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Mestari

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About Mestari

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  1. Sure, morality would mandate a division, but that does not mean we are not obliged to respect the rights of animals. Animals, and I'm going to use a deontic lens here as well, aren't even moral entities. We still, however, have to respect them. Animals don't behave rationally, they are purely instinctive. This is what morally differentiates animals from humans. You can't grant them certain rights based on the actions they take because they are unable to reason practically. I'm not well-read on the ontology vs epistemology debate, but I am familiar with ontology vs ethics. Jean-Paul Sartre rejects the notion of a universal human nature in his existentialist thought, but Kant would argue for a universally shared human nature through our common practical reason. These cannot be simultaneously true. Levinas' work clearly illustrates that there is in fact a profound discussion occurring to determine whether ontology precedes morality, or vice versa. I understand that morality and justice are two separate concepts, however many philosophers believe that justice is a mechanism for upholding morality. In that sense, what is required of morality must also be required of justice. This would also serve as a framework that would allow the affirmative to win a substantial amount of rounds, for reasons I hope are obvious. If not, let me know and I will explain, but for now my time is limited.
  2. I'm sorry if I came off as hostile. It was early in the morning, and I have yet to see a post by this member, on either of his accounts, that is simultaneously logical and productive to any significant extent. Anyway... The first interpretation is essentially right, although the phrasing could use some improvement. The second interpretation doesn't apply directly because finding a logical link from justice to animal rights doesn't affirm. You must explain how the recognition of animal rights is a prerequisite to justice. You can affirm the resolution under the first interpretation much easier than you seem to acknowledge. See my last post in this thread. You just have to go framework-heavy. Just =/= Justice. Right there I see a flaw in the aff idea. I also don't see how one logical fallacy warrants all other. A logical fallacy may provide a gateway to false claims, but it is not a proper warrant anymore than statistics on the efficiency of nuclear weapons on deterring asteroids being used to prove that our educational system needs improvement. It is an interesting idea, nonetheless. As for rights philosophy. I feel that you are mixing ontology and moral philosophy too much, as I'm guessing that you have run ontology a lot in policy. They are two near-exclusive concepts. Ontology is the study of existence and morality applies to essence. They lead to contradictory priorities which is why there have been age-long debates about whether one precedes the other. This topic is calling for a deontological approach to morality, and if you will allow it I would like to recommend a book to you to conceptualize deontology without ontology. It is Sources of Normativity by Christine Korsgaard. If you need a copy, I can email it to you. Just message me.
  3. That's an idiotic metric for weighing fairness and will lose every time vs even a half-ass theory debater.
  4. Affirming, as you have noticed with your use of Aristotle's definition will be largely framework. You have to win a theory of justice that affirms the resolution. It's actually easier to argue that justice does not have scientific restraints than to say that it does, so I don't think the level of cognitive development in animals will be a large factor. I actually believe that the idea of using Aristotle's definition is quite interesting. However, correct me if I'm wrong as I have not read much on Aristotle's theory, it would be hard to justify this theory over any other. And if you do, you have to prove that all animals have some quantifiable justification for having their rights recognized. So even if you win your fw, the way you weigh impacts would be incredibly vague.
  5. So basically you are saying that the neg can screw with the aff by proposing that the affirmative has the contextual burden of affirming the resolution? We should all bow down to your oozing intelligence... Yeah... if you want to lose a theory debate. That's a theory debate you are going to lose as well. Recognizing something does not mean action must be taken. I may recognize that we ought donate to those in need, but that doesn't necessarily mean that I will donate. Simply because justice "recognizes" animal rights does not mean that we will treat animals any differently than in the squo. Hell, governments around the world recognize human rights and don't attribute any value to them. The bolded section is the only thing of value you've said in this entire thread. But that is something obvious that everyone already knows. The other part... sigh, I have lost faith in the debate community. If you are relying on presumption to win rounds then you won't be going very far at many tournaments.
  6. Nobody said morality is "fair." Anyway, he conceded the definition that ought = moral obligation. He was also neg, so the theory essentially functioned at this point as "The affirmative must not affirm the resolution."
  7. What he means is that for traditional circuits, judges don't want to hear tag, evidence, tag, evidence. They want you to give logical transitioning. If you just erase the quoted evidence and citations leaving everything else, your case should still say the same thing as it does with the evidence. Evidence should only be used to add credibility to your arguments.
  8. Evidence is fine, if not necessary. I've always carded it policy-style for both the national and local circuits, as usually the judges don't even look at your cases anyway. For lay judges, however, read more of the rhetoric of the card if it is written persuasively, even if it isn't critical to making your point. If your judge does read your case for whatever reason, perhaps if your opponent is not used to that style of cutting and picked, then you can just explain the technique to your judge. However, I would ask some of the debaters in your region about how the judges will react just to be safe.
  9. Sorry about the red text, I'm not to sure as how to split up quotes within one post.
  10. Debaters must not value morality... This was in an LD round... The voter was fairness...
  11. I should probably add a disclaimer: I'm just explaining the traditionally accepted views of a standard in LD Debate. Personally I am against using values and standards because they 1) tend to cause a tunnel vision within debate rounds that fails to recognize many facets of the arguments and 2) they are a strategic hindrance as they limit the ground you can defend, and 3) promote the creation of insubstantial links to several different impacts that would be much stronger without a standard. There are benefits though, however they are largely restricted to lay judging.
  12. As for the plan part of this discussion, again I'm not an expert on that form of LD. Your argument makes sense, and if I were a judge I'd support it, but that's the crux of this, judge adaptation. I don't think that there is anything else to say other than it depends on the judges perception more so than any logical argument. Towards the V/C weighing mechanism, let me go over the purpose of it. You see, you have a value within the round, but it wouldn't necessarily be "life" or "quality of life" in the exact rhetorical sense. It can range from morality to justice to preserving human life or even reducing suffering. Your criterion is how you achieve your value. If you value morality, your criteria could be respecting moral agency. Then you could access impact calculus based on dehumanization and inherent human worth or a body-count approach, along with many others. You see, what's vital to understand is that your value and criterion are simply an outline for your case. Your framework should still have philosophical arguments within it. When trying to weigh between saving 5 lives and universally ending hunger, ignoring the fact that ending suffering would save more than 5 lives, the impact weighing is through the philosophical frameworks. The debate itself in essence isn't so much a pragmatic one as an ontological one. It's more of a question as to what is morality and how we should perceive it than which impact has a bigger body count. If the affirmative solves for the mass genocide of 2.5 million people, but the negative proves that in doing so, they destroy the moral agency of 1 billion and makes the argument that human lives have no value without moral agency, then the impact of the aff has effectively no weight. I'll probably sound like a complete bastard for saying this, but so what if 2.5 million people die in a genocide if their life has no moral value. After all, we are quite often discussing a moral obligation in LD. Does this make sense? If not, just ask me to clarify wherever needed.
  13. Yeah, in LD the resolution is the focus. Now if the aff actually runs a plan, then how a topical counterplan functions within the round is beyond me. Maybe somebody with more experience with policy-oriented LD can answer that for you.
  14. Because there is still a constructive conversation to be had. 1. Maybe it's just me, but I've never seen an aff so specific as to avoid clash. If it is, theory will probably be enough to warrant a neg ballot. 2. Many will argue that values gain purpose when applied to policy. 3. Ought it almost always defined as either a moral obligation or desirability in LD. If it's desirability, exceptions are fine. As for moral obligations it depends on the moral theory that the aff himself chooses to defend. The neg can propose an opposing theory, but let's not get into the drawn-out ethical framework debates that avoid application. After all, the FW is a weighing mechanism, not the argument itself. 4. I believe that this is the most strategic response. Just be ready to apply it to vague moral theories. 5. Quite often the aff has to defend a moral obligation, moral permissibility, or a given ethical value depending on the resolution. That may or may not be a heavier burden than "substantial," but it is certainly more defined, at least from an LDers perspective. Either way, this is a difference between Policy and LD, not a reason not to parametricize. 6. I heard "aff must defend dearmament" theory was a game changer on the "Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons" topic. Anyway, the aff's burden largely shifts with the arguments made in round, and the judging paradigm adopted. LD is a lot more flexible than it seems. It appears that in more rounds than one would imagine the debate is won at the line of scrimmage deciding where we place the burden (sorry for the poor use of a football reference). Topical counterplans affirm the resolution, do they not? Please expand on how this would serve to check aff abuses. As for kritikal arguments, go for it if you don't have a lay judge. I love these myself.
  15. I have a hard time calling many of the traditional judges you are talking about truth testers. They say that they follow the paradigm and then will complete ignore a won a priori in the RFD. Many judges agree with the notion of truth testing and falter when facing the technicalities.
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