Plan: I instrumentally affirm that the United States federal government should substantially increase social services for persons living in poverty in the United States.
Contention one: I’m topical.
I defend the entirety of the resolution and all the consequences of US action.
Contention two: I win
Advantage 1: Fairness
First, I’m predictable – my plan is the resolution – the neg can easily be prepared.
Second, I set a reasonable limit – affirmative’s only get the resolution – the neg gets any argument that links to the resolution. This is perfect because the neg only has to be prepared for the resolution which makes everyone’s life easier.
Being predictable and setting limits are key to fairness. The neg can only stand up to affs that can be predicted from the resolution and don’t justify unlimiting the resolution. Without predictable limits the neg could never win and debate would be horribly unfair. Our aff is means for radically transforming the debate activity into a fair forum for productive discussion.
This preserves the model of debate because if debate wasn’t fair people would leave the activity and unfair debate would mean we wouldn’t learn anything because debates would always be won by non-topical affs.
Vote aff for fairness and education. Voting aff adopts an ethic of fairness that guarantees the continuation of the activity and opens the space for emancipating discourses. Vote aff to change the unfair status quo where untopical affs win debates. Voting aff because I’m topical is a radical shift from status quo practices of non-topicality that ruin the activity because no one can predict them and only unlimit the resolution to the point where it risks destroying debate.
Advantage two: Switch side debate
Debate has seen the emergence of non-topical affs and affirmitives that don’t defend plan passage or instrumentally affirm the topic.
College and high school case list also proves.
In the context of policy debate, the topic serves as a pivot around which switch side debating occurs—the commitment to the topic and to defending one side of the debate is the pre-requisite for the testing of ideas—affirmitive attempts to shirk the topic and to not advocate plan passage represents an attempt to close their advocacy’s off from criticism and to escape from the necessity of switch side debate—this refusal to commit to the topic and to switch side debate entails an ethics of closure towards otherness and an ethics of intolerance—only a commitment to the topic in the context of policy debate can engender the kind of tolerant ethic necessary to combat fundamentalism and totalitarianism
Muir 1993 (Star A. PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate," v26,
The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions. The values of tolerance and fairness implicit in the metaphor of debate as game, are idealistic in nature. They have a much greater chance of success, however, in an activity that requires students to examine and understand both sides of an issue. I n his description of debating societies, Robert Louis Stevenson questions the prevalence of unreasoned opinion, and summarizes the judgment furthered in this work: Now, as the rule stands, you are saddled with the side you disapprove, and so you are forced, by regard for your own fame, to argue out, to feel with, to elaborate completely, the case as it stands against yourself; and what a fund of wisdom do you not turn up in this idle digging of the vineyard! How many new difficulties take form before your eyes! how many superannuated arguments cripple finally into limbo, under the glance of your enforced eclecticism! ... It is as a means of melting down this museum of premature petrifactions into living and impressionable soul that we insist on their utility.
Otherization is at the center of the genocidal process
Kovel, Prof Pol, Comm, & Psych @ Einstein, 1984
(Joel, Against the State of Nuclear Terror, p175-6)
The irrationality that often befalls groups on the margins of society reveals the working of a general mechanism that undoubtedly contributes in a major way to the stability of irrational and oppressive social orders. When society as a whole is irrational and permeated with violence and domination, then each individual within it will stand to internalize some of the same as he or she runs the gauntlet of personal development. By “internalize,” I mean the development of unconscious structured relations with others. We each have an internal (i.e., intrapsychic) group of relations between the “I” and the “Other” that is, on the one hand, quite fantastic and out of immediate contact with external reality, while, on the other, is shaped by that reality and is shaped by it in turn. Such shaping occurs through the mental processes called introjection (modeling of the self by the world) and projection (modeling of the world according to the self). The Other, being the negation of the self, can take on many characteristics, good or bad. The Other, therefore, is both a rough replication of the goodness and badness of the external world as well as a determinant of that goodness or badness.
When we congrugate into groups (including the society which is integral to these groups) the relations of Otherness take on a decisive importance. For in the formation of a group a kind of splitting necessarily takes place between elements of the Other. This splitting is shaped about the irreducible fact of the group (or society) and its identity. If there is a group, then one is either in it or not. From another angle, groups take shape about the deployment of the feeling of “insideness.” And once one is in, then there must be an outside. If there is an America, then one can be an American. If so, then all others become Other, and non-Americans or foreigners.
A lot of history has turned around the fact that the basic inside-outside relations of groups have come to be fused with the goodness and badness of the Other. Then all those inside become good, and all outside, bad. The members of the group each return to being of the “purified pleasure ego,” described earlier when we were developing the notion of paranoia and the general psychology of technocracy. Insofar as the bad outside takes on a persecutory quality, the group itself becomes paranoid—with this key difference between the group and the individual level: that the individual paranoiac experiences the persecution immediately, while the member of the group is insulated by identification with the others and his or her participation in the group’s practice. In this way, the paranoia is delegated to the group as a whole. We might say that it becomes de-subjectified and passes beyond the psychologies of the individuals of the group. The individual mind remains under the sway of the affiliation of the good Other that remains inside group relations. Meanwhile the persecutory potential of the outsiders is reduced by dehumanization. This is how people remain “normal” individually while countenancing and even actively carrying out the most heinous and irrational acts on the “thingified” and dehumanized bodies of outsiders. It tells us a lot about how gracious and kindly white Southerners could lynch and castrate blacks; of how good, clean efficient Germans could turn Jews into lampshades; of how Israelis, with their ancient tradition of Jewish compassionateness, earned through centuries of suffering, could calculatedly dispossess the Palestinian people; and of course, how the friendly Americans could annihilate Hiroshima and cut their swath through history.
Vote affirmative to unconditionally insist on the necessity of the topic for an ethic of responsibility and tolerance—vote aff to affirm the ethic of tolerance entailed in switch side debate
Voting aff is a demand for an ethics of responsibility that opens up a space for others
Pinchevski, PhD Cand – Comm @ McGill U, 2001
(Amit, “Freedom of Speech (or the Silent Demand)”, Diacritics 31.2, 71-84)
The Silent Demand
This discussion, which set out to unsettle the ethical significance of the notion of freedom of speech, has possibly brought the act of free speech to a moral predicament. It appears that we can no longer regard such an act apart from its prior responsibilities; we can no longer ascribe to it an ethical value in itself irrespective of what already surrounds it. Nevertheless, this predicament is precisely what reintroduces the forsaken Other into the speech act and allows for the recognition of the Other. Rather than a problem, it presents the ethical chance for freedom of speech. How, therefore, should such a chance be taken?
One thing is certain: it is not a matter of limiting the freedom of speech. Such limitation would have to present a power impeding the speaker's right to speak, thereby reintroducing violence. Instead, the question is, how can the right to speak be deferred, "delayed," or, to paraphrase Levinas, how can it be late to the rendezvous with itself? It is in this lapse that quietude becomes silence, and from which the Other's call is addressed to the not-yet speaker; it is here where the Other is saying the Saying. This lapse presents a break in the system of message circulation, the system that favors the Said over the Saying, a break that opens up a rift in attentive waiting for the Other. Here a "command never heard is obeyed" [OBBE 168]. The Other is coming to me as a face, practicing no power, no coercion. I don't have to listen to this call; there is no rule forcing me to do so. Instead, I am drawn to its destitute highness, to its impoverished authority, addressing me beyond any rhetorical means, a resistance exercising no force. The face speaks, and its speech defies the taken-for-granted context in which it is situated; the face baffles me and any previous orientation I may have had. Its call does not challenge mine, nor does it silence it—it is directed to me, imploring to be noticed. However, according to the halved model of the speaker, there are no calls directed to me; my horizon is open to the broadcasting of free address while undermining the possibility of a particular call and a particular response existing separately from the public sphere.
Following the explications of the ethical boundaries of speech and freedom, what perhaps becomes clear now is that the fundamental shape of an ethical discourse is responsive and responsible rather than effective and cooperative. The problem is not that freedom of speech is not ethical but rather that it is not ethical enough. The constitution of a system based on freedom of speech is not enough since it does not bear in itself an ethical value—it is only when subjected to the Other's call that it takes on an ethical involvement. Hence, it is not a matter of improving one model of speech or replacing it with another. The ethical possibility lies in the ability to step outside the economy of free speech by letting oneself be interrupted by the Other's call; it does not rest in the successful execution of free speech but rather in its ability to be questioned. In deferring or delaying the appearance of the speaking self, there is the possibility of listening and thereby of responding. By responding to the Other's call, even at the expense of the right to produce a "free" speech, one takes the role of the witness and speaks for the Other, who may be absent or silent. The halved model of the speaker may then fail to catch up with the goal of the speech, thereby opening the possibility of becoming a witness of the time and the place in which he or she will speak. The Other receives precedence: the Other is listened to before the speaking self sets out to produce its own speech; the deferring of the self is the deferring to the Other. Only in this delay can the Other's address, silent and audible, be acknowledged; without it, this address is already relegated to a forgettable quietude.