy of microbes, and the differential survival of ecological general-ists. Rates of evolutionary processes will change in different groups, and speciation in the larger vertebrates is essentially over…Whether the biota will continue to provide the dependa- ble ecological services humans take for granted is less clear…Our inability to make clearer predictions about the future of evolution has serious consequences for both biodiversity andhumanity (Woodruff 2001: 5471).The consequences for biodiversity and humanity depend in part on the timescale in reference. Some scientists argue that the Earth’s sixth extinction has already arrived, where an estimated loss of over 75% of spe-cies can be expected, possibly within 250 to 500 years (Barnosky et al. 2011), although others highlight thefact that projections of species extinction rates are controversial (Pereira et al. 2010). A mass extinction hard-ly bodes well for humans given the changes in the biosphere, in biomes and ecosystems, the associated pestand disease outbreaks, etc. that are associated with the different drivers of biodiversity change and the possi- ble critical thresholds or tipping points discussed below and in other papers presented here. Thus, the implications of what is laid out below are magnified many fold and their effects become increasingly synergisticover time – 500 years is a very short period when we consider that Homininae appeared 8 million years ago, Homo sapiens 500,000 years ago, and modern humans 200,000 years ago – effectively, it constitutes only.25% of modern human history. Were humans to have a council of elders to deliberate the impact of our ac-tivities on future generations, it would certainly be extraordinarily alarmed and calling for radical transfor-mations as, indeed, are many scientists today.What is extraordinary about this possible 6 th extinction of species is that, since it is human-induced,it is not inevitable and depends, for example, on rates of climate and land-use change (Pereira et al. 2010).For the first time in the Earth’s history, a species is actually in a position to change the course of evolutionwrit large (Western 2001). This is reflected in the range of projected changes in biodiversity, which is very broad both because ‘there are major opportunities to intervene through better policies, but also because of large uncertainties in projections’ (Pereira et al. 2010: 1496). The possibilities and constraints to doing so arediscussed below and in other papers. Many scientists consider that the probability that we will change thecourse that evolution is currently on is low or very low without radical and immediate transformations invalues, knowledge, behaviour, markets, and governance. Impact Calculus No war – great powers are responsible, nukes deter, and conflicts remain local.Kennedy 13 - Dilworth Professor of History and director of International Security Studies at Yale University (Paul, “The Great Powers, Then and Nowâ€, 8/13/13; < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/opinion/global/the-great-powers-then-and-now.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>)//Beddow All of these Great Powers are egoistic, more or less blinkered, with governments chiefly bent upon surviving a few more years. But none of them are troublemakers; nor are they, in any really significant sense, a source of trouble. Would they but realize it, they all have a substantial interest in preserving the international status quo, since they do not know what negative consequences would follow a changed world order. The troublemakers, and the sources of trouble, lie elsewhere: in the unpredictable, overmilitarized lunatic asylum that is North Korea; in an Iran that sometimes seems to be daring an Israeli air strike; in a brutal and autistic Syrian regime; in a Yemen that both houses terrorists and pretends to be killing them off; and, far less purposefully, in the conflict-torn, crumbling polities of Central Africa, Egypt and Afghanistan, and many nations in between. Here are the world’s problem cases. If there are neurotic Kaiser Wilhelms or bullying Mussolinis or murderous Stalins around today, they are not — thank heavens — to be found in Beijing, Moscow or New Delhi. If this thesis is correct, and the Great Powers, while sometimes complaining about one another’s actions, generally act in a restrained manner, then perhaps we may look forward to a long period without a major war, rather like the unprecedented peace among the Great Powers that existed after 1815 under the Concert of Europe. Many wars would still take place, but they would be local conflicts, not cause enough, despite their atrocities and inhumanity, to drag a major actor directly into the fighting. The Great Powers, in turn, would set aside their own differences to keep the bloodshed local, putting pressure upon their own client states if necessary to stop them from upsetting the international apple cart. In no way would this be a “democratic peace.†Rather, it would continue to be an Old Boys’ club, even if it has new members like India and Brazil. The myth of the equality of all nation-states would indeed remain a myth. Such is the price that liberal internationalists would have to pay to ensure the avoidance of a Third World War. The price the Great Powers have to pay is self-restraint, year after year, decade after decade. If this is forgotten, then another 1914-like crisis could occur. At that time, it will be remembered, Russia failed to rein in its “trouble-making†satellite, Serbia. Austria-Hungary recklessly sent Belgrade an impossible-to-accept ultimatum. Berlin, forgetting Bismarck’s cautions, foolishly supported Vienna. A weak czar lost control of his country’s military plans. The Prussian army struck westwards, occupying Belgium, and bringing in the British Empire. Are we sure some equivalent follies will never happen again, even though nuclear weapons surely help keep governments from going over the brink? When you say your prayers, spare one for the leaders of the Great Powers. They may not be attractive individuals — some are nasty, blinkered and devious. But so long as they realize their responsibilities to prevent any actions that might lead to a world war, we should all be happy. Their job is simply to hold firm the iron frame that keeps the international system secure. It is our job, not theirs, to work within that frame, to advance the dignity and prosperity of humanity. But that will never be achieved without the Great Powers acting reasonably well. No nuke war impacts – isolation, de-escalation, and no winter.Martin 90 – Professor at the Department of Science and Technology Studies at the University of Wollongong (Brian, “Politics after a Nuclear Crisisâ€, Fall 1990; http://mises.org/journals/jls/9_2/9_2_4.pdf)//Beddow Especially in the past several years, an enormous amount of attention has been given to the physical consequences of nuclear war, much of it emphasizing the possibility of global annihilation. The impression given is that once any sort of nuclear war occurs, there is really nothing further to consider. My argument here is simple. Whatever the likelihood that a major nuclear confrontation will result in total annihilation of the earth’s population, a significant possibility remains that nuclear crisis or war will leave major portions of the world’s population alive and, for the most part, unaffected physically. If this is the case, then it is worth considering post-crisis and post-war politics. Three types of scenarios are worth noting: nuclear crisis, limited nuclear war, and global nuclear war. First, nuclear crisis: It is possible to imagine the development of a major nuclear confrontation short of nuclear war. This might be an extended nuclear emergency, like the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, yet more serious and prolonged. It could lead to declarations of martial law and changes in political structures as described below, that might well persist beyond the nuclear crisis itself. Second, limited nuclear war: A nuclear war does not have to be global in extent. Such a war might be limited geographically – for example, to the Middle East – or restricted to the exchange of a few tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts argue that it would be difficult to keep a nuclear exchange limited, but these arguments remain to be tested: There is no evidence of actual nuclear wars to prove or disprove them. It is worth remembering that expert predictions concerning wars (for example, that World War I would be over quickly) have often been quite wrong. It is also possible to imagine a “successful†first strike, for example, using a few high-altitude explosions over a country to disable electronics through electromagnetic pulse, thereby putting the enemy’s command and control systems out of commission. However unlikely the success of such a tactic, it cannot be ruled out a priori. Third, global nuclear war: If a nuclear war does escalate to major exchanges, does that mean that near or actual human extinction is certain? The available evidence is by no means conclusive. Although since the 1950s many people have believed that nuclear war will inevitably lead to the death of most or all the people on earth, the scientific evidence to support this belief has been skimpy and uncertain. The only mechanism currently considered to create the potential threat to the survival of the human species I the global climatic effects of smoke and dust from nuclear explosions, commonly called nuclear winter. Even here, some scientists believe the effects will be much more moderate than initially proclaimed. My assessment is that global nuclear war, which containing the potential for exterminating much of the world’s population, might kill “only†some hundreds of millions of people – an unprecedented disaster to be sure, but far short of global annihilation.
  19. I like the idea - Atlantis-utopia as a metaphor for an ideological K sounds pretty cool. One interesting avenue is some sort of Rapture (Bioshock metaphor for Objectivism/libertarianism... advantage of anarcho-zionism or something), but I'm sure there is literature elsewhere that talks about Atlantis as a metaphorical paradise for communists or something. If you want to run it more policy-oriented, you might want to look into seasteading. The practical side (solvency advocates) of this sort of aff could be found at the Seasteading Institute (or w/e it's called)... they'll also probably have advantage ground for either a libertarian adv or some sort of competing governments advantage (like, escape from biopolitics). Overall, I think utopian affs will be awesome on this topic, so I'm pretty jealous of whoever gets to run the Rapture aff.
  20. Stirner

    Big affs

    I'm hoping or affs that faciliate military development... so, developing arctic ports (Arctic war), oceanic trade agreements in East Asia (Asia pivot). There are probably a number of non-military trade, infrastructure, and territorial affs that qualify as non-military but still access deterrence advantages by improving naval capabilities, and naval power impacts tend to be incredibly good. I'm not sure what the definitions the topic terms are but passing UNCLOS is a possible aff, with advantages like...maybe I-law, naval conflict, etc. I won't be debating on this topic next year, but I think they made a good choice and I look forward to seeing what affs people release. I think UNCLOS, some trade/oceanic development/shipping lanes affs, and then some affs with very specific advantage scenarios (Arctic ports - some people suggested icebreakers, which is probably less topical - with arctic war, etc.) will be popular. I think there will be cool room for K affs, too... maybe some libertarian/privatization seasteading aff (you can probably access some interesting advantages with these - like, technology internal links to science leadership, econ, etc... along with more kritikal advantages dealing with libertarianism, coercion, biopower/governmental competitiveness, etc.), some anthro affs, border affs, etc. I don' think there will be one "big" aff because this is a large topic and the literature base will contain many different internal links to many different impact scenarios (Latin America is a big topic too, but aff ground was somewhat limited by the inability to garner high-magnitude impacts, as essentially all of these impacts take place outside of the immediate purview of the topic, and it's sort of difficult to establish strong internal links from a Latin America aff to a Russia war scenario... less so for oceans). So, yeah... I'd expect I-law, trade, localized (Semi)military affs on the policy side, then some interesting k-affs. Neg ground might be difficult to garner on this topic - process counterplans will probably be common (I think a lot of the best aff ground will be insulated from advantage counterplans... South China Sea war aff would probably be very good. Like, define development to include legal structures, plantext to negotiate redlines and conflict norms with China in the South China Sea, advantages are like Spratley Islands/Taiwan war, maybe energy or econ scenarios... possibly a China rise good advantage with internal links to Eurasian/Asian war?).
  21. lol, one would think But I don't think it's as difficult as we'd assume, though. I think link-turning the race K with hegemony is an underutilized strategy that can pay off well.
  22. Russia war causes extinction – miscalc and declining relations overcomes your defense. Barrett et al 4/22 – researchers for Global Catastrophe Institute/Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University/Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University/Corresponding Author (Anthony M., “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russiaâ€, 4/22/13; http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc_NuclearWar.pdf)//Beddow War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter- attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16 Russia war triggers instant extinction and turns every other impact. Wickersham 1/22 – University of Missouri Adjunct Professor of Peace Studies and member of the Missouri University Nuclear Disarmament Education Team (Bill, “Nuclear Weapons Still a Threatâ€, 1/22/13; http://www.columbiatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/nuclear-weapons-still-a-threat/article_9ad4a514-9bea-59d0-9921-11a70c967e16.html)//Beddow Nearly 20 years after the Cold War ended, humankind still faces the distinct possibility of instant extinction without representation. If nuclear war occurs between Russia and the United States, there will be no parliamentary or congressional debates nor declarations of war. In a time of crisis or perceived attack, the Russian and U.S. presidents each have only a few minutes to make a decision to order an attack against each other. The time frame for those decisions could be as short as seven minutes, depending on the nature of the perceived attack and the efficiency of communications within the respective early-warning chains of command. Launch-to-landing time for submarine-launched nuclear missiles can occur in as few as four minutes. Launch-to-landing time for hundreds of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles is about 25 minutes. An attack with just two 1-megaton nuclear warheads would unleash explosive power equivalent to that caused by all the bombs used during World War II. For the duration of the Cold War, leaders of the United States and USSR were concerned about the devastation both countries would experience if a nuclear war were triggered by a false alarm attributable to human or technological error. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack on New York killed nearly 3,000 people, causing massive destruction, chaos and grief. In comparison, a purposeful or accidental nuclear strike between the United States and Russia would kill hundreds of millions in the short term and many more over time caused by worldwide, wind-driven nuclear fallout. Thus, the threat of nuclear war is the most serious potential health, environmental, agricultural, educational and moral problem facing humanity. Steven Starr, senior scientist with Physicians for Social Responsibility, said research makes clear the environmental consequences of a U.S.-Russian nuclear war: “If these weapons are detonated in the large cities of either of their nations, they will cause such catastrophic damage to the global environment that the Earth will become virtually uninhabitable for most humans and many other complex forms of life.†(See www.nucleardarkness.org.) It is important for Missourians to be aware that a Russian nuclear attack on the United States would probably incinerate the Honeywell nuclear bomb parts factory in Kansas City, the Boeing Defense, Space and Security plant near St. Louis, and Whiteman Air Force Base, home of U.S. B-2 bombers deployed at Knob Noster. Political leaders have taken elaborate steps to assure us accidental war between the United States and Russia is next to impossible. However, the mere existence and deployment of launch-ready nuclear missiles offers the possibility of an unpredicted sequence of events that might lead to their accidental use. A major obstacle to nuclear disarmament is the widespread belief by “political realists†that nuclear threat systems can be maintained ad infinitum without causing accidental or purposeful war. The true political realists are those who endorse Murphy’s Law, which says: “Nothing is as easy as it looks. Everything takes longer than you expect. If anything can go wrong, it will at the worst possible moment.†A prime example of Murphy’s Law in action was the recent earthquake and water damage to nuclear reactors in northern Japan. Over the years, dozens of accidents with nuclear weapon systems have occurred. As far as India goes, the Helfand 12 card I posted above is written in context of Indopak war. I haven't cut any other India/Indopak terminal impacts (I'm sure some backfiles include them). Also, you may want to look for that overused Bostrom card for Russia war (though, iirc, it was written in the context of cold war arsenals. Might be wrong on that).
  23. tbh, I'm very disappointed I won't be able to debate this topic and defend my Objectivist utopia. :/
  24. I never finished cutting this, but I think this is a direct answer to Royal's diversionary theory. Royal cites multiple warrants for econ decline-->war, most of which would be answered by any generic piece of econ decline defense (even diversionary theory is answered by Tir, Ferguson, or whatever else you read). But this is an on-point answer, I think, to Royal diversionary theory: They misread diversionary theory – nations turn inward in times of economic crisis and war during growth. Boehmer 06 – Department of Political Science at Penn State University, PhD, Graduate Director as Chair of the Graduate Council, fellow at UTEP’s Center for Excellence in Teaching and Learning (Charles, “Domestic Crisis and Interstate Conflict: The Impact of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflictâ€, 9/18/06; http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/boehmer.html)//Beddow Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. While it is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Again, lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do in fact undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power (especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy). Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit. Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988), however, have questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later studies do not necessarily build on past studies. The discrepancies between studies are difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000).†To these problems we should include a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies. Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate. They offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. However, a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using Bayesian updating games, Richards et al. (1993) and Smith (1996) demonstrate that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is.[3] Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Downs and Rocke (1984) and Bueno De Mesquita, et al. (1999) where leaders “gamble for resurrection,†although the diversionary scenario in the latter study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? To be clear, I am primarily interested in whether possible diversionary conflicts are related to economic growth, although I also provide and examination of domestic conflict, democracy, and state efficacy. The next section offers a theoretical basis to expect that diversionary conflicts may be less probable than regime transitions during periods of lower economic growth. This is followed by discussions of the research design used to test my theoretical expectations and the empirical results. I then conclude that while there is evidence to support aspects of the diversionary conflict thesis, this behavior is not related to lower rates of economic growth. Theories of diversionary conflict make a few basic assumptions. First, leaders seek to remain in office. Second, leaders have some latitude to use military force. Third, leader approval is in part determined by the state of the economy. Lastly, the use of military force results in a rally effect that increases leader popularity. Yet, while these assumptions appear reasonable and help simplify theories, they may not be the most appropriate or informative towards an explanation of the decision to engage in interstate conflict. From these pieces we cannot put together the whole diversionary puzzle. Other components of the story are missing and unaccounted for. For example, is there a difference between scape-goating and externalizing conflict? Disparate studies have discussed the roles of regime types, repression, the magnitude of domestic conflict, opportunities for participation in foreign disputes, and differences in how the severity of international conflict should affect the prospects of successful diversion. However, many theoretical linkages remain unclear in individual studies. I find the claim that lower rates of economic growth should motivate diversionary behavior less than convincing since other studies suggest that lower rates of growth increase the probability that leaders will be removed from office (Londregan and Poole 1990; Bloomberg and Hess 2002). Empirical research also suggests that incumbents in democracies are most likely to lose elections following periods of economic stagnation (Lewis-Beck 1988). Logically, lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk leaders face, no matter whether they are democrats or autocrats. Perhaps leaders do “gamble for resurrection,†although many could be removed from power before they may be able to attempt this strategy. Another body of literature disagrees with the diversionary conflict thesis and contends that higher rates of economic growth should lead to more frequent (or more severe) interstate conflict. Some of these studies are posed on the systemic level of analysis (Kondratieff 1926; Goldstein 1988; Mansfield 1988; Pollins 1996; Pollins and Murrin 1999) while others are focused on the national level of analysis (MacFie 1938; Blainey 1988; Choucri and North 1975; Doran 1983, 1985; Pollins and Schweller 1999). Economic growth is said to have two effects that increase the probability of conflict. First, economic growth could allow for increases in military spending that could increase war-making capacity (war-chest theme) or, second, that growth provides a greater social willingness to allow leaders to opt to participate in interstate conflict. Fewer domestic constraints should give leaders a freer hand to initiate or join conflicts. Admittedly, theories in this category are no more developed (arguably less so) than diversionary conflict theory. However, some insights are useful that I hope to explicate below. All leaders depend on a constituency of some sort (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999) and always face potential opposition to their policies (Richards et al., 1993; Hagan 1994; Miller 1995, 1999; Heldt 1999). In democratic systems, opposition parties may seek to exploit foreign policies that they will argue are not in the best interest of the nation and executives in democracies should be more constrained than their authoritarian counterparts. But during times of economic prosperity, society is less likely to be influenced by the rhetoric of parties and factions that stand in opposition to the leader. Assuming that popularity ratings are higher than would be the case during economic recession or depression, leaders should be more apt to initiate or reciprocate military actions. Economic growth should reduce societal resistance to conflict. This may seem like a counter-intuitive proposition that people that should be relatively better off and happy during periods of prosperity would allow leaders to opt for foreign conflicts. However, some people may become more nationalistic or xenophobic during times of prosperity and optimistic that success could be achieved in foreign conflicts. Blainey (1988) claims that anything that increases optimism and state strength should be thought of as a cause of war. However, it is most likely that this effect could heighten the risk of foreign conflict by reducing constraints placed on executives. For example, would the Clinton administration have been able to commit US troops to conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, areas where US interests were debatable, without stauncher Republican resistance in Congress if the economy had not experienced prolonged prosperity and economic growth? Of course diversionary theory contends that domestic conflict should motivate interstate conflict, although there is no clear agreement on what type of diversionary behavior should be most beneficial. Again, some studies of diversionary conflict focus on the benefits of conflict externalization but not the potential costs. Leeds and Davis (1997) are an exception and theorize that if it is low growth that induces diversionary behavior, than initiators should choose targets that are growing based on the belief that they would be less likely to respond militarily. Reducing the costs posed by other states could then maximize the benefits of diversion? However, it is also unclear whether states need to merely make threats of if they need to use military force to attain the benefits of diversion. Clearly, provoking crises that are costly to a state in lives and resources could be a detriment to leader survival, and of course possibly seen as immoral. Perhaps merely threatening other states could achieve the leader’s aims, although citizens may not pay as much attention to these conflicts. While diversion may have benefits, what are its potential internal costs? Involvement in interstate conflict could be hampered by the presence of domestic conflict. There are many reasons why people rebel. Through history, however, economic hardship seems to have been a key factor explaining peasant rebellions, revolutions, and coup d'état. It would seem that domestic groups must either be appeased or distracted, albeit by externalization or controlling other countries and extracting benefits. For reasons specified below, the theory presented here makes the opposite prediction. When governments face severe domestic discontent, they should be less likely to become involved in militarized interstate conflicts. A people suffering from economic hardship may become pessimistic, and this mood may spread to the upper echelons of leadership as a consequence of the constraints that arise from below. If a state becomes involved in a dispute that escalates, especially if it becomes fatal, it could undermine the government. During these times, the leader’s political opposition is better able to detach the support of society away from the leader’s policies during periods when society is generally pessimistic. While during times of economic prosperity the leader enjoys increased popular support, during economic hardship the political opposition may be able to tap into the lower popular support for the leader and exploit it for their political advantage. Consequently, if an opportunity for military conflict occurs during a period of economic stagnation, factions or parties in the domestic arena may be more able to resist the initiation and reciprocation of military conflicts. Of course, people in democracies have a more direct means to express support or disapproval through direct communications, elections, and the media compared to citizens of autocracies. But again these same sentiments occur in societies governed by non-democratic forms of government, but in a different mode. Factions within institutions such as the military or the sole legitimate party (communist, Baath, etc.) may launch a coup d'état, or similar tactic aimed at removing current leaders, sometimes with the backing of elite business interests (in non-totalitarian states). In some instances, people may visibly begin to protest and demonstrate their displeasure with the economy or other matters related to the government’s management of the social and economic realms. Overall though, autocracies face weaker internal constraints than democracies and should be more apt to participate in military contests during periods of recession or depression. But what do we mean by domestic conflict? Most studies of diversionary conflict do not make it conceptually clear what type of domestic problems should make interstate conflict attractive to leaders. Surely, winning elections or avoiding coups would seem to be a goal. However, two factors would seem to be important: regime type and the magnitude of domestic conflict. I will first discuss the importance of the magnitude of domestic conflict. Conceptualizations of domestic conflict appear underdeveloped in the diversionary literature, and this is true of its operationalizations as well.[4] Pat James (1988) provides a useful categorization of domestic discontent and conflict. Societies that have begun to feel disgruntled with the policies of their current government are said to hold feelings that can be best expressed as latent. A poorly growing national economy may be reflected in the prevailing mood of society, although such anti-government sentiments may not yet be visible. James admits this concept is somewhat abstract but can be measured through indicators such as growth of GDP, a misery index (inflation times unemployment), leader approval polls, and similar variables. Only later does this discontent become manifest as it is expressed through various acts ranging from strikes and demonstrations to revolutions and civil wars. Yet, James’ dichotomy of latent and manifest conflict is of course a simplification of reality. While clearly it is a difficult task to capture all that domestic conflict entails in its various forms, we can at least broaden the manifest category by breaking it into less and more severe types. There is a great difference, for example, between riots and revolutions, but clearly the latter could be linked to the same factors that led to the former. In other words, manifest domestic conflict may arise from latent sentiments, but the magnitude of visible manifestations of these acts may vary in their ability to constrain participation in foreign conflicts. Lower magnitude feelings may be revealed in acts of protest such as riots and demonstrations. Later, protest may lead to attempts to overthrow the government. While I contend that manifest acts of domestic conflict should constrain leaders seeking to initiate or participate in interstate conflicts, the most severe form of manifest conflict, rebellion, should pose a stronger constraint. How leaders of governments respond to lower popularity and domestic unrest appears related to the type of government that they lead, although leaders would generally want to use diversionary tactics before rebellion occurs. Miller (1995) speculates that by the time violent internal crises break out in democracies, it is too late to use diversionary tactics to externalize the conflict, while autocracies are likely able to suppress non-violent domestic unrest. However, Gelpi (1997) argues that democracies should be more likely to engage in diversionary tactics since they cannot as easily repress their citizens.[5] Scape-goating other nations for a state’s internal problems, or at least distracting a state’s citizens from these problems, could potentially accomplish this objective. Meanwhile, since autocracies retain repression as an option they need not externalize internal conflicts. Yet, it seems only when discontent turns into manifest violence are dictatorships left with little option but to attempt diversion. In fact, Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) show that while domestic conflict leads to both repression and interstate disputes, repression is more common. Moreover, executive constraints reduce interstate disputes more than repression. Democracies also engage in repression, but will repress and become involved in interstate disputes less often than states with fewer constraints. This is contrary to Gelpi’s theory. However, attempts to suppress protest, or other acts, are likely to be counter-productive in the long run. Suppression by all regimes is likely to lead to declines in popular support. With declines in support come decreases in state efficacy (Hagan 1994). Governmental legitimacy may fall with state efficacy, leading to the eventual downfall of the government (Jackman 1993). Even in cases where states have a limited ability to suppress their own people without losing all legitimacy or state efficacy, neither economic reforms nor diversion may be viable options. Governments often fall, by vote or force, because they are unable to deal with seemingly intractable economic problems, and attempting to engage foreign rivals during these crises should only increase this risk. Conflicts against weak states may not alter the government’s own domestic situation, while contests against strong states entail a lower probability of victory that could accelerate a government’s downfall. Hence, this strategy would seemingly entail more risk than necessary to retain the stability of the government. As Ginkel and Smith (1999) point out, strong governments are likely to succeed in suppressing domestic conflict and vulnerable states will neither be able to offer concessions in the form of economic or political reform, nor suppress discontent because these acts will only signal the weakness of the regime. It may be a misnomer then that states facing economic and political crises have much latitude to initiate foreign conflicts that have any chance of success. In fact, while states may have alternatives to diversion, a possibility for some regimes is that they simply collapse. The best strategic option facing leaders in this situation may be to verbally scapegoat other external actors in a manner that does not invite some form of detrimental (especially military) reprisal. A perfect example was the verbal attack on the IMF and currency speculator George Soros by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia during the economic crisis that swept through Asia in the late 1990s. Such forms of diversion or scape goating would fall below the radar screen of quantitative studies. However, for now let us assume economic hardship does induce diversionary behavior on the part of leaders. If diversion exists, I suspect that authoritarian regimes are the most likely to use tactics involving threats, displays or uses of force since democracies face more institutional constraint and stable totalitarian regimes will have less need to do so. Also, autocracies should be less constrained to act in this manner considering the decreased sources of resistance, yet still not so strong that they need not worry about the maintenance of their power. For example, the Soviet Union under Stalin was stable through much of his regime and faced no serious threat from society. Militarized diversionary tactics were less necessary. However, such totalitarian regimes may be more likely to use diversionary rhetoric since there is little way for their societies to verify the legitimacy of government statements. Instead, any constraint upon the leader of a totalitarian state is likely to come from the leader’s inner circle, such as the top leadership of a communist party or the military. Finally, the diversionary literature typically ignores the potential difference between a short-term economic shock and more prolonged periods of economic growth or stagnation. For example, the Great Depression seemed to compound American isolationism in a way that a single year of economic contraction could not. Only Russett (1987, 1990) and Miller (1995,1999) adequately tap into the dynamic effect of economic conditions on socio-political variables through the use of measures of economic growth or misery longer than a single-year lag. Perhaps manifest domestic conflicts appear only after prolonged exposure to economic stagnation. Diversionary conflict theory does not present a dynamic picture of how economic growth could be related to domestic unrest and interstate conflict. I believe that prolonged periods of economic growth or stagnation should reduce the uncertainty leaders face regarding their domestic support and the need or ability to become involved in interstate conflicts. After prolonged economic decline, citizen views or behavior should become more apparent to leaders, while prolonged growth should increase their popularity and possibly reduce resistance to involvement in foreign conflicts. In summary, I expect that higher rates of economic growth will increase the probability of militarized interstate conflict while reducing the risk of regime transition. In instances where states experience both regime transitions and militarized interstate conflicts in the same year, I expect that lower rates of economic growth will raise the probability of a regime transition to occur first. I also expect that higher levels of economic development and democracy will reduce both militarized conflict and regime transitions. Finally, while I expect domestic conflict to decrease the risk of a militarized interstate conflict, it should have its strongest effect in increasing the probability of a regime transition.
  25. If you want cards for specific nuclear war scenarios (Russia, China, nuclear terror, Israel, Iran, Saudi Prolif, Indopak, European, Eurasian, Asian, etc.) or anything else (warming, etc.), just ask. Even a limited nuclear war would cause extinction – fallout and starvation. Helfand 12 – co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War – organization which received the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize-, former chair of the department of emergency medicine at Cooley Dickinson Hospital in Northampton and a physician at Family Care Medical Center in Springfield, working with senior climate scientists to document effects from a limit nuclear exchange (Ira, “The Frightening Scenario of Nuclear Warâ€, 12/19/12; < http://original.antiwar.com/helfand/2012/12/18/the-frightening-scenario-of-nuclear-war/)//Beddow Since 2008, we have gained a fuller understanding of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. For decades we have known that a large-scale war between the U.S. and Russia would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the whole world. We now understand that even a much more “limited,†regional nuclear war, as might take place in South Asia, would also pose a threat to all of humanity. Studies by Alan Robock, Owen Brian Toon, and their colleagues have looked at a scenario in which India and Pakistan each use 50 Hiroshima-size bombs — only 0.4% of the world’s nuclear arsenal of more than 25,000 warheads ­ against urban targets in the other country. The consequences would be beyond our comprehension. The explosions, firestorms, and radiation would kill 20 million people over the first week. But the worldwide consequences would be even more catastrophic. The firestorms would loft 5 million tons of soot into the upper atmosphere, blocking out sunlight and reducing temperatures around the world by an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius for an entire decade. This sudden drop in temperature, and the resulting decline in precipitation and shortening of the growing season, would cut food production in areas far removed from South Asia. According to a study by Mutlu Ozdogan, U.S. corn production would fall an average of 12% for an entire decade. A study by Lili Xia has shown that Chinese middle season rice would decline 15% over a full decade. Recent preliminary studies have shown even larger shortfalls for other grains. The world is not prepared to deal with a decline in food production of this magnitude. World grain reserves currently equal less than three months’ consumption and would provide an inadequate buffer against these shortfalls. Further, according to the most recent data from the United Nations, there are currently more than 870 million people in the world who are malnourished. An additional 300 million people receive adequate nutrition today but live in countries that import much of their food. All of these people, more than 1 billion in all, would be at risk of starvation in the aftermath of this “limited†war. A large-scale war between the U.S. and Russia would be even more catastrophic. Hundreds of millions of people would be killed directly; the indirect climate effects would be even greater. Global temperatures would drop an average of eight degrees Celsius, and more than 20 degrees Celsius in the interior of North America and Eurasia. In the Northern Hemisphere, there would be three years without a single day free of frost. Food production would stop, and the vast majority of the human race would starve. Since the end of the Cold War we have acted as though this kind of war simply can’t happen. But it can: the two nuclear superpowers still have nearly 20,000 nuclear warheads; more than 2,000 of them are maintained on missiles that can be fired in less than 15 minutes, destroying the cities of the other power 30 minutes later. As long as the U.S. and Russia maintain these vast arsenals there remains the very real danger that they will be used, either intentionally or by accident. We know of at least five occasions since 1979 when one or the other of the superpowers prepared to launch a nuclear attack on the other country in the mistaken belief that they themselves were under attack. The most recent of these events was in January 1995. The conditions that existed then, which brought us within minutes of a nuclear war, have not significantly changed today. The next time an accident takes place, we may not be so lucky. Nuclear war causes extinction. Morgan 09 – professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Dennis Ray, “World on Fire: Two Scenarios of the Destruction of Human Civilization and the Possible Extinction of the Human Raceâ€, 2009)//Beddow Russell and Einstein warned of bombs that are thousands of times more powerful than those of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, bombs that would send ‘‘radio-active particles into the upper air’’ and then return to the Earth in the form of a ‘‘thousands of times greater than those ‘‘Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish,’’ to quite possibly ‘‘put deadly dust or rain’’ that would infect the human race an end to the human race.’’ They feared that ‘‘if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death, sudden only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.’’ [7]. Years later, in 1982, at the height of the Cold War, Jonathon Schell, in a very stark and horrific portrait, depicted sweeping, bleak global scenarios of total nuclear destruction. Schell’s work, The Fate of the Earth [8] represents one of the gravest warnings to humankind ever given. The possibility of complete annihilation of humankind is not out of the question as long as these death bombs exist as symbols of national power. As Schell relates, the power of destruction is now not just thousands of times as that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; now it stands at more than one and a half million times as powerful, more than fifty times enough to wipe out all of human civilization and much of the rest of life along with it [8]. In Crucial Questions about the Future, Allen Tough cites that Schell’s monumental work, which ‘‘eradicated the ignorance and denial in many of us,’’ was confirmed by ‘‘subsequent scientific work on nuclear winter and other possible effects: humans really could be completely devastated. Our human species really could become extinct.’’ [9]. Tough estimated the chance of human self-destruction due to nuclear war as one in ten. He comments that few daredevils or high rollers would take such a risk with so much at stake, and yet ‘‘human civilization is remarkably casual about its high risk of dying out completely if it continues on its present path for another 40 years’’ [9]. What a precarious foundation of power the world rests upon. The basis of much of the military power in the developed world is nuclear. It is the reigning symbol of global power, the basis, – albeit, unspoken or else barely whispered – by which powerful countries subtly assert aggressive intentions and ambitions for hegemony, though masked by ‘‘diplomacy’’ and ‘‘negotiations,’’ and yet this basis is not as stable as most believe it to be. In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In otherwords, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter. Nuclear war causes extinction. Deniston 12 ­ - representative of the LaRouche Policy Institute and member of the LaRouche “Basement†Scientific Research Team (Benjamin, “The Thermonuclear Option: Extinction or Existenceâ€, 5/25/12; http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2012/eirv39n21-20120525/08-14_3921.pdf)//Beddow Thermonuclear war is unlike any other form of warfare ever to have taken place. It is total annihilation warfare, in which the first strike immediately ensures the last strike, as the first confirmation of a launch on either side triggers immediate full retaliation from the other. Within a few minutes, human civilization could be over. Beyond the hundreds of immediate targets, the carryover effects of hundreds to thousands of thermonuclear detonations would produce a so-called thermonuclear winter, from which we have no guarantee that the human species would emerge. Bio-D loss causes extinction. Bucznyski 10 – writer and editor for Care2, Ecosalon and Inhabitat (Beth, “UN: Loss of Biodiversity Could Mean End of Human Raceâ€, 10/18/10; <http://www.care2.com/causes/un-humans-are-rapidly-destroying-the-biodiversity-ne.html>)//Beddow UN officials gathered at the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Japan have issued a global warning that the rapid loss of animal and plant species that has characterized the past century must end if humans are to survive. Delegates in Nagoya plan to set a new target for 2020 for curbing species loss, and will discuss boosting medium-term financial help for poor countries to help them protect their wildlife and habitats (Yahoo Green). “Business as usual is no more an option for mankind,†CBD executive secretary Ahmed Djoghlaf said in his opening statements. “We need a new approach, we need to reconnect with nature and live in harmony with nature into the future.†The CBD is an international legally-binding treaty with three main goals: conservation of biodiversity; sustainable use of biodiversity; fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. Its overall objective is to encourage actions which will lead to a sustainable future. As Djoghlaf acknowledged in his opening statements, facing the fact that many countries have ignored their obligation to these goals is imperative if progress is to be made in the future. “Let us have the courage to look in the eyes of our children and admit that we have failed, individually and collectively, to fulfill the Johannesburg promise made to them by the 110 Heads of State and Government to substantially reduce the loss of biodiversity by 2010,†Djoghlaf stated. “Let us look in the eyes of our children and admit that we continue to lose biodiversity at an unprecedented rate, thus mortgaging their future.†Earlier this year, the U.N. warned several eco-systems including the Amazon rainforest, freshwater lakes and rivers and coral reefs are approaching a “tipping point†which, if reached, may see them never recover. According to a study by UC Berkeley and Penn State University researchers, between 15 and 42 percent of the mammals in North America disappeared after humans arrived. Compared to extinction rates demonstrated in other periods of Earth’s history, this means that North American species are already half way to to a sixth mass extinction, similar to the one that eliminated the dinosaurs. The same is true in many other parts of the world. The third edition of the Global Biodiversity Outlook demonstrates that, today, the rate of loss of biodiversity is up to one thousand times higher than the background and historical rate of extinction. The Earth’s 6.8 billion humans are effectively living 50 percent beyond the planet’s biocapacity in 2007, according to a new assessment by the World Wildlife Fund that said by 2030 humans will effectively need the capacity of two Earths in order to survive. Extinction. Yule et al 3/21 – School of Biological Sciences, Louisiana Tech University (Jeffrey V. Yule, “Biodiversity, Extinction, and Humanity’s Future: The Ecological and Evolutionary Consequences of Human Population and Resource Useâ€, 3/21/13)//Beddow As a species, Homo sapiens sapiens has either already arrived or will shortly arrive at a fork in the road, and the route we choose will determine what sort of world our species will occupy. One road leads to a relatively biodiverse future in which a significant majority of today’s non-domestic species persist. The other leads to a future in which the majority of today’s non-domestic species are extinct. Along both courses, we suspect that global human population will likely stabilize below the current estimated total of slightly above seven billion. Our species has already experienced and, to a considerable extent, contributed to a significant extinction event, so both prehistoric and historic human actions have already shaped global biology. At issue now is the extent and direction of ongoing human effects on global ecology and evolution, including the probability that our species will be a long-term or short-term component of global biological communities. In speculating about humanity’s biological future, it is important to recognize that the details depend on how far into the future we opt to look. Ours is not an especially old species. Depending on the criteria used to differentiate modern humans from our ancestors, we are either at least a 200,000 year-old species (based on anatomy) or a 50,000 year-old species (based on behavioral criteria) [1]. Assuming a future of roughly the same duration as our past, we will generally look less than 100,000– 200,000 years into the future. While that amount of time is vast from a human cultural perspective— and, indeed, from the ecological and evolutionary perspectives of microorganisms—from other perspectives, it is comparatively brief. Greatest extinction risk. Rahbek 12 – Professor of Biology, Ecology, and Evolution at the University of Coopenhagen (Carsten, “The Biodiversity Crisis: Worse than Climate Changeâ€, /1/19/12; < http://news.ku.dk/all_news/2012/2012.1/biodiversity/>)/Beddow Mass extinctions of species have occurred five times previously in the history of the world – last time was 65 million years ago when the dinosaurs and many other species disappeared. Previous periods of mass extinction and ecosystem change were driven by global changes in climate and in atmospheric chemistry, impacts by asteroids and volcanism. Now we are in the 6th mass extinction event, which is a result of a competition for resources between one species on the planet – humans – and all others. The process towards extinction is mainly caused by habitat degradation, whose effect on biodiversity is worsened by the ongoing human-induced climate change. "The biodiversity crisis – i.e. the rapid loss of species and the rapid degradation of ecosystems – is probably a greater threat than global climate change to the stability and prosperous future of mankind on Earth. There is a need for scientists, politicians and government authorities to closely collaborate if we are to solve this crisis. This makes the need to establish IPBES very urgent, which may happen at a UN meeting in Panama City in April," says professor Carsten Rahbek, Director for the Center for Macroecology, Evolution and Climate, University of Copenhagen. Bio-D loss triggers every impact; famine, nuclear war, econ collapse, disease, climate change. Takacs 96 – Professor in Earth Systems Science & Policy at CSU Monterey Bay and consultant for Conservation International and USAID (David, “The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradiseâ€, 1996, < http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm>)//Beddow More recently, Jane Lubchenco feels very strongly that people are in fact much more dependent on ecosystem services that are provided by both managed and unmanaged ecosystems than is generally perceived to be the case. So I think it's sheer folly for us to act in ways that are undermining the ability of both managed and unmanaged ecosystems to provide these services that we're dependent on. And that we're doing that more and more as we pollute and destroy habitats, or alter habitats in one fashion or another. And I guess the bottom line is that we're changing the environment faster than our ability to understand the consequences of how we're changing it." Most predictions of eco-doom are predicated on this argument, and many are stated in much more dramatic terms than those Lubchenco employs. As the argument runs, a myriad of organisms, especially "little things," comprise ecosystems that provide countless services that keep the Earth's biotic and abiotic processes up and running.' According to Souls, "Many, if not all, ecological processes have thresholds below and above which they become discontinuous, chaotic, or suspended." Biodiversity may regulate these processes; among its many talents, biodiversity is said to create soil and maintain its fertility, control global climate, inhibit agricultural pests, maintain atmospheric gas balances, process organic wastes, pollinate crops and flowers, and recycle nutrients.' Confusion in this line of argumentation ties back into why the concept of biodiversity has risen to prominence. Remember that biologists have scant understanding of the roles that species or populations play in maintaining ecosystems. In interviews, Lovejoy, Falk, and Ray confessed that you can strip away many species from an ecosystem without loss of ecosystem function. Ehrlich points out that by the time a species is endangered, it has probably stopped playing an important role in keeping the system functioning anyway." Furthermore, it is not clear whether we should focus on species as functional cogs in the ecosystem wheel, or whether ecological services are emergent properties of ecosystems themselves. With the biodiversity concept, these dilemmas become nearly moot. Biodiversity embraces lists of species, lists of ecosystems, the interactions of species within ecosystems, and the processes that species may maintain or control. When arguing on behalf of bio-diversity, one need not focus on the specifics-specifically, the specifics of what we don't know. It is enough to explicate some of the functions that keep ecosystems running, or that ecosystems provide for us, and then extrapolate to the dangers associated with declining biodiversity. Peter Raven bases his thinking on Leopold's observation "To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering": "In every sense, in the sense of communities that will preserve soil, promote local climate, keep the atmosphere, preserve water, and everything else, the first rule of being able to put together communities well or have the world go on functioning well, or to keep climates as they are, or to retard disease, to produce products we want sustainably, be cause, after all, plants, algae, and photosynthetic bacteria are the only device we have to capture energy from the sun effectively-in all those senses, and in the sense that we're losing the parts so rapidly, I con sider the loss of biological diversity to be the most serious problem that we have-far more serious than global climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion, or anything else." "Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization."" Elsewhere, Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civili zation will disappear some time before the end of the next century not with a bang but a whimper. 14 Stephen jay Gould presents an equally chilling picture. It is in our "enlightened self interest" to treat Mother Nature nicely: "We had better sign while she is still willing to make a deal. If we treat her nicely, she will keep us going for a while. If we scratch her, she will bleed, kick us out, bandage up, and go about her business at her planetary scale."" Nature is personified as a woman who cares not a whit about us; we, however, must value her supremely, as her biotic processes hold the key to our future. David Pimentel expresses this somewhat more soberly: "We can't have agriculture without these species, we can't have forestry without these species, we can't live without these species, and that's the essential part." Walter Rosen, Jane Lubchenco, and Gordon Orians offer similar arguments as in Orians's statement, "I'm very much concerned about preserving the capacity of living systems to provide the resources upon which a quality human life depends." Bryan Norton points out that since humans reside at the end of food chains, we surpass most other organisms in our vulnerability to extinction." Not only does biodiversity sustain us; it provides an "early warning system" that alerts us when it-and therefore humanity-may be in peril. Similarly, biodiversity is a "barometer of environmental health." According to Falk, endangered species are "meaningful primarily because they tell us where there is trouble. And not just geographically. They are excellent ways of spotting problems." Raven calls biodiversity "the key to the world's stability, in terms of the fact that rich biodiversity provides an index, a canary in the coal mine kind of thing, to the stability and healthiness of the world." Ehrlich ties his study organism to this way of thinking: "Butterflies are key indicator organisms for the health of ecosystems, systems that provide Homo sapiens with indispensable services without which civilization cannot persist."" These ecological-value arguments for biodiversity attempt to convey values much bigger than their spokespersons' individualistic preferences. Biodiversity keeps the world's ecology running, which in turn keeps human civilization running; or biodiversity is the ecological world in its entirety, which not only has immense value in itself, but also sustains humanity. Biodiversity's ecological value, therefore, looms inexpressibly large, virtually unknown, but incalculably important.
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