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Nietzsche K

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alls you need is one book - 'twilight of the idols, or how to philozophize with a hammer'. one of the idols which you're smashing is 'civil liberties'. ... here's the break down :

 

morality as anti-nature : #6

the four great errors : #1 & #2; #7 & #8

expeditions of an untimely man : #38

 

that's four cards - respectively, it comprises a kritik of morality ('should'), of causality (case solvency for harms), of free will (legitimation of punishment), and of liberal institutions ('civil liberties'). read closely the entire work, and you'll be capable of answering any counter-arguments analytically. (take special care with feminism.) ... here's the specific link :

 

38 My conception of freedom. - The value of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it - what it costs us. I give an example. Liberal institutions immediately cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: subsequently there is nothing more thoroughly harmful to freedom than liberal institutions. One knows, indeed, what they bring about: they undermine the will to power, they are the levelling of mountain and valley exalted to a moral principle, they make small, cowardly and smug - it is the herd animal which triumphs with them every time. Liberalism: in plain words, reduction to the herd animal. . . . As long as they are still being fought for, these same institutions produce quite different effects; they then in fact promote freedom mightily. Viewed more closely, it is war which produces these effects, war for liberal institutions which as war permits the illiberal instincts to endure. And war is a training in freedom. For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one preserves the distance which divides us. That one has become more indifferent to hardship, toil, privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one's cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts - for example, over the instinct for 'happiness'. The man who has become free - and how much more the mind that has become free - spurns the contemptible sort of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats. The free man is a warrior. - How is freedom measured, in individuals as in nations? By the resistance which has to be overcome, by the effort it costs to stay aloft. One would have to seek the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is constantly being overcome: five steps from tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude. This is trye psychologically when one undersands by 'tyrants' pitiless and dreadful instincts, to combat which demands the maximum of authoirty and discipline towards oneself - finest type Julius Ceasar - ; it is also true politically: one has only to look at history. The nations which were worth something, which became worth something, never became so under liberal institutions: it was great danger which made of them something deserving reverence, danger which first teaches us to know our resources, our virtues, our shield and spear, our spirit - which compels us to be strong. . . . First principle: one must need strength, otherwise one will never have it. - Those great forcing-houses for strong human beings, for the strongest kind there has eve been, the aristocratic communities of the pattern of Rome and Venice, understood freedom in precisely the sense in which I understand the word 'freedom': as something one has and does not have, something one wants, something one conquers . . .

 

_______________________

 

 

.k (kevin.sanchez@gmail.com)

 

 

 

maxims and arrows - #36

 

Whether we immoralists do virtue any harm? - As little as anarchists do princes. Only since they have been shot at do they again sit firmly on their thrones. Moral: one must shoot at morals.

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An Excellent link Mr.Sanchez, mind if I help out with the impact card?:

 

Nietzsche, 73

(Friedrich, Damn Good Philosopher, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. RJ Hollingdale, p.154-6, 1973)

 

Whether it be hedonism or pessimism or utilitarianism or eudaemonism: all these modes of thought which assess the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is to say, according to attendat and secondary phenomena, are foreground modes of thought and naiveties which anyone conscious of creative powers and an artist's conscience will look down on with derision, thought not without pity. Pity for you! That, to be sure, is not pity for social 'distress', for 'society' and its sick and unfortunate, for the vicious and broken from the start who lie all around us; even less is it pity for the grumbling, oppressed, rebellious slave classes who aspire after domination - the call it 'freedom'. Our pity is a more elevated, more farsighted pity- we see how man is diminishing himself, how you are diminishing him! - and there are times when we behold your pity with an indescribable anxiety, when we defend ourselves against this pity- when we find your seriousness more dangerous than any kind of frivolity. You want if possible - and there is no madder 'if possible' - to abolish suffering; and we? - it really does seem that we would rather increase it and make it worse than it has ever been! Wellbeing as you understand it - that is no goal, that seems to us an end! A state which soon renders man ludicrous and contemptible - which makes it desirable that he should perish! The discipline of suffering, of great suffering - do you not know that it is this discipline alone which has created every elevation of mankind hitherto? That tension of the soul in misfortune which cultivates its strengthm its terror at the sight of great destruction, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting, exploiting misforture, and whatever of depth, mystery, mask, spirit, cunning, and greatness has been bestowed upon it - has it not been bewstowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In man, creature and creator are united: in man there is matter, fragment, excess, clay, mud, madness, chaos; but in man there is also creator, sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divine spectator and the seventh day - do you understand this antithesis? And that your pity is for the 'creature in man', for that which has to be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, annealed, refined - that which has to suffer and should suffer? And our pity - do you not grasp whom our opposite pity is for when it defends itself against your pity as the worst of fall pampering and weakening? - Pity against pity, then! - But, to repeat, there are higher problems than the problems of pleasure and pain; and every philsophy that treats only of the is a piece of naivety. -

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i'm not sure if this is similar to yall's ideas...

Link- Aff accepts outside moral standards without question and also imposes those standards on others creating an essence before existence.

MPX- With this mindset, the aff's ethical framework kills the spirit of human freedom and diminishes what it means to live and be human

Alt: K is only effective alternative for that it creates an ethical framework in which each individual can consult heir own beings and define their own existence. We must rise above morality and examine it.

 

it is really similar to Sartre but can it be doable with Nietzsche? or does it simply make no sense?

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"i'm not sure if this is similar to yall's ideas..."

 

_

 

seems pretty straightforward. three problems though :

 

(1) 'essence before existence' - this invokes existentialism, sadly. also i'm not sure nietzsche ever worked with this distinction specifically. you might try (transcedent) ideals before (immanent) reality, or replace 'creating an essence before existence' to read something like 'halting becoming'.

 

(2) 'be human' - nietzsche was very post-humanist. his goal was the 'ubermensch', and humanity was just a bridge between the animal and the super-man. nietzsche also tended to say some ugly things about 'being human' (see, for instance, 'human, all too human').

 

(3) 'each individual' - nietzsche wasn't much of an individualist. again, the existentialism seeps in, by way of those who've read nietzsche through satrean lenses (such as robert solomon). nietzshce thought the concept of the individual was a fiction, a static name draped across a multiplicity of on-going phenomena. also every individual embodies the entire historical process preceeding it, to the point where there is no meaningful separation between ourselves and the world. indeed, one of his missions is to destroy the ego and replace it with the will to power.

 

_

 

so without reading the cards, here's how i'd rewrite the tags...

 

lnx : aff imposes moral standards which profane the innocence of becoming

 

mpx : aff cages the will to power within safe boundaries, reducing free spirits to a herd mentality

 

alt : immoralist kritik empowers us to rise above moral restrictions

 

_

 

i can go through some of the cards i cited above, if ya'll are interested? ... if you take away your opponent's capacity to say 'we should' or 'this causes that' or 'we defend freedom', then you've really de-fanged their offense.

 

 

.k

 

 

"It is a sign of one's feeling of power and well-being how far one can acknowledge the terrifying and questionable character of things; and whether one needs some sort of 'solution' at the end." - will to power, #852

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I'm not sure I would suggest a Nietzsche K, but ignoring that for the time being, I suggest reading Genealogy of Morals and I also suggest perhaps cutting book on Nietzsche, like Deleuze's, Bataille's, or Klowoski(sp?)'s.

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well it's not the first time i've disagreed with james. =) ...

 

nietzsche is as much yours as he's deleuze's or klossowski's, and there's kritiks in his original work that contain ten times the potency of later philosophers [1]. no one is worse than existentialist readers of nietzsche, but hardt and negri come in sloppy seconds (they never trouble their idealistic concept of 'the multitude' with nietzche's kritik of 'the herd mentality', for example).

 

nietzsche was really a poet - he compressed entire books into single sentences, and with one stroke of cold reason could kill age-old gods. if there's a need for specific application to typically-run debate arguments, then learn to do the analysis yourself.

 

swim in his work for a while and i promise it'll change you forever.

 

.k

 

 

[1] i've quoted this before, but it's a threat construction kritik with a demilitarization alternative, and a pre-emptive answer to liberal reformism, written a hundred years before reagan was elected president.

 

Nietzsche. 1880. ('The Wander and His Shadow'. Aphorism #284. in Walter Kaufmann's The Portable Nietzsche. 1982. p71-73.)

 

The means to real peace. No government admits any more that it keeps any army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests.

 

And perhaps the great day will come when a people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, 'We break the sword,' and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling - that is the means to a real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared - this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth too.

 

Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a 'gradual decrease of the military burden.' Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud - and from up high.

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Yea i know i bring up existentialism. that's y i did have a feeling that the link delt more with Sartre than Nietzsche. Maybe i should have called this thread Sartre K.

can you actually show me the cards you would use for the shell? or at least elaborate it more? that would be great.

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well it's not the first time i've disagreed with james. =) ...

 

haha, no it isn't. But is it because I have my doubts about the effectiveness of a Nietzsche K? (Which comes from the fact I have never seen anything but awful Nietzsche Ks. I have my doubts about D&G ks as well. But overall run what works for you).

 

Or because I suggest people buffet that K with some secondary sources?

 

Speaking of which, here are some amazon links

Pierre Klossowski's Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0226443876/qid=1113120838/sr=2-1/ref=pd_bbs_b_2_1/104-6741885-0963117

Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231056699/ref=pd_sim_b_6/104-6741885-0963117?%5Fencoding=UTF8&v=glance

Georges Bataille's On Nietzsche http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1557786445/qid=1113121101/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-6741885-0963117?v=glance&s=books

You might also want to check out Daniel Conway's Nietzsche and the Political http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0415100690/qid=1113121511/sr=2-1/ref=pd_bbs_b_2_1/104-6741885-0963117

 

 

no one is worse than existentialist readers of nietzsche,

 

God yes they are bad. They make Nietzsche some how sad (or at least Sartre does) and agnst filled.

The germans may be worse (including Heidegger). However, the non-heideggerian german nietzscheans somehow make Nietzsche into this German Aristotle.

 

but hardt and negri come in sloppy seconds (they never trouble their idealistic concept of 'the multitude' with nietzche's kritik of 'the herd mentality', for example).

 

Would this be the distinction between the people and the multitude?

 

nietzsche was really a poet - he compressed entire books into single sentences, and with one stroke of cold reason could kill age-old gods. if there's a need for specific application to typically-run debate arguments, then learn to do the analysis yourself.

 

swim in his work for a while and i promise it'll change you forever.

 

that is very true. Especially the last part. Few things are as benefical as reading Nietzsche. Seriously.

 

Love

TheScuSaysNietzscheIsThePhilosopherOfJoyAndFreedom

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i.

'morality as anti-nature'. aphorism #6. twilight of the idols. originally published, 1889. r.j. hollingdale translation, 1968. p46.
_

Let us consider finally what naivety it is to say 'man ought to be thus and thus!' Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the luxuriance of a prodigal play and change of forms: and does some pitiful journeyman moralist say at the sight of it: 'No! man ought to be different'? . . . He even knows how man ought to be, this bigoted wretch; he paints himself on the wall and says 'ecce homo'!* [*Behold the man!] . . . But even when the moralist merely turns to the individual and says to him: 'You ought to be thus and thus' he does not cease to make himself ridiculous. The individual is, in his future and in his past, a piece of fate, one law more, one necessity more for everything that is and everything that will be. To say to him 'change yourself' means to demand that everything should change, even in the past. . . . And there have indeed been consistent moralists who wanted man to be different, namely virtuous, who wanted him in their own likeness, namely that of a bigot: to that end they denied the world! No mean madness! No modest presumption! . . . In so far as morality condemns as morality and not with regard to the aims and objects of life, it is a specific error with which one should show no sympathy, an idiosyncrasy of the degenerate which has caused an unspeakable amount of harm! . . . We others, we immoralists, have on the contrary opened wide our hearts to every kind of understanding, comprehension, approval. We do not readily deny, we seek our honor in affirming. We have come more and more to appreciate that economy which needs and knows how to use all that which the holy lunacy of the priest, the diseased reason of the priest rejects; that economy in the law of life which derives advantage even from the repellent species of the bigot, the priest, the virtuous man - what advantage? - But we ourselves, we immoralists, are the answer to that . . .
_

ii.

'the four great errors'. aphorisms #1 & #2. ibid. p47-8.
_

The error of mistaking cause for consequence. - There is no more dangerous error than that of mistaking the consequence for the cause: I call it reason's intrinsic form of corruption. Nonetheless, this error is among the most ancient and most recent habits of mankind: it is even sanctified among us, it bears the names 'religion' and 'morality'. Every proposition formulated by religion and morality contains it; priests and moral legislators are the authors of this corruption of reason. [...] The most general formula at the basis of every religion and morality is: 'Do this and this, refrain from this and this - and you will be happy! Otherwise. . . .' Every morality, every religion is this imperative - I call it the great original sin of reason, immortal unreason. [...] The Church and morality say: 'A race, a people perishes through vice and luxury'. My restored reason says: when a people is perishing, degenerating physiologically, vice and luxury (that is to say the necessity for stronger and stronger and more and more frequent stimulants, such as every exhausted nature is acquainted with) follow therefrom. A young man grows prematurely pale and faded. His friends say: this and that illness is to blame. I say: that he became ill, that he failed to resist the illness, was already the consequence of an impoverished life, an hereditary exhaustion. The newspaper reader says: this party will ruin itself if it makes errors like this. My higher politics says: a party which makes errors like this is already finished - it is no longer secure in its instincts. Every error, of whatever kind, is a consequence of degeneration of instinct, degradation of will: one has thereby virtually defined the bad. Everything good is instinct - and consequently easy, necessary, free. Effort is an objection, the god is typically distinguished from the hero (in my language: light feet are the first attribute of divinity).
_

iii.

'the four great errors'. aphorisms #7 & #8. ibid. p53-4.
_

The error of free will. - We no longer have any sympathy today with the concept of 'free will': we know only too well what it is - the most infamous of all the arts of the theologian for making mankind 'accountable' in his sense of the word, that is to say for making mankind dependent on him. . . . I give here only the psychology of making men accountable. - Everywhere accountability is sought, it is usually the instinct for punishing and judging which seeks it. One has deprived becoming of its innocence if being in this or that state is traced back to will, to intentions, to accountable acts: the doctrine of will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is of finding guilty. The whole of the old-style psychology, the psychology of will, has as its precondition the desire of its authors the priests at the head of the ancient communities, to create for themselves a right to ordain punishments - or their desire to create for God a right to do so. . . . Men were thought of as 'free' so that they could become guilty: consequently, every action had to be thought of as willed, the origin of every action as lying in the consciousness (- whereby the most fundamental falsification in psychologicis was made into the very principle of psychology). . . . Today, when we have started to move in the reverse direction, when we immoralists especially are trying with all our might to remove the concept of guilty and the concept of punishment from the world and to purge psychology, history, nature, the social institutions and sanctions of them, there is in our eyes no more radical opposition than that of the theologians, who continue to infect the innocence of becoming with 'punishment' and 'guilt' by means of the concept of the 'moral world-order'. Christianity is a hangman's metaphysics . . .

What alone can our teaching be? That no one gives a human being his qualities: not God, not society, not his parents or ancestors, not he himself (- the nonsensical idea here last rejected was propounded, as 'intelligible freedom', by Kant, and perhaps also by Plato before him). No one is accountable for existing at all, or for being constituted as he is, or for living in the circumstances and surroundings in which he lives. The fatality of his nature cannot be disentangled from the fatality of all that which has been and will be. He is not the result of a special design, a will, a purpose; he is not the subject of an attempt to attain an 'ideal of man' or an 'ideal of happiness' or an 'ideal of morality' - it is absurd to want to hand over his nature to some purpose or other. We invented the concept 'purpose': in reality purpose is lacking. . . . One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole - there exists nothing which could judge, measure, compare, condemn our being, for that would be to judge, measure, compare, condemn the whole. . . . But nothing exists apart from the whole! - That no one is any longer made accountable, that the kind of being manifested cannot be traced back to a causa prima, that the world is a unity neither as sensorium nor as 'spirit', this alone is the great liberation - thus alone is the innocence of becoming restored. . . . The concept 'God' has hitherto been the greatest objection to existence. . . . We deny God; in denying God, we deny accountability: only by doing that do we redeem the world.
_

i'll write in the tags and provide further explanation later. for now, tell me if you have any specific questions about the above. .k


p.s. this could work as an interesting alternative - actually going for a walk.

aphorism #1039 in the will to power. march-june 1888. walter kaufmann translation, 1967. p535.

And how many new ideals are, at bottom, still possible! - Here is a little ideal I stumble upon once every five weeks on a wild and lonely walk, in an azure moment of sinful happiness. To spend one's life amid delicate and absurd things; a stranger to reality; half an artist, half a bird and metaphysician; with no care for reality, except now and then to acknowledge it in the manner of a good dancer, with the tips of one's toes; always tickled by some sunray of happiness; exuberant and encouraged even by misery - for misery preserves the happy man; fixing a little humorous tail even to the holiest things[.]


p.p.s. for scu :

nietzsche's potential outstrips the awful realities of the way he's run; you can become your own secondary source by reading the primary material and thinking for yourself; 'the people' in hardt and negri's terminology is tied to the nation-state, while 'the herd' in nietzsche's terminology relates to any leveling of the exceptional to the common - nietzsche's an elitist, not a communist (not that anyone has to agree with either, but you do have to confront this fact before citing someone's work).

Edited by Lazzarone

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'the people' in hardt and negri's terminology is tied to the nation-state, while 'the herd' in nietzsche's terminology relates to any levelling of the exceptional to the common - nietzsche's an elitist, not a communist (not that anyone has to agree with either, but you do have to confront this fact before citing someone's work).

 

 

I think you undervalue the Sponizist tradition of the multitude. Remember, Spinoza and Nietzsche are two of the thinkers most similar to each other. The whole purpose of the multitude was to enter into joyful compositions that freed people rather than people desiring their slavery as if it was their freedom. The tyrant needs broken spirits, and broken spirits need the tyrant. That is why the multitude is inherently a joyful undertaking, and one that is incompatible with the herd instinct. You might argue that H&N don't provide enough 'safe-guards' in their conception of the multitude, or that they are not advocating for some sort of 'authentic' multitude, but in both cases I think you'd be missing the boat. Your criticism sounds like Hegel's criticism of Spinoza, he didn't articulate thoroughly the power of negativity and lack.

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i fail to see much connection between spinoza and nietzsche - one believed in god, for example, and the other murdered him. spinoza is a systematizer; nietzsche an aphorist, for another example.

 

i see the similarities between hardt and negri's multitude and nietzsche's concept of dionysian joy, a destruction of the personal ego in the divine dancing of the crowd (sort of like a rave =). neverthless, drawing upon nietzsche's work without dealing with the difference between the herd and the multitude shows a lack of rigor. there should also be some discussion of the foreshadowing of nazism (the section on breeding in 'the will to power', for instance), since h&n deal with the disutopian aspects of state-centered communism at some length. file this under lack of safeguards, sure, but it's also being too safe. how much of h&n's multitude still has the residue of the communist romanticism of the proletarait, the unfathomable brillance of the laboring masses (which they're quick to remind us now include even those not typically defined as workers proper)? this is foreign to nietzsche, who views the masses as cannon-fodder and slaves to those who stand above the law, or rather, to those empowered to make their own law. nietzsche draws a distinction between the intoxication of the herd and the existential joy available only for the strongest. so how grounded is h&n's concept of the multitude in actual people (working, unemployed, wealthy, or hungry)? whereas nietzsche's valorization of multiplicity always deals with an infinite number of perspectives, bigger and smaller than individuals (or what h&n call a set of singularities). this idea certainly shines in deleuze and guattari, but seems noticably dimmer in h&n's work. just a thought. .k

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hey thanks a lot for the cards!

 

can u explain to me the taking a walk alternative. it seems like the card doesn't have many warrants...either that or i'm not seeing it.

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basically it's just an excuse to go for a walk and think nietzschean thoughts before the judge makes their decision. =) so put some analyticals out there. the campuses you all debate at are really beautiful, you know.

 

.k

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>i fail to see much connection between spinoza and nietzsche -<

 

I remember that Deleuze begins Nietzsche and Philosophy by saying that Nietzsche admitted no predecesors save Spinoza (something like that). Many of the major themes that Nietzsche explores begins in Spinoza. For example, the rejection of Good/Evil for good/bad begins not with Nietzsche, but in Spinoza. The analysis of society as keeping humans down begins with Spinoza (he sees the people as a method for keeping people from being as affectual as possible). Those are just two, I'll try to come up more later if needed.

 

>one believed in god, for example,<

 

Yes, spinoza believes in God. An immenant God that is not emminate or transcendental.

 

>and the other murdered him.<

 

Nietzsche didn't kill God, he relates stories from funeral orators (The Madman, Zarathustra, etc.). God died because of our lack of belief, or God died because of its compassion for us. If a philosopher commited Theicide, it would be Kant. But that was a case of philosophical mansulauther. He thought he was saving God, but killed God instead.

 

>spinoza is a systematizer;<

 

What do you mean? And are we talking about most of Spinoza's work or only Ethics?

 

>nietzsche an aphorist,<

Except, you know, Birth of Tragdy, Genalogy of Morals, Ecce Homo. Probably some of Nietzsche's lesser works I haven't read. Nietzsche doesn't have one style, but plays with them. Every thought combines with every style. Sometimes a lightening thought demands a aphorism, sometimes a stormy thought requires a treatise (Genealogy of Morals), sometimes a horrific thought requires a completely new mythology (Thus Spoke Zarathustra).

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125.

 

The Madman. Have you ever heard of the madman who on a bright morning lighted a lantern and ran to the market-place calling out unceasingly: "I seek God! I seek God!" As there were many people standing about who did not believe in God, he caused a great deal of amusement. Why? is he lost? said one. Has he strayed away like a child? said another. Or does he keep himself hidden? Is he afraid of us? Has he taken a sea voyage? Has he emigrated? - the people cried out laughingly, all in a hubbub.

 

The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with his glances. "Where is God gone?" he called out. "I mean to tell you! We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not become colder? Does not night come on continually, darker and darker? Shall we not have to light lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell the divine putrefaction? - for even Gods putrify! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!

 

How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife - who will wipe the blood from us? With what water could we cleanse ourselves? What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have to devise? Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it? There never was a greater event - and on account of it, all who are born after us belong to a higher history than any history hitherto!" Here the madman was silent and looked again at his hearers; they also were silent and looked at him in surprise.

 

At last he threw his lantern on the ground, so that it broke in pieces and was extinguished. "I come too early," he then said. "I am not yet at the right time. This prodigious event is still on its way, and is traveling - it has not yet reached men's ears. Lightning and thunder need time, the light of the stars needs time, deeds need time, even after they are done, to be seen and heard. This deed is as yet further from them than the furthest star - and yet they have done it themselves!" It is further stated that the madman made his way into different churches on the same day, and there intoned his Requiem aeternam deo. When led out and called to account, he always gave the reply: "What are these churches now, if they are not the tombs and monuments of God?"

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yeah nietzsche offers us about 7 versions of the death of god. my favorite part of this quotation from zarathustra is, "What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have to devise? ... Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it?" : how mormon-esque. =)

 

as for spinoza, nietzsche describes him as possessing contempt for change; that is, the will to self-preservation is negated by the will to power. spinoza's happiness is contemplative, not joyously destructive. perhaps spinoza upends the usual moral-natural law, relegating good and evil to mere apperances (in support of an almost situational ethics), but he still ties it all back to the old (however boundlessly creative) god, the transcendental monarch instead of the immanent world of becoming (which one would think is a prerequiste for the concepts of multitude and singularity). so nietzsche advances a critique of spinozism (if uncharateristically respectful), excavating and incinerating all the residues of christian value judgments found in socialistic and postivistic systems everywhere. so i think deleuze was exaggerating, which isn't atypical.

 

:P .k

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yeah nietzsche offers us about 7 versions of the death of god. my favorite part of this quotation from zarathustra is, "What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have to devise? ... Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it?" : how mormon-esque. =)

 

as for spinoza, nietzsche describes him as possessing contempt for change; that is, the will to self-preservation is negated by the will to power. spinoza's happiness is contemplative, not joyously destructive. perhaps spinoza upends the usual moral-natural law, relegating good and evil to mere apperances (in support of an almost situational ethics), but he still ties it all back to the old (however boundlessly creative) god, the transcendental monarch instead of the immanent world of becoming (which one would think is a prerequiste for the concepts of multitude and singularity). so nietzsche advances a critique of spinozism (if uncharateristically respectful), excavating and incinerating all the residues of christian value judgments found in socialistic and postivistic systems everywhere. so i think deleuze was exaggerating, which isn't atypical.

 

:P .k

 

 

Kevin, no offense intended at all, but have you read Spinoza? The only reason I ask is most of your terminology and thoughts on this subject are not spinozian at all.

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>yeah nietzsche offers us about 7 versions of the death of god. my favorite part of this quotation from zarathustra is, "What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have to devise? ... Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it?" : how mormon-esque. =)<

 

From that great Orator of God's Death:

To the Unknown God (1864)

 

Once more, before I wander on

And turn my glance forward,

I lift up my hands to you in loneliness —

You, to whom I flee,

To whom in the deepest depths of my heart

I have solemnly consecrated altars

So that

Your voice might summon me again.

 

On them glows, deeply inscribed, the words:

To the unknown god.

I am his, although until this hour

I've remained in the wicked horde:

I am his—and I feel the bonds

That pull me down in my struggle

And, would I flee,

Force me into his service.

 

I want to know you, Unknown One,

You who have reached deep into my soul,

Into my life like the gust of a storm,

You incomprehensible yet related one!

I want to know you, even serve you.

(By Nietzsche —Translation by Philip Grundlerhner)

 

>as for spinoza, nietzsche describes him as possessing contempt for change; that is, the will to self-preservation is negated by the will to power.<

 

I don't know what you are talking about. Will to self-preservation sounds vaguely like Schopenhaur? Maybe you mean conatus? I certainly not sure how any thought by Spinoza expresses a contempt for change, will to power negating will to self-preservation certainly is an expression that seems to not have any bearing on Spinoza.

 

>spinoza's happiness is contemplative,<

 

What are you talking about, again? Because of Spinoza's concept of parrellism the old mind/body distinction is over. Joy for Spinoza is whatever increases our ability to be affectual. So using a hammer can make us joyful because we celebrate how our body feels weilding it. There is no contemplation in joy here.

 

>not joyously destructive.<

All from Nietzsche.

The Gay Science from aphorism 276: "I do not want to accuse; I do not want even to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation."

 

Thus Spoke Zarathustra from "On Passing By": "This doctrine, however, I give you, fool, as a parting present: where one can no longer Love, there one should pass by."

 

Genealogy of Morals: "Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumpht saying 'yes' to itself, slave morality says 'no' on principle to everything that is 'outside', 'other', 'non-self': and this'no' is its creative deed."

 

Your criticism of Spinoza just reminds me of Hegel's criticism, that Spinoza ignored the negative and its power. Spinoza simply affirms life, celebrates life. All the negative and rejection of life is simply passed by by Spinoza.

 

>perhaps spinoza upends the usual moral-natural law, relegating good and evil to mere appearances<

 

I have no clue what you're even talking about. Spinoza rejects Good and Evil, and advocates an understanding of good and bad where good is anything that increases your power of action, your life, your joy. (you get bad, right?).

 

>but he still ties it all back to the old (however boundlessly creative) god, the transcendental monarch<

 

Kevin, where are you getting this from? Do you just know Spinoza talks about God and made up the rest of that? Because everything you said is just bullshit. Spinoza rejects transcendentalism and also rejects eminence (anthropomorphing God), so no monarch.

 

>instead of the immanent world of becoming<

 

So let's begin with John Duns Scotus. Duns Scotus conceived of God as an Univocal Being ( omne ens habet aliquod esse proprium -every entity has a singular essence). This opposed Thomist analogical view (and hence dualistic) of God. The analogical God had one foot in this world and one foot in transcendence. Duns Scotus' Univocal Being is an ontological argument that opposes the transcendental argument of Aquinas.

Deleuze explains more here "Equal being is immediately present in everything, without mediation or intermediary, even though things reside unequally in this equal being. There, however, where they are borne by hubris, all things are in absolute proximity, and whether they are large or small, inferior or superior, none of them participates more or less in being, nor receives it by analogy. Univocity of being thus also signifies equality of being. Univocal Being is at one and the same time nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy." (Difference and Repetition, p.37).

The failure of Duns Scotus' project is to conceive of Univocal Being as neutral, indifferent. Univocal Being for Spinoza is proposed as pure affirmation, life itself. (Deus sive Natura). Also, whereas God was the first principle for Duns Scotus, Spinoza does not begin with God as the first principle, rather God must be gotten to as quickly as possible. This turns being into becoming, and gives difference itself its own concept. (Not to mention just as we can see Duns Scotus launching an attack on the transcendental project of Aquinas, so Spinoza does against Descartes, and Nietzsche does against Hegel).

Spinoza's conception of God is the plane of immance itself. This is a point that both Deleuze (and Guattari) and Negri (and Hardt) agree on, and even came to independently of each others work.

 

>so nietzsche advances a critique of spinozism (if uncharateristically respectful), excavating and incinerating all the residues of Christian value judgments found in socialistic and postivistic systems everywhere.<

 

(1) Christian? Spinoza was jewish, Kevin.

(2) I don't really get all this sudden talk of socialistic and positivistic stuff out of the blue.

 

 

l

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good, something substantive.

 

"I don't know what you are talking about."

 

have you read nietzsche's many back-handed blows against spinoza?

 

"Will to self-preservation sounds vaguely like Schopenhaur? Maybe you mean conatus? I certainly not sure how any thought by Spinoza expresses a contempt for change, will to power negating will to self-preservation certainly is an expression that seems to not have any bearing on Spinoza."

 

ethics, part IV, prop XX - "the more every man endeavours and is able to seek what is useful to him - in other words, to preserve his own being - the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power."

 

the will to power here is levelled to mere self-preservation. nietzsche won't have any of this. our sense of power (and beauty and love and joy) occur when we leave ourselves behind, when we're willing to risk everything for a moment of intensity, when we don't worry obsessively about perserving our own being. read the other props for further proof : 'no virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one's own being' and 'no one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else'.

 

"What are you talking about, again? Because of Spinoza's concept of parrellism the old mind/body distinction is over. Joy for Spinoza is whatever increases our ability to be affectual. So using a hammer can make us joyful because we celebrate how our body feels weilding it. There is no contemplation in joy here."

 

'insofar only as men live in obedience to reason do they always necessarily agree in nature' is not a statement nietzsche would agree with. no sooner does spinoza subvert the mind/body distinction than he seems to prefer the space that only the mind used to occupy. no sooner does he refuse to separate anything from nature than he reifies the results of these separations with the notion of harmony and balance. no sooner does he acknowledge the value of passions and emotions then he says they should be categorically reduced to the decrees of god and reason. he rejects the impulsive, he frowns upon the excessive, he sees hatred as always bad, but for nietzsche, things will never be that simple.

 

prop XLV : "it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbour." - ('hatred can never be good').

 

i'm not suggesting this is a bad way of living. and perhaps it's inaccurate to characterize this as a 'contemplative life' (in the sense meant by monks and mystics, for instance) - perhaps 'life of reason' fits better. it always seems like it's the mind that's blessed while the body only lives in nourish the mind; maybe why spinoza thinks that the mind lives on without the body, as a thing eternal... an essence nietzsche appears to discard. the wise man ruled by intellect and the ignorant ruled by lusts is an ancient religious tale, one i hope we can leave behind.

 

none of your quotations from nietzsche negate his embrace of dionysian joy. i admit that he oscillates between an explicit war on tyrannical ideals and an almost passive 'go fuck yourself' methodology; sometimes he loves to fight and sometimes he loves refusing to fight and being different anyway. yet nietzschean destruction isn't just a matter of saying no, but of realizing the underlying yes behind all the nos; it's a celebration of the new which is only possible on the ashes of the old - the love that knows the value of having hated enemies, for example.

 

"Kevin, where are you getting this from? Do you just know Spinoza talks about God and made up the rest of that? Because everything you said is just bullshit. Spinoza rejects transcendentalism and also rejects eminence (anthropomorphing God), so no monarch."

 

sure, he sees god as infinity, and sure, there's some depersonalification, but god is always an infinite *intellect*, an eternal *being*. so no, i don't think he completely escapes the trancendentalisms of his day, nor should that be expected of him.

 

"Christian? Spinoza was jewish, Kevin."

 

i know. i was referring there to the values of western cultures, not spinoza's work specifically. i could've said judeo-christian, if that strikes you sunnier.

 

"I don't really get all this sudden talk of socialistic and positivistic stuff out of the blue."

 

just that these are things nietzsche wanted to hammer, and spinoza, not so much. ... look, i like spinoza. back when i was christian, 'ethics' really opened some things up for me. and there are direct comparisons to nietzsche - the critique of womanish pity, for example.

 

still, i think that in recognizing the uniqueness of spinoza people jump too quickly to give him way too much credit. deleuze and hardt (or anyone else) are free to use him, of course, as they often use nietzsche, prying them out of their provincal concerns and updating their ideas for the contemporary world.

 

by the way, i'm pretty sure hardt's and deleuze's ideas about spinoza didn't happen 'indepedently' as hardt had probably read everything deleuze had written before writing on his own.

 

but to answer your first question, yes, i've read spinoza. =) ... i'm sorry if it's not the way i'm supposed to, but maybe your next post will straigten me out.

.k

 

we're not alone : http://www.dissensus.com/showthread.php?t=1286&page=2

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I didn't know you posted on dissensus. What is your screen name?

 

Mark K-Punk is a pretty decent guy, I like all the hyperstition/ccru/warwick people. I don't always agree with K-punk's stuff, but he's smart.

 

I'm on vacation(ish). So no real time spent on the internet for at least a week, so probably no response until then.

 

Random question posed to you while I am gone, however.

 

How do you read Deleuze without spinoza? Is it just you agree with what he has to say but just don't really think spinoza is saying it? Or, like Negri rejecting Bergsonism in Deleuze, you have an particular take or reading of deleuze that despinozifies him?

 

Sorry if I was harsh, it didn't sound harsh in my head until I just reread my last post. It certainly wasn't meant to be (lol internet and all that jazz).

 

Love

TheScuLeavesForNINAndDresdenDolls

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how would nietzche apply to debate?!? HOW WOULD NIETZSCHE APPLY TO DEBATE?!!!!!!!? ... please look at post #2 on this thread before the vein in my forehead pops.

 

(_8^(|)

 

no, james, i don't read delueze without spinoza - that's impossible considering what an impact he had on his thinking. deleuze is like the baby that marx and spinoza would've concieved. truth is, i like the kid more than the parents. but that's probably because i'm still a kid myself.

 

i don't post on dissensus, well, at least kevin doesn't - i'm sure there's more personalities in this body than just one though. ... you weren't harsh; even so, harsh i can handle. this is a debate chat forum, after all. :BB

 

.k

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