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ConsultVerminSupreme

Answering Psychoanalysis

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I run a kritikal race aff, and am running one again next year. On the oceans topic, the K's I hit I had trouble answering thoroughly were centered on Psychoanalysis (Lacan). I ended up reading generic "Western authors are racist" kind of cards that didn't take me far.

 

How do you go about answering them.

 

Willing to trade for answers, looking for cards like "Psychoanalysis is a racist science" or "Lacan promotes a colorblind view of the world" "Lacan racist" etc

 

How would y'all go about answering Lacan K's?

Edited by ConsultVerminSupreme
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Wilderson is pretty based on Lacanian ideas. I doubt that these Psychoanalysis K have legit links. 

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If you could explain the links in the context of your affirmative that would be helpful. I havent heard of Lacan being used to answer antiblackness, so I am not exactly sure what this argument would be. As it is run against policy affs is often based on fear and threat construction which is pretty clearly racist.

 

As stated above, Wilderson is very much so based in Lacanian theory. If you dont read Wilderson in the 1AC, I would consider cutting some of his evidence concerning how antiblackness functions through a libidinal economy as a link turn/permutation argument.

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Wilderson is pretty based on Lacanian ideas. I doubt that these Psychoanalysis K have legit links. 

 

Like parzival said, it isn't a Wilderson or antiblackness based aff, I have a few cards from wilderson on psychoanalysis, but they are too specific to antiblackness.

 

Here is one Lacan K we hit earlier this year - we beat it using generic BS but Id rather have something more solid to read

 

The aff sustains the fantasy of Whiteness as a promise to access being itself by suturing over the anxiety which emanates from Whiteness through an investment in the structure of visibility and the gaze - voting negative to traverse the fantasy solves better.

Crooks 03

 

Master Signifier – the identification of racism as the all-pervasive social force DEFINES RACE AS SUCH – that turns case because it means they come to desire the theological wholeness of the “Self” by overcoming lack which is the backbone of racial politics

Crooks 2k

 

Their approach to racial difference cannot overcome the access to jouissance that is the fundamental lack written within the symbolic order that denies enjoyment and produces virulent racial identification.

Zizek 94

 

These investments highlight the fatal flaw of the 1ac: their criticism simply creates the conditions for a new community of stability. Reject all attempts at unity, as they require the violent extermination of the lack through genocide.

Stavrakakis 99 

 

Their naturalization of race accepts the game as offered by the Colonizer - their internalization of psychic colonization makes possible actual colonization of spaces -the impact is Settler Colonialism wherein Whiteness projects both negative and positive aspects of their identity into the colonized. 

Oliver 4 

 

The alternative is the creation of a counter-aesthetics which dismantles the regime of visuality as a way of seeing - it is not enough to simply recognize fantasy.

Crooks 03

Edited by ConsultVerminSupreme
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Honestly do you have the cards on the process , that the search of the critism against the fantasy is what created the camp , and shaping of the other - 

 i forgot the cite to this but their are direct turns to this 

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Like parzival said, it isn't a Wilderson or antiblackness based aff, I have a few cards from wilderson on psychoanalysis, but they are too specific to antiblackness.

 

Here is one Lacan K we hit earlier this year - we beat it using generic BS but Id rather have something more solid to read

 

The aff sustains the fantasy of Whiteness as a promise to access being itself by suturing over the anxiety which emanates from Whiteness through an investment in the structure of visibility and the gaze - voting negative to traverse the fantasy solves better.

Crooks 03

 

Master Signifier – the identification of racism as the all-pervasive social force DEFINES RACE AS SUCH – that turns case because it means they come to desire the theological wholeness of the “Self” by overcoming lack which is the backbone of racial politics

Crooks 2k

 

Their approach to racial difference cannot overcome the access to jouissance that is the fundamental lack written within the symbolic order that denies enjoyment and produces virulent racial identification.

Zizek 94

 

These investments highlight the fatal flaw of the 1ac: their criticism simply creates the conditions for a new community of stability. Reject all attempts at unity, as they require the violent extermination of the lack through genocide.

Stavrakakis 99 

 

Their naturalization of race accepts the game as offered by the Colonizer - their internalization of psychic colonization makes possible actual colonization of spaces -the impact is Settler Colonialism wherein Whiteness projects both negative and positive aspects of their identity into the colonized. 

Oliver 4 

 

The alternative is the creation of a counter-aesthetics which dismantles the regime of visuality as a way of seeing - it is not enough to simply recognize fantasy.

Crooks 03

Must've been a bad team, they didn't even cite the first few cards correctly, it's Seshadri-Crooks 2K

 

Just contest the thesis of Lacan, "lack" (or "constitutive lack")

 

Psychoanalysis is a non-falsifiable science 

 

Psychoanalysis is a racist science

 

Psychoanalysis overdetermines the human psyche 

 

Desire doesn't lack anything

 

Lack reinscribes the Oedipal fantasy 

Edited by Theparanoiacmachine
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Must've been a bad team, they didn't even cite the first few cards correctly, it's Seshadri-Crooks 2K

 

Just contest the thesis of Lacan, "lack" (or "constitutive lack")

 

Psychoanalysis is a non-falsifiable science 

 

Psychoanalysis is a racist science

 

Psychoanalysis overdetermines the human psyche 

 

Desire doesn't lack anything

 

Lack reinscribes the Oedipal fantasy 

Yeah, if your aff isn't also based on Fanon/Wilderson et al's reworking of psychonanalysis then I'd K the **** out of it. There is tons of evidence out there about it being racist/Eurocentric.

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Yeah, if your aff isn't also based on Fanon/Wilderson et al's reworking of psychonanalysis then I'd K the **** out of it. There is tons of evidence out there about it being racist/Eurocentric.

 

Anyone got a file - willing to trade heavily depending on offers

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If you feel like trolling: 

 

The 1NC positions you as the analyst -- we never asked for our 1AC to be the analyzed and the negative team certainly didn't obtain our consent -- this violates a fundamental rule of practice for psychoanalysis -- reject them on ethical grounds

 

American Psychoanalytic Association Principles and Standards of Ethics for Psychoanalysts No Date http://www.apsa.org/About_APsaA/Ethics_Code.aspx

 

II. Mutuality and Informed Consent. The treatment relationship between the patient and the psychoanalyst is founded upon trust and informed mutual agreement or consent. At the outset of treatment, the patient should be made aware of the nature of psychoanalysis and relevant alternative therapies. The psychoanalyst should make agreements pertaining to scheduling, fees, and other rules and obligations of treatment tactfully and humanely, with adequate regard for the realistic and therapeutic aspects of the relationship. Promises made should be honored.

When the patient is a minor these same general principles pertain but the patient's age and stage of development should guide how specific arrangements will be handled and with whom.

IV. Confidentiality. Confidentiality of the patient’s communications is a basic patient’s right and an essential condition for effective psychoanalytic treatment and research. A psychoanalyst must take all measures necessary to not reveal present or former patient confidences without permission, nor discuss the particularities observed or inferred about patients outside consultative, educational or scientific contexts. If a psychoanalyst uses case material in exchanges with colleagues for consultative, educational or scientific purposes, the identity of the patient must be sufficiently disguised to prevent identification of the individual, or the patient's authorization must be obtained after frank discussion of the purpose(s) of the presentation, other options, the probable risks and benefits to the patient, and the patient's right to refuse or withdraw consent.

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If you feel like trolling: 

 

The 1NC positions you as the analyst -- we never asked for our 1AC to be the analyzed and the negative team certainly didn't obtain our consent -- this violates a fundamental rule of practice for psychoanalysis -- reject them on ethical grounds

 

American Psychoanalytic Association Principles and Standards of Ethics for Psychoanalysts No Date http://www.apsa.org/About_APsaA/Ethics_Code.aspx

 

II. Mutuality and Informed Consent. The treatment relationship between the patient and the psychoanalyst is founded upon trust and informed mutual agreement or consent. At the outset of treatment, the patient should be made aware of the nature of psychoanalysis and relevant alternative therapies. The psychoanalyst should make agreements pertaining to scheduling, fees, and other rules and obligations of treatment tactfully and humanely, with adequate regard for the realistic and therapeutic aspects of the relationship. Promises made should be honored.

When the patient is a minor these same general principles pertain but the patient's age and stage of development should guide how specific arrangements will be handled and with whom.

IV. Confidentiality. Confidentiality of the patient’s communications is a basic patient’s right and an essential condition for effective psychoanalytic treatment and research. A psychoanalyst must take all measures necessary to not reveal present or former patient confidences without permission, nor discuss the particularities observed or inferred about patients outside consultative, educational or scientific contexts. If a psychoanalyst uses case material in exchanges with colleagues for consultative, educational or scientific purposes, the identity of the patient must be sufficiently disguised to prevent identification of the individual, or the patient's authorization must be obtained after frank discussion of the purpose(s) of the presentation, other options, the probable risks and benefits to the patient, and the patient's right to refuse or withdraw consent.

Hahaha, I know someone who reads Taoism and the aff thought it was psychoanalaysis and read this against them (along with like 3 minutes of psychoanalysis bad cards).

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It's been a while since going for Seshadri-Crooks but here's a bit of line-by-line:

 

Must've been a bad team, they didn't even cite the first few cards correctly, it's Seshadri-Crooks 2K

 

Just contest the thesis of Lacan, "lack" (or "constitutive lack")

(2NC/1NR overview will defend constitutive lack, but the lack isn't really a part of what Seshadri-Crooks talks about--no link.)

 

Psychoanalysis is a non-falsifiable science 

It's not a science; falsifiability isn't truth; much of the aff epistemology doesn't meet this standard; scientism racist and turns case.

 

Psychoanalysis is a racist science

Cross-apply #2; prove how we are racist, not how Freud and white men in the 1920s are.

 

Psychoanalysis overdetermines the human psyche 

Nothing about the K makes arguments about the psyche; your theory overdetermines other parts of human behavior so it's a moot point; K isn't about the psyche, but the Big Other and the way you negotiate your relationship between regimes of visible difference and society.

 

Desire doesn't lack anything

Cross-apply #1

 

Lack reinscribes the Oedipal fantasy

Oedipalization isn't the impact to the K, so no impact; any Deleuze/Seem cards you read link to your aff; we're not afraid to go for Deleuze with some 1AR double-turns, homie.

 

But it's really hard to make 2ACs against Lacan in my experience. Most of the cards are generic and the arguments rarely interact with 1NC cards & neg block explanations.

 

Hopefully this helps with thinking about the direction the block will take the K.

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It's been a while since going for Seshadri-Crooks but here's a bit of line-by-line:

 

 

But it's really hard to make 2ACs against Lacan in my experience. Most of the cards are generic and the arguments rarely interact with 1NC cards & neg block explanations.

 

Hopefully this helps with thinking about the direction the block will take the K.

None of what I listed was related to each other (i.e. Seshadri-Crooks was not relevant to what I wrote about contesting lack) 

Edited by Theparanoiacmachine
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None of what I listed was related to each other (i.e. Seshadri-Crooks was not relevant to what I wrote about contesting lack) 

 

Fair enough, though S-C is the most common "Lacan vs. Race" author; it's just for OP's benefit really

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It's not a science; falsifiability isn't truth; much of the aff epistemology doesn't meet this standard; scientism racist and turns case.

 

Well, it's definitely not a science.  Non-falsifiable science is a contradiction in terms.

 

And yes, falsifiability isn't truth - because lots of falsifiable things are in fact false.  

 

However, falsifiability is a pre-requisite to any non-trivial truth, because to be true something must also have the potential to be false, and be testable to determine whether or not it is false.  Non-falsifiable claims are neither true nor false, they are meaningless.  (It's impossible to have a justified belief in something without the possibility of disproving that belief - it's the testing which gives the justification for believing.  See also: Wittgenstein: 'To understand something is to know what would be the case if it were true' - paraphrased from memory). (Trivial truths being things that are tautological).

 

"Scientism" is an academic expletive used by modern-day mystics who are threatened by a system of knowledge production that actually works.  That is, actually produces justified belief.  But falsifiability-based reasoning includes more than science - math is also falsifiable.  (That is, the process of using logic to arrive at proofs, aka math, is a form of hypothesis testing.  Many important mathematical problems start as Conjectures - which is an hypothesis.  The logical reasoning of the proof is itself a way of testing the claim. And that same epistemological structure exists even when the conjecture isn't formally made.)

 

Science itself - the process involved in using the scientific method, is not and can not be racist.  Human implementation can of course fail, because we're running on flawed hardware.  Humans can be racist.  Let's not confuse that with the scientific method.  

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Well, it's definitely not a science.  Non-falsifiable science is a contradiction in terms.

 

And yes, falsifiability isn't truth - because lots of falsifiable things are in fact false.  

 

However, falsifiability is a pre-requisite to any non-trivial truth, because to be true something must also have the potential to be false, and be testable to determine whether or not it is false.  Non-falsifiable claims are neither true nor false, they are meaningless.  (It's impossible to have a justified belief in something without the possibility of disproving that belief - it's the testing which gives the justification for believing.  See also: Wittgenstein: 'To understand something is to know what would be the case if it were true' - paraphrased from memory). (Trivial truths being things that are tautological).

 

"Scientism" is an academic expletive used by modern-day mystics who are threatened by a system of knowledge production that actually works.  That is, actually produces justified belief.  But falsifiability-based reasoning includes more than science - math is also falsifiable.  (That is, the process of using logic to arrive at proofs, aka math, is a form of hypothesis testing.  Many important mathematical problems start as Conjectures - which is an hypothesis.  The logical reasoning of the proof is itself a way of testing the claim. And that same epistemological structure exists even when the conjecture isn't formally made.)

 

Science itself - the process involved in using the scientific method, is not and can not be racist.  Human implementation can of course fail, because we're running on flawed hardware.  Humans can be racist.  Let's not confuse that with the scientific method.

 

you're like a breathing 2 off Schmitt/framework
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Squirrelloid, I agree with a lot of what you say on substantive terms. Like, yeah, there's nothing about the process of scientific knowledge-production that is racist (what an absurd claim, honestly). My post was just taking up the psychoanalytic K debater's mantle for a watered-down speech.

 

I wonder if it's true that falsifiability is necessary for non-trivial truths, though; I imagine that things that are necessary don't have the "potential" to be false, but still can be non-trivial truths (say, the existence of God, or laws of nature [both contentious of course] - I don't think any theologians think God's existence is non-necessary, but I wouldn't call it non-trivial. It's also not a falsifiable claim, though we could decide it's true or false regardless of its falsifiability). Then again, in another sense, even necessary things could conceivably be untrue, even if they didn't actually have the potential to be false.

 

"Scientism" is an academic expletive used by modern-day mystics who are threatened by a system of knowledge production that actually works.  That is, actually produces justified belief.  But falsifiability-based reasoning includes more than science - math is also falsifiable.  (That is, the process of using logic to arrive at proofs, aka math, is a form of hypothesis testing.  Many important mathematical problems start as Conjectures - which is an hypothesis.  The logical reasoning of the proof is itself a way of testing the claim. And that same epistemological structure exists even when the conjecture isn't formally made.)

 

This I disagree with, though. 'Scientism' isn't a term used by "mystics," it's used by a lot of frustrated epistemologists that are tired of Dawkins, Harris, their followers, and other naive people who think that the natural sciences are the only way that we can know anything. People often take this to absurd lengths, like claiming that social sciences are conjecture or that philosophy is useless (ironically remaining ignorant of the philosophical underpinnings of and the problems with their naive empiricism). No doubt does science produce justified belief, but there are more fundamental questions about what justified belief is (and whether or not it's truth, and whether or not that matters, and so on) that can't be touched on by science; remaining willfully ignorant of epistemology and philosophy of science is scientism. Which is not to say that you're scientistic, or that scientists are or that science is; it's like you said: an academic expletive used to deride bad philosophy and silly arrogance.

 

Re: math being falsifiable? In a broad sense of the word, maybe. But I don't think that falsifiability - a criterion associated with methods like observation and testing - is the only way to decide if something is proven or disproven, or if your belief in it is justified (propositions expressed in symbolic logic is provable and disprovable, but has nothing to do with observation and testing - same for mathematical and analytic truths). I guess what I'm saying is that hypothesis-testing can be of both an a priori and a posteriori kind, but we don't typically associate the phrase "falsifiability" with the former, only the latter. But that's splitting hairs, and it's controversial anyway - Popper agrees with you, Einstein agrees with me; many philosophers call math purely a priori knowledge (I agree), but others don't. I guess it really does depend on whether you think falsifiability refers to empirical, and never a priori, claims.

Edited by dancon25
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Also, sorry for derailing the thread. Squirreloid and I moved to a private message. And, to help things get back on-topic, here are some cards that you may find helpful for answering the Lacan K. I used these for my queerness aff, so some of them are about queer identity.

 

Self-Fulfilling Prophecy – theorizing identity as inherently antagonistic licenses passivity in the guise of radicalism—demonizes progressive transformations like the aff

Robinson 5.

(Andrew, Politics @ Nottingham “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique”)

The basic claim of Lacanian theory is that identity - whether individual or social - is founded on a lack.  Therefore, social relations are always irreducibly concerned with antagonism, conflict, strife and exclusion.  Chantal Mouffe, for instance, writes of 'the primary reality of strife in social life' 4, while Slavoj Zizek seeks an 'ethics grounded in reference to the traumatic Real which resists symbolization' 5.  'Lack ("castration") is original; enjoyment constitutes itself as "stolen"' 6.  According to Stavrakakis, the Real is 'inherent in human experience' and 'doesn't stop not being written' 7.  Hence, the primary element of social life is a negativity which prevents the emergence of any social "whole".  In Mouffe's words, 'society is the illusion... that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes', putting the 'harsh reality' of antagonism behind a 'protective veil' 8.  For Newman, 'war is the reality', whereas 'society is the illusion... that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes' 9.  For Stavrakakis, 'personal trauma, social crisis and political rupture are constant characteristics of human experience' 10.  Such claims have political consequences, because they rule out the possibility of achieving substantial improvements (whether "reformist" or "revolutionary") in any area on which this fundamental negativity bears.  The dimension of antagonism is, after all, 'ineradicable' 11 Instead of the imperative to overcome antagonism which one finds in forms as diverse as Marxian revolution and deliberative democracy, Lacanian political theory posits as the central political imperative a demand that one "accept" the underlying lack and the constitutive character of antagonism. While the various authors disagree about the means of achieving this, they agree on its desirability.  Lacanian theory thus entails an ethical commitment to create conflict and antagonism.  This ethics mostly expresses itself via a detour into ontology: the ethical imperative is to 'accept' or 'grasp' the truth of the primacy of lack, and the accusation against opponents is that they fall into some kind of fallacy (illusion, delusion, blindness, failure to accept, and so on).  At other times, however, one finds a direct ethical advocacy of exclusion and conflict as almost goods in themselves.

 

Race DA – Lacanian psychoanalysis privileges a phallicized whiteness by touting itself as “universal” in the face of racialized dramas that don’t fit their account.

Winnubst 6.

Shannon Winnubst (qualz pls). Queering Freedom. Bloomington, IN, USA: Indiana University Press, 2006. p 59. http://shop.ebrary.com/Doc?id=10161030&ppg=72 <APY>

Of course, in carving out a space that I refer to as ‘our cultural symbolic,’ I am already at odds with most Lacanians’ understandings of ‘the symbolic.’ While I understand that Lacan was attempting to unravel the structures of signification and dynamics of subjectivation that occur within the symbolic, I wish to speak of this symbolic as a historicized and particular phenomenon. Referring to ‘our cultural symbolic,’ I am referring more specifically to the symbolic that dominates cultures of phallicized whiteness and structures signifiers in a way that gives disproportionate and abusive power to some persons— some bodies— over others. Following out Lacanian dynamics of signification and subjectivation, I am reading ‘our cultural symbolic’ as a process that signifies some bodies as more powerful, more valuable, and more meaningful than others—namely, those white male straight Christian propertied bodies that we have already encountered in the emergence of the neutral liberal individual. In reading race through psychoanalysis, therefore, I wish to follow not only Zizek’s suggestions, but also those of Frantz Fanon. Fanon reads his place as a black man in a white world fundamentally through psychoanalysis, which he frames as dominating the western psyche, both culturally and individually. As Fanon describes his experiences and those of his fellow colonized Antilleans, he shows how “the racial drama” (1967, 150) that occurs when the black man comes into contact with white culture is due, in part, to a clash of psychic developments. For example, Fanon claims that the black familial constellation cannot be mapped through the Oedipal complex; therefore, when the black man comes into contact with white culture, where authority can be read through the Oedipal drama, a neurosis and conflict over authority occurs in the black psyche. 3 He thus reads psychoanalytic models as both describing and constituting western (Eurocentric) symbolics. And he gains his critical distance from these models, a distance that is vital to his survival and his sanity, through recognizing them as specific to historical and cultural formations. If we wish to interrupt the logics of racism that are embedded in our cultural symbolic of phallicized whiteness, perhaps we should follow Fanon’s insights and begin interrogating that very model of psychic development. That is, if the psychoanalytic model dominates our cultural notions of authority, law, language, and subjectivity, then perhaps an interrogation of some of its logics will expose some of the conceptions and dynamics endemic to forms of racism in our culture. Specifically, an interrogation of Lacan's accounts of ego-formation may expose some of the latent logics about space and embodiment that undergird forms of white supremacist racism within our culture – logics that are reducible to a logic of the limit, written here in the registers of boundaries and containment.

 

Cap DA – Psychoanalysis pathologizes queerness and posits desire as a commodity to be ‘properly’ allocated in the service of ‘normal’ life to the detriment of minoritarian politics.

Conley 9.

Verena Andermatt Conley (Visiting Prof. of Romance Language and Literature @ Harvard Univ.). “Thirty-six Thousand Forms of Love,” in “Deleuze and Queer Theory,” edited by Chrysanthi Igianni and Merl Storr, Edinburgh University Press (2009). Pages 32-33 //dtac

Guattari takes his own discipline to task. Focusing on the limit between normal and pathological, psychoanalysis has entered a political field. It is part of a capitalist system of production established according to these norms and serves as a model for life and desiring. Psychoanalysis tries to structure itself according to scientific models from biology to linguistics; it has even sought refuge in literary activity. The problem is that psychoanalysis thinks its practices are in collusion with dominant models of power and goes against liberating desire. It takes over and frames human beings from birth on. Having relayed in the social domain religious and philosophical quarrels of other times, it has become hegemonic and aims at controlling madness, dreams, deviations, art, history, even occurrences in the everyday such as a slip of the tongue (245–6). In the dominant society of 1974, every non-meaning has to be interpreted and homosexuality is classified as perversion. It is explained as a fixation at an infantile stage, that is, a pre-genital or polymorphic stage. This is how, under the guise of an objective description, ‘a normal desire is imposed that disqualifies that of the child, the homosexual, the mad person and, closely related, that of woman and of a young person who has not fully accepted the conjugalo-familial perspective, etc.’ (246). Revolutionary struggle has to do away with dominant models and, especially, the model of models – capital – that reduces desiring multiplicities into an undifferentiated flux of workers and consumers. To do away with struggles based on binary oppositions one has to recognise the plural character of desiring commitments, of possible hyphens between revolts and revolutions. Such a struggle would have to take into consideration minorities of all kinds without prior normative rules. For such a conversion to happen, one has to be rid of psychoanalytic models of repression based on Oedipal scenarios and castration. No struggle will be possible that does not focus on desire. Desire is made captive by psychoanalysis in the service of capitalism that opposes a dangerous subjective desire and a rational self on the side of reality with which one has to negotiate (247). For Guattari, a desire liberated from power is more real than the delirious rationalism of planners. As long as there exist no micro-politics that introduce shifts in an official desire, one cannot but repeat the same model and, as a result, no liberation is possible for minorities. In a short section, ‘Becoming Woman’ – included in the English translation – that follows the one on ‘pédés and voyous’, fags and rogues, Guattari explains why he coined the contested expression, ‘becoming woman’. As the prototype of a minority and insofar as she enters into dominant binaries between man, woman, such as strong, weak, rich, poor, active, passive, she also has the opportunity of escaping the dominant order and of entering into becoming. This is the case for woman as a sexual body, not as a social body. The latter, caught as she is in society by marriage and maternity, has forfeited that chance. As the prototype of becoming, woman as sexual body can inspire homosexuals and other minorities to become. This kind of becoming is only open to those who are outside of any category.

 

[A2 the "Community of Believers" alt.] Their claims to community are founded on hearing what people “want,” which is to survive – this is only a ruse for erasing difference and creating a new form of exclusion.

Secomb 2K; “Fractured community” Project muse; Hypatia vol. 15, no. 2 (Spring 2000) © by Linnell Secomb

This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on “a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others’ point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount” (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a “reasonable agreement” can be achieved. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib for- mulates a universalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib’s critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between al- terities so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a “reasonable agreement.” She assumes the necessity of a com- mon goal for the community that would be the outcome of the “reasonable agreement.” Benhabib’s community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness.

 

 

And, psychoanalytic principles are co-opted by capitalism such that the queer meets a dead end.

Hickey-Moody and Rasmussen 9.

Anna Hickey-Moody (Postdoctoral Fellow in the Faculty of Education @ Monash Univ., Victoria, Aus.; Co-Edited a collection of works on applied Deleuzian Ethics, Deleuzian Encounters: Studies in Contemporary Social Issues) and Mary Lou Rasmussen (Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Education @ Monash Univ., Victoria, Aus.). “The Sexed Subject in-between Deleuze and Butler,” in “Deleuze and Queer Theory,” edited by Chrysanthi Igianni and Merl Storr, Edinburgh University Press (2009). Pages 37-38 //dtac – brackets and ellipses in original

[T]he notion of the subject carries with it a doubleness that is crucial to emphasise: the subject is one who is presumed to be the presupposition of agency [. . .] but the subject is also subjected to a set of rules or laws that precede the subject [. . .] (Judith Butler in Meijer and Prins 1998: 285) The ‘set of rules’ to which Butler refers in the latter quote above are the same structures that make up the ‘senselessly privileged’ psychoanalytic subject which Deleuze and Guattari urge their readers to move beyond (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 298). Deleuze and Guattari critique the ways in which capitalism axiomatises1 the psychoanalytic subject. Psychoanalysis sutures myth to capitalism and subjectivity, heterosexuality to family and sociability. Psychoanalysis co-constructs homosexuality and madness, neither of which offer any escape from the psychoanalytic theatrical stage of capitalism. Rather, homosexuality and madness are co-constitutive of the neurotic, psychoanalytic pole of capitalism. As such, homosexuality and madness have their own traps: madness embodies the schizophrenic social movement in a state too extreme to be useful; homosexuality can operate within a circuit of production-consumption that is excessively closed. Deleuze and Guattari argue for a movement towards: ‘new regions where the connections are always partial and nonpersonal, the conjunctions nomadic and polyvocal, the disjunctions included, where homosexuality and heterosexuality cannot be distinguished any longer’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 319). On the one hand, this reads like a manifesto for queer theory. On the other hand, this is dangerous territory. Identities, politics and social visibility are at stake. Not to mention lifestyles and sexual pleasure. It seems almost as if Deleuze and Guattari would have women dump their girlfriends and fuck chairs outdoors in order to affect a flow in which ‘nonhuman sex mingles with the flowers’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 319). While we do not think this is the kind of social action schizoanalysis calls for, we do want to grapple with the work of Judith Butler to offer a located way of thinking ‘queer’ in relation to Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari understand much about the politics of producing subjectivity: we often create psychoanalytic types in ourselves. We submit to myth as a form of social control. As little factories of myth reproduction, we are the new Ophelia: women who want to marry our mothers, men who desire union with the Father. We re-invent thousands of Hamlet and Oedipus Rex complexes. Butler asserts the difficulty of moving beyond such a double-bind in which the subject is an effect of a set of laws that precede it: psychoanalytic, mythic, tragic, cultural laws – laws which are re-invented and re-imagined across generations. In the introductory quote above, Butler reminds us that an answer is not always to be found by looking beyond the subject. What Butler is saying here is that it is important to both work with the notion of the subject and, at the same time, to be able to look beyond the subject. In emphasising the importance of working within and beyond the subject, Butler draws on her own approach, which intends to work the legacy of humanism against itself. She then contrasts her approach to Latour and Haraway’s approaches, which emphasise a trans-human agency, especially in their use of the term ‘actor’ and their focus on exchanges within networks. There are parallels here with schizoanalysis: in which the schizoanalyst is an agent that effects productive flows beyond the increasingly personalised limits of capitalism. In creating space for such resonances to be discussed, this chapter identifies select schizoanalytic elements in Butler’s work and makes room for further encounters between Deleuze and Butler.

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Also, sorry for derailing the thread. Squirreloid and I moved to a private message. And, to help things get back on-topic, here are some cards that you may find helpful for answering the Lacan K. I used these for my queerness aff, so some of them are about queer identity.

 

Self-Fulfilling Prophecy – theorizing identity as inherently antagonistic licenses passivity in the guise of radicalism—demonizes progressive transformations like the aff

Robinson 5.

(Andrew, Politics @ Nottingham “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique”)

The basic claim of Lacanian theory is that identity - whether individual or social - is founded on a lack.  Therefore, social relations are always irreducibly concerned with antagonism, conflict, strife and exclusion.  Chantal Mouffe, for instance, writes of 'the primary reality of strife in social life' 4, while Slavoj Zizek seeks an 'ethics grounded in reference to the traumatic Real which resists symbolization' 5.  'Lack ("castration") is original; enjoyment constitutes itself as "stolen"' 6.  According to Stavrakakis, the Real is 'inherent in human experience' and 'doesn't stop not being written' 7.  Hence, the primary element of social life is a negativity which prevents the emergence of any social "whole".  In Mouffe's words, 'society is the illusion... that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes', putting the 'harsh reality' of antagonism behind a 'protective veil' 8.  For Newman, 'war is the reality', whereas 'society is the illusion... that hides the struggle and antagonism behind the scenes' 9.  For Stavrakakis, 'personal trauma, social crisis and political rupture are constant characteristics of human experience' 10.  Such claims have political consequences, because they rule out the possibility of achieving substantial improvements (whether "reformist" or "revolutionary") in any area on which this fundamental negativity bears.  The dimension of antagonism is, after all, 'ineradicable' 11 Instead of the imperative to overcome antagonism which one finds in forms as diverse as Marxian revolution and deliberative democracy, Lacanian political theory posits as the central political imperative a demand that one "accept" the underlying lack and the constitutive character of antagonism. While the various authors disagree about the means of achieving this, they agree on its desirability.  Lacanian theory thus entails an ethical commitment to create conflict and antagonism.  This ethics mostly expresses itself via a detour into ontology: the ethical imperative is to 'accept' or 'grasp' the truth of the primacy of lack, and the accusation against opponents is that they fall into some kind of fallacy (illusion, delusion, blindness, failure to accept, and so on).  At other times, however, one finds a direct ethical advocacy of exclusion and conflict as almost goods in themselves.

 

Race DA – Lacanian psychoanalysis privileges a phallicized whiteness by touting itself as “universal” in the face of racialized dramas that don’t fit their account.

Winnubst 6.

Shannon Winnubst (qualz pls). Queering Freedom. Bloomington, IN, USA: Indiana University Press, 2006. p 59. http://shop.ebrary.com/Doc?id=10161030&ppg=72 <APY>

Of course, in carving out a space that I refer to as ‘our cultural symbolic,’ I am already at odds with most Lacanians’ understandings of ‘the symbolic.’ While I understand that Lacan was attempting to unravel the structures of signification and dynamics of subjectivation that occur within the symbolic, I wish to speak of this symbolic as a historicized and particular phenomenon. Referring to ‘our cultural symbolic,’ I am referring more specifically to the symbolic that dominates cultures of phallicized whiteness and structures signifiers in a way that gives disproportionate and abusive power to some persons— some bodies— over others. Following out Lacanian dynamics of signification and subjectivation, I am reading ‘our cultural symbolic’ as a process that signifies some bodies as more powerful, more valuable, and more meaningful than others—namely, those white male straight Christian propertied bodies that we have already encountered in the emergence of the neutral liberal individual. In reading race through psychoanalysis, therefore, I wish to follow not only Zizek’s suggestions, but also those of Frantz Fanon. Fanon reads his place as a black man in a white world fundamentally through psychoanalysis, which he frames as dominating the western psyche, both culturally and individually. As Fanon describes his experiences and those of his fellow colonized Antilleans, he shows how “the racial drama” (1967, 150) that occurs when the black man comes into contact with white culture is due, in part, to a clash of psychic developments. For example, Fanon claims that the black familial constellation cannot be mapped through the Oedipal complex; therefore, when the black man comes into contact with white culture, where authority can be read through the Oedipal drama, a neurosis and conflict over authority occurs in the black psyche. 3 He thus reads psychoanalytic models as both describing and constituting western (Eurocentric) symbolics. And he gains his critical distance from these models, a distance that is vital to his survival and his sanity, through recognizing them as specific to historical and cultural formations. If we wish to interrupt the logics of racism that are embedded in our cultural symbolic of phallicized whiteness, perhaps we should follow Fanon’s insights and begin interrogating that very model of psychic development. That is, if the psychoanalytic model dominates our cultural notions of authority, law, language, and subjectivity, then perhaps an interrogation of some of its logics will expose some of the conceptions and dynamics endemic to forms of racism in our culture. Specifically, an interrogation of Lacan's accounts of ego-formation may expose some of the latent logics about space and embodiment that undergird forms of white supremacist racism within our culture – logics that are reducible to a logic of the limit, written here in the registers of boundaries and containment.

 

Cap DA – Psychoanalysis pathologizes queerness and posits desire as a commodity to be ‘properly’ allocated in the service of ‘normal’ life to the detriment of minoritarian politics.

Conley 9.

Verena Andermatt Conley (Visiting Prof. of Romance Language and Literature @ Harvard Univ.). “Thirty-six Thousand Forms of Love,” in “Deleuze and Queer Theory,” edited by Chrysanthi Igianni and Merl Storr, Edinburgh University Press (2009). Pages 32-33 //dtac

Guattari takes his own discipline to task. Focusing on the limit between normal and pathological, psychoanalysis has entered a political field. It is part of a capitalist system of production established according to these norms and serves as a model for life and desiring. Psychoanalysis tries to structure itself according to scientific models from biology to linguistics; it has even sought refuge in literary activity. The problem is that psychoanalysis thinks its practices are in collusion with dominant models of power and goes against liberating desire. It takes over and frames human beings from birth on. Having relayed in the social domain religious and philosophical quarrels of other times, it has become hegemonic and aims at controlling madness, dreams, deviations, art, history, even occurrences in the everyday such as a slip of the tongue (245–6). In the dominant society of 1974, every non-meaning has to be interpreted and homosexuality is classified as perversion. It is explained as a fixation at an infantile stage, that is, a pre-genital or polymorphic stage. This is how, under the guise of an objective description, ‘a normal desire is imposed that disqualifies that of the child, the homosexual, the mad person and, closely related, that of woman and of a young person who has not fully accepted the conjugalo-familial perspective, etc.’ (246). Revolutionary struggle has to do away with dominant models and, especially, the model of models – capital – that reduces desiring multiplicities into an undifferentiated flux of workers and consumers. To do away with struggles based on binary oppositions one has to recognise the plural character of desiring commitments, of possible hyphens between revolts and revolutions. Such a struggle would have to take into consideration minorities of all kinds without prior normative rules. For such a conversion to happen, one has to be rid of psychoanalytic models of repression based on Oedipal scenarios and castration. No struggle will be possible that does not focus on desire. Desire is made captive by psychoanalysis in the service of capitalism that opposes a dangerous subjective desire and a rational self on the side of reality with which one has to negotiate (247). For Guattari, a desire liberated from power is more real than the delirious rationalism of planners. As long as there exist no micro-politics that introduce shifts in an official desire, one cannot but repeat the same model and, as a result, no liberation is possible for minorities. In a short section, ‘Becoming Woman’ – included in the English translation – that follows the one on ‘pédés and voyous’, fags and rogues, Guattari explains why he coined the contested expression, ‘becoming woman’. As the prototype of a minority and insofar as she enters into dominant binaries between man, woman, such as strong, weak, rich, poor, active, passive, she also has the opportunity of escaping the dominant order and of entering into becoming. This is the case for woman as a sexual body, not as a social body. The latter, caught as she is in society by marriage and maternity, has forfeited that chance. As the prototype of becoming, woman as sexual body can inspire homosexuals and other minorities to become. This kind of becoming is only open to those who are outside of any category.

 

[A2 the "Community of Believers" alt.] Their claims to community are founded on hearing what people “want,” which is to survive – this is only a ruse for erasing difference and creating a new form of exclusion.

Secomb 2K; “Fractured community” Project muse; Hypatia vol. 15, no. 2 (Spring 2000) © by Linnell Secomb

This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on “a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others’ point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount” (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a “reasonable agreement” can be achieved. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib for- mulates a universalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib’s critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between al- terities so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a “reasonable agreement.” She assumes the necessity of a com- mon goal for the community that would be the outcome of the “reasonable agreement.” Benhabib’s community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness.

 

 

And, psychoanalytic principles are co-opted by capitalism such that the queer meets a dead end.

Hickey-Moody and Rasmussen 9.

Anna Hickey-Moody (Postdoctoral Fellow in the Faculty of Education @ Monash Univ., Victoria, Aus.; Co-Edited a collection of works on applied Deleuzian Ethics, Deleuzian Encounters: Studies in Contemporary Social Issues) and Mary Lou Rasmussen (Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Education @ Monash Univ., Victoria, Aus.). “The Sexed Subject in-between Deleuze and Butler,” in “Deleuze and Queer Theory,” edited by Chrysanthi Igianni and Merl Storr, Edinburgh University Press (2009). Pages 37-38 //dtac – brackets and ellipses in original

[T]he notion of the subject carries with it a doubleness that is crucial to emphasise: the subject is one who is presumed to be the presupposition of agency [. . .] but the subject is also subjected to a set of rules or laws that precede the subject [. . .] (Judith Butler in Meijer and Prins 1998: 285) The ‘set of rules’ to which Butler refers in the latter quote above are the same structures that make up the ‘senselessly privileged’ psychoanalytic subject which Deleuze and Guattari urge their readers to move beyond (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 298). Deleuze and Guattari critique the ways in which capitalism axiomatises1 the psychoanalytic subject. Psychoanalysis sutures myth to capitalism and subjectivity, heterosexuality to family and sociability. Psychoanalysis co-constructs homosexuality and madness, neither of which offer any escape from the psychoanalytic theatrical stage of capitalism. Rather, homosexuality and madness are co-constitutive of the neurotic, psychoanalytic pole of capitalism. As such, homosexuality and madness have their own traps: madness embodies the schizophrenic social movement in a state too extreme to be useful; homosexuality can operate within a circuit of production-consumption that is excessively closed. Deleuze and Guattari argue for a movement towards: ‘new regions where the connections are always partial and nonpersonal, the conjunctions nomadic and polyvocal, the disjunctions included, where homosexuality and heterosexuality cannot be distinguished any longer’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 319). On the one hand, this reads like a manifesto for queer theory. On the other hand, this is dangerous territory. Identities, politics and social visibility are at stake. Not to mention lifestyles and sexual pleasure. It seems almost as if Deleuze and Guattari would have women dump their girlfriends and fuck chairs outdoors in order to affect a flow in which ‘nonhuman sex mingles with the flowers’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 319). While we do not think this is the kind of social action schizoanalysis calls for, we do want to grapple with the work of Judith Butler to offer a located way of thinking ‘queer’ in relation to Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari understand much about the politics of producing subjectivity: we often create psychoanalytic types in ourselves. We submit to myth as a form of social control. As little factories of myth reproduction, we are the new Ophelia: women who want to marry our mothers, men who desire union with the Father. We re-invent thousands of Hamlet and Oedipus Rex complexes. Butler asserts the difficulty of moving beyond such a double-bind in which the subject is an effect of a set of laws that precede it: psychoanalytic, mythic, tragic, cultural laws – laws which are re-invented and re-imagined across generations. In the introductory quote above, Butler reminds us that an answer is not always to be found by looking beyond the subject. What Butler is saying here is that it is important to both work with the notion of the subject and, at the same time, to be able to look beyond the subject. In emphasising the importance of working within and beyond the subject, Butler draws on her own approach, which intends to work the legacy of humanism against itself. She then contrasts her approach to Latour and Haraway’s approaches, which emphasise a trans-human agency, especially in their use of the term ‘actor’ and their focus on exchanges within networks. There are parallels here with schizoanalysis: in which the schizoanalyst is an agent that effects productive flows beyond the increasingly personalised limits of capitalism. In creating space for such resonances to be discussed, this chapter identifies select schizoanalytic elements in Butler’s work and makes room for further encounters between Deleuze and Butler.

Ayyyy lmao 

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Ayyyy lmao 

Lul yeah. A few arguments to think about against Seshadi-Crooks specifically 

 

1. No alt solvency - the regime of looking is inevitable as long as we can see; no counter-aesthetics, other than literal blindness, can overcome (You could probably make this into an interesting perm double bind argument).

 

2. Our gaze has no meaning other than what we determine it to be - we should determine what it means to look at another; the regime of looking shouldn't overdetermine what it means to be [X racial identity]

 

3. The alternative is ableist because your counter-aesthetics romanticize blindness

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