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nlandsman

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About nlandsman

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    Nick L-R
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    Table of Contents This file contains the Green Bubble DA and a counterplan to which it is a net-benefit. The DA story is that there is slow, market-driven alternative energy growth now. Government based incentives (and picking winners) create a speculative bubble in the alternative energy market. When that bubble bursts it crushes the economy and turns the case. There are also some 2NC impacts.The disadvantage is ideal because it is difficult (if not impossible) to link turn since its basically a slow growth good / inflation bad argument. Any link turn (we increase growth) would just feed the link story. There are also a number of answers to the "stimulus non-uniques" answer. In addition to the DA and counterplan, there are also affirmative answers to both. The file itself is in Microsoft Word.

    10.00 USD

  2. Does anyone have some of the UTNIF files like W.A.S.T.E. K, Ecological Cartography Aff, Biopower K etc? I know some UTNIF files are posted but I havent seen these ones (and the other ev from whichever lab they came).
  3. Dillon ’99 [Michael (Professor at the University of Lancaster); “Another Justice”; Political Theory; Vol. 27 Issue 2; p. 164-166 //nick] Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such away that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the humanway of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contingency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, knowing is necessary and, indeed, integral to ‘decision’. But it does not exhaust ‘decision’, and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a ‘decision’. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The management science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as heterogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between ‘decision’ and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been—could not as yet have been—known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see. This is no simple absence of knowing. Neither is it an economic account of the asymmetry of knowing. Nor, finally, is it a matter of calculating the logics that apply in situations of imperfect information. Here we have no mere lack of knowledge that may be remedied, calibrated, or otherwise represented mathematically and of which an account can be taken. What I amreferring to is, instead, a lack integral to the structure of any and every ‘decision’; where the issue precisely is not a matter of not yet knowing but of the unknowable inalienable from knowing itself. Further even, and this is the crux of the issue, it is a matter of that peculiar infinite responsibility which releases the human pneuma in respect of unknowability as such. A peculiar and quite distinctive form of responsibility thereby arises; it corresponds to the very unknowability that invokes it. Since the unknowable is not the not yet known, but that which cannot be known in every act or exercise of knowing, it is attended by a responsibility which can similarly never be discharged. Assumption of responsibility for this unknowability—taking it on—is what makes a ‘decision’ a ‘decision’; rather than the application of judgment according to a rule, or the submission to the necessity of a law, however that law is decreed or described. Short of divesting the human of that very lack of measure, the assumption of which distinguishes the being of human being, this responsibility will never be discharged. Here then, too, the thinking of deconstruction reveals its profoundly ethical and political character: through its commitment to think and not elide the aporetic character of the co-presence of the ethical and the political; through its insistence on the inescapability of assuming responsibility for that immeasurable task; and through its continuous indictment of the hubristic eclipsing of undecidability by decidedness. For deconstruction is ultimately not an analytical technique. Rather, it is the event of undecidability, simply the case as Derrida puts it, taking place in every decidedness. Thus ‘decision’ is that which is prepared to own responsibility for undecidability. It knows that neither ‘decision’ nor responsibility will ever discharge each other in relation to this Otherness. Since undecidable is therefore what ‘we’ are—or suffer—an ethos may arise governed by the desire continuously to make way for the immeasurable responsibility consequent upon it. Such an ethos, it may then be said—Iwouldwant to say—is what distinguishes political life.
  4. First of all, there are certainly impact turns to topicality/framework questions. If you're looking for fairness specifically, Kerpen of all people wrote up impact turns to conditionality bad arguments that can be found here: http://www.cross-x.com/work/2002-03/ click on condi.doc Here they are as well: __________________________________________ CONDITIONALITY IMPACT TURNS PAGE 1 OF 3 1.Time Skews Are Good a. Forces strategic thinking. 2AC has to make smart args and maximize time allocation, which enhances critical thinking and information processing skills. b. Improves 2AC block writing. Time skews force affs to refine their 2AC blocks to have the best arguments on top, which is educational in itself and spills over to create better clash in all debates. Punish them for putting their bad args first. c. Forces increased speed. And speaking faster makes you smarter. Mike Korcok, debate coach and cognitive theorist, 1997, URL: http://hsdebate.com/archives/theory/old/Korcok--Speak_Fast.html The best evidence available indicates that speedy speaking makes you smarter. This claim has a now solid base of research support from nearly a quarter-century of studies in cognitive psychology. To a cognitive psychologist this claim would not be surprising nor would it necessarily even be considered controversial: a considerable body of evidence is now available to substantiate the claim that speaking faster makes one smarter. Debate pedagogy is sometimes criticized because debate competitors speak "like auctioneers", are "incomprehensibly fast", or talk "at a ridiculous pace". Occasionally, those objecting press the point by insisting that either individual debaters or that debate as a whole "slow down or else". The proper response to the critics is that speedy speaking is a pedagogically sound practice: speaking faster improves cognitive ability. Speech rate determines working memory capacity and working memory capacity is a critical component of cognitive ability. The argument is that simple, but the support for it is formidable. Two relationships must be shown to establish this argument : 1) speech rate determines working memory capacity. 2) working memory capacity is a critical component of cognitive ability. d. You get what you deserve. 2AC chose to waste time on these shitty conditionality args. 2.Multiple Worlds Are Good a. Key to rational policy analysis. The only way to properly determine whether the plan should be done is to compare it to all possible worlds. b. Real world. Any proposal in a business, academic, or political context will be answered with multiple alternatives. Debate must teach the skills to compare multiple alternatives to have any educational benefit. 3.Breadth Is Better Than Depth a. Education. Better to learn something about everything than to only learn a couple of things. b. Breadth is key to depth. A broad array of initial 1NC arguments is key to identifying the most salient problems with the plan so they can be expanded in depth later in the debate. CONDITIONALITY IMPACT TURNS PAGE 2 OF 3 4.Abuse Is Good a. You don't winon abuse—you lose because we abused you. You got jacked because we're better than you, not because we ran this counterplan. b. Abuse voters create perverse incentives. They give debaters a reason to drop, undercover, and mishandle args intentionally so they can whine about it. c. Punish incompetence. Plenty of debaters are good enough to handle the 1NC we put out in this debate. Voting on abuse tells them that they have no reason to work and improve. d. Life isn't fair. Suck it up. Nobody will listen to abuse whines in the real world. e. It's absurd to express weakness as strength—their abuse claims express impotence as strength, as if they chose to get jacked by us. Friedrich Nietzsche, greatest philosopher ever, 1887, “On the Genealogy of Morals,” URL: http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/phil/classmorality.htm That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no grounds for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: "these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb would he not be good?" there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: "we don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb." To demand of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength. . A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect--more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a "subject," can it appear otherwise. For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed--the deed is everything. The popular mind in fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the deed of a deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a second time as its effect. Scientists do no better when they say "force moves," "force causes," and the likeall its coolness, its freedom from emotion notwithstanding, our entire science still lies under the misleading influence of language and has not disposed of that little changeling, the "subject" (the atom, for example, is such a changeling, as is the Kantian "thing-in-itself"); no wonder if the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengefulness and hatred exploit this belief for their own ends and in fact maintain no belief more ardently than the belief that the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb for thus they gain the right to make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey. When the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged exhort one another with the vengeful cunning of impotence: "let us be different from the evil, namely good! And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, and just"this, listened to calmly and without previous bias, really amounts to no more than: 'we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing for which we are not strong enough"; but this dry matter of fact, this prudence of the lowest order which even insects possess (posing as dead, when in great danger, so as not to do "too much"), has, thanks to the counterfeit and self-deception of impotence, clad itself in the ostentatious garb of the virtue of quiet, calm resignation, just as if the weakness of the weak--that is to say, their essence, their effects, their sole ineluctable, irremovable reality--were a voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a deed, a meritorious act. CONDITIONALITY IMPACT TURNS PAGE 3 OF 3 e. This is ridiculous. Time wasn't your problem—you could have had a 20 minute 2AC and still not made any good arguments. 5.Reverse Voter. If we impact turn their reasons we lose then we win. ____________________________________________________________ Some of those arguments are specific to conditionality but definitely the abuse good stuff can be an impact turn to fairness questions. Otherwise, here is some more evidence: Imperialism in western thought makes it necessary to evaluate texts like the resolution. Ignoring racism imprisons us in conditioned ways of seeing the world Raka Shome, doctoral candidate in the Speech Communication Department, University of Georgia, Athens, 96 (www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00119.x) I thus argue for the importance of a postcolonial perspective for rhetorical studies. Postcolonialism, which is a critical perspective that primarily seeks to expose the Eurocentrism and imperialism of Western discourses (both academic and public), ’ has significantly influenced a wide range of fields across the humanities such as sociology, anthropology, education, literature, cultural studies, and even some areas in communication such as mass communication and development communication. However, the field of rhetorical studies has not adequately recognized the critical importance of a postcolonial perspective. By working from a postcolonial perspective, I suggest that as we engage in rhetorical understandings of texts, or produce rhetorical theories, it is important to place the texts that we critique or the theories that we produce against a larger backdrop of neocolonialism and racism, and interrogate to what extent these discourses and our own perspectives on them reflect the contemporary global politics of (neo) imperialism. In today’s world, when people are constantly discriminated against by virtue of their skin color or by virtue of their belonging to “other worlds, ” to avoid the issues of racism and neocolonialism in our critical politics is to “avoid questions concerning ways in which we see the world; it is to remain imprisoned . .. by conditioned ways of seeing . .. without the self-consciousness that must be the point of departure for all critical understanding” (Dirlik, 1990, p. 395). Examining a larger backdrop to the topic is a pre-requisite to determining the ways that policy interacts. The Negative asks for you to reject our research option based on arbitrary distinctions. This replicates the status quo policy of global hegemonic domination. Raka Shome, doctoral candidate in the Speech Communication Department, University of Georgia, Athens, 96 (www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00119.x) The importance of a postcolonial position to any scholarly practice is that it urges us to analyze our academic discourses and connect them to the larger political practices of our nations. This means that in examining our academic discourses, the postcolonial question to ask is: To what extent do our scholarly practices-whether they be the kind of issues we explore in our research, the themes around which we organize our teaching syllabi, or the way that we structure our conferences and decide who speaks (and does not speak), about what, in the name of intellectual practices - legitimize the hegemony of Western power structures? In posing this question, the postcolonial perspective does not suggest that as scholars writing in the West all that we do is legitimize the imperial political practices of Western nations. Rather, the argument is that we need to examine our academic discourses against a larger backdrop of Western hegemony, neocolonial, and racial politics. We need toengage in “contrapuntal lines of a global analysis” where we see “texts and worldly institutions . .. working together” (Said, 1993, p. 318). In the pursuit of our scholarly goals, we often do not stop to think or ask questions about why, for example, research agenda A seems more important to us than research agenda B? What is the ideology that operates in us that makes research agenda A seem more significant than research agenda B? How are we always already “interpellated” into examining A but not B? What does that interpellation say about our role in reproducing and participating in the hegemonic global domination of the rest by the West? What does it mean, for instance, when I am told that there is a market for research agenda A but none for research agenda B? Or that if I did pursue research agenda By I would have to do it in a way that would make it marketable? And what way would that be? Whose way would that be? Who decides what is marketable? What does the decision have to do with the political practices of our nations? How does this market serve the capitalistic and racist hegemony of Western nations? And what is my position, as an intellectual, in reproducing this hegemony? The point in asking such questions is to recognize the latent ideological structures that inform our scholarship and practices. As Van Dijk (1993) puts it, often “under the surface of sometimes sophisticated scholarly analysis and description of other races, peoples, or groups . .. we find a powerful ideological layer of self-interest, in-group favoritism, and ethnocentrism” (p. 160). In fact, even when we do sometimes try to break out of the Eurocentric canons informing contemporary academic scholarship by including alternate cultural and racial perspectives in our syllabi, we often do not realize that instead of really breaking free of the canon, all that we do is stretch it, add things to it. But the canon remains the same and unchallenged. Our subject positions in relation to the canon remain the same and ~nchallengedI. n~s tead of examining how the canon itself is rooted in a larger discourse of colonialism and Western hegemony, we frequently use the canon to appropriate “other” voice^. ^ The question than arises, so what is to be done? Perhaps the first step here is to do what Spivak (1990) suggests: to unlearn our privilege (p. 9). And the first step toward that unlearning requires self-reflexivity; it requires seeing ourselves not sequestered in an academic institution but connecting things that we think or not think, say or not say, teach or not teach, to the larger political and ideological practices of our nations in their interactions with the rest of the world. The Western media makes it imperative that we examine the basis behind texts. Raka Shome, doctoral candidate in the Speech Communication Department, University of Georgia, Athens, 96 (www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1996.tb00119.x) The second reason, which today is even more important, has to do with the tremendous global media presence of Western nations, and it is here that the U. S. role as a neoimperial power gets established. U.S. communication products (both print and televisual, popular and academic) penetrate most parts of the world. As Said (1993) notes, “[Rlarely before in human history has there been so massive an intervention of force and ideas from one culture to another as there is today from America to the rest of the world” (p. 319). The issue is not merely one of technological or cultural power but also one of linguistic power. The universality of English makes communication products produced in the United States and England accessible to most parts of the world. In the case of the United States, such accessibility is even more significant because it is backed by financial and technological resources that are able to transport its culture to almost every part of the world. It is this tremendous global American presence that invites examination of U. S. discourses as neocolonial texts; for texts, after all, are sites of power that reflect the politics of their surroundings.4 Topicality forces us to increase federal control. We choose to solve micro-politically and resist the racist and dominant ideology that the Negative attempts upon us. Vote for our global transformative movement Porter 1998 (Richard, Associate Prof. of Law & Dir. Of Tribal Law and Govt. Center, U of Kansas, “A proposal to the Hanodagany as to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law,” U of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Summer, p. L/N) Taking and exploiting Indian lands and resources is a paradigm requirement for America's economic system - capitalism - and the Indian nations have been powerless to defend themselves against it.This thirst has destabilized federal-Indian relations in the way that a fox eating chickens destabilizes henhouse relations. Moreover, federal Indian policy has been based upon a paternalistic ethnocentrism that has never viewed Indigenous people as capable of determining our own future. American policymakers have assumed that their way of life was superior and worth emulating, that their society was in a superior position to safeguard Indian interests, and that their opinions about the future of Indian people were the correct ones. These faulty assumptions have been a constant throughout America's dealings with the Indian nations. Indeed, the degree to which this paternalistic ethnocentrism has infiltrated even the most "beneficial" federal Indian policies raises the possibility that these beliefs are defining characteristics of what it means to be an American. This imbalance of perspectives has undermined the development of stable relations between the Indian nations and the United States. Aside from these fundamental flaws in federal Indian policymaking, other defects are related to the unique nature of Indian affairs within the American policymaking arena. Federal Indian control law incorporates a unique tension between satisfying federal interests, as reflected by the Plenary Power Doctrine, and accommodating tribal interests, as reflected by the trust responsibility. These concepts, especially the trust responsibility, are difficult concepts to define and reflect in legislation. Federal Indian policymaking is, therefore, a mandated exercise that "is as much a state of mind or moral attitude as it is a complex body of Indian law stemming from Congress' constitutional authority to regulate Indian affairs." Utilizing fiat denies the possibility for debate to be used as an instrument of micro political resistance, ensuring alienation of citizens from the political sphere and guaranteeing biopolitical control Jessica J. Kulynych, “Performing politics: Foucault, Habermas, and postmodern participation, Polity, Winter, 1997 Performative resistance recognizes disciplinary power, enables action in the face of that power, enables innovation in deliberation, and thus allows us to see the world of political action differently. Consequently, it is possible, and more meaningful, to conceptualize contemporary participation as a performative rather than a representative action. The failure to reconceptualize political participation as resistance furthers an illusion of democratic control that obscures the techniques of disciplinary power and their role in global strategies of domination, fundamentally missing the real, although much more humble opportunities for citizens to "take part" in their own "governance." Accepting the idea of participation as resistance has two broad implications that fundamentally transform the participation debate. First, it widens the parameters of participation to include a host of new actors, activities, and locations for political action. A performative concept redirects our attention away from the normal apparatus of government and economy, and therefore allows us to see a much broader range of political actions. Second, it requires that we look anew at traditional participatory activities and evaluate their performative potential. Spectatorship - fiat creates a spectator mentality detaching us from human suffering, killing our civic voice and undermining the educational value of debate. Mitchell ’98 [Gordon 1998, Associate Professor @ U Pitt, “Argumentation and Advocacy”, Vol 15 //nick] While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998). The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life" (1991, p. 8). Their insistence upon the truth of their framework is contrived and ignores the historical contingency of debate. We should embrace this contingency rather than closely guarding the borders of our activity Johnston ’96 [ian, Research Associate at Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, British Columbia, Canada, “There’s nothing Nietzsche Couldn’t’ teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist.” http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm //nick] The analogy I want to put on the table is the comparison of human culture to a huge recreational complex in which a large number of different games are going on. Outside people are playing soccer on one field, rugby on another, American football on another, and Australian football on another, and so on. In the club house different groups of people are playing chess, dominoes, poker, and so on. There are coaches, spectators, trainers, and managers involved in each game. Surrounding the recreation complex is wilderness. These games we might use to characterize different cultural groups: French Catholics, German Protestants, scientists, Enlightenment rationalists, European socialists, liberal humanitarians, American democrats, free thinkers, or what have you. The variety represents the rich diversity of intellectual, ethnic, political, and other activities. The situation is not static of course. Some games have far fewer players and fans, and the popularity is shrinking; some are gaining popularity rapidly and increasingly taking over parts of the territory available. Thus, the traditional sport of Aboriginal lacrosse is but a small remnant of what it was before contact. However, the Democratic capitalist game of baseball is growing exponentially, as is the materialistic science game of archery. And they may well combine their efforts to create a new game or merge their leagues. When Nietzsche looks at Europe historically what he sees is that different games have been going on like this for centuries. He further sees that many of the participants in any one game have been aggressively convinced that their game is the "true" game, that it corresponds with the essence of games or is a close match to the wider game they imagine going on in the natural world, in the wilderness beyond the playing fields. So they have spent a lot of time producing their rule books and coaches' manuals and making claims about how the principles of their game copy or reveal or approximate the laws of nature. This has promoted and still promotes a good deal of bad feeling and fierce arguments. Hence, in addition any one game itself, within the group pursuing it there have always been all sorts of sub-games debating the nature of the activity, refining the rules, arguing over the correct version of the rule book or about how to educate the referees and coaches, and so on. Nietzsche's first goal is to attack this dogmatic claim about the truth of the rules of any particular game. He does this, in part, by appealing to the tradition of historical scholarship which shows that these games are not eternally true, but have a history. Rugby began when a soccer player broke the rules and picked up the ball and ran with it. American football developed out of rugby and has changed and is still changing. Basketball had a precise origin which can be historically located. Rule books are written in languages which have a history by people with a deep psychological point to prove: the games are an unconscious expression of the particular desires of inventive games people at a very particular historical moment; these rule writers are called Plato, Augustine, Socrates, Kant, Schopenhauer, Descartes, Galileo, and so on. For various reasons they believe, or claim to believe, that the rules they come up with reveal something about the world beyond the playing field and are therefore "true" in a way that other rule books are not; they have, as it were, privileged access to reality and thus record, to use a favorite metaphor of Nietzsche's, the text of the wilderness. In attacking such claims, Nietzsche points out, the wilderness bears no relationship at all to any human invention like a rule book (he points out that nature is "wasteful beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power--how could you live according to this indifference. Living--is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature" (Epigram 9). Because there is no connection with what nature truly is, such rule books are mere "foreground" pictures, fictions dreamed up, reinforced, altered, and discarded for contingent historical reasons. Moreover, the rule books often bear a suspicious resemblance to the rules of grammar of a culture (thus, for example, the notion of an ego as a thinking subject, Nietzsche points out, is closely tied to the rules of European languages which insist on a subject and verb construction as an essential part of any statement). So how do we know what we have is the truth? And why do we want the truth, anyway? People seem to need to believe that their games are true. But why? Might they not be better if they accepted that their games were false, were fictions, having nothing to do with the reality of nature beyond the recreational complex? If they understood the fact that everything they believe in has a history and that, as he says in the Genealogy of Morals, "only that which has no history can be defined," they would understand that all this proud history of searching for the truth is something quite different from what philosophers who have written rule books proclaim. Furthermore these historical changes and developments occur accidentally, for contingent reasons, and have nothing to do with the games, or any one game, shaping itself in accordance with any ultimate game or any given rule book of games given by the wilderness, which is indifferent to what is going on. And there is no basis for the belief that, if we look at the history of the development of these games, we discover some progressive evolution of games towards some higher type. We may be able, like Darwin, to trace historical genealogies, to construct a narrative, but that narrative does not reveal any clear direction or any final goal or any progressive development. The genealogy of games indicates that history is a record of contingent change. The assertion that there is such a thing as progress is simply one more game, one more rule added by inventive minds (who need to believe in progress); it bears no relationship to nature beyond the sports complex. Ditto for science. So long as one is playing on a team, one follows the rules and thus has a sense of what constitutes right and wrong or good and evil conduct in the game, and this awareness is shared by all those carrying out the same endeavour. To pick up the ball in soccer is evil (unless you are the goalie); and to punt the ball while running in American football is permissible but stupid; in Australian football both actions are essential and right. In other words, different cultural communities have different standards of right and wrong conduct. These are determined by the artificial inventions called rule books, one for each game. These rule books have developed the rules historically; thus, they have no permanent status and no claim to privileged access. Strict policymaking fails - we can’t magically fiat change, but through kritikal discussions, we can shape and influence policy outcomes. Edkins and Zehfuss ‘5 [Jenny and Maja, Generalizing the International, Review of International Studies (32, 451-472) //nick] What we are attempting in this article is an intervention that demonstrates how the illusion of the sovereign state in an insecure and anarchic international system is sustained and how it might be challenged. It seems to us that this has become important in the present circumstances. The focus on security and the dilemma of security versus freedom that is set out in debates immediately after September 11th presents an apparent choice as the focus for dissent, while concealing the extent to which thinking is thereby confined to a specific agenda. Our argument will be that this approach relies on a particular picture of the political world that has been reflected within the discipline of international relations, a picture of a world of sovereign states. We have a responsibility as scholars; we are not insulated from the policy world. What we discuss may not, and indeed does not, have a direct impact on what happens in the policy world, this is clear, but our writings and our teaching do have an input in terms of the creation and reproduction of pictures of the world that inform policy and set the contours of policy debates.21 Moreover, the discipline within which we are situated is one which depends itself on a particular view of the world – a view that sees the international as a realm of politics distinct from the domestic – the same view of the world as the one that underpins thinking on security and defence in the US administration.22 In this article then we develop an analysis of the ways in which thinking in terms of international relations and a system of states forecloses certain possibilities from the start, and how it might look to think about politics and the international differently. Our chosen point of intervention is to examine how IR thinking works; by showing how this thinking operates, and how it relies on certain analytical moves and particular categorisations and dichotomies, we hope to demonstrate that it is not the only way that world politics could be thought through. Identifying the underpinnings of existing frameworks is an important preliminary before new thinking can be fully effective and is itself a first move in dislodging these underpinnings.
  5. Its the Nayar argument. And I'm still looking for this file. AIM: nlandsman
  6. In time for CFLs the recent popular file Kritik Answers - The Next Wave is on sale, now only ten dollars. Check it out here: http://www.cross-x.com/evazon/product.php?id=10599 Here's the description: While there have been a number of kritik answers for sale on Evazon, this file is unique because it brings to you answers to some of the arguments people are actually running these days. You all went crazy for Chipp's Anti-K file a few years. This is a similar deal except it got answers to some of the newest stuff that is more difficult to deal with. Specifically besides an assortment of excellent general answers, you'll find answers to Nayer, Capitalism K (not impact turns), the Rev DA, Fear of the Bomb K, Heidegger K, Edelman K, Empire K, and Agamben K as well as a few cards on Deleuze/Guatarri and Stavrakakis. These are some of the best round-tested arguments that will have you read for the next generation of arguments. These are all new cards; no repeats in other files on this site. All of the cards are underlined and the file is a word doc. It costs now only ten dollars. Thats more than some files. But this is 160 pages. Also, you're getting answers to some K's that camps haven't even written yet like Edelman. This is a great deal; you're paying under ten cents a page. Let me know if you have any question. Post them below or email me directly.
  7. You should buy the file on Evazon by Bryan Grayson. Its very high quality and he read the CP on the college energy topic a few years ago. Just search Evazon... its way better than anything you'd be getting elsewhere.
  8. Hey I'm looking for the 2004 (UN Topic) UTNIF Globe DA. If you've got it please post below, email or AIM me. Thanks
  9. There are some similarities and it sort of depends on what you think the eco-security K. This isn't making a threat con, management, or biopower argument like a security K might. There's no Dalby evidence like you might find in a eco-security K. Also, this K is really just concerned with a representational/framing question. Its not an indict of securing the environment nor does it make arguments like the state is bad etc. While their similar, they seemed to emerge as two distinct arguments on the college energy topic a few years ago. So while this is certainly a K in itself you probably also could read it as part of a security K. Although, as I've said, this does have its own link/impact/alt story so there are advantages to reading this K exclusively.
  10. The alternative, links and impacts are explained throughout this thread. If you have a particular question feel free to email / message me directly. I do think the impact evidence is pretty good. I also think the case turn evidence is on point. You certainly could read this kritik as a one off although I'd put more evidence in the shell. I encourage you to buy it and/or contact me directly with specific questions.
  11. While no singular card in the shell says "speak about it like this," the argument throughout the file in both the link and alt evidence is that apocalyptic discourse is based on this notion of 'the limit' where we reach some limit where something happens and then extinction happens. Rather than portraying it as an apocalypse it should be represented (more realistically) as a degradation. For instance, in the movie The Day After Tomorrow the apocalyptic ice storm happens instantly. The K argues that we shouldn't represent the environmental effects of warming in such terms, rather we should speak about it as an unraveling.
  12. Besides rejecting the crisis representations, the alternative evidence speaks to alternative ways to frame environmental issues such as climate change.
  13. I'd say its a real mix. Its sort of hard to answer that question because a lot of the more "generic" environmental literature uses climate change as their primary advantage when discussing environmental crisis rhetoric. Hope that helps.
  14. One of the biggest advantages on next years topic will be global warming. This is a critique of the framing of global warming as a crisis / coming apocalypse. The argument is that by framing warming as apocalyptic it prevents effective environmentalism to contain the harms of climate change and leads to authoritarianism. It shouldn't be hard for you to win a link since most people read warming scenarios that end in extinction. The file is a great buy. Its only 10 dollars. Its in word. All the cards are underlined and there are blocks to a number of common affirmative arguments. Even if you don't plan on reading the K there are some solid answers that any affirmative needs. This file also gives you a leg up on some of the stuff that will likely come out of camps. Its all digital (many of these cards are from books) and there are blocks - both you most likely won't get at camp. Also this file isn't the typical Luke / environmental management redux. Its specific to these central framing questions. This is a good file to have on the alternative energy topic but also could be useful in debates on the Africa topic against cases with environmental impacts. Let me know if you have any questions.
  15. Version

    Table of Contents One of the biggest advantages on next years topic will be global warming. This is a critique of the framing of global warming as a crisis / coming apocalypse. It shouldn't be hard for you to win a link since most people read warming scenarios that end in extinction. This file gives you an excellent start on the topic. It is different than some of your typical environmental management Ks (this isn't a big Luke K) that you might get at camp. It comes with some blocks and affirmative answers and is a great buy for 10 dollars.

    10.00 USD

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