These are neg cards I cut
Ocularcentrist perspectives on knowledge condemn us to a paradigm of visual dominance. This paradigm estranges and otherizes the blind. Reject ocularcentrist rhetoric to make a paradigm shift
Bowring 05 (Jacky, 2005, Environment, Society and Design Group, Lincoln U, New Zealand “Sensory Deprivation: Globalisation & the Phenomenology of Landscape Architecture” 81-82, http://dspace.lincoln.ac.nz/dspace/bitstream/10182/61/1/sensory_deprivation.pdf)
Ocularcentrism, or the hegemony of the eye, dominates the Western paradigm of engagement with the world since the Renaissance. Through globalisation’s colonisation of time and space, the tyranny of the eye has become one of the most insidious and pervasive influences upon landscape worldwide. Both Martin Jay and David Michael Levin have written extensively on ocularcentrism, and the ongoing intersection with ideas of knowledge and those of sight (see for example, Jay, 1994; Levin, 1988). While the dominance of the eye can be traced back to the Greeks, it was primarily through developments such as perspective and the picturesque, and the rise of viewing-based practices such as museums, zoos and tourism, that sight became elevated to the position of the pre-eminent sense. The eye’s dominion over sensory experience extends through to Modernism, where Marcel Duchamp rejected much of Modernism as “retinal art”, or art purely about visuality, or ‘opticality,’ rather than about ideas. Ocularcentrism extends to the here and now, with contemporary Western culture emphatically visual, illustrated in the term ‘visual culture’ which encapsulates the breadth of practices associated with the eye, the gaze, and the operations of contemporary culture – everything from the digital, to cinema, to photography, and the consumption of all things visual. Visuality’s association with the West also has connotations of a fear of the ‘other’, as expressed in Horkheimer and Adorno’s warning that “When we see we remain what we are; but when we smell we are taken over by otherness. Hence the sense of smell is considered a disgrace in civilization, the sign of a lower social strata, lesser races and base animals.” (in Classen, 1998, p.58) The dominance of the visual is a two-headed sword. On one side, visuality is aligned with knowledge, and there is a plethora of figures of speech in the English language which connect understanding with sight, “I see” being one of the most obvious. On the other side, however, 82 pure opticality can also be interpreted as a failure to fully engage, an ‘overlooking’ of the richness of ideas that might be within what one beholds. The alignment of the ‘eye’ and the ‘I’ emphasises the distancing of the subject from the object, the ‘disembodied eye’ (Jay, 1994, p.81), or in landscape terms, a detachment of the self from place.
Legal discourse is inherently occularcentrist
Hibbitts 94 (Bernard J., “MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS: VISUALITY, AURALITY, AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF AMERICAN LEGAL DISCOURSE”, Cardozo Law Review, Yeshiva University, December 1994)
While American legal discourse has embraced a range of figurative expressions evoking all sorts of sensory experience, n2 it has [*230] long favored visual metaphors. We frequently consider law as a matter of looking: we "observe" it; we evaluate claims "in the eye of the law"; n3 our high courts "review" the decisions of inferior tribunals. Alternatively, we speak of law as something one would usually look at: it is a "body," a "text," a "structure," a "bulwark of freedom," n4 a "seamless web," n5 and even a "magic mirror." n6 We identify particular legal concepts with striking visual images: property rights are a "bundle of sticks"; n7 a long-standing constitutional principle is a "fixed star"; n8 a sequence of ownership is a "chain of title." n9 We associate legal reasoning with the manipulation of visible geometric forms: we try to "square" precedents with one another; n10 we repeatedly agonize over "where the line [between different doctrines and situations] can be drawn." n11 We discuss legality in terms of light and darkness: we search for "bright-line" n12 tests; we consider an area of concurrent jurisdiction to be a "zone of twilight"; n13 we seek to extend constitutional protections by probing the shadowy "penumbras" n14 of well-known guarantees. With the aid of metaphor, we go so far as to give law the visual quality of hue: we may make a property claim under "color of title"; n15 we [*231] discourage "yellow dog" contracts n16 and make securities trading subject to "blue sky" laws; n17 for good or ill, we frequently adhere to "black letter" rules. n18