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Username420

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About Username420

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  • Birthday 11/24/1991

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    Joe Enimabag
  1. What happened in the round? Or can anyone tell me how either of the semi's rounds went down?
  2. Username420

    Rorty

    Anyone have the card by rorty that says civic engagement solves tyranny?
  3. Anyone know what centerville KO aff or record is?
  4. Anyone able to explain what Oepidus and phallus have in relation to Lacanian theory?
  5. The 3rd question is more of helping to answer Ojanakas who has these two cards - maybe more these are the only ones i've seem. No impact – In a biopolitical world, people’s lives are controlled and directed not killed – It needs a subject to stay in power. Ojanakas 05 [Mika, " Impossible dialogue on bio-power: Agamben and Foucault" Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, May 2005, Foucault Studies No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/index.html] In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives. The effectiveness of biopower can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In biopolitical societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: “One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.” However, given that the “right to kill” is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the biopolitical societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely biopolitical. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely biopolitical. Nevertheless, the fact is that present-day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very “right to kill” that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of biopolitical thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agamben’s thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West, has to be corrected. The biopolitical paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present-day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the biopolitical society can be seen, for example, in the middle-class Swedish social democrat. Although this figure is an object – and a product – of the huge biopolitical machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest “crime” against the machinery. (In biopolitical societies, death is not only “something to be hidden away,” but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most “shameful thing of all”.) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the biopolitical machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he “should have been dead long ago”.115 This is because biopower is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the success of biopower. Root Cause – Biopower isn’t the cause of violence it’s the sovereign power. Ojanakas 05 [Mika, " Impossible dialogue on bio-power: Agamben and Foucault" Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, May 2005, Foucault Studies No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/index.html] For Foucault, the coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life was something puzzling: “It is one of the central antinomies of our political reason.” 110 However, it was an antinomy precisely because in principle the sovereign power and biopower ‐ are mutually exclusive. How is it possible that the care of individual life paves the way for mass slaughters? Although Foucault could never give a satisfactory answer to this question, he was convinced that mass slaughters are not the effect or the logical conclusion of biopolitical rationality. I am also convinced about that. To be sure, it can be argued that sovereign power and biopower ‐ are reconciled within the modern state, which legitimates killing by biopolitical ‐ arguments. Especially, it can be argued that these powers are reconciled in the Third Reich in which they seemed to “coincide exactly”. 111 To my mind, however, neither the modern state nor the Third Reich – in which the monstrosity of the modern state is crystallized – are the syntheses of the sovereign power and biopower, but, rather, the institutional loci of their irreconcilable tension. This is, I believe, what Foucault meant when he wrote about their “demonic combination”. Then Dillion wrote an article in reply http://www.hull.ac.uk/socsci/downloads/caredtodeath.pdf Maybe if someone or Scu could help explain dillion's response.
  6. Alright sorry about that, I typically read the specific intellectual alternative. And I don't know it might be, I always thought schmit was the guy who said state of exceptions are good because they protect people or something.
  7. I'm blocking out 2NC biopower foucault style. And i'm finding 3 left that I was wondering if anyone could help me finish. 1. Is Schmit an answer to foucauldian style, the no state of exception, biopower? If so how should he be answered. 2. This article, or I guess the idea of "Democracy checks violence" style arguements. Dickinson being the main author: The modern democratic welfare state doesn’t trigger their impact – the neg’s shallow analysis fails to understand structural differences Dickinson 2004 (Edward Ross. “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’.” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48) In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany. 3. The diffrence in what Ojankis is talking about versus. what Dillion critiqued of Ojankis's work? Or what is a better answer if not Dillion. Thank you.
  8. Anyone have a good impact or internal link card to why eugenics/sterilization is bad? I figured it was obvious. Then Edelman came along.
  9. anyone want to post some of this on the actual thread? I'd be intrested in seeing some of this or at least what are the main internal links your getting between poverty and feminism.
  10. Social Service - Services provided by a government for its disadvantaged citizens. Homosexuals=disadvantaged because they don't get same rights to marriage. And marriage would be a service given to them.
  11. "pace v. hays: 2nr: Pace took their pic- that PIC'd out of utilities that suported CAFOs" Can anyone explain that? I realize i'm a little behind.
  12. "I think someone ran an abortion aff on the SSA topic. It was critical and based on Edelman." Yeah the boy ran that aff in one of the VD. Anyways, I think the aff would be structured around the idea of increasing the availability of abortion's would make more women get them and not just having a child increasing poverty.
  13. It seems to be better ran as a capitalism isn't sustainable card to answer impact turns better than it would be as an impact.
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