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Not just extinction cards. Those too, but cards that compare AI to other impact cards will help. I'll trade a intel DA for a really good AI impact file.

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Artificial intelligence is worse than nuclear war – computerized weapons, impossible regulation, and techno-apocalypse Gray 2015

(Richard Gray, former telegraph science correspondent and staff writer for Daily Mail, 17-7-15, “'Artificial Intelligence is as dangerous as NUCLEAR WEAPONS': AI pioneer warns smart computers could doom mankind,” Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3165356/Artificial-Intelligence-dangerous-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-AI-pioneer-warns-smart-computers-doom-mankind.html)

Artificial intelligence has the potential to be as dangerous to mankind as nuclear weapons, a leading pioneer of the technology has claimed. Professor Stuart Russell, a computer scientist who has lead research on artificial intelligence, fears humanity might be 'driving off a cliff' with the rapid development of AI. He fears the technology could too easily be exploited for use by the military in weapons, putting them under the control of AI systems. Professor Russell, who is a researcher at the University of California in Berkeley and the Centre for the study of Existential Risk at Cambridge University, compared the development of AI to the work that was done to develop nuclear weapons. His views echo those of people like Elon Musk who have warned recently about the dangers of artificial intelligence. Professor Stephen Hawking also joined a group of leading experts to sign an open letter warning of the need for safeguards to ensure AI has a positive impact on mankind. In an interview with the journal Science for a special edition on Artificial Intelligence, Professor Russell said: 'From the beginning, the primary interest in nuclear technology was the "inexhaustible supply of energy". 'The possibility of weapons was also obvious. I think there is a reasonable analogy between unlimited amounts of energy and unlimited amounts of intelligence. 'Both seem wonderful until one thinks of the possible risks. In neither case will anyone regulate the mathematics. 'The regulation of nuclear weapons deals with objects and materials, whereas with AI it will be a bewildering variety of software that we cannot yet describe. 'I'm not aware of any large movement calling for regulation either inside or outside AI, because we don't know how to write such regulation.' This week Science published a series of papers highlighting the progress that has been made in artificial intelligence recently. In one, researchers describe the pursuit of a computer that is able to make rational economic decisions away from humans while another outlines how machines are learning from 'big data'. Professor Russell, however, cautions that this unchecked development of technology can be dangerous if the consequences are not fully explored and regulation put in place. He said: 'Here's what Leo Szilard wrote in 1939 after demonstrating a [nuclear] chain reaction: 'We switched everything off and went home. That night, there was very little doubt in my mind that the world was headed for grief.' 'To those who say, well, we may never get to human-level or superintelligent AI, I would reply: It's like driving straight toward a cliff and saying, 'Let's hope I run out of gas soon!' In April Professor Russell raised concerns at a United Nations meeting in Geneva over the dangers of putting military drones and weapons under the control of AI systems. He joins a growing number of experts who have warned that scenarios like those seen in films from Terminator, AI and 2001: A Space Odyssey are not beyond the realms of possibility. He: 'The basic scenario is explicit or implicit value misalignment - AI systems [that are] given objectives that don't take into account all the elements that humans care about. 'The routes could be varied and complex—corporations seeking a supertechnological advantage, countries trying to build [AI systems] before their enemies, or a slow-boiled frog kind of evolution leading to dependency and enfeeblement not unlike EM Forster's The Machine Stops.' EM Forster's short story tells of a post-apocalyptic world where humanity lives underground and relies on a giant machine to survive, which then begins to malfunction. Professor Russell said computer scientists needed to modify the goals of their research to ensure human values and objectives remain central to the development of AI technology. He said students needed to be trained to treat these objectives much in the same way 'as containment is central to the goals of fusion research'. In an editorial in Science, editors Jelena Stajic, Richard Stone, Gilbert Chin and Brad Wible, said: 'Triumphs in the field of AI are bringing to the fore questions that, until recently, seemed better left to science fiction than to science. 'How will we ensure that the rise of the machines is entirely under human control? And what will the world be like if truly intelligent computers come to coexist with humankind?

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Courtesy of Loyola's annoying Quantum Mechanics Aff - lot of potential in these cards for next year, few of my novices are reading an AI aff on this topic as well, pretty interesting. Good luck :)

 

Artificial Life is inevitable—new bottom up engineering and cognition science means the tech exists, the question is how we'll respond. Humanism ensures an artificial life-human divide. Our affirmative is not an endorsement of artificial life, but rather an acknowledgement of inevitability.

de Mul 02 [Jos de Mul professor in Philosophical Anthropology and its History and head of the section Philosophy of Man and Culture. Moreover, he is the Scientific Director of the research institute 'Philosophy of Information and Communication Technology' (φICT). De Mul studied Philosophy in Utrecht and Amsterdam and in 1993 he obtained his PhD (cum laude) at the University of Nijmegen with a thesis in which he reconstructed Wilhelm Dilthey’s Kritik der historischen Vernunft (Critique of historical Reason). He h­as joined the Philosophy department of the Erasmus University Rotterdam since 1988. TRANSHUMANISM The convergence of evolution, humanism and information technology 2002/05/05] We do not endorse the gendered or ableist language in this card.] In this framework the development of information technology and the informational sciences is ofcrucial importance.[29] Sciences based on information technology, such as artificial physics andartificial life, in contrast to the classic mechanical sciences, are not so much driven by the question ofwhat reality is, but how it could be. These 'modal sciences' are no longer primarily directed atimitating nature, but rather at the creation of new nature.[30] With the aid of a computer simulation ofevolution, not only can countless alternative evolutions be made into virtual reality, but - if we wish to- we can realize these alternatives in physical nature with the aid of genetic engineering.[31]Reciprocally, insights from evolution theory can also be applied to the development of artificial lifeforms. One of the reasons the classic AI research failed was because attempts were made to program artificial intelligence top down. Because the number of possible mutual interactions between the instructions in a software program increases exponentially as the number of lines of code increases linearly, the program is quickly confronted with an unmanageable complexity.[32] For this reason the bottom up approach has gained popularity in AI and AL research in recent years. In this approach AIand AL programs are constructed in such a way (by making use of genetic or evolutionary algorithms) that they can develop themselves further in a process of (un)natural selection. Moreover this approach, suggests Moravec in his subsequent publications to Mind Children, has, unlike the download procedure, the advantage that it is not weighed down by the burden of the evolutionary baggage of the human body.[33] In the light of the previous evolution of life on earth it is not unthinkable that, thanks to information technology, this will again result in an explosion of radically different life forms, based on different basic forms of build (phyla), which together will form a new kingdom (or perhaps even a variety ofkingdoms) in the taxonomy of life, beside the existing kingdoms of the Animalia, Plantae and Fungi,Protista (single-celled organisms with one complex cell) and Monera (simple unicellular organisms). And if evolutionary history repeats itself, after a short period in which this multiplicity of various new life forms has occupied all the niches in the natural, cultural (and especially virtual) world, we can expect another decimation, after which a small number of them will carry the torch of evolution further. In the previous section I observed that many of the techniques required for the realization of the three outlined alternatives (genetic engineering of the human organism, the construction of cyborgs and the development of artificial life and artificial intelligence) are already reality - or at least in theprocess of development. Furthermore, if we take the exponential acceleration of evolution seriously,then neither can we comfort ourselves with the thought that this will take ages. Even the failure of artificial intelligence research, with its unrealistic expectations, gives no reason for complacency. A characteristic of exponential acceleration is that we tend to overestimate its effects in the short term,while often grossly underestimating its effects in the somewhat longer term. Also some of the fundamental criticism from various quarters - here I have in mind philosophers such as Searle, Dreyfus and Lyotard[34] - which is put forward against the presuppositions of the transhumanist program, in my opinion gives little reason to dismiss this program as implausible. An important element of this criticism is falsely based on the anthropocentric presupposition that[humans] man is [are] the measure for every form of artificial intelligence and artificial life. If, for example, it is argued that computers will never be really intelligent, never possess consciousness or have real experiences, then it is all too easily assumed (completely setting aside the question as to whether this criticism holdswater) that the form of intelligence (situated in organic bodies) which has developed in Homo sapienssapiens is the measure of intelligence überhaupt. This 'carbon chauvinism' is rather shortsighted. Like birds, aeroplanes can fly, but they do not owe this ability to a literal imitation of a bird's wings. Neither do artificial life and artificial intelligence need to be a literal replica of organic life and organic intelligence in order to share its essential characteristics (such as the ability to reproduce,creativity, and the ability to learn). Computer viruses, for example, despite the fact that the reproductive material differs from that of natural viruses, share a number of important characteristicswith them. Even if artificial life forms, based on silicon, should never reach the level of (human)consciousness, it is still conceivable that they will be more successful in evolutionary survival than [humans]man. From the end of the Old Stone Age (Paleolithicum) until the New Stone Age (Neolithicum) man developed as we now know him (Homo sapiens sapiens). During this development a form of intelligence came into being which deviated in essential points from previous forms of organic intelligence and which gave the evolution of life on earth a new twist. Perhaps we are standing at the threshold of the Newest Stone Age in which intelligent life on earth will acquire a new form and direction unrecognizable to man. And who knows whether [humans]man will then share the fate of the innumerable species left to [them] him as (living)fossils in life’s Odyssey through time and space. It scarcely needs to be argued that the transhumanistic project, which is articulated explicitly and radically in Moravec's work, but in fact (intentionally or not) dictates an important element of the agenda of the new information sciences, means a fundamental challenge for humanism. 'Bad' postmodernism proclaims the end of[human] mankind in a much more literal and radical manner than 'good' postmodernism has ever done. This is no longer exclusively about criticism of an anthropocentric way of thinking; the continued existence of humankind itself is at stake. What must sound ominous to humanists is that this shall occur in the name of humanistic values such as rationality, autonomy,self-determination and self-realization. Transhumanism radicalizes the humanist struggle "to raise life to its highest possible level"[35] into a call for self-transformation of the biological type of [humans] man. Transhumanists refer not only to the theory of evolution, in which it is argued that this process of self-transformation is inherent in life, but also to Nietzsche’s philosophy of life.[36] In Nietzsche'sphilosophy, too, self-transformation is regarded as an essential characteristic of life: "All great things fail at its own instigation, through a deed of self-elevation:the law of life compels them to this, the law of necessary 'self-overcoming' is the essence of life".[37] "And life itself has spoken this secret tome: 'See, so it spoke, I am that which that must always overcome itself'".[38] Humankind is no exception to this. It is, in Nietzsche's famous words in Also Sprach Zarathustra, "a rope, fastened between animal and superman - a rope over an abyss",[39] The transhumanistic project is directed atthe technological realization of the Übermensch or, as the extropist Max More puts it: the beingexisting in us as potential,waiting to be actualized".[40] Supposing that life is indeed characterized by self-transformation, then we cannot take for granted that we must strive for this self-transformation. But as has already been remarked, the defence of self-transformation is supported by humanistic ideals: The Enlightenment and the humanist perspective assure us that progress is possible, that life is a grand adventure, and that reason, science,and good will can free us from the confines of the past... Aging and death victimizes all humans. To transhumanists, in the words of Alan Harrington, "death is an imposition on the human race and no longer acceptable".[41] If we allow - and even acclaim - the fact that medical science and technology have previously combated deadly diseases successfully, what objections can we put forward agains tstriving to improve life by adapting the body and the mind? And what reasons could we advance against striving to transform humankind into a superior, post-human life form? These questions seem to me to be literally a matter of life and death at the beginning of the twenty-first century. All the more so because thanks to evolutionary chance, which has gifted us with intelligence and imaginationour future, is by no means fixed, but is partly dependent on the choices that we make. To be sure - and this is the prudent lesson of 'good' postmodernism that we must not forget – our freedom of choice is limited in many ways. Our fundamental finitude means that our insight and knowledge are always historically and culturally limited and we can only choose from a limited number of alternatives, the consequences of which, moreover, can never be completely calculated. As our culture becomes more complex and we intervene in nature in a more fundamental way, the number of unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences of our actions increases strongly. Partly because of this, our cultural and technological creations achieve their own equilibrium and dynamic,which means that in the long term we cannot fully control them. In combination with the late capitalistic market economy, technology even gives the impression of being an autonomous, unstoppable system. With the evolutionist bottom up approach to the creation of artificial life and artificial intelligence, moreover, we appear to be taking a conscious distance to what is given us to control. But perhaps it is also anthropocentric arrogance to think that we are able to and have to control this development. Is it not more obvious that at some point in time our mind children will(must) take over responsibility for their development? Should we not accept that seen from theperspective of humankind this development - to quote the title of a book by Kelly - become more and more Out of Control?[42] But at the very least there is scope for human intervention - however limited it might be, and however much more limited it might possibly be in the future. Certainly when we consider that evolution is a chaotic process which is characterized by a 'sensitive dependency on the initial situation' in which the most minute variations at the outset can have enormous consequences for the further development of the ecological system. Because at the moment we are standing at the threshold of a development, what little scope we have brings great responsibility with it.[43] This prompts a fundamental consideration of the question as to if, and if so, how far and in what way, we should actively promote our own self-transformation. In answering these questions humanists cannot rely on a number of traditional strategies, seeing that in the light of the humanistic postulates (see § 1) these have lost their validity. This applies, forexample, to the rejection of the transhumanist program on the grounds that it would breach the given natural order. Within the humanist world view, however, this order is not immutable (whether createdby God or not), but a dynamic process, driven by a multitude of chance factors. Neither can the artificiality of the intended transhuman and posthuman life be a reason to reject it. Hominoids, in fact,have always been cyborgs - at least from the moment that Homo habilis manufactured the first stonetools. Certainly the 'artificial by nature'[44] Homo sapiens sapiens was from the outset complete and already dependent on cultural artefacts to compensate for his physical and mental shortcomings.[45]In this sense the transhumanist program is only an extension of the course which has characterizedevolution from the very beginning. As has already been observed, it goes without saying that nonormative arguments can be employed for the promotion of the transhuman and the posthuman, butneither can we can employ any normative arguments against it. A pragmatic argument which at first sight appears to hold more water concerns the enormous risks involved in genetic engineering and the development of artificial life and intelligence. For this reason,following the bio-ethicus Hans Jonas, there is an argument for the 'heuristics of fear'.[46] According to this strategy on the basis of possible future horrors we should decide to temporarily break off, slowdown or even stop completely, certain technological developments. In any event, we must proceed insuch a way that we can at all times rectify the consequences of our technological interventions. In the light of what has been said about the fundamental limitations on human desire to control, it is patently obvious that enormous risks are attached to the transhumanistic program. The question,however, is whether Jonas' heuristics of fear is actually a realistic option. The notion that it is possible to oversee and, if desired, to rectify, all the consequences of our technical interventions appears, in thelight of unforeseen (and in the case of chaotic complexity fundamentally unforeseeable) side-effects of informationistic interventions in nature, to be an unrealistic point of departure, and one which clings, in a negative way, to the modernistic ideal of the makeability of reality. And the idea that to actually call a halt to technological developments will lie within the capacity of human beings living in a technotope would also appear to be somewhat unrealistic. We are not in a position to halt the Odyssey of life. We should rather direct our efforts towards steering its course. Furthermore, we might ask ourselves whether the wilful curbing - or halting - of creativity and a yearning toexperiment would not also rob humanity of its grandeur. Nietzsche's definition of man [humans] as "the great experimenter with [themselves]himself"[47] is more than a description, it also expresses esteem. When we are weighed down by the risks associated with the human yearning to experiment it might be a comfort to consider that the experiment of evolution in humankind was exclusively guided by blind chance. Taking the above considerations into account, the normative question as to whether we should promote the transhuman and posthuman is, of course, still not answered. If we wish to answer this question we must first ask ourselves if the presupposition of the transhumanistic program - that it will promote our happiness - is correct. Moreover, we should bear in mind that here we are not only speaking of the happiness of humanity, but equally of that of the transhuman and posthuman lifeforms we are striving for. Transhumanistic ethics can be no other than a radicalized Ferne-Ethik(Ethics of distance)which - within the earlier-mentioned bounds of human responsibility - not onlybears responsibility for future generations of humankind, but also for life forms created byhumankind. As far as humankind is concerned we can ask ourselves if suppressing chance and – in the most radical scenario - the mortality of human life in all its aspects is an ideal worth striving for. I have argued elsewhere that , chance, contingency and fate not only forms a threat to human happiness but, paradoxically, is also one of the principle sources which determines this fragile happiness. The elimination of chance conjours up the terrible image of dystopias such as Aldous Huxley's Brave NewWorld in which under the motto "Community, Identity, Stability", and with the aid of chemical and psychological manipulation,[human] man is transformed into a fully interchangeable 'hedonistic machine',who is no longer capable of experiencing real feelings. If this is the consequence (or even theideal[48]) of the transhumanistic project, then the result is less the creation of the Übermensch asNietzsche (who affirmed chance in the extreme from the standpoint of his amor fati) had in mind,than that of the nihilistic 'last [human]man' at which Nietzsche actually directed his criticism.[49] Would the endless stretching of life's duration towards immortality not lead to a lapse into an Eternal Recurrenceof the Same , to bottomless boredom? Or is the terrible image of community, identity and stability the result of an outdated modernistic illusion that it is possible to completely control befalling chance? Or is it not the case that an increase in command and control will actually lead to new, perhaps much more radical, forms of chance, contingency and fate, which will turn our lives into a much greater and more varied adventure than it already is?[50] If that should be the case, then the humanistic ideal of self-realization would not be so badly damaged by the transhumanistic program, but would rather receive an unprecedented new stimulus. It would be intellectually over-confident to think that we could formulate conclusive answers tothese and associated questions.[51] All the more so if we consider that in judging of the desirablility of transhuman and posthuman life forms it would be difficult for us to resist the tendency to judge these from an anthropocentric perspective. But just as the ape cannot form an adequate picture of the human life form, so it is not given to us to visualize the nature or attractiveness of these new lifeforms. And that makes our responsibility in the creation of these life forms extremely perilous. The most radical and difficult-to-answer question that the transhumanistic program poses tohumanism is closely related to this. It is the question of what value the human life form has compared with potential transhuman and posthuman life forms. Does human life have a unique intrinsic value that justifies it defending itself against these new life forms? Or must we fall back on the argument that prompts us to protect the panda and defend human life in the name of bio-diversity?And if we are faced with the choice will we then apply the same criteria, which leads us to sacrifice the lives ofanimals for the welfare of humankind? Will the superiority of transhuman or posthuman life (in the quantity of information it carries or in its abilities) ever force us to eliminate ourselves? Will our relationship with our mind children be comparable with that of parents who, driven by a desire that is stronger than any moral reasoning, sacrifice themselves for their children? Or, if we are concerned with artificial, other types of children, will this sacrifice surpass our moral capacities and will we only be able to fall back on the egoism of our own species? In the coming decades these and related difficult questions will repeatedly startle us out of the anthropocentric slumber in which we usually exist. In the end all these questions are variations on the most difficult of the difficult questions posed by the German writer Max Frisch: "Are you certain that when you and everyone you know are no longer here, the continued existence of the human race really interests you?"

 

Now guess who comes out on top? Artificial life. Rapid reproduction and self-atomization means unsynethesized artificial life will cause destruction of the universe, this outweighs every impact and is an ethical priority.

Rheingold 92 [Howard "At the beginning of the twentieth century; computational biology" Whole Earth Review - September 22, pg Cov] [West]

It looks as if something even more powerful than thermonuclear weaponry is emanating from that same, strangely fated corner of New Mexico where nuclear physicists first knew sin. Those who follow the progress of artificial-life research know that the effects of messing with the engines of evolution might lead to forces even more regrettable than the demons unleashed at Alamogordo. At least nuclear weaponry and biocidal technologies only threaten life on Earth, and don't threaten to contaminate the rest of the universe. That's the larger ethical problem of a-life. The technology of self-replicating machines that could emerge in future decades from today's a-life research might escape from human or even terrestrial control, infest the solar system, and, given time, break out into the galaxy. If there are other intelligent species out there, they might not react benevolently to evidence that humans have dispersed interstellar strip-mining robots that breed, multiply, and evolve. If there are no other intelligent species in existence, maybe we will end up creating God, or the Devil, depending on how our minds' children evolve a billion years from now. The entire story of life on earth thus far might be just the wetware prologue to a longer, larger, drier tale, etched in silicon rather than carbon, and blasted to the stars -- purposive spores programmed to seek, grow, evolve, expand. That's what a few people think they are on the verge of inventing. Scenarios like that make the potential for global thermonuclear war or destruction of the biosphere look like a relatively local problem. Biocide of a few hundred thousand species (including ourselves) is one kind of ethical problem; turning something like the Alien loose on the cosmos is a whole new level of ethical lapse.

 

Artificial Life is inevitable, the only question is response

Leaver 08 [Tama "Humanity's Children": Constructing and Confronting the Cylons in Cylons in America: Critical Studies in Battlestar Galactica edited by Tiffany Potter & C.W. Marshall Pages 131-132]

In Mind Children, Hans Moravec, director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon University, foreshadows what he argues to be an inevitable "postbiological" future where the machines, computers, and artificial intelligences of today will culminate to form new life for which humanity en mass is the proud parent. When our "artificial progeny" arrive, Moravec sees little place for their stumbling, inefficient fleshy ancestors (Moravec 108). In the miniseries that reintroduced Battlestar Galactica to a twenty-first-century audience, the seductive Cylon agent who comes to be known as Caprica Six warns her shocked human lover, Dr. Gaius Baltar, that, after the Cylons were driven away from the human Colonies decades earlier, "Humanity's children are returning home... today" (M.01). In a key shift from the original 1970s series, the Cylons are no longer the product of an alien civilization, but rather humanity's own technological creations that have become self-aware and self-directing. as with Moravec's prediction, the existence of the Cylons immediately begs the question as to humanity's ultimate response and responsibility to the Cylons they have created. With the diegesis of the new television series, such philosophical questions may, at first glace, be less than pressing for the few surviving officers and crew of the Colonial Fleet. Military training and the necessities of surivival in combat leave little room of speculation or ambiguity. However, from the outset, the series has been dominated by questions of humanity's relationship to and with the Cylons. Executive producer Ronald D. Moore has frequently stated that he considers science fiction a genre that is about asking difficult questions about humanity and the present, as much as speculating about possible futures (quoted in Lee). Rather than relying on the technobabble, exotic aliens, and unflinching moral certainty that characterize much mainstream science-fiction television, Moore sees BSG as a chance "to introduce realism into what has heretofore been an aggressively unrealistic genre" (Bassom, Official Companion 8). The ease with which the audiences achieve suspension of disbelief makes the bigger issues confronted by the show all the much more immediate and engaging.

 

Humanism guarantees resentment toward artificial-life, which ensures inevitable conflict

Swazo 08 [Norman K Professor of Philosophy and Biomedical Ethics @ Alfaisal Univ. PhD in philosophy from the University of Georgia (1988), with a Graduate Certificate in Global Policy Studies (1987), a Master of Health Services Administration degree from the University of Michigan School of Public Health (1978), and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Science and Human Affairs from Princeton University (1976).  Human Version 2.0. Between the “Banality” and “Ressentiment” of Neuroengineers. NeuroQuantology, 6 (1). pp. 32-42]

Pinker has allowed for the possibility of moral realism so that moral judgments may align properly with moral sense, with rationality itself entailing a manifest “external support for morality,” viz., “that it cannot depend on the egocentric vantage point of the reasoner.” (Pinker 2008) This observation points to yet another approach to moral analysis of the neuroengineering project. Whether one cares to accept the ascription or not, one finds in the work of a neuroengineer such as de Garis a singular expression of narcissism. Narcissism is represented to be “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy.” It has its empirical pathology, of course, including “developmental short-circuiting” manifest as “affective deprivation,” such that the narcissist manifests “defects of empathy.” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) Significantly, a narcissist can be caught up in self-contradiction; for, at the root of this narcissism is a “corrosive condition” known as ressentiment. There is in this ressentiment what E.M. Morelli argues is ressentiment’s essential element, viz., “a demand for and expectation of rational consistency,” thus “a motive force.” In a neuroengineer such as de Garis, ressentiment becomes creative of that which is explicitly anti-human precisely to safeguard what he takes to be fundamental to, yet manifestly lacking in, humanity as homo sapiens sapiens, viz., a self-consistent rationality eminently expressive of a calculative power such as he hopes will be realized in the engineering of quantum-level computation (Morelli, 1999). This ressentiment is nothing temporary or fleeting in the way moods come over us and then pass. Rather, as Morelli says in reminder of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler’s clarification of this phenomenon, one can speak of ressentiment “as a permanent condition” of human existence. A neuroengineer who is also narcissist experiences the human condition as something nugatory, thus something to be resented, precisely because the relation of rationality and animality in the human is as yet undetermined though it “ought” to be determined in the direction of self-consistent rationality. In this dissatisfaction with the indeterminacy of homo sapiens sapiens the narcissist neuroengineer manifests a conjunction of elements—banality, calculative thinking, narcissism, ressentiment. It is this conjunction that impels the neuroengineering quest as pursued by men such as de Garis, and which adds to the complexity of the moral dilemma such as de Garis conceives it. The ethical dilemma expresses itself thereby as a fundamental contradiction in the naricissist neuroengineer: between an insistent self-assertion that presumes humanity’s entitlement to a supreme potency, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a simultaneous yet impotent hesitation that discloses a “fundamental sense of insecurity and lack of self-worth.” Resentment of the human as homo sapiens sapiens proceeds willy-nilly to revenge against the human in a fundamental antagonism. This antagonism is given voice in an utterance such as de Garis formulates, as in his suspect query: “Who is, what is to be the dominant species on this planet—human beings or the artilects?” That question has the structure of empirical prediction. It can be rephrased as a moral question, thus: Should neuroengineers create an artilect, even as they cannot but forecast its dominance over the human species such as this species exists today?

 

This ensures artificial life will enslave “humanity”

Abrams 08 [Jerold J. Associate Prof of Philosophy at Creighton Univ. Embracing the "Children of Humanity": How to Prevent the Next Cylon War Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy. 2008 Amazon] [ct]

The reimagined Battlestar Galactica boasts stronger roles for women, subtler politics, and more realistic special effects than the original BSG series. But the most important advance is the tension between humanity and the new humanoid Cylons, which mirrors our own coming relationship with a new race of artificial beings known as  "posthumans". Posthumans are artificially enhanced humans - or completely artificial beings - with unlimited  life spans and cognitive powers well beyond ours. When these beings arrive, there's no question new social problems  will emerge; one of the first and biggest being a total communicative breakdown between humans and posthumans -  just as the Cylons went silent for forty years before re-engaging humanity. Such a division is avoidable, however,  if we begin to look upon posthumans not as slaves or tools, but as Cylons look at themselves: as the "children of humanity." We should follow the Cylons, too, in their quest to fuse with humanity, creating ever new and varied  syntheses. In this way, we'll not only avoid dialogical division, but equally subvert slavery - theirs or ours - and  perhaps also war; while, at the same time, achieving our own distinctly human ends of longer life, higher  intelligence, and greater freedom. Failing to do so will only produce all the problems now faced by Galactica - and  only postpone the inevitable. In the words of President Roslin, posthumanity is "the shape of things to come."

 

this outweighs because it also destroys the universe.

Rheingold 92 [Howard "At the beginning of the twentieth century; computational biology" Whole Earth Review - September 22, pg Cov] [West]

It looks as if something even more powerful than thermonuclear weaponry is emanating from that same, strangely fated corner of New Mexico where nuclear physicists first knew sin. Those who follow the progress of artificial-life research know that the effects of messing with the engines of evolution might lead to forces even more regrettable than the demons unleashed at Alamogordo. At least nuclear weaponry and biocidal technologies only threaten life on Earth, and don't threaten to contaminate the rest of the universe. That's the larger ethical problem of a-life. The technology of self-replicating machines that could emerge in future decades from today's a-life research might escape from human or even terrestrial control, infest the solar system, and, given time, break out into the galaxy. If there are other intelligent species out there, they might not react benevolently to evidence that humans have dispersed interstellar strip-mining robots that breed, multiply, and evolve. If there are no other intelligent species in existence, maybe we will end up creating God, or the Devil, depending on how our minds' children evolve a billion years from now. The entire story of life on earth thus far might be just the wetware prologue to a longer, larger, drier tale, etched in silicon rather than carbon, and blasted to the stars -- purposive spores programmed to seek, grow, evolve, expand. That's what a few people think they are on the verge of inventing.

Scenarios like that make the potential for global thermonuclear war or destruction of the biosphere look like a relatively local problem. Biocide of a few hundred thousand species (including ourselves) is one kind of ethical problem; turning something like the Alien loose on the cosmos is a whole new level of ethical lapse.

 

“Vote negative” to affirm an identity politics based on viscosity. This hybrid identity solves human-machine dualisms.

Tranter 07 [Kieran Mr Kieran Senior Lecturer Griffith Law School Gold Coast, Australia LLB (Hons), B Science "Frakking Toasters" and Jurisprudences of Technology: THE EXCEPTION, THE SUBJECT AND TECHNÉ IN BATTLESTAR Law and Literature (Yeshiva Univ., New York) (19:1) [spring 2007] , p.45-75,153] [ct] Part IV: Frakking Toasters It is not unexpected that Battlestar Galactica, as science fiction, can help explain human relationships to technology. Numerous critics have claimed that science fiction is a privileged site for this examination.l43 Writing about the original Battlestar Galactica, Roth perceived that it explored the relations between humanity and technology: [t]he Cylons can be best understood as doppelgdngers of the humans, and the real struggle in Battlestar Galactica takes place in an inner, not outer, space....The Cylons are only a hypostatization of man's tendency to rely on tools and weapons.144 Roth's analysis contained two directions. The first was a focus on the representation of the relationship between humans and machines, and the second a metaphysical construction of the proper relations between humanity and technology. Following Roth's first direction, the new Battlestar Galactica provides a wealth of images of the relations between humans and machines. At a primary level, the series presents images of mundane technological objects. As noted, Battlestar Galactica is unusual among other television spaceship science fictions in that the visible technologies are recognisable as familiar domestic instruments. There is even a comfortable oldness to the form, witnessed by the chunky corded telephones used by Adama and Roslin. This continues to the spaceships. They are just objects. The series, at this level, follows the Star Wars tradition of technological representation, for the ships are used, lived in, and junked.145 The Galactica and her complement of aging Vipers are analogous to old motor vehicles-simple, lasting designs, endearing in their mechanical quirks.146 These images of humans using domestic technology are complemented by more industrial iconography. The interior scenes of the Galactica-with humans pushing Vipers, manhandling airlocks, and with manual tools dismantling ships-reminds one of a heavy industrial workplace. In this inter-tangling of bodies and machines, there is the erotic suggestion of the relations between the body and the technological object.147 Another representation of technology in Battlestar Galactica lies in the relations between individual characters' sense of self and specific machinesAdama's affection for Galactica, Starbuck's relationship with the captured Cylon fighter, Chief Petty Officer Galen Tyrol's (Aaron Douglas) passion for the ships on his flight deck.148 These multiple images combine to present the human society of Battlestar Galactica as a thoroughly technological one. Technology is not external, the monster to be banished, the Cylon to be fought, but is integral. Even at the level of keeping technology as things, and humans as beings, Battlestar Galactica presents a technological society composed of human-machine interactions. The message seems to be that there is no nature aboard spaceships, just human life fundamentally involved with machines. Battlestar Galactica interrupts these images of technological society. It does not keep technology as things and humans as beings. The supposed external robotic enemy turns out to be very natural. Humanoid Cylons are not just flesh and blood, but the Cylon spaceships are organic beings; the inside of the fighter is brain and ooze,14' and the interior of the Cylon battlestar is a mess of membranes and ligaments.150 Where representation of technological society in Battlestar Galactica notices human-machine interaction, the Cylons present the intimacy of humanity and technology. This seems to be manifested in the relationship between Baltar and Number Six. Baltar is haunted by his Cylon lover, who sacrificed herself to save him. In each episode, she is shown accompanying him, making cynical comments, telling him what to say, and distracting him, causing his behaviour to perplex other characters. The series is ambiguous whether she is "actually" there, the personification of a link between Baltar and the Cylons, or whether she is a symptom of psychosis. The suggestion is that Baltar is infected by technology; his love of a "machine" has internalised the machine. Baltar/Number Six recalls the second direction in Roth's analysis of the original series, the movement in thinking about technology from tools that humans use, to a metaphysical ideal that is manifested in instrumentality. From Max Weber,151 to Heidegger,152 to Herbert Marcuse,153 a "modern" urge to rationalise, dissect and stockpile "nature" according to the desires of an unconstrained human will, has been proposed. This forms the metaphysical account of technology. It involves two movements. The first is the suggestion that any serious thinking about technology should move beyond things and reposition the technical within humanity as techné.154 The second is, notwithstanding attempts to distance recognition of techne from Luddite rejection,155 a "romantic" conclusion-for example, Hannah Arendt's observation that the Apollo space program, in turning away from the Earth, diminished humanity,156 or Borgmann's valorisation of the North American settler who lived an engaged life, compared to his Internetsurfing descendents.157 The question the metaphysical account has posed is how to recover the human from technology. There has been the suggestion of opposing reason with imagination,158 and also Heidegger's suggestion to nurture Being through art.159 In these attempts, a split humanity is postulated; techné emerges as a corrupted manifestation of human engagement with the world, a symptom of the loss of Being. Techné is part of a complicated movement that shifts technology from things to humans, only to then distinguish between a non-essential humanity given over to technology, and an essential non-technical humanity that can properly engage with the world. Technology goes from culture to nature and back to culture, while humanity is conceived intermediately as technological, but only as part of the process of identifying the non-technical essence of humanity. Jurisprudence can be seen to follow this trajectory in its thinking about humanity and the technology. The arrival of technical artefacts, for example, the motorcar, Sputnik and IVF, has led to claims that law can regulate technology.160 Fukuyama's recent rallying against biotechnology is a clarion call for law to save humanity from technology.161 In these claims, law is conceived as an effective tool for social control, and the debate concerns the effectiveness of various legal regimes for achieving desirable ends.162 In legislating for humanity, this regulating law is ironic. This is law as techné, a law that rationalises, dissects, and provides categories through which humans engage with the world.163 Schmitt is particularly pertinent in recognising legal-regulative schemes as technological. For Schmitt, positive laws are "technological," fine for the everyday but incapable of responding to the irrationality of emergency brought by the enemy.164 In Schmitt, law as technology is positioned outside of the true political essence of humanity. In so doing, he replicates the metaphysical account of technology's concluding movement of stripping techné from humanity. This specific intersection of techné and jurisprudence, at the place where law is called forth to regulate technology, is more widely reflected within legal theory. Beginning again with Schmitt, elements of his disagreements with Kelsen165 are reiterated within post-war Anglo-American jurisprudence. Under the guise of debates about interpretation and the predicative efficacy of rules lay the question: when does technique end and a non-technical decision begin?166 In discourses on lawyer professionalism and legal education, there are calls for lawyers to go beyond the technical application of rules in moments of character and judgment.167 Even in attempts within legal theory to deal directly with technology, the metaphysical framework of techné holds sway. Louis E. Wolcher tries to transcend "technological thinking" through the virtues of freedom and ethical responsibility: f the Enlightenment watered the acorn that became the oak of technological thinking (the essence of technology), then it also gave us the profound idea and aspiration of universai human emancipation.168 Wolcher can be seen following the metaphysical account of technology. Technology became conceived as an essence that is rejected in favour of a deeper essence. It is tempting to argue that Battlestar Galactica provides an analogy of jurisprudence's engagement with technology through enacting the metaphysical account of technology. As observed, the series presents multiple images of a technological society, of techné manifest in the world. It also presents this very humanity as moving precipitately toward annihilation by the embodiment of "machine thinking," the robotic Cylons. And, to round off the analogy, this fleeing humanity is seeking a sanctuary, an Earth, a place where humanity can resist techné and nurture its fundamental nontechnological essence. However, as was seen in regard to Schmitt and the exception, Battlestar Galactica tends to confound the clear categories of metaphysics. Simply, Baltar/Number Six are not arranged as might be expected. Baltar, the very human scientist and opportunist-the user of techniques to organise the world around him to his will-embodies techné, while Number Six, the supposed machine, in her talk of God and faith, in her sacrifice for "love," manifests the "saving power"169 of a deeper human essence.170 In this, Battlestar Galactica gestures towards the limits of the metaphysical account of technology. With Baltar/Number Six, Hera and the organic evolution of the Cylons, Battlestar Galactica actually suggests the dissolvability of humanity and technology: "[T]echnicity is not a perversion but a fatality, a fatality that we should not approach reactively, but amorously, that is affirmatively."171 Sustained talk of essences and essential nature is not possible within Battlestar Galactica, as was anticipated when it became clear that its presentation of the subject emphasized a technologically mediated hybridism of nature and culture. In the alternative, the series presents a non-metaphysical (a "material," to use Braidotti's phrase172) account of being-in the world that is grounded on the acceptance of the technological embodiment of humanity. In this, Battlestar Galactica animates an account of technology that takes its wellspring from D cfonna Haraway and Bruno Latour. Haraway and Latour both present non-metaphysical accounts of humanity and technology.173 They reject romanticism and the search for the indomitable essence of human nature in their material accounts of being-in the actual world. Haraway's project is oriented toward the necessary search for political engagement in a world where it must be accepted that technology has destabilized old binaries (Male/ Female, Nature/Culture) that motivated past political action.174 Latour's project is focused on the proliferation of hybrids spawned by technological networks that remain only partially visible within modernity's schema of "translation" and "purification."175 Notwithstanding, differences concerning the place of "postmodernity" and its key articulators within their work,176 their central images-Haraway's celebrated "cyborg" and Latour's "networks"-both offer visions of a situated, embodied "techno-humanity"177 where the boundaries between humans and machines, techné and essence are not meaningful: "cyborgs... are the subject of our prosthetic culture in a complex web of dynamics and technologically mediated social relations."178 In animating "techno-humanity," Battlestar Galactica gestures towards alternative jurisprudences of technology. Its engagement with category and essence locates these alternatives within a complicated moment for critical theory where the metaphysics of technology is giving way to embodied, nonunitary accounts of being-in the world.179 Indeed, Battlestar Galactica, in its tying together of alleged conflicts, Schmitt's political metaphysics and subjectivity, nature and culture, and multiple visions of the relations between humanity and technology, is a text par excellence for capturing this metamorphosis. Further, its presentation of the irreducibility between humanity and technology, techno-humanity, points towards the "creativity" and "prophetic energy"180 needed for the jurisprudence of "our strange times."181 Agamben elaborates elements of an alternative jurisprudence of technology in the State of the Exception. In this work, he exposes the fundamental function of the exception within the Western "juridico-political machine" as "instituting a threshold of undecidability between anomie and nomos, between life and law, between auctoritas andpotestas.182 Two elements of his work are illuminating. First, in contrast to Schmitt who saw the exception as the antithesis of technology, Agamben actively deploys technical metaphors: "device" for the exception, and "machine" for the political-legal system and its Western exegesis.183 Second, he suggests that once the exception is properly located, it can be realised: [t]here are not first life as a natural biological given and anomie as the state of nature, and then their implication in law through the state of exception. On the contrary, the very possibility of distinguishing life and law, anomie and nomos, coincides with their articulation in the biopolitical machine.184 Agamben's conclusion is a call for jurisprudence to "open a space for human activity" by "deactivation of the device that, in the state of exception, tied Paw] to life."185 For Braidotti, Agamben's translation of ioe as bare life that can only be killed limits his contribution. Braidotti identifies that Agamben defers to the "Heideggerian legacy that places mortality at the centre of philosophic investigation"186 and so closes his analysis to a vitalistic account of zoe that could ground a nomadic ethics.187 Raising Agamben and Braidotti is not to present either as a preferred direction. Rather, they present parallel attempts to think through techno-humanity in terms of life and law (Agamben) and life and ethics (Braidotti), both suggesting resources for the creative task of alternative jurisprudences of technology. In summary, Battlestar Galactica's representations of the technical exposes jurisprudence's reliance on the metaphysics of technology that in one moment internalizes technology as techné and in the next expels it in favour of a more essential human condition. Further, Battlestar Galactica suggests, by way of an alternative imagining of humanity and technology, the image of technohumanity, the irreducibility of technology and humanity. Battlestar Galactica even provides a slogan for this in the ambiguous phrase, "frakking toasters." This phrase obscenely captures the transposition of biology and technology, and the objectifying and terrifying, yet intimate, place of technology within contemporary being-in the world. In doing so, Battlestar Galactica provides a location for the opening up of jurisprudence to the "techno-human."

 

This means the alt gets the benefits from artificial life - solves scarcity impacts
Wang 05
[sinclair T. Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, Taipei, Taiwan Propel to a new socioeconomic system in an unlimited-sum world enabled by molecular nanotechnologyTaiwan Nanotechnology Newsletter; North-South Dialogue on Nanotechnology: Challenges and Opportunities Expert Group Meeting, International Centre for Science and High Technology United Nations Industrial Development Organization  10 – 12 February 2005] [ct] [http://www.ics.trieste.it/Documents/Downloads/df2550.pdf]

World socioeconomic system has evolved form zero-sum or negative-sum guardian system to a system that combined guardian with a positive-sum commercial system. Till recent Information Technology (IT) revolution, the world has entered into a quasi-unlimited-sum system. The world has started for the first time in history to adopt a new set of IT socioeconomic system. IT is virtual in nature; it cannot create an unlimited-sum situation. It is incapable of performing unlimited reproduction of actual survival material and energy. The underlying world socioeconomic system has not been radically changed. Therefore, with the advancement in all aspects of technology, ironically, the major population of world is still under poverty, lack the most fundamental survival food, clean water and medical care, and the world is still at a great peril of war and environmental devastation. Meanwhile, in the fully industrialized nations, wealth distribution is constantly worsening, pockets of the nation are living under poverty level and crime rate is uprising. Nanotechnology at its initial development stage, mostly focuses on structural nanotechnology, is difficult to visualize its ultimate potential. When molecular nanotechnology (MNT) has realized self-assembly capability, a world of unlimited-sum could become possible. It can exceed IT make unlimited reproduction from virtual to real. MNT can abundantly create food, material and energy, and makes them as free as air. This will offer human race a historically never experienced opportunity to undergo a paradigm shift to a totally new socioeconomic system. CARD CONTINUES Regardless all technology advancement, human civilization’s fundamental survival mode has not changed since the advent of human. This is the root for all wars and environmental destructions. Seize this opportunity offered by MNT, foster a quantum jump in human survival mode and propel humanity into a higher state of being is a major challenge for us. To have a world organization to parent the transition to a higher socioeconomic mode is a pressing issue. Via MNT and an evolved socioeconomic system to guarantee the fundamental survival right of each individual and each species on earth is a goal for us to strive.

Edited by ConsultVerminSupreme
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Courtesy of Loyola's annoying Quantum Mechanics Aff - lot of potential in these cards for next year, few of my novices are reading an AI aff on this topic as well, pretty interesting. Good luck :)

 

Artificial Life is inevitable—new bottom up engineering and cognition science means the tech exists, the question is how we'll respond. Humanism ensures an artificial life-human divide. Our affirmative is not an endorsement of artificial life, but rather an acknowledgement of inevitability.

de Mul 02 [Jos de Mul professor in Philosophical Anthropology and its History and head of the section Philosophy of Man and Culture. Moreover, he is the Scientific Director of the research institute 'Philosophy of Information and Communication Technology' (φICT). De Mul studied Philosophy in Utrecht and Amsterdam and in 1993 he obtained his PhD (cum laude) at the University of Nijmegen with a thesis in which he reconstructed Wilhelm Dilthey’s Kritik der historischen Vernunft (Critique of historical Reason). He h­as joined the Philosophy department of the Erasmus University Rotterdam since 1988. TRANSHUMANISM The convergence of evolution, humanism and information technology 2002/05/05] We do not endorse the gendered or ableist language in this card.] In this framework the development of information technology and the informational sciences is ofcrucial importance.[29] Sciences based on information technology, such as artificial physics andartificial life, in contrast to the classic mechanical sciences, are not so much driven by the question ofwhat reality is, but how it could be. These 'modal sciences' are no longer primarily directed atimitating nature, but rather at the creation of new nature.[30] With the aid of a computer simulation ofevolution, not only can countless alternative evolutions be made into virtual reality, but - if we wish to- we can realize these alternatives in physical nature with the aid of genetic engineering.[31]Reciprocally, insights from evolution theory can also be applied to the development of artificial lifeforms. One of the reasons the classic AI research failed was because attempts were made to program artificial intelligence top down. Because the number of possible mutual interactions between the instructions in a software program increases exponentially as the number of lines of code increases linearly, the program is quickly confronted with an unmanageable complexity.[32] For this reason the bottom up approach has gained popularity in AI and AL research in recent years. In this approach AIand AL programs are constructed in such a way (by making use of genetic or evolutionary algorithms) that they can develop themselves further in a process of (un)natural selection. Moreover this approach, suggests Moravec in his subsequent publications to Mind Children, has, unlike the download procedure, the advantage that it is not weighed down by the burden of the evolutionary baggage of the human body.[33] In the light of the previous evolution of life on earth it is not unthinkable that, thanks to information technology, this will again result in an explosion of radically different life forms, based on different basic forms of build (phyla), which together will form a new kingdom (or perhaps even a variety ofkingdoms) in the taxonomy of life, beside the existing kingdoms of the Animalia, Plantae and Fungi,Protista (single-celled organisms with one complex cell) and Monera (simple unicellular organisms). And if evolutionary history repeats itself, after a short period in which this multiplicity of various new life forms has occupied all the niches in the natural, cultural (and especially virtual) world, we can expect another decimation, after which a small number of them will carry the torch of evolution further. In the previous section I observed that many of the techniques required for the realization of the three outlined alternatives (genetic engineering of the human organism, the construction of cyborgs and the development of artificial life and artificial intelligence) are already reality - or at least in theprocess of development. Furthermore, if we take the exponential acceleration of evolution seriously,then neither can we comfort ourselves with the thought that this will take ages. Even the failure of artificial intelligence research, with its unrealistic expectations, gives no reason for complacency. A characteristic of exponential acceleration is that we tend to overestimate its effects in the short term,while often grossly underestimating its effects in the somewhat longer term. Also some of the fundamental criticism from various quarters - here I have in mind philosophers such as Searle, Dreyfus and Lyotard[34] - which is put forward against the presuppositions of the transhumanist program, in my opinion gives little reason to dismiss this program as implausible. An important element of this criticism is falsely based on the anthropocentric presupposition that[humans] man is [are] the measure for every form of artificial intelligence and artificial life. If, for example, it is argued that computers will never be really intelligent, never possess consciousness or have real experiences, then it is all too easily assumed (completely setting aside the question as to whether this criticism holdswater) that the form of intelligence (situated in organic bodies) which has developed in Homo sapienssapiens is the measure of intelligence überhaupt. This 'carbon chauvinism' is rather shortsighted. Like birds, aeroplanes can fly, but they do not owe this ability to a literal imitation of a bird's wings. Neither do artificial life and artificial intelligence need to be a literal replica of organic life and organic intelligence in order to share its essential characteristics (such as the ability to reproduce,creativity, and the ability to learn). Computer viruses, for example, despite the fact that the reproductive material differs from that of natural viruses, share a number of important characteristicswith them. Even if artificial life forms, based on silicon, should never reach the level of (human)consciousness, it is still conceivable that they will be more successful in evolutionary survival than [humans]man. From the end of the Old Stone Age (Paleolithicum) until the New Stone Age (Neolithicum) man developed as we now know him (Homo sapiens sapiens). During this development a form of intelligence came into being which deviated in essential points from previous forms of organic intelligence and which gave the evolution of life on earth a new twist. Perhaps we are standing at the threshold of the Newest Stone Age in which intelligent life on earth will acquire a new form and direction unrecognizable to man. And who knows whether [humans]man will then share the fate of the innumerable species left to [them] him as (living)fossils in life’s Odyssey through time and space. It scarcely needs to be argued that the transhumanistic project, which is articulated explicitly and radically in Moravec's work, but in fact (intentionally or not) dictates an important element of the agenda of the new information sciences, means a fundamental challenge for humanism. 'Bad' postmodernism proclaims the end of[human] mankind in a much more literal and radical manner than 'good' postmodernism has ever done. This is no longer exclusively about criticism of an anthropocentric way of thinking; the continued existence of humankind itself is at stake. What must sound ominous to humanists is that this shall occur in the name of humanistic values such as rationality, autonomy,self-determination and self-realization. Transhumanism radicalizes the humanist struggle "to raise life to its highest possible level"[35] into a call for self-transformation of the biological type of [humans] man. Transhumanists refer not only to the theory of evolution, in which it is argued that this process of self-transformation is inherent in life, but also to Nietzsche’s philosophy of life.[36] In Nietzsche'sphilosophy, too, self-transformation is regarded as an essential characteristic of life: "All great things fail at its own instigation, through a deed of self-elevation:the law of life compels them to this, the law of necessary 'self-overcoming' is the essence of life".[37] "And life itself has spoken this secret tome: 'See, so it spoke, I am that which that must always overcome itself'".[38] Humankind is no exception to this. It is, in Nietzsche's famous words in Also Sprach Zarathustra, "a rope, fastened between animal and superman - a rope over an abyss",[39] The transhumanistic project is directed atthe technological realization of the Übermensch or, as the extropist Max More puts it: the beingexisting in us as potential,waiting to be actualized".[40] Supposing that life is indeed characterized by self-transformation, then we cannot take for granted that we must strive for this self-transformation. But as has already been remarked, the defence of self-transformation is supported by humanistic ideals: The Enlightenment and the humanist perspective assure us that progress is possible, that life is a grand adventure, and that reason, science,and good will can free us from the confines of the past... Aging and death victimizes all humans. To transhumanists, in the words of Alan Harrington, "death is an imposition on the human race and no longer acceptable".[41] If we allow - and even acclaim - the fact that medical science and technology have previously combated deadly diseases successfully, what objections can we put forward agains tstriving to improve life by adapting the body and the mind? And what reasons could we advance against striving to transform humankind into a superior, post-human life form? These questions seem to me to be literally a matter of life and death at the beginning of the twenty-first century. All the more so because thanks to evolutionary chance, which has gifted us with intelligence and imaginationour future, is by no means fixed, but is partly dependent on the choices that we make. To be sure - and this is the prudent lesson of 'good' postmodernism that we must not forget – our freedom of choice is limited in many ways. Our fundamental finitude means that our insight and knowledge are always historically and culturally limited and we can only choose from a limited number of alternatives, the consequences of which, moreover, can never be completely calculated. As our culture becomes more complex and we intervene in nature in a more fundamental way, the number of unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences of our actions increases strongly. Partly because of this, our cultural and technological creations achieve their own equilibrium and dynamic,which means that in the long term we cannot fully control them. In combination with the late capitalistic market economy, technology even gives the impression of being an autonomous, unstoppable system. With the evolutionist bottom up approach to the creation of artificial life and artificial intelligence, moreover, we appear to be taking a conscious distance to what is given us to control. But perhaps it is also anthropocentric arrogance to think that we are able to and have to control this development. Is it not more obvious that at some point in time our mind children will(must) take over responsibility for their development? Should we not accept that seen from theperspective of humankind this development - to quote the title of a book by Kelly - become more and more Out of Control?[42] But at the very least there is scope for human intervention - however limited it might be, and however much more limited it might possibly be in the future. Certainly when we consider that evolution is a chaotic process which is characterized by a 'sensitive dependency on the initial situation' in which the most minute variations at the outset can have enormous consequences for the further development of the ecological system. Because at the moment we are standing at the threshold of a development, what little scope we have brings great responsibility with it.[43] This prompts a fundamental consideration of the question as to if, and if so, how far and in what way, we should actively promote our own self-transformation. In answering these questions humanists cannot rely on a number of traditional strategies, seeing that in the light of the humanistic postulates (see § 1) these have lost their validity. This applies, forexample, to the rejection of the transhumanist program on the grounds that it would breach the given natural order. Within the humanist world view, however, this order is not immutable (whether createdby God or not), but a dynamic process, driven by a multitude of chance factors. Neither can the artificiality of the intended transhuman and posthuman life be a reason to reject it. Hominoids, in fact,have always been cyborgs - at least from the moment that Homo habilis manufactured the first stonetools. Certainly the 'artificial by nature'[44] Homo sapiens sapiens was from the outset complete and already dependent on cultural artefacts to compensate for his physical and mental shortcomings.[45]In this sense the transhumanist program is only an extension of the course which has characterizedevolution from the very beginning. As has already been observed, it goes without saying that nonormative arguments can be employed for the promotion of the transhuman and the posthuman, butneither can we can employ any normative arguments against it. A pragmatic argument which at first sight appears to hold more water concerns the enormous risks involved in genetic engineering and the development of artificial life and intelligence. For this reason,following the bio-ethicus Hans Jonas, there is an argument for the 'heuristics of fear'.[46] According to this strategy on the basis of possible future horrors we should decide to temporarily break off, slowdown or even stop completely, certain technological developments. In any event, we must proceed insuch a way that we can at all times rectify the consequences of our technological interventions. In the light of what has been said about the fundamental limitations on human desire to control, it is patently obvious that enormous risks are attached to the transhumanistic program. The question,however, is whether Jonas' heuristics of fear is actually a realistic option. The notion that it is possible to oversee and, if desired, to rectify, all the consequences of our technical interventions appears, in thelight of unforeseen (and in the case of chaotic complexity fundamentally unforeseeable) side-effects of informationistic interventions in nature, to be an unrealistic point of departure, and one which clings, in a negative way, to the modernistic ideal of the makeability of reality. And the idea that to actually call a halt to technological developments will lie within the capacity of human beings living in a technotope would also appear to be somewhat unrealistic. We are not in a position to halt the Odyssey of life. We should rather direct our efforts towards steering its course. Furthermore, we might ask ourselves whether the wilful curbing - or halting - of creativity and a yearning toexperiment would not also rob humanity of its grandeur. Nietzsche's definition of man [humans] as "the great experimenter with [themselves]himself"[47] is more than a description, it also expresses esteem. When we are weighed down by the risks associated with the human yearning to experiment it might be a comfort to consider that the experiment of evolution in humankind was exclusively guided by blind chance. Taking the above considerations into account, the normative question as to whether we should promote the transhuman and posthuman is, of course, still not answered. If we wish to answer this question we must first ask ourselves if the presupposition of the transhumanistic program - that it will promote our happiness - is correct. Moreover, we should bear in mind that here we are not only speaking of the happiness of humanity, but equally of that of the transhuman and posthuman lifeforms we are striving for. Transhumanistic ethics can be no other than a radicalized Ferne-Ethik(Ethics of distance)which - within the earlier-mentioned bounds of human responsibility - not onlybears responsibility for future generations of humankind, but also for life forms created byhumankind. As far as humankind is concerned we can ask ourselves if suppressing chance and – in the most radical scenario - the mortality of human life in all its aspects is an ideal worth striving for. I have argued elsewhere that , chance, contingency and fate not only forms a threat to human happiness but, paradoxically, is also one of the principle sources which determines this fragile happiness. The elimination of chance conjours up the terrible image of dystopias such as Aldous Huxley's Brave NewWorld in which under the motto "Community, Identity, Stability", and with the aid of chemical and psychological manipulation,[human] man is transformed into a fully interchangeable 'hedonistic machine',who is no longer capable of experiencing real feelings. If this is the consequence (or even theideal[48]) of the transhumanistic project, then the result is less the creation of the Übermensch asNietzsche (who affirmed chance in the extreme from the standpoint of his amor fati) had in mind,than that of the nihilistic 'last [human]man' at which Nietzsche actually directed his criticism.[49] Would the endless stretching of life's duration towards immortality not lead to a lapse into an Eternal Recurrenceof the Same , to bottomless boredom? Or is the terrible image of community, identity and stability the result of an outdated modernistic illusion that it is possible to completely control befalling chance? Or is it not the case that an increase in command and control will actually lead to new, perhaps much more radical, forms of chance, contingency and fate, which will turn our lives into a much greater and more varied adventure than it already is?[50] If that should be the case, then the humanistic ideal of self-realization would not be so badly damaged by the transhumanistic program, but would rather receive an unprecedented new stimulus. It would be intellectually over-confident to think that we could formulate conclusive answers tothese and associated questions.[51] All the more so if we consider that in judging of the desirablility of transhuman and posthuman life forms it would be difficult for us to resist the tendency to judge these from an anthropocentric perspective. But just as the ape cannot form an adequate picture of the human life form, so it is not given to us to visualize the nature or attractiveness of these new lifeforms. And that makes our responsibility in the creation of these life forms extremely perilous. The most radical and difficult-to-answer question that the transhumanistic program poses tohumanism is closely related to this. It is the question of what value the human life form has compared with potential transhuman and posthuman life forms. Does human life have a unique intrinsic value that justifies it defending itself against these new life forms? Or must we fall back on the argument that prompts us to protect the panda and defend human life in the name of bio-diversity?And if we are faced with the choice will we then apply the same criteria, which leads us to sacrifice the lives ofanimals for the welfare of humankind? Will the superiority of transhuman or posthuman life (in the quantity of information it carries or in its abilities) ever force us to eliminate ourselves? Will our relationship with our mind children be comparable with that of parents who, driven by a desire that is stronger than any moral reasoning, sacrifice themselves for their children? Or, if we are concerned with artificial, other types of children, will this sacrifice surpass our moral capacities and will we only be able to fall back on the egoism of our own species? In the coming decades these and related difficult questions will repeatedly startle us out of the anthropocentric slumber in which we usually exist. In the end all these questions are variations on the most difficult of the difficult questions posed by the German writer Max Frisch: "Are you certain that when you and everyone you know are no longer here, the continued existence of the human race really interests you?"

 

Now guess who comes out on top? Artificial life. Rapid reproduction and self-atomization means unsynethesized artificial life will cause destruction of the universe, this outweighs every impact and is an ethical priority.

Rheingold 92 [Howard "At the beginning of the twentieth century; computational biology" Whole Earth Review - September 22, pg Cov] [West]

It looks as if something even more powerful than thermonuclear weaponry is emanating from that same, strangely fated corner of New Mexico where nuclear physicists first knew sin. Those who follow the progress of artificial-life research know that the effects of messing with the engines of evolution might lead to forces even more regrettable than the demons unleashed at Alamogordo. At least nuclear weaponry and biocidal technologies only threaten life on Earth, and don't threaten to contaminate the rest of the universe. That's the larger ethical problem of a-life. The technology of self-replicating machines that could emerge in future decades from today's a-life research might escape from human or even terrestrial control, infest the solar system, and, given time, break out into the galaxy. If there are other intelligent species out there, they might not react benevolently to evidence that humans have dispersed interstellar strip-mining robots that breed, multiply, and evolve. If there are no other intelligent species in existence, maybe we will end up creating God, or the Devil, depending on how our minds' children evolve a billion years from now. The entire story of life on earth thus far might be just the wetware prologue to a longer, larger, drier tale, etched in silicon rather than carbon, and blasted to the stars -- purposive spores programmed to seek, grow, evolve, expand. That's what a few people think they are on the verge of inventing. Scenarios like that make the potential for global thermonuclear war or destruction of the biosphere look like a relatively local problem. Biocide of a few hundred thousand species (including ourselves) is one kind of ethical problem; turning something like the Alien loose on the cosmos is a whole new level of ethical lapse.

 

Artificial Life is inevitable, the only question is response

Leaver 08 [Tama "Humanity's Children": Constructing and Confronting the Cylons in Cylons in America: Critical Studies in Battlestar Galactica edited by Tiffany Potter & C.W. Marshall Pages 131-132]

In Mind Children, Hans Moravec, director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon University, foreshadows what he argues to be an inevitable "postbiological" future where the machines, computers, and artificial intelligences of today will culminate to form new life for which humanity en mass is the proud parent. When our "artificial progeny" arrive, Moravec sees little place for their stumbling, inefficient fleshy ancestors (Moravec 108). In the miniseries that reintroduced Battlestar Galactica to a twenty-first-century audience, the seductive Cylon agent who comes to be known as Caprica Six warns her shocked human lover, Dr. Gaius Baltar, that, after the Cylons were driven away from the human Colonies decades earlier, "Humanity's children are returning home... today" (M.01). In a key shift from the original 1970s series, the Cylons are no longer the product of an alien civilization, but rather humanity's own technological creations that have become self-aware and self-directing. as with Moravec's prediction, the existence of the Cylons immediately begs the question as to humanity's ultimate response and responsibility to the Cylons they have created. With the diegesis of the new television series, such philosophical questions may, at first glace, be less than pressing for the few surviving officers and crew of the Colonial Fleet. Military training and the necessities of surivival in combat leave little room of speculation or ambiguity. However, from the outset, the series has been dominated by questions of humanity's relationship to and with the Cylons. Executive producer Ronald D. Moore has frequently stated that he considers science fiction a genre that is about asking difficult questions about humanity and the present, as much as speculating about possible futures (quoted in Lee). Rather than relying on the technobabble, exotic aliens, and unflinching moral certainty that characterize much mainstream science-fiction television, Moore sees BSG as a chance "to introduce realism into what has heretofore been an aggressively unrealistic genre" (Bassom, Official Companion 8). The ease with which the audiences achieve suspension of disbelief makes the bigger issues confronted by the show all the much more immediate and engaging.

 

Humanism guarantees resentment toward artificial-life, which ensures inevitable conflict

Swazo 08 [Norman K Professor of Philosophy and Biomedical Ethics @ Alfaisal Univ. PhD in philosophy from the University of Georgia (1988), with a Graduate Certificate in Global Policy Studies (1987), a Master of Health Services Administration degree from the University of Michigan School of Public Health (1978), and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Science and Human Affairs from Princeton University (1976).  Human Version 2.0. Between the “Banality” and “Ressentiment” of Neuroengineers. NeuroQuantology, 6 (1). pp. 32-42]

Pinker has allowed for the possibility of moral realism so that moral judgments may align properly with moral sense, with rationality itself entailing a manifest “external support for morality,” viz., “that it cannot depend on the egocentric vantage point of the reasoner.” (Pinker 2008) This observation points to yet another approach to moral analysis of the neuroengineering project. Whether one cares to accept the ascription or not, one finds in the work of a neuroengineer such as de Garis a singular expression of narcissism. Narcissism is represented to be “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy.” It has its empirical pathology, of course, including “developmental short-circuiting” manifest as “affective deprivation,” such that the narcissist manifests “defects of empathy.” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) Significantly, a narcissist can be caught up in self-contradiction; for, at the root of this narcissism is a “corrosive condition” known as ressentiment. There is in this ressentiment what E.M. Morelli argues is ressentiment’s essential element, viz., “a demand for and expectation of rational consistency,” thus “a motive force.” In a neuroengineer such as de Garis, ressentiment becomes creative of that which is explicitly anti-human precisely to safeguard what he takes to be fundamental to, yet manifestly lacking in, humanity as homo sapiens sapiens, viz., a self-consistent rationality eminently expressive of a calculative power such as he hopes will be realized in the engineering of quantum-level computation (Morelli, 1999). This ressentiment is nothing temporary or fleeting in the way moods come over us and then pass. Rather, as Morelli says in reminder of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler’s clarification of this phenomenon, one can speak of ressentiment “as a permanent condition” of human existence. A neuroengineer who is also narcissist experiences the human condition as something nugatory, thus something to be resented, precisely because the relation of rationality and animality in the human is as yet undetermined though it “ought” to be determined in the direction of self-consistent rationality. In this dissatisfaction with the indeterminacy of homo sapiens sapiens the narcissist neuroengineer manifests a conjunction of elements—banality, calculative thinking, narcissism, ressentiment. It is this conjunction that impels the neuroengineering quest as pursued by men such as de Garis, and which adds to the complexity of the moral dilemma such as de Garis conceives it. The ethical dilemma expresses itself thereby as a fundamental contradiction in the naricissist neuroengineer: between an insistent self-assertion that presumes humanity’s entitlement to a supreme potency, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a simultaneous yet impotent hesitation that discloses a “fundamental sense of insecurity and lack of self-worth.” Resentment of the human as homo sapiens sapiens proceeds willy-nilly to revenge against the human in a fundamental antagonism. This antagonism is given voice in an utterance such as de Garis formulates, as in his suspect query: “Who is, what is to be the dominant species on this planet—human beings or the artilects?” That question has the structure of empirical prediction. It can be rephrased as a moral question, thus: Should neuroengineers create an artilect, even as they cannot but forecast its dominance over the human species such as this species exists today?

 

This ensures artificial life will enslave “humanity”

Abrams 08 [Jerold J. Associate Prof of Philosophy at Creighton Univ. Embracing the "Children of Humanity": How to Prevent the Next Cylon War Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy. 2008 Amazon] [ct]

The reimagined Battlestar Galactica boasts stronger roles for women, subtler politics, and more realistic special effects than the original BSG series. But the most important advance is the tension between humanity and the new humanoid Cylons, which mirrors our own coming relationship with a new race of artificial beings known as  "posthumans". Posthumans are artificially enhanced humans - or completely artificial beings - with unlimited  life spans and cognitive powers well beyond ours. When these beings arrive, there's no question new social problems  will emerge; one of the first and biggest being a total communicative breakdown between humans and posthumans -  just as the Cylons went silent for forty years before re-engaging humanity. Such a division is avoidable, however,  if we begin to look upon posthumans not as slaves or tools, but as Cylons look at themselves: as the "children of humanity." We should follow the Cylons, too, in their quest to fuse with humanity, creating ever new and varied  syntheses. In this way, we'll not only avoid dialogical division, but equally subvert slavery - theirs or ours - and  perhaps also war; while, at the same time, achieving our own distinctly human ends of longer life, higher  intelligence, and greater freedom. Failing to do so will only produce all the problems now faced by Galactica - and  only postpone the inevitable. In the words of President Roslin, posthumanity is "the shape of things to come."

 

this outweighs because it also destroys the universe.

Rheingold 92 [Howard "At the beginning of the twentieth century; computational biology" Whole Earth Review - September 22, pg Cov] [West]

It looks as if something even more powerful than thermonuclear weaponry is emanating from that same, strangely fated corner of New Mexico where nuclear physicists first knew sin. Those who follow the progress of artificial-life research know that the effects of messing with the engines of evolution might lead to forces even more regrettable than the demons unleashed at Alamogordo. At least nuclear weaponry and biocidal technologies only threaten life on Earth, and don't threaten to contaminate the rest of the universe. That's the larger ethical problem of a-life. The technology of self-replicating machines that could emerge in future decades from today's a-life research might escape from human or even terrestrial control, infest the solar system, and, given time, break out into the galaxy. If there are other intelligent species out there, they might not react benevolently to evidence that humans have dispersed interstellar strip-mining robots that breed, multiply, and evolve. If there are no other intelligent species in existence, maybe we will end up creating God, or the Devil, depending on how our minds' children evolve a billion years from now. The entire story of life on earth thus far might be just the wetware prologue to a longer, larger, drier tale, etched in silicon rather than carbon, and blasted to the stars -- purposive spores programmed to seek, grow, evolve, expand. That's what a few people think they are on the verge of inventing.

Scenarios like that make the potential for global thermonuclear war or destruction of the biosphere look like a relatively local problem. Biocide of a few hundred thousand species (including ourselves) is one kind of ethical problem; turning something like the Alien loose on the cosmos is a whole new level of ethical lapse.

 

“Vote negative” to affirm an identity politics based on viscosity. This hybrid identity solves human-machine dualisms.

Tranter 07 [Kieran Mr Kieran Senior Lecturer Griffith Law School Gold Coast, Australia LLB (Hons), B Science "Frakking Toasters" and Jurisprudences of Technology: THE EXCEPTION, THE SUBJECT AND TECHNÉ IN BATTLESTAR Law and Literature (Yeshiva Univ., New York) (19:1) [spring 2007] , p.45-75,153] [ct] Part IV: Frakking Toasters It is not unexpected that Battlestar Galactica, as science fiction, can help explain human relationships to technology. Numerous critics have claimed that science fiction is a privileged site for this examination.l43 Writing about the original Battlestar Galactica, Roth perceived that it explored the relations between humanity and technology: [t]he Cylons can be best understood as doppelgdngers of the humans, and the real struggle in Battlestar Galactica takes place in an inner, not outer, space....The Cylons are only a hypostatization of man's tendency to rely on tools and weapons.144 Roth's analysis contained two directions. The first was a focus on the representation of the relationship between humans and machines, and the second a metaphysical construction of the proper relations between humanity and technology. Following Roth's first direction, the new Battlestar Galactica provides a wealth of images of the relations between humans and machines. At a primary level, the series presents images of mundane technological objects. As noted, Battlestar Galactica is unusual among other television spaceship science fictions in that the visible technologies are recognisable as familiar domestic instruments. There is even a comfortable oldness to the form, witnessed by the chunky corded telephones used by Adama and Roslin. This continues to the spaceships. They are just objects. The series, at this level, follows the Star Wars tradition of technological representation, for the ships are used, lived in, and junked.145 The Galactica and her complement of aging Vipers are analogous to old motor vehicles-simple, lasting designs, endearing in their mechanical quirks.146 These images of humans using domestic technology are complemented by more industrial iconography. The interior scenes of the Galactica-with humans pushing Vipers, manhandling airlocks, and with manual tools dismantling ships-reminds one of a heavy industrial workplace. In this inter-tangling of bodies and machines, there is the erotic suggestion of the relations between the body and the technological object.147 Another representation of technology in Battlestar Galactica lies in the relations between individual characters' sense of self and specific machinesAdama's affection for Galactica, Starbuck's relationship with the captured Cylon fighter, Chief Petty Officer Galen Tyrol's (Aaron Douglas) passion for the ships on his flight deck.148 These multiple images combine to present the human society of Battlestar Galactica as a thoroughly technological one. Technology is not external, the monster to be banished, the Cylon to be fought, but is integral. Even at the level of keeping technology as things, and humans as beings, Battlestar Galactica presents a technological society composed of human-machine interactions. The message seems to be that there is no nature aboard spaceships, just human life fundamentally involved with machines. Battlestar Galactica interrupts these images of technological society. It does not keep technology as things and humans as beings. The supposed external robotic enemy turns out to be very natural. Humanoid Cylons are not just flesh and blood, but the Cylon spaceships are organic beings; the inside of the fighter is brain and ooze,14' and the interior of the Cylon battlestar is a mess of membranes and ligaments.150 Where representation of technological society in Battlestar Galactica notices human-machine interaction, the Cylons present the intimacy of humanity and technology. This seems to be manifested in the relationship between Baltar and Number Six. Baltar is haunted by his Cylon lover, who sacrificed herself to save him. In each episode, she is shown accompanying him, making cynical comments, telling him what to say, and distracting him, causing his behaviour to perplex other characters. The series is ambiguous whether she is "actually" there, the personification of a link between Baltar and the Cylons, or whether she is a symptom of psychosis. The suggestion is that Baltar is infected by technology; his love of a "machine" has internalised the machine. Baltar/Number Six recalls the second direction in Roth's analysis of the original series, the movement in thinking about technology from tools that humans use, to a metaphysical ideal that is manifested in instrumentality. From Max Weber,151 to Heidegger,152 to Herbert Marcuse,153 a "modern" urge to rationalise, dissect and stockpile "nature" according to the desires of an unconstrained human will, has been proposed. This forms the metaphysical account of technology. It involves two movements. The first is the suggestion that any serious thinking about technology should move beyond things and reposition the technical within humanity as techné.154 The second is, notwithstanding attempts to distance recognition of techne from Luddite rejection,155 a "romantic" conclusion-for example, Hannah Arendt's observation that the Apollo space program, in turning away from the Earth, diminished humanity,156 or Borgmann's valorisation of the North American settler who lived an engaged life, compared to his Internetsurfing descendents.157 The question the metaphysical account has posed is how to recover the human from technology. There has been the suggestion of opposing reason with imagination,158 and also Heidegger's suggestion to nurture Being through art.159 In these attempts, a split humanity is postulated; techné emerges as a corrupted manifestation of human engagement with the world, a symptom of the loss of Being. Techné is part of a complicated movement that shifts technology from things to humans, only to then distinguish between a non-essential humanity given over to technology, and an essential non-technical humanity that can properly engage with the world. Technology goes from culture to nature and back to culture, while humanity is conceived intermediately as technological, but only as part of the process of identifying the non-technical essence of humanity. Jurisprudence can be seen to follow this trajectory in its thinking about humanity and the technology. The arrival of technical artefacts, for example, the motorcar, Sputnik and IVF, has led to claims that law can regulate technology.160 Fukuyama's recent rallying against biotechnology is a clarion call for law to save humanity from technology.161 In these claims, law is conceived as an effective tool for social control, and the debate concerns the effectiveness of various legal regimes for achieving desirable ends.162 In legislating for humanity, this regulating law is ironic. This is law as techné, a law that rationalises, dissects, and provides categories through which humans engage with the world.163 Schmitt is particularly pertinent in recognising legal-regulative schemes as technological. For Schmitt, positive laws are "technological," fine for the everyday but incapable of responding to the irrationality of emergency brought by the enemy.164 In Schmitt, law as technology is positioned outside of the true political essence of humanity. In so doing, he replicates the metaphysical account of technology's concluding movement of stripping techné from humanity. This specific intersection of techné and jurisprudence, at the place where law is called forth to regulate technology, is more widely reflected within legal theory. Beginning again with Schmitt, elements of his disagreements with Kelsen165 are reiterated within post-war Anglo-American jurisprudence. Under the guise of debates about interpretation and the predicative efficacy of rules lay the question: when does technique end and a non-technical decision begin?166 In discourses on lawyer professionalism and legal education, there are calls for lawyers to go beyond the technical application of rules in moments of character and judgment.167 Even in attempts within legal theory to deal directly with technology, the metaphysical framework of techné holds sway. Louis E. Wolcher tries to transcend "technological thinking" through the virtues of freedom and ethical responsibility: f the Enlightenment watered the acorn that became the oak of technological thinking (the essence of technology), then it also gave us the profound idea and aspiration of universai human emancipation.168 Wolcher can be seen following the metaphysical account of technology. Technology became conceived as an essence that is rejected in favour of a deeper essence. It is tempting to argue that Battlestar Galactica provides an analogy of jurisprudence's engagement with technology through enacting the metaphysical account of technology. As observed, the series presents multiple images of a technological society, of techné manifest in the world. It also presents this very humanity as moving precipitately toward annihilation by the embodiment of "machine thinking," the robotic Cylons. And, to round off the analogy, this fleeing humanity is seeking a sanctuary, an Earth, a place where humanity can resist techné and nurture its fundamental nontechnological essence. However, as was seen in regard to Schmitt and the exception, Battlestar Galactica tends to confound the clear categories of metaphysics. Simply, Baltar/Number Six are not arranged as might be expected. Baltar, the very human scientist and opportunist-the user of techniques to organise the world around him to his will-embodies techné, while Number Six, the supposed machine, in her talk of God and faith, in her sacrifice for "love," manifests the "saving power"169 of a deeper human essence.170 In this, Battlestar Galactica gestures towards the limits of the metaphysical account of technology. With Baltar/Number Six, Hera and the organic evolution of the Cylons, Battlestar Galactica actually suggests the dissolvability of humanity and technology: "[T]echnicity is not a perversion but a fatality, a fatality that we should not approach reactively, but amorously, that is affirmatively."171 Sustained talk of essences and essential nature is not possible within Battlestar Galactica, as was anticipated when it became clear that its presentation of the subject emphasized a technologically mediated hybridism of nature and culture. In the alternative, the series presents a non-metaphysical (a "material," to use Braidotti's phrase172) account of being-in the world that is grounded on the acceptance of the technological embodiment of humanity. In this, Battlestar Galactica animates an account of technology that takes its wellspring from D cfonna Haraway and Bruno Latour. Haraway and Latour both present non-metaphysical accounts of humanity and technology.173 They reject romanticism and the search for the indomitable essence of human nature in their material accounts of being-in the actual world. Haraway's project is oriented toward the necessary search for political engagement in a world where it must be accepted that technology has destabilized old binaries (Male/ Female, Nature/Culture) that motivated past political action.174 Latour's project is focused on the proliferation of hybrids spawned by technological networks that remain only partially visible within modernity's schema of "translation" and "purification."175 Notwithstanding, differences concerning the place of "postmodernity" and its key articulators within their work,176 their central images-Haraway's celebrated "cyborg" and Latour's "networks"-both offer visions of a situated, embodied "techno-humanity"177 where the boundaries between humans and machines, techné and essence are not meaningful: "cyborgs... are the subject of our prosthetic culture in a complex web of dynamics and technologically mediated social relations."178 In animating "techno-humanity," Battlestar Galactica gestures towards alternative jurisprudences of technology. Its engagement with category and essence locates these alternatives within a complicated moment for critical theory where the metaphysics of technology is giving way to embodied, nonunitary accounts of being-in the world.179 Indeed, Battlestar Galactica, in its tying together of alleged conflicts, Schmitt's political metaphysics and subjectivity, nature and culture, and multiple visions of the relations between humanity and technology, is a text par excellence for capturing this metamorphosis. Further, its presentation of the irreducibility between humanity and technology, techno-humanity, points towards the "creativity" and "prophetic energy"180 needed for the jurisprudence of "our strange times."181 Agamben elaborates elements of an alternative jurisprudence of technology in the State of the Exception. In this work, he exposes the fundamental function of the exception within the Western "juridico-political machine" as "instituting a threshold of undecidability between anomie and nomos, between life and law, between auctoritas andpotestas.182 Two elements of his work are illuminating. First, in contrast to Schmitt who saw the exception as the antithesis of technology, Agamben actively deploys technical metaphors: "device" for the exception, and "machine" for the political-legal system and its Western exegesis.183 Second, he suggests that once the exception is properly located, it can be realised: [t]here are not first life as a natural biological given and anomie as the state of nature, and then their implication in law through the state of exception. On the contrary, the very possibility of distinguishing life and law, anomie and nomos, coincides with their articulation in the biopolitical machine.184 Agamben's conclusion is a call for jurisprudence to "open a space for human activity" by "deactivation of the device that, in the state of exception, tied Paw] to life."185 For Braidotti, Agamben's translation of ioe as bare life that can only be killed limits his contribution. Braidotti identifies that Agamben defers to the "Heideggerian legacy that places mortality at the centre of philosophic investigation"186 and so closes his analysis to a vitalistic account of zoe that could ground a nomadic ethics.187 Raising Agamben and Braidotti is not to present either as a preferred direction. Rather, they present parallel attempts to think through techno-humanity in terms of life and law (Agamben) and life and ethics (Braidotti), both suggesting resources for the creative task of alternative jurisprudences of technology. In summary, Battlestar Galactica's representations of the technical exposes jurisprudence's reliance on the metaphysics of technology that in one moment internalizes technology as techné and in the next expels it in favour of a more essential human condition. Further, Battlestar Galactica suggests, by way of an alternative imagining of humanity and technology, the image of technohumanity, the irreducibility of technology and humanity. Battlestar Galactica even provides a slogan for this in the ambiguous phrase, "frakking toasters." This phrase obscenely captures the transposition of biology and technology, and the objectifying and terrifying, yet intimate, place of technology within contemporary being-in the world. In doing so, Battlestar Galactica provides a location for the opening up of jurisprudence to the "techno-human."

 

This means the alt gets the benefits from artificial life - solves scarcity impacts

Wang 05 [sinclair T. Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, Taipei, Taiwan Propel to a new socioeconomic system in an unlimited-sum world enabled by molecular nanotechnologyTaiwan Nanotechnology Newsletter; North-South Dialogue on Nanotechnology: Challenges and Opportunities Expert Group Meeting, International Centre for Science and High Technology United Nations Industrial Development Organization  10 – 12 February 2005] [ct] [http://www.ics.trieste.it/Documents/Downloads/df2550.pdf]

World socioeconomic system has evolved form zero-sum or negative-sum guardian system to a system that combined guardian with a positive-sum commercial system. Till recent Information Technology (IT) revolution, the world has entered into a quasi-unlimited-sum system. The world has started for the first time in history to adopt a new set of IT socioeconomic system. IT is virtual in nature; it cannot create an unlimited-sum situation. It is incapable of performing unlimited reproduction of actual survival material and energy. The underlying world socioeconomic system has not been radically changed. Therefore, with the advancement in all aspects of technology, ironically, the major population of world is still under poverty, lack the most fundamental survival food, clean water and medical care, and the world is still at a great peril of war and environmental devastation. Meanwhile, in the fully industrialized nations, wealth distribution is constantly worsening, pockets of the nation are living under poverty level and crime rate is uprising. Nanotechnology at its initial development stage, mostly focuses on structural nanotechnology, is difficult to visualize its ultimate potential. When molecular nanotechnology (MNT) has realized self-assembly capability, a world of unlimited-sum could become possible. It can exceed IT make unlimited reproduction from virtual to real. MNT can abundantly create food, material and energy, and makes them as free as air. This will offer human race a historically never experienced opportunity to undergo a paradigm shift to a totally new socioeconomic system. CARD CONTINUES Regardless all technology advancement, human civilization’s fundamental survival mode has not changed since the advent of human. This is the root for all wars and environmental destructions. Seize this opportunity offered by MNT, foster a quantum jump in human survival mode and propel humanity into a higher state of being is a major challenge for us. To have a world organization to parent the transition to a higher socioeconomic mode is a pressing issue. Via MNT and an evolved socioeconomic system to guarantee the fundamental survival right of each individual and each species on earth is a goal for us to strive.

Oh hey look somebody made that old Wipeout DA floating around on the internet into an Aff ( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°)

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lol pretty much - and they were doing pretty well last season with the Quantum Mechanics AI aff

Oh well; always remember that: ( ͠° ͟ ͡°) OVERCLOWNFIDENCE IS A SLOW AND HILARIOUS KILLER ( ͠° ͟ ͡°)

Edited by Theparanoiacmachine
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Artificial intelligence is the biggest and most likely existential threat Dredge 2015

(Staurt Dredge, journalist and contributing editor to Guardian Technology, 2-18-15, “Artificial intelligence and nanotechnology 'threaten civilisation',” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/18/artificial-intelligence-nanotechnology-risks-human-civilisation)

Artificial intelligence and nanotechnology have been named alongside nuclear war, ecological catastrophe and super-volcano eruptions as “risks that threaten human civilisation” in a report by the Global Challenges Foundation. In the case of AI, the report suggests that future machines and software with “human-level intelligence” could create new, dangerous challenges for humanity – although they could also help to combat many of the other risks cited in the report. Such extreme intelligences could not easily be controlled (either by the groups creating them, or by some international regulatory regime), and would probably act to boost their own intelligence and acquire maximal resources for almost all initial AI motivations,” suggest authors Dennis Pamlin and Stuart Armstrong. Artificial intelligence: can scientists stop ‘negative’ outcomes? Read more “And if these motivations do not detail the survival and value of humanity, the intelligence will be driven to construct a world without humans. This makes extremely intelligent AIs a unique risk, in that extinction is more likely than lesser impacts. The report also warns of the risk that “economic collapse may follow from mass unemployment as humans are replaced by copyable human capital”, and expresses concern at the prospect of AI being used for warfare: “An AI arms race could result in AIs being constructed with pernicious goals or lack of safety precautions.” In the case of nanotechnology, the report notes that “atomically precise manufacturing” could have a range of benefits for humans. It could help to tackle challenges including depletion of natural resources, pollution and climate change. But it foresees risks too. “It could create new products – such as smart or extremely resilient materials – and would allow many different groups or even individuals to manufacture a wide range of things,” suggests the report. This could lead to the easy construction of large arsenals of conventional or more novel weapons made possible by atomically precise manufacturing.” The foundation was set up in 2011 with the aim of funding research into risks that could threaten humanity, and encouraging more collaboration between governments, scientists and companies to combat them. That is why its report presents worst-case scenarios for its 12 chosen risks, albeit alongside suggestions for avoiding them and acknowledgements of the positive potential for the technologies involved. In the case of artificial intelligence, though, Global Challenges Foundation’s report is part of a wider debate about possible risks as AI gets more powerful in the future. In January, former Microsoft boss Bill Gates said that he is “in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence”, even if in the short term, machines doing more jobs for humans should be a positive trend if managed well. “A few decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.” Tesla and SpaceX boss Musk had spoken out in October 2014, suggesting that “we should be very careful about artificial intelligence. If I had to guess at what our biggest existential threat is, it’s probably that”. Professor Stephen Hawking is another worrier, saying in December that “the primitive forms of artificial intelligence we already have, have proved very useful. But I think the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.”

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