Jump to content

Recommended Posts

So.. I just got assigned my last neg assignment for lab and I have to cut a Schmitt Shell and probably Perm answers by tomorrow. Could someone explain Schmitt's thesis a bit more and send me some articles to cut?

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

So.. I just got assigned my last neg assignment for lab and I have to cut a Schmitt Shell and probably Perm answers by tomorrow. Could someone explain Schmitt's thesis a bit more and send me some articles to cut?

 

Not familiar enough with Schmitt to give an explanation, but here's some Schmitt cards I have on me - might be helpful?

 

Ethical obligations are based on the presumption of universally applicable human values and thus a universal humanity – makes wars of annihilation inevitable.

Odysseos ‘8 [Dr. Louiza Odysseos- University of Sussex, Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan”, published 3/22/8, accessed 7/7/13, PDF] //pheft

 

Ethics, polemics, tactics: the discourse of humanity In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increased usage of the terminology of ‘humanity’ by both theorists and institutional actors such as the League of Nations (1996a). His initial critique allows us to illuminate four distinct criticisms against contemporary world politics’ ethical recourse to the discourse of humanity (cf. Odysseos 2007b). The first objection arises from the location of thisdiscourse in the liberal universe of values. By using the discourse of humanity, theproject of a universal ethics reverberates with the nineteenth century ‘ringingproclamations of disinterested liberal principle’ (Gowan 2003: 53) through which‘liberalism quite successfully conceals its politics, which is the politics of getting ridof politics’ (Dyzenhaus 1998: 14). For Schmitt, the focus of liberal modernity onmoral questions aims to ignore or surpass questions of conflict altogether: it istherefore ‘the battle against the political - as Schmitt defines the political’, in terms ofthe permanency of social antagonism in politics (Sax 2002: 501). The second criticism argues that ‘humanity is not a political concept, and no politicalentity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it’ (Schmitt 1996a: 55). Outside of this historical location,where does it find concrete expression but in the politics of a politically neutral‘international community’ which acts, we are assured, in the interest of humanity? (cf. Blair 1999). The ‘international community is coextensive with humanity…[it]possesses the inherent right to impose its will…and to punish its violation, notbecause of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an international need’, aneed which it can only determine as the ‘secularized “church” of “commonhumanity”’ (Rasch 2003: 137, citing James Brown Scott).2 A third objection, still, has to do with the imposition of particular kind of monism:despite the lip-service to plurality, taken from the market (Kalyvas 1999), ‘liberalpluralism is in fact not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overridingmonism, the monism of humanity’ (Rasch 2003: 136). Similarly, current universalist perspectives, while praising ‘customary’ or cultural differences, think of them ‘but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture – a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents’ (Brennan 2003: 41). One oft-discussed disciplining effect is that, politically, the ethics of a universalhumanity shows little tolerance for what is regarded as ‘intolerant’ politics, which isany politics that moves in opposition to its ideals, rendering political opposition to itillegitimate (Rasch 2003: 136). This is compounded by the fact that liberal ethicaldiscourses are also defined by a claim to their own exception and superiority. They naturalise the historical origins of liberal societies, which are no longer regarded as ‘contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization’; rather, they ‘become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Thosefound wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one ofthe signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty’ (ibid.:141; cf. Donnelly 1998).Most importantly, and related to this concern, there is the relation of the concept ofhumanity to ‘the other’, and to war and violence. In its historical location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives; yet its utilisation by liberal ethical discourses within a philosophy of an ‘absolute humanity’, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion (1996a, 2003, 2004/2007): By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizablepolis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Doeshumanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus nobarbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? (Rasch 2003: 135).

 

Our alternative is to draw clear lines in the sand as an expression of the fundamental equality of our enmity. Our duty is not to eliminate violence, but rather to question the processes and discourses which unleash its true horror.

Rasch 05 – (Spring 2005, William Rasch, Professor and Chair of Germanic Studies. Ph.D. University of Washington/Seattle, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle,” South Atlantic Quarterly 104(2): 253-262 (2005), Duke University Press)

But how are we to respond? For those who say there is no war and who yet find themselves witnessing daily bloodshed, Adornoian asceticism (refraining from participating in the nihilism of the political) or Benjaminian weak, quasi, or other messianism (waiting for the next incarnation of the historical subject [the multitudes?] or the next proletarian general strike [the event?]) would seem to be the answer. To this, however, those who say there is a war can respond only with bewilderment. Waiting for a ‘‘completely new politics’’10 and completely new political agents, waiting for the event and the right moment to name it, or waiting for universal ontological redemption feels much like waiting for the Second Coming, or, more accu- rately, for Godot. And have we not all grown weary of waiting? The war we call ‘‘the political,’’ whether nihilist or not, happily goes on while we watch Rome burn. As Schmitt wrote of the relationship of early Christianity to the Roman Empire, ‘‘The belief that a restrainer holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire of the Germanic kings’’ (60). One does not need to believe in the virtues of that particular ‘‘historical monolith’’ to understand the dangers of eschatological paralysis. But as Max Weber observed firsthand, ascetic quietude leads so often, so quickly, and so effortlessly to the chiliastic violence that knows no bounds; and as we have lately observed anew, the millennial messianism of imperial rulers and nomadic partisans alike dominates the contemporary political landscape. The true goal of those who say there is no war is to eliminate the war that actually exists by eliminating those Lyons and Tygers and other Savage Beasts who say there is a war. This war is the truly savage war. It is the war we witness today. No amount of democratization, pacification, or Americanization will mollify its effects, because democratization, pacification, and Americanization are among the weapons used by those who say there is no war to wage their war to end all war. What is to be done? If you are one who says there is a war, and if you say it not because you glory in it but because you fear it and hate it, then your goal is to limit it and its effects, not eliminate it, which merely intensifies it, but limit it by drawing clear lines within which it can be fought, and clear lines between those who fight it and those who don’t, lines between friends, enemies, and neutrals, lines between combatants and noncombatants. There are, of course, legitimate doubts about whether those ideal lines could ever be drawn again; nevertheless, the question that we should ask is not how can we establish perpetual peace, but rather a more modest one: Can symmetrical relationships be guaranteed only by asymmetrical ones? According to Schmitt, historically this has been the case. ‘‘The traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the old nomos of the earth. This order arose from a legendary and unforeseen discovery of a new world, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth’’ (39). We have since gone to the moon and have found nothing on the way there to exploit. We may soon go to Mars, if current leaders have their way, but the likelihood of finding exploitable populations seems equally slim. Salvation through spatially delimited asymmetry, even were it to be desired, is just not on the horizon. And salvation through globalization, that is, through global unity and equality, is equally impossible, because today’s asymmetry is not so much a localization of the exception as it is an invisible generation of the exception from within that formal ideal of unity, a generation of the exception as the difference between the human and the inhuman outlaw, the ‘‘Savage Beast, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’’ We are, therefore, thrown back upon ourselves, which is to say, upon those artificial ‘‘moral persons’’ who act as our collective political identities. They used to be called states. What they will be called in the future remains to be seen. But, if we think to establish a differentiated unity of discrete political entities that once represented for Schmitt ‘‘the highest form of order within the scope of human power,’’ then we must symmetrically manage the necessary pairing of inclusion and exclusion without denying the ‘‘forms of power and domination’’ that inescapably accompany human ordering. We must think the possibility of roughly equivalent power relations rather than fantasize the elimination of power from the political universe. This, conceivably, was also Schmitt’s solution. Whether his idea of the plurality of Großräume could ever be carried out under contemporary circumstances is, to be sure, more than a little doubtful, given that the United States enjoys a monopoly on guns, goods, and the Good, in the form of a supremely effective ideology of universal ‘‘democratization.’’ Still, we would do well to devise vocabularies that do not just emphatically repeat philosophically more sophisticated versions of the liberal ideology of painless, effortless, universal equality. The space of the political will never be created by a bloodless, Benjaminian divine violence. Nor is it to be confused with the space of the simply human. To dream the dreams of universal inclusion may satisfy an irrepressible human desire, but it may also always produce recurring, asphyxiating political nightmares of absolute exclusion.

 

The political is everywhere and everything – we can never escape and the only way to avoid annihilation is to limit it through agonistic respect for the other.

Behnke and Bishai, 04 – (3/17/04, Andreas Behnke, PhD, Lecturer in Political Theory, School of Politics and IR, University of Reading, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science at Towson University, and Linda Bishai, PhD, International Relations, senior program officer in the Education and Training Center/International at the United States Institute of Peace, where she focuses on international relations, conflict resolution, human rights and peace studies, “War, Violence and the Displacement of the Political" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73563_index.html)

From a Schmittean perspective, nothing of this should come as a surprise. One can try to deny, suppress, or displace the Political, yet one can never abolish it. The problem is in what fashion the Political emerges in different ideologies. As Gary Ulmen has pointed out, for Schmitt, the ‘key to the concept of the Political is […] not enmity but the distinction itself’ (Ulmen 1978: 189). The Political is therefore based on the reality of difference and of plurality in the international society. One should not exaggerate this point and romanticize this reality too much. Neither identity nor difference can claim moral or ethical priority as such. Hence, no moral privilege can be assigned to the ‘other’, as some ‘post-modern’ ethics have tried to do. The main concern for realists like Schmitt is instead to limit the inherent violence in a system of difference that has no recourse to a higher political, judicial, or moral authority. Irreconcilable differences abound, and violence is thus a systemic condition, always implicated in the decisions between self and other, friend and enemy, and always a potentiality in the relations between these entities. For Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy establishes a limit for conflict by associating it with what William Connolly has called ‘agonistic respect’ (Connolly 1994: 166-7). In Schmitt’s terms, ‘according to traditional international law, war finds its right, its honour and its dignity in the fact that the enemy is no pirate and no gangster, but a “state” and a “subject of international law”’ (Schmitt 1988: 48-9). The recognition of sovereign equality, and the concomitant recognition that the only universally acceptable norm is the absence of universal norms, imposes a modicum of restraint upon the exercise of violence, as it divests states of morality and truth as legitimising resources. Again, if ‘agonistic respect’ sounds too romantic in this context, one might justify the restraint imposed upon the exercise of force against other states by the prudent recognition that ‘our’ ideas, values, and principles may not be the solution to the problems in other places. Moreover, and in regard to the liberal fondness for liberating ‘oppressed’ people, the right of self-determination that is at the heart of the democratic entitlement vests in none other than the people, and […] it is they – not some foreign power that they have similarly not elected – who must determine their own destiny (Byers and Chesterman 2000: 291). 

Edited by ConsultVerminSupreme
  • Upvote 2

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

I've never run Schmitt but basically he's the right wing K. He's about the closest thing you can get to impact turning racism without impact turning racism. He says us vs. them is good (like the cards ConsultVerminSupreme posted above, drawing lines in the sand between countries etc.) I suppose Schmitt is strategic for this year's topic because the negative is more right-wing than usual, and most left wing liberty loving authors (which have usually been more utilized by negative teams) probably think that curtailing surveillance is good (in some sense). 

 

EDIT: More info http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schmitt/

Also I forgot, he was also like actually a supportive and outspoken member of the Nazi party so that's a thing you might have to deal with. I'm sure there are very long "AT: Schmitt=Nazi" blocks that exist or else nobody could probably read this K. 

Someone else may have to help you with the task of finding cards/articles, as I do not have a schmitt file. Many people above have pointed out files I assume will be helpful.

Edited by yee
  • Upvote 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Just FYI, ethically, he's objectively fucked.

Yeah, I'm cutting this against racism and it's pretty messed up and I'm violating my ethics as we speak. 

 

I've never run Schmitt but basically he's the right wing K. He's about the closest thing you can get to impact turning racism without impact turning racism. He says us vs. them is good (like the cards ConsultVerminSupreme posted above, drawing lines in the sand between countries etc.) I suppose Schmitt is strategic for this year's topic because the negative is more right-wing than usual, and most left wing liberty loving authors (which have usually been more utilized by negative teams) probably think that curtailing surveillance is good (in some sense). 

 

EDIT: More info http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schmitt/

Also I forgot, he was also like actually a supportive and outspoken member of the Nazi party so that's a thing you might have to deal with. I'm sure there are very long "AT: Schmitt=Nazi" blocks that exist or else nobody could probably read this K. 

I cut part of that article. It's probs not ev worthy but I'm just gonna put it in there for an explanation. I'm only supposed to cut it so it goes on the case neg vs. an Metadata Aff that has a race advantage. So I guess I'll cut that and perm answers since ev is due tomorrow. :-)

  • Upvote 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

The affirmative is an attempt to collapse the friend/enemy distinction, when we destroy that distinction it somehow causes war and genocide.

He's a nazi, all you need to know.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Yeah, I'm cutting this against racism and it's pretty messed up and I'm violating my ethics as we speak. 

 

I cut part of that article. It's probs not ev worthy but I'm just gonna put it in there for an explanation. I'm only supposed to cut it so it goes on the case neg vs. an Metadata Aff that has a race advantage. So I guess I'll cut that and perm answers since ev is due tomorrow. :-)

You're at the jdi right? What's the evidence site for jdi this year?

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

You're at the jdi right? What's the evidence site for jdi this year?

It's not out yet - it's only the starter packs so far. I'll post it tomorrow or sunday when the rest is due. There are some pretty cool affs and a Cosmopolitan K that seems promising. Schmitt is just going in the metadata aff's case neg so it won't be too extensive.

  • Upvote 2

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

ew

The way it was explained in the K lecture pretty cool. Shawn's lecture was incredible. Granted, he didn't explain the alternative or link story but the idea of the K sounded interesting. Someone put Lacan turns on the alt. :P

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Enmity is at the core of our existence; trying to resolve it through things such as "liberal utopianism" or "liberal democracy" only channel that enmity onto other things (i.e. groups of people); alternative is usually something like the acceptance of enmity through political agonism; yes he's a Nazi, but equally as much as with Heidegger, that's not a reason to throw out his theories all-together. USC ran it a lot in the War Powers resolution as a critique of liberal politics; it's kinda like a much more political science-esque version of Stavrakakis 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

He was an ass, but His philosophy isn't completely fucked as a result

Eh, I'm not super familiar with all of his writings but the stuff I have read seems to, if not advocate for really shitty things, justify them. In my opinion you can find alternatives that are not so problematic.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Eh, I'm not super familiar with all of his writings but the stuff I have read seems to, if not advocate for really shitty things, justify them. In my opinion you can find alternatives that are not so problematic.

Obviously he's "Problematic" but so is the Nietzsche K and so is the China war good DA. It's a K meant to impact turn. His secondaries attempt to depart from his Nazism (might be hard of course, but they make sense nontheless and they dont say racism good). Some of the most famous philosophers cite Schmitt (Laclau and Mouffe's radical democracy is heavily dependent on Schmitt). If you don't mind impact turning cosmopolitianism then its not so problematic but just a K of universalism 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

The way it was explained in the K lecture pretty cool. Shawn's lecture was incredible. Granted, he didn't explain the alternative or link story but the idea of the K sounded interesting. Someone put Lacan turns on the alt. :P

Well Skenn is pretty incredible at everything so that would explain that

  • Upvote 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now

×