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harper231

Schopenhauer K

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Alright so I have a few questions to on this K.

 

1. What is the deference between Schopenhauer and Wipeout? (is it how they are run or is it something more complex)

 

2. Are there any backfiles that anyone would be willing share?

 

3. Would humans good (like anthro or batille answers) work as a decent response?

 

4. What should the AT blocks look like?

 

5. Besides the obvious what authors would commonly be run?

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I can answer the first one at least. Schopenhauer doesnt care about aliens.

 

As for answers, I would say suffering decreasing, excessive suffering not inevitable, death bad. Its not anthro.

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Here is a file. I found it posted on another thread here awhile back. I don't know a lot about him though.  

 I do not know if it will be helpful to you or not. It might just be something nice for you to look through if you're interested in running his K. 

schopenauer.doc

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Here is a file. I found it posted on another thread here awhile back. I don't know a lot about him though.  

 I do not know if it will be helpful to you or not. It might just be something nice for you to look through if you're interested in running his K. 

this argument is just gross

Edited by aram
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Attfield 99 is a great answer to this

 

I can post it later if no one else does

I didnt see it in the file above

 

It is really good on the future generations arg

 

EDIT: Was on my phone, got to a computer.

 

Another key arg is that even if some suffering is inevitable, the aff is key to prevent unimaginable suffering in the form of economic collapse, global warming, disease, ecological collapse, nuclear war, etc... which will lead to famine, poverty, cancer, natural disasters and other impacts that are unique offense against this K before extinction even happens.

 

Also, here is that attfield card.

 

Even if life is suffering now, don't let everyone die- future generations could always have value and should get to choose

Robin Attfield, Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University, “The Ethics of the Global Environment”, Perdue University Press, 1999, pg 68

 

Nevertheless, as John Leslie has remarked, many philosophers write as if there were no reason for preserving the human species beyond obligations either to the dead or to the living, and some as if there would be nothing wrong with allowing the species to extinguish itself, or even with actively extinguishing it ourselves, well before this would happen in the ordinary course of events. Now the argument concerning the value of ongoing current activities already shows that the verdicts that there would be nothing wrong with allowing (let alone causing) premature extinction are unsupportable; for the prospect of premature human extinction deprives many (but not all) widespread current activities of their meaning and value. But, as has just been argued, there must be something else to explain the strength of the imperative not to allow or to make premature extinction come about, and to explain what it is that makes most people who contemplate the possibility of premature human extinction regard it as appalling. Cicero makes a parallel point: 'As we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare that they care not if when they themselves are dead the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake.'23  Likewise the consequentialist ethic introduced and defended in Chapter 2 maintains that future people have moral standing (and future living creatures of other species too). Future generations have this standing even though their existence is contingent on current generations and the identity of future individuals is unknown at present; the good or ill of individuals who could be brought into existence count as reasons for or against actions or policies which would bring them into being. This in turn implies that where the existence beyond a certain date of individuals likely to lead happy, worthwhile or flourishing lives can be facilitated or prevented, there is an obligation not to prevent it, other things being equal. This does not mean that everyone should be continually having children; other things are seldom equal, and problems of human numbers mean that acting on this basis could easily produce overextended families, countries or regions, or an overpopulated planet, where extra people would spell misery for themselves and for the others (see Chapter 7). But it does mean that each life likely to be of positive quality comprises a reason for its own existence, and that countervailing reasons of matching strength (concerning the disvalue of adding this life) are required to neutralise such a reason.  There are many other implications, including the importance of planning for the needs of future generations (considered in later chapters). A further implication, more relevant here, is that humanity should not be allowed to become extinct, insofar as this is within human control, even if, foreseeably, a small minority of any given generation will lead lives of negative quality (lives which are either not positively worth living or actually worth not living), as long as, overall, the lives of that generation are of positive quality, and the positive intrinsic value of worthwhile lives outweighs the intrinsic disvalue of the lives of misery. Since each generation is highly likely to include some lives which are not worth living, however hard its members and their predecessors may try to raise the quality of these lives, this implication makes all the difference to the issue of whether causing or even allowing the extinction of humanity is a moral crime.  People who think that preventing misery is always of the greatest importance have to take the view that human extinction should be tolerated or even advocated; but the consequentialist ethic defended here says otherwise. So, of course, say the widespread intuitions reviewed earlier. A modified version of one of John Leslie's thought-experiments could be used to test much the same issue. On each of numerous inhabitable planets, capable of supporting a large human population, whose members would predictably lead lives of positive quality, there will also be a person whose life will predictably and inevitably be of negative quality. For the purposes of the thought-experiment, these large human populations can be brought into existence by waving a magic wand. Should this be done? For consequentialists who believe in optimising the balance of intrinsic value over intrinsic disvalue, and in counting every actual and possible life as having moral standing, the answer is affirmative, even though the resulting population of each planet includes a life of negative quality.  But theorists who prioritise the prevention of misery would have to hold that the answer depends entirely on whether the life of negative quality on each planet can be prevented; if it cannot, then none of these lives should be engendered. (Others too, including consequentialists, might also take this view if the addition of human lives were liable to harm the living creatures of these same planets; to make this thought-experiment a test case, we need to adopt the further assumption that no such harm would be done.)   This thought-experiment also has a bearing on human extinction. For the future of the Earth beyond a certain date (just after the death of the youngest person now alive) is in some ways similar to the situation of the planets just mentioned. The current generation could produce a population living then, most of them people with lives worth living, but only at the risk of producing a minority whose lives will foreseeably be miserable. If the happiness or the worthwhile lives of the majority do not count as reasons for generating those same lives, and hence nothing counts but the misery of the minority, or if the prevention of misery  should be prioritised over all else, then allowing extinction is clearly mandatory, and so may be even genocide. However, as Leslie claims, the coexistence of hundreds of thousands of lives of positive quality with one life of misery is not morally disastrous, if the misery of the miserable life really cannot be alleviated. 25 (If of course this misery could be alleviated, whether by contemporaries or by the previous generation, then this might well be a morally disastrous situation, and alleviation would almost certainly be obligatory.) Consequentialism, then, does not mandate extinction, unlike several of the theories which stand opposed to it.

Edited by KTricksfordays

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Attfield 99 is a great answer to this

 

I can post it later if no one else does

I didnt see it in the file above

 

It is really good on the future generations arg

 

EDIT: Was on my phone, got to a computer.

 

Another key arg is that even if some suffering is inevitable, the aff is key to prevent unimaginable suffering in the form of economic collapse, global warming, disease, ecological collapse, nuclear war, etc... which will lead to famine, poverty, cancer, natural disasters and other impacts that are unique offense against this K before extinction even happens.

 

Also, here is that attfield card.

 

 

Even if life is suffering now, don't let everyone die- future generations could always have value and should get to choose

Robin Attfield, Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University, “The Ethics of the Global Environment”, Perdue University Press, 1999, pg 68

 

Nevertheless, as John Leslie has remarked, many philosophers write as if there were no reason for preserving the human species beyond obligations either to the dead or to the living, and some as if there would be nothing wrong with allowing the species to extinguish itself, or even with actively extinguishing it ourselves, well before this would happen in the ordinary course of events. Now the argument concerning the value of ongoing current activities already shows that the verdicts that there would be nothing wrong with allowing (let alone causing) premature extinction are unsupportable; for the prospect of premature human extinction deprives many (but not all) widespread current activities of their meaning and value. But, as has just been argued, there must be something else to explain the strength of the imperative not to allow or to make premature extinction come about, and to explain what it is that makes most people who contemplate the possibility of premature human extinction regard it as appalling. Cicero makes a parallel point: 'As we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare that they care not if when they themselves are dead the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake.'23  Likewise the consequentialist ethic introduced and defended in Chapter 2 maintains that future people have moral standing (and future living creatures of other species too). Future generations have this standing even though their existence is contingent on current generations and the identity of future individuals is unknown at present; the good or ill of individuals who could be brought into existence count as reasons for or against actions or policies which would bring them into being. This in turn implies that where the existence beyond a certain date of individuals likely to lead happy, worthwhile or flourishing lives can be facilitated or prevented, there is an obligation not to prevent it, other things being equal. This does not mean that everyone should be continually having children; other things are seldom equal, and problems of human numbers mean that acting on this basis could easily produce overextended families, countries or regions, or an overpopulated planet, where extra people would spell misery for themselves and for the others (see Chapter 7). But it does mean that each life likely to be of positive quality comprises a reason for its own existence, and that countervailing reasons of matching strength (concerning the disvalue of adding this life) are required to neutralise such a reason.  There are many other implications, including the importance of planning for the needs of future generations (considered in later chapters). A further implication, more relevant here, is that humanity should not be allowed to become extinct, insofar as this is within human control, even if, foreseeably, a small minority of any given generation will lead lives of negative quality (lives which are either not positively worth living or actually worth not living), as long as, overall, the lives of that generation are of positive quality, and the positive intrinsic value of worthwhile lives outweighs the intrinsic disvalue of the lives of misery. Since each generation is highly likely to include some lives which are not worth living, however hard its members and their predecessors may try to raise the quality of these lives, this implication makes all the difference to the issue of whether causing or even allowing the extinction of humanity is a moral crime.  People who think that preventing misery is always of the greatest importance have to take the view that human extinction should be tolerated or even advocated; but the consequentialist ethic defended here says otherwise. So, of course, say the widespread intuitions reviewed earlier. A modified version of one of John Leslie's thought-experiments could be used to test much the same issue. On each of numerous inhabitable planets, capable of supporting a large human population, whose members would predictably lead lives of positive quality, there will also be a person whose life will predictably and inevitably be of negative quality. For the purposes of the thought-experiment, these large human populations can be brought into existence by waving a magic wand. Should this be done? For consequentialists who believe in optimising the balance of intrinsic value over intrinsic disvalue, and in counting every actual and possible life as having moral standing, the answer is affirmative, even though the resulting population of each planet includes a life of negative quality.  But theorists who prioritise the prevention of misery would have to hold that the answer depends entirely on whether the life of negative quality on each planet can be prevented; if it cannot, then none of these lives should be engendered. (Others too, including consequentialists, might also take this view if the addition of human lives were liable to harm the living creatures of these same planets; to make this thought-experiment a test case, we need to adopt the further assumption that no such harm would be done.)   This thought-experiment also has a bearing on human extinction. For the future of the Earth beyond a certain date (just after the death of the youngest person now alive) is in some ways similar to the situation of the planets just mentioned. The current generation could produce a population living then, most of them people with lives worth living, but only at the risk of producing a minority whose lives will foreseeably be miserable. If the happiness or the worthwhile lives of the majority do not count as reasons for generating those same lives, and hence nothing counts but the misery of the minority, or if the prevention of misery  should be prioritised over all else, then allowing extinction is clearly mandatory, and so may be even genocide. However, as Leslie claims, the coexistence of hundreds of thousands of lives of positive quality with one life of misery is not morally disastrous, if the misery of the miserable life really cannot be alleviated. 25 (If of course this misery could be alleviated, whether by contemporaries or by the previous generation, then this might well be a morally disastrous situation, and alleviation would almost certainly be obligatory.) Consequentialism, then, does not mandate extinction, unlike several of the theories which stand opposed to it.

It looks more like a neg card

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No, it does say that if all life ever will be more miserable than good, extinction is justified. This is less a negative argument than a truism that if the neg wins the thesis of the K to the most extreme, then they win the debate. However, it makes a couple distinct aff args. First, future generations have standing i.e. we shouldnt condemn future generations just because there is misery now. And it also answers any moral absolutism claims by making comparative argument that if we can do things to create positive life value then that outweighs a risk that some people suffer, which is an aff framing argument for any uniqueness arguments or arguments as to why the aff reduces suffering.

Edited by KTricksfordays

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Hi! If you want to go for straight death good I have a ton of cards on my wiki (any round report that says viviocentrism turn) should work.

http://hspolicy.debatecoaches.org/Walter+Payton/Brahin-Cusick+Neg

 

Things you need to win to beat this argument: 

1. Suffering not inevitable. The easiest way to win a Schopenhauer debate when you're neg is just draw the differentiation that extinction eliminates all suffering - post aff, there will always be some suffering which is bad

2. There is something valuable about humans/living. The best card here, I think, is the Kacou card that's just like "life is good bc sex and rock paper scissors." Like there are enjoyable parts of life that o/w the unenjoyable parts

3. Death is bad. This is distinct from the above since extinction is fundamentally just non existence, so there's nothing intrinsically bad about that. You  could probably make the choice da here(?) but I dont think that's a particularly persuasive argument

4. Things getting better is a newer strategy I've been being hit with a lot. The argument is just like, shits getting better which means that we don't have to destroy the entire world 

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Hi! If you want to go for straight death good I have a ton of cards on my wiki (any round report that says viviocentrism turn) should work.

http://hspolicy.debatecoaches.org/Walter+Payton/Brahin-Cusick+Neg

 

Things you need to win to beat this argument: 

1. Suffering not inevitable. The easiest way to win a Schopenhauer debate when you're neg is just draw the differentiation that extinction eliminates all suffering - post aff, there will always be some suffering which is bad

2. There is something valuable about humans/living. The best card here, I think, is the Kacou card that's just like "life is good bc sex and rock paper scissors." Like there are enjoyable parts of life that o/w the unenjoyable parts

3. Death is bad. This is distinct from the above since extinction is fundamentally just non existence, so there's nothing intrinsically bad about that. You  could probably make the choice da here(?) but I dont think that's a particularly persuasive argument

4. Things getting better is a newer strategy I've been being hit with a lot. The argument is just like, shits getting better which means that we don't have to destroy the entire world

 

Lenny def knows this better than me, but I'll just add that the Ligotti stuff is pretty great if you want to read pessimism.

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Hi! If you want to go for straight death good I have a ton of cards on my wiki (any round report that says viviocentrism turn) should work.

http://hspolicy.debatecoaches.org/Walter+Payton/Brahin-Cusick+Neg

 

Things you need to win to beat this argument: 

1. Suffering not inevitable. The easiest way to win a Schopenhauer debate when you're neg is just draw the differentiation that extinction eliminates all suffering - post aff, there will always be some suffering which is bad

2. There is something valuable about humans/living. The best card here, I think, is the Kacou card that's just like "life is good bc sex and rock paper scissors." Like there are enjoyable parts of life that o/w the unenjoyable parts

I don't think this is super responsive to a good Schopenhauer team. It's not that he denies that there aren't happy moments, but rather that joy is nothing more than a temporary reprieve from the suffering that underpins our existence. 

An interesting point here is the perspective offered by psychoanalysis. The evidence from the K above mentions that life is always sucky because once you achieve your goals, shit is lame again, but PA suggests that goals are never achievable, ie the object of your desire will constantly escape you. If that's true (and I'm not saying that is) then it means that there's no I/L for the K to stand on.

 

3. Death is bad. This is distinct from the above since extinction is fundamentally just non existence, so there's nothing intrinsically bad about that. You  could probably make the choice da here(?) but I dont think that's a particularly persuasive argument

Death being bad doesn't really take out that life is worse than death.

 

4. Things getting better is a newer strategy I've been being hit with a lot. The argument is just like, shits getting better which means that we don't have to destroy the entire world 

Meh, also not a super great UQ argument because a lot of the ev is sooo generic. 

The trick, IMO, to dealing with Schop is finding creative ways to deal with the UQ question of the debate. Schop (like Wilderson and a few other K's) belongs to the k-family of 'UQ K's,' IE K's where the debate hinges around winning your view of the world. You do that and the debate is yours (for example, if you win blackness is ontological in a Wilderson debate, there's no perm and no UQ to any of their impacts). In this case, the UQ question is about VTL (or lack thereof). If you can win that there is VTL then the entire K just kind of crumbles. To that end, I really like the cards that are like...VTL is subjective. First, it's just kind of true. Second, if people determine their own meaning in life then no matter how much you have some whining by some obscure dead dude, people would like to, you know, not get nuked or whatever, so the K falls flat. 

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Pretty sure everybody hates me for saying this, but the may card used to answer the Nietzsche k's and the BS nihilistic continental philosophers such as Baudrillard is pretty responsive to this k and is a great piece of evidence in general. it makes the claim that "there is no such thing as a sad revolutionary" I.e. just the fact that we are having a positive project produces a form of existential hapiness. May also makes the claim that to not engage in world changing is to negate others' being. I think you should couple this with the uq claim that the world is getting better and a specific card that says schopenhauer's problems that he cites are largely due to the fact we have no tech now (which actually exists; ive seen that backfile). Lastly, Michigan AP made a pretty sweet arg in the 2AR that was sort of like a fiat bad argument. They said pretty much we have no hands over the levers of powers but we can have productive discussions about policy that produces and affect that allows for change and optimism. Wipeout and Schopenhauer produces a negative affect that would never be exportable outside a debate round and at best just makes people want to become serial killers who think ISIS is really moral for putting people out of their misery unconsentually. 

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Pretty sure everybody hates me for saying this, but the may card used to answer the Nietzsche k's and the BS nihilistic continental philosophers such as Baudrillard is pretty responsive to this k and is a great piece of evidence in general. it makes the claim that "there is no such thing as a sad revolutionary" I.e. just the fact that we are having a positive project produces a form of existential hapiness. May also makes the claim that to not engage in world changing is to negate others' being. I think you should couple this with the uq claim that the world is getting better and a specific card that says schopenhauer's problems that he cites are largely due to the fact we have no tech now (which actually exists; ive seen that backfile). Lastly, Michigan AP made a pretty sweet arg in the 2AR that was sort of like a fiat bad argument. They said pretty much we have no hands over the levers of powers but we can have productive discussions about policy that produces and affect that allows for change and optimism. Wipeout and Schopenhauer produces a negative affect that would never be exportable outside a debate round and at best just makes people want to become serial killers who think ISIS is really moral for putting people out of their misery unconsentually. 

Just because they're FATALIST doesn't mean that they're bullshit 

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Alright thanks. I've learned an insane amount about this K. It's dark as hell, but I can see the strategic use of it. Can any suggest some more recent authors for this K? the entire file seems to be from Schope himself.

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Hi! If you want to go for straight death good I have a ton of cards on my wiki (any round report that says viviocentrism turn) should work.

http://hspolicy.debatecoaches.org/Walter+Payton/Brahin-Cusick+Neg

 

Things you need to win to beat this argument: 

1. Suffering not inevitable. The easiest way to win a Schopenhauer debate when you're neg is just draw the differentiation that extinction eliminates all suffering - post aff, there will always be some suffering which is bad

2. There is something valuable about humans/living. The best card here, I think, is the Kacou card that's just like "life is good bc sex and rock paper scissors." Like there are enjoyable parts of life that o/w the unenjoyable parts

3. Death is bad. This is distinct from the above since extinction is fundamentally just non existence, so there's nothing intrinsically bad about that. You  could probably make the choice da here(?) but I dont think that's a particularly persuasive argument

4. Things getting better is a newer strategy I've been being hit with a lot. The argument is just like, shits getting better which means that we don't have to destroy the entire world 

Nevermind.  If anyone still wants the cites, it's at a new URL:  http://hspolicy14.debatecoaches.org/Walter+Payton/Brahin-Cusick+Neg

Edited by NovaPlasm

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If they are going for the extinction turn and they read base Schopenhauer, one way to answer the suffering question is to read evidence that says the will to nothingness is based off of a materialistic view of the world. Combine this with evidence that states a) meaning to life is subjective/not totally based upon suffering b)extinction places false agency on suffering and doesn't outweigh if the world is constantly getting better c) their interp of suffering is put on an ivory tower of privileged debate (IE: torture is not as bad as doing your homework) you should have a decent strat

 

 

You can also go for a possible transcendence turn, but most philosophy that advocates for transcendence has bad implications like racist evola.

Edited by FUDGE

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