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About Jmei

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    John Mei
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  1. Jmei

    NDT 2008

    Was a 4-1. Don't know panel though.
  2. Jmei

    NDT 2008

    They debated each other round 7. Dartmouth is locked aff, I believe.
  3. Jmei


    I believe st. stephens lost to Greenhill RR in the octos.
  4. I would try and discourage this until you get to the institute proper, unless you know that both you and your potential partner will be in the same lab. Partners must be in the same lab, and it's kind of useless to try and form a partnership now before you know the placements (it's also nearly impossible to find out ahead of time the lab placements, even the lab leaders don't know until a few days before the institute starts). Don't worry about lacking a partner, you'll meet lots of talented debaters and cool people in lab during the first few days. EDIT: that said, an "introduce yourself" thread is still a great idea, but keep in mind that it's kind of asinine to create partnerships at this point.
  5. Few, if any, people get rejected from the DDI proper. Senior assistants is another matter, but it still isn't amazingly selective (although I imagine many people aren't selected who apply).
  6. Right, even if I win that the CP is illegit, it's not necessarily a reason to vote aff. I think the smarter (or easier to win) impact to theory in this instance is that it legitimizes severance on the perm. For instance, if you're only kind of winning the theory debate, it might not be a voter but it could justify the perm. Of course, if you win it and they let you get away with an independent voter, well, duh.
  7. I think the point is that the unique nature of funding PICs justify a severance permutation. If the negative gets to abusively fiat a private organization, the aff gets to sever out of normal means/"policy". Besides, the perm still has to be preferrable/equivalent to the CP to win.
  8. Private actor funding PICs are bad. I think the best argument is infinitely regressive. Having evidence is irrelevant- the Peace Corps accepts tax-deductable donations from companies and individuals on an hourly basis. This [http://www.peacecore.gov/index.cfm?shell=resources.donors.mgifts] or this [http://www.peacecore.gov/index.cfm?shell=resources.donors.volproj] alone shows dozens of companies and individuals who have donated, and I'm sure I could find ev that shows the literally thousands of individuals and persons who have donated to the P.C. before. Since there's no (predictable/enforcable) bright-line on what constitutes acceptable prior funding, it means I have to defend against a gigantic (if not infinite) pool of "company x" or "wealthy person y" funding CPs. One might say I only need a block that says "federal funding good" but the unpredictable nature of these CPs means agency/person-specific net benefits will always win. Additionally, their NB will probably be a spending DA (or a spending unpopular politics link) to USFG action, but I can't reciprocate and cut spending DAs to each possible actor. That along with the standard funding pics bad/private actor bad for blah blah blah warrents and a counter-interpretation- 'only governmental funding pics are legit' or 'only completely private CPs (ie: have the geekcorps funding and implement some action) and no only private funding CPs', depending on which side of the debate your block's stronger against. Or do them both, and say the intersection of the two is the really abusive part (the infinitely regressive arg above only applies to private organizations, there's only a handful of governmental organizations that can fund the plan). And those are all reasons why perm severence is OK, because the CP is abusive/uneducational. There are substantive arguments too, but they're probably not as strong as the NBs, I posted them in the beginning of the year somewhere and am too lazy to find them again. -Jmei
  9. When someone told me someone else had cut a SOCOM aff, I got curious and took a look. What a waste of 10 minutes. The 1AC advantage evidence is god-awful, especially the "Lebanon" advantage, when you read a card that talks about how the SOF succeeded in Somalia this one time to claim that an increase is key to "take out" Lebanon. The rest of the cards are spotty at best, mostly tagged incorrectly, poorly warranted, and don't assume an SOF increase. And don't get me started on how poorly the plan is written. It bans US citizens from joining PMCs in addition to raising the pay of SOF soldiers, which is easily PICed out of and just a terrible idea. To (partly) redeem this thread, here's the outline for a SF aff I cut and ran at Harvard (and did pretty good with). This one has some (major) holes in it (which noone pointed out), but I never did an outline for the other version of the aff and am too lazy to do now. Check it out, if you want. Contention one is inherency: The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review has called for an increase in the size of the Army Special Forces, but existing units remain incomplete and no mechanism has been put in place to deliver on this promise, making a catastrophic collapse of the Special Forces all but inevitable. Sean D. Naylor, Armed Forces Journal. "Expansion plans leave many in Army Special Forces uneasy". November, 2006. [http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/11/2166057] “The impending expansion of Army special operations forces… cultures than SF soldiers traditionally have been.” And, attempting to recruit directly out of the Army is impossible due to simultaneous increases in all SF forces. Sean D. Naylor, Armed Forces Journal. "Expansion plans leave many in Army Special Forces uneasy". November, 2006. [http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/11/2166057] "By planning for all the Army's combat...concern," said an SF officer with recent Iraq experience." Only by recruiting more soldiers can the Special Forces meet its growth targets. GAO (United States Government Accountability Office), July, 2006. "Special Operations Forces Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role" "The military services and the Special Operations Command have... for achieving planned growth, and enforce all of the directive’s reporting requirements." Fortunately, the 18 X-Ray program can help to solve the shortage by directly recruiting civilians. However, recruiting goals have been decreased and aren’t bringing in enough recruits. Sean D. Naylor, Armed Forces Journal. "Expansion plans leave many in Army Special Forces uneasy". November, 2006. [http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/11/2166057] The only reason USASOC can even think of expanding the...recruiting goal for 2006 and again for 2007. Thus the plan: The United States Department of Defense should increase the number of persons per year receiving a contract in the 18X enlistment option by 3,500. Observation two is Foreign Internal Defense: The United States has shifted towards a strategy of foreign internal defense that focuses on training indigenous forces to defeat terrorism. However, only maintaining a credible capacity to counter insurgents can guarantee success. Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, Ph.D. in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency". Parameters, Summer 2006, pp. 47-62. In distilled form, the corpus of current national strategic and...indigenous allies to effectively counter insurgents and terrorists And, ONLY the Special Forces have the ability to guarantee successful preventive defense, which is key to maintaining leadership and combating terrorism. Gen. Henry H. Shelton, commander in chief, U.S. Special Operations Command. Defense Issues: Volume 12, Number 12, March, 1997, "Special Operations Forces: Key Role in Preventive Defense". [http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=634] SOF are in the best position to adapt to the changing security environment...tensions, enforce democratic values and build trust among nations. Loss of leadership causes global nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, senior defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and former undersecretary of defense, Spring 1995. Washington Quarterly, lexis. The alternative to US hegemony is apolarity- exacerbating all other problems, including terrorism, the economy and regional conflicts. Niall Ferguson, Professor, History, School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September-October 2004 ("A World Without Power"-Foreign Policy) p. infotrac Additionally, expanding the Special Forces is key to winning the war on terror—the existing force structure is unprepared to conduct irregular warfare. Michael G. Vickers, director of strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Armed Forces Journal, February 2006. "What the QDR should say". [http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813629] The global war on terrorism and irregular warfare more...Forces and in classified Special Mission Units. The impact is extinction. Alexander, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, 2003 [Yonah, Washington Times, "Terrorism myths and realities," 8/28, LN] We’ll isolate a specific scenario: Only by having sufficient numbers of Special Forces soldiers can the US successfully train Iraqi Security Forces—the current shortage forces the US to utilize younger and less experienced troops that fail. James F. Dunnigan, Technical Advisory Board, US Army Simulation, Training & Instrumentation Command. Strategy World, August 27th, 2005. "How Not To Train Iraqi Security Forces" [http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20058270580.asp] One of the most important campaigns in Iraq gets little coverage. This...trainer training, and selection, missed some important items. And, American withdrawal is inevitable, but only through creating effective Iraqi stability forces can stability be maintained. Erich Marquardt, Program Manager of the Global Terrorism Analysis division at The Jamestown Foundation, The Power and Interest News Report. "Washington Must Create Viable Iraqi Security Forces", April 22nd, 2004. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=162] Washington's ultimate success in creating...with U.S. regional interests. And, the Army Special Forces are absolutely critical to this task—their unique capability to train Iraqi security forces are the only way to end the insurgency. Bruce Hoffman, Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and counterinsurgency expert with the RAND Corporation. "Lessons from the Past for Iraq's Future". July 23rd, 2004. [http://www.rand.org/commentary/072304SDUT.html] Such an integrated approach is precisely what military special operations... needed to stabilize Iraq. Continued chaos will escalate into all out war, crash the economy, jack leadership, energize terrorism, and spark ethnic cleansing. The Iraq Study Group, "The Iraq Study Group Report". James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson. The US Institute of Peace, 12/6/06. [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html] Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos...enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. The impact is extinction. Bahig Nassar, Arab Coordinating Centre of Non-Governmental Organizations & Afro-Asian People’s Solidary Organization, 11/25/02, http://www.inesglobal.org/BahigNassar.htm Contention four is solvency First, only expanding the 18x program ensures retention and long-term continuality—existing soldiers are increasingly reaching retirement eligibility. Michael S. Breasseale, command sergeant major for the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. Special Warfare, Vol. 16, Issue 4, May 1st, 2004. "The 18X Program : Ensuring the Future Health of Special Forces". The 18X program will provide not only more SF Soldiers...mention actually growing as a force. And, without solving retention issues Special Forces growth is impossible. Andrew Feickert, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service. "U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):Background and Issues for Congress". April 17th, 2006. [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf] While USSOCOM may be graduating additional operators...meaningful growth for USSOCOM forces. And, QDR growth is both achievable and critical—large recruiting pool, updated training methods, increased technology, and higher standards prove. Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Special Operations Technology, "SOF Specialist: Delivering SOF Confidence Through Trust, Leadership and Experience". Oct. 10th, 2006. [http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1697] Perhaps at some point that could become a concern but it...standards, and in some cases, raising them. Finally, 18x training combined with real-life experiences ensure a successful transformation. Michael S. Breasseale, command sergeant major for the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. Special Warfare, Vol. 16, Issue 4, May 1st, 2004. "The 18X Program : Ensuring the Future Health of Special Forces". It is primarily the maturity of the 18X...who is seeking college benefits or a paycheck.
  10. Jmei


    Varsity semis results (don't remember judge names, sorry): (4) Gulliver BM (Bowen/Moliver) d. (9) Kinkaid BT (Beiermeister/Tilney) (3-0) (23) Hooch KM (Kaushish/Mettler) d. (3) Rowland Hall AB (Akrami/Burton) (2-1) ... and I believe Gulliver has to go home, so no final round was debated.
  11. http://www.cdedebate.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=90&Itemid=82
  12. Is it just the coercion/objectivism argument that national service promotes an obligation of the citizen and "brain-washes" them into serving the nation? That seems plausible.
  13. Most Peace Corps oppertunities are given to college graduates. The few not holding an undergrad degree generally have some type of serious work experience in the field they would enter the P.C. in. A high-school student would certainly have a more difficult time getting in, although I've heard it happen. PS: I have also considered this option, but reached the conclusion that the best time to pursure P.C. volunteering would be between undergrad and grad.
  14. Bob and Lina won their round. As I'm not 100% sure of other results, I'll abstain from posting them for fear of misinformation.
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