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Anyone have access to the full text of Kappeller 95 (preferably in a form I can copy and paste from)?

If not, does anyone have the card that says Kappeller concludes affirmative? I'd prefer the original source in its entirety, but will take what I can get.

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Card for reference:

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg.10-11) Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN – finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution. ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others.’ We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

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Might as well fulfill your other request...




c. Your author concludes aff: Individuals still have the freedom of self-induced action but are forced certain political responsibilities in order to maintain democratic order

Kappeler, 95 - Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al-Akhawayn University (Susanne, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 32-33) // AK


What is not the ‘private sphere’ of individual citizens is the ‘public sphere’, which belongs to them all equally. However, citizens and individuals whose understanding of themselves is based on the conception of a subject in relation to objects, that is, on ‘private’ domination, cannot simultaneously be part of a collective, even if only the collective community of male citizens. These two conceptions are mutually exclusive. Hence even the mutual relationships between citizens are structured according to the primary assumption of the self-interest of every single and individual citizen and can be regulated and kept in check only by the hierarchically superordinated state, or those in charge of it. Hence the state in turn necessarily develops its own self-interest, which on principle is opposed to the interests of the citizens, leading to the well-known expansion of state power at the cost of citizens’ right. Above all, however, the principle of self-interest is thus institutionalized as the legitimate basic attitude of the citizen among citizens, regulatable and regulated through the control of the state. Its protection and preservation becomes the central concern of liberalism, democratic theory and the philosophy of rights. As Carole Pateman writes, [The individual] is a ‘private’ individual, but he needs a sphere in which he can exercise his rights and opportunities, pursue his (private) interests and protect and increase his property. If all men (‘individuals’) are so to act in an orderly fashion, then as Locke is aware, a public ‘umpire’) rather than a hidden – private? – hand), or a representative, liberal state, is required to make and enforce publicly known, equitable laws.11 The sphere of his possible action as a ‘private’ individual, as one who exercises his rights, pursue his interests, protects and above all increases his property, must not be restricted to the small sphere of the family, which, despite everything, is quite limited in its possibilities for exploitation and accumulation. That would not be freedom. For the exercise of his rights, of his ‘freedom’ and his claims to the acquisition of property, the individual requires the public sphere of the entire society – which hence is declared the ‘private sector’. On the level of the citizens and the state (free zone ‘family’ excepted) there is a second division into ‘private’ and ‘public’: The separation between private and public is thus re-established as a division within civil society itself, within the world of men. The separation is then expressed in a number of different ways, not only private and public but also, for example, ‘society’ and ‘state’, or ‘economy’ and ‘politics’, or ‘freedom’ and ‘coercion’ or ‘social’ and ‘political’.12 So-called ‘political’ responsibility, that is, the self-interested desire and need of citizens for a regulation of the competing self-interests of citizens, is handed over to and invested in the states and is what remains properly ‘public’. This results in a considerable shrinkage of what is ‘public’ and ‘political’, while ‘civil society is seen, above all else, as the sphere of private interest, private enterprise and private individuals.’14 And as Pateman comments, ‘in the late twentieth century the relation between the capitalist economy and the state no longer looks like that between Locke’s umpire and civil society. 14 Rather, the economy seems to have become the umpire in relation to the state. Moreover, in the twentieth century and with political emancipation of women, the citizenry has doubled. This has not, however, resulted in the abolition of the original division of society into the familial ‘private’ sphere and the ‘public’ sphere.



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