Jeffrey A. â€œPhilosophizing the double-bindâ€. Philosophy Today; Winter 1995; 39, 4; Research Library
pg. 371. www.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/doublebind.pdf.
specifically, deleuze and nietzsche's concept of becoming
"The reference is to Alice in Through the Looking Glass, for when â€œAlice becomes largerâ€ she becomes larger than she was and is yet smaller than she becomes. Or, as Deleuze puts it, â€œshe is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before.â€25 The claim is thus not that Alice is, at some â€œpresentâ€ moment, bigger and smaller at the same time, but rather that in becoming larger she is simultaneously smaller than she becomes. Becoming entails this double structure, this being pulled in bother directions at once, and this â€œat onceâ€ is not an identifiable, present moment, but is a â€œself-contradictoryâ€ moment that will forever â€œelude the present.â€ As that which forever eludes the present, by being non-identifiable and â€œself-contradictory,â€ becoming also eludes being â€œknown,â€ at least if knowledge is assumed to be a manner of grasping and identifying something. This is precisely what Nietzsche, after stating that becoming is â€œself-contradictory,â€ claims: â€œKnowledge and becoming exclude one another.â€27 But if we are to get on with our lives we must have â€œknowledge,â€ or the strange and unfamiliar (i.e., becoming as â€œself-contradictoryâ€) must be reduced to the habitual and the familiar (i.e., being as non-contradictory). â€œConsequently,â€ Nietzsche continues, â€œthere must first of all be a will to make knowable, a kind of becoming must itself create the deception of beings.â€28 This will is the â€œwill to powerâ€: â€œTo impose upon becoming the character of being: that is the supreme will to power.â€29 Yet as â€œa kind of becomingâ€ will to power must itself be â€œself-contradictory,â€ or have the double structure of being simultaneously pulled in two directions at once, and indeed this is what Deleuze claims is the case. The will to power is simultaneously pulled toward becoming both affirmative and negative, becoming and being, chance and necessity. The will which wills and affirms â€œbeing,â€ for example, the â€œwill to make knowable,â€ is for Nietzsche a negative will. This will affirms being, it says yes to being, yet it simultaneously negates becoming, and negates it in order to have knowledge; but since the will to power, even the â€œwill to make knowable,â€ is a â€œkind of becoming,â€ this will consequently negates itself, or, as Nietzsche puts it, â€œthe condemnation of life is only a value judegment of life.â€30 With this Nietzsche concludes that this condemnation is symptomatic of a â€œdeclining, weakened, weary, condemned life.â€ This is a will and life that does not have the â€œstrength of spiritâ€31 to endure the â€œtruthâ€ of itself-i.e., the â€œtruthâ€ of becoming. Consequently, this is a will that simply to reacts to and affirms the results of a fundamental negation (i.e., it affirms beings as negated becomings), and thus this affirmation is not, Deleuze argues, an affirmation of strength, or even affirmation which affirms what is. This is the affirmation of the ass in Zarathustra (IV, â€œThe Awakeningâ€): â€œHe carries our burden, he took upon himself the form of a servant, he is the patient of heart and never says No.â€32 In other words, as a result of negating its own becoming, the assâ€™s â€œYea-Yuhâ€ and affirmation does not know how to say â€œnoâ€ to this fundamental negation (i.e., nihilism). The assâ€™s â€œYeah-Yuhâ€ reacts to, or is a servant of, the consequence of this negation (i.e., the affirmation of â€œbeing,â€ â€œrealityâ€), or, as Deleuze puts it, â€œhe always answers yes, but answers yes each time nihilism opens the conversation.â€33"
later on Bell goes on to describe Heideggers depart from Nietzsche
"What Heidegger believed Nietzsche failed to overcome is the very opposition between an â€œaboveâ€ and a â€œbelowâ€; he left this oppositional, metaphysical structure intact. But did he? Heidegger grants that Nietzsche did come to question this faith in opposing values, but that he did so â€œonly in his final creative year (1888).â€10 However, Nietzsche was well aware of this faith in opposing values, and in fact criticized, in Beyond Good and Evil (1886), the fundamental metaphysical â€œfaith in opposite values,â€ suggesting that â€œmaybeâ€ these opposites are â€œinsidiously related,â€ or even one in essence (&2). And in Human All-too-Human (1878, &1) he calls for a â€œchemistry of moral feelings,â€ a chemistry that might find that the glorious and the logical are â€œinsidiously relatedâ€ to their â€œsupposedâ€ opposites to the despised and the illogical, â€œmaybe even one with them in essence. Maybe!? One must therefore question Heideggerâ€™s claim that Nietzscheâ€™s inversion and reversal of Platonism â€œmeansâ€ that the sensuous â€œis the true . . . genuine being [as opposed to a false and counterfeit being].â€11But what is this inversion, or, to put it another way, how does Nietzsche avoid binary oppositions (e.g., supersensuous/sensuous, appearance/reality)? His answer: â€œwill to power.â€ It is the will to power that imposes order on the chaos or frenzy in oneself, and it does this not by virtue of a pre-established truth or binary opposition, but rather it is this will that is constitutive of, or fictions, these oppositions and truths; or, as Nietzsche puts it, it is the will to power that idealizes: If there is to be art, if there is to be any aesthetic doing and seeing, one physiological condition is indispensable: frenzy. . . . What is essential in such frenzy is the feeling of increased strength and fullness. Out of this feeling [i.e., will to power] one lends to things, one forces them to accept from us, one violates them-this process is called idealizing.12 By idealizing, Nietzsche does not mean a process of â€œdiscounting and subtracting what is petty and inconsequential,â€ but rather â€œa tremendous drive to bring out the main features so that the others disappear in the process.â€ A decision, an aesthetic differentiation is made, and it is the Dionysian frenzy and chaos in oneself that makes this possible. This Dionysian frenzy, with its â€œincreased strength and fullness,â€ is the medium of this decision, the condition for this difference (i.e., difference between the â€œmain featuresâ€ and the â€œothersâ€ that disappear). When referring to this state of â€œincreased strength that is discharged or expended as the medium of a decision or difference, Nietzsche will most often refer to this as â€œwill to power.â€13 Consequently, â€œwill to powerâ€ is to be understood as the medium or condition which makes decisions (i.e., differentiation) possible. â€œWill to power,â€ as Deleuze puts it, is the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic.â€14 What is differentiated are forces, the forces that are part of the â€œfeeling of increased strength and fullness.â€ The â€œmain featuresâ€ are thus forced to disappear, and hence the decisions or differences that are made possible by will to power are decisions and differences of force."
obviously youll want to read the entire article but these are some important and interesting passages for inquiring about the heidegger/deleuze debate.