Jump to content
8minutesASPEC

Icebreakers

Recommended Posts

Is the Icebreakers aff any good? I heard that some good teams are reading it, and I want to know if it's something worth looking into.

Would anyone like to trade me some icebreaker files? I don't have much - mainly just UO stuff.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Hey, so if I recall correctly, you are from Thurston? First, and completely unrelated, I heard Alex Bailey was on the debate team. If so, could you tell him Conrad Sproul says "hi"?

 

On to the question; Arctic Icebreakers, the common variant of the Icebreakers aff, is not great. There is a lot of solvency issues, it's probably not topical (Arctic icebreakers are usually military, and it's only effects-topical for exploration/development) not to mention the extremely specific and effective Russia SOI DA.

 

However, Clackamas has been running an Antarctic variant (I won't go more into detail, they can disclose if they like), which isn't subject to most of the on-case arguments, T-violations, and DAs that the Arctic Icebreakers link to. They have been pretty successful with that aff; it is pretty great, and Clackamas A is just a really good team.

 

Whether it's worth looking into is up to you; be warned though that since one of the best teams on the circuit runs an Icebreakers aff, most teams worth beating will be prepped out for it. I would go a different direction if I were you. You say you want to trade files? Oak Hill has put together some Icebreakers neg shells, if you like. They are mainly for Arctic Icebreakers, but over the next week we are going to be looking at Antarctic a little more.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Hey, so if I recall correctly, you are from Thurston? First, and completely unrelated, I heard Alex Bailey was on the debate team. If so, could you tell him Conrad Sproul says "hi"?

 

On to the question; Arctic Icebreakers, the common variant of the Icebreakers aff, is not great. There is a lot of solvency issues, it's probably not topical (Arctic icebreakers are usually military, and it's only effects-topical for exploration/development) not to mention the extremely specific and effective Russia SOI DA.

 

However, Clackamas has been running an Antarctic variant (I won't go more into detail, they can disclose if they like), which isn't subject to most of the on-case arguments, T-violations, and DAs that the Arctic Icebreakers link to. They have been pretty successful with that aff; it is pretty great, and Clackamas A is just a really good team.

 

Whether it's worth looking into is up to you; be warned though that since one of the best teams on the circuit runs an Icebreakers aff, most teams worth beating will be prepped out for it. I would go a different direction if I were you. You say you want to trade files? Oak Hill has put together some Icebreakers neg shells, if you like. They are mainly for Arctic Icebreakers, but over the next week we are going to be looking at Antarctic a little more.

 

Oh ok I just thought that icebreakers would be a good aff because my coach thought it was good on the TI topic and because the other thread seemed to say so also.

 

Is there another aff that I should look into? We've been reading stuff like methane hydrates, but we got rolled the last time we read that.

 

I don't know if I'll ever debate Clackamas this year, but I'd be happy to trade for case negs to their aff just in case. I have an anthro K and a federalism DA fully blocked out - they were written for us, and they seem to be high quality.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Icebreakers  :  

just to be a help - i see this aff having many issues on how topical this aff truly is

I'd critque the hell out of the aff 

 : 

if its more leftist scientific research aff : Heidegger all the way 

 

  more rightist : Security or any critque /turning heg 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Oh ok I just thought that icebreakers would be a good aff because my coach thought it was good on the TI topic and because the other thread seemed to say so also.

Yeah, it isn't bad, it just isn't good. 

 

Is there another aff that I should look into? We've been reading stuff like methane hydrates, but we got rolled the last time we read that.

I'm assuming y'all are relatively new? I recommend some variant of offshore wind. It's a good case, without a lot of downsides. There are of course plenty of Ks that link into it, but you can't avoid Ks. The only good DA is the Rare Earth Metals one, but there are plenty of answers to be found on that, plus case usually outweighs.

Another option is exploration for medical microbes. It is a good aff, and my partner and I have been running it with a lot of success for some time now.

 

I don't know if I'll ever debate Clackamas this year, but I'd be happy to trade for case negs to their aff just in case. I have an anthro K and a federalism DA fully blocked out - they were written for us, and they seem to be high quality.

That sounds good. We are going to be compiling answers to their case in preparation for this weekend (Oregon City). I'll be in touch when we have something more to trade you.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Yeah, it isn't bad, it just isn't good. 

 

I'm assuming y'all are relatively new? I recommend some variant of offshore wind. It's a good case, without a lot of downsides. There are of course plenty of Ks that link into it, but you can't avoid Ks. The only good DA is the Rare Earth Metals one, but there are plenty of answers to be found on that, plus case usually outweighs.

Another option is exploration for medical microbes. It is a good aff, and my partner and I have been running it with a lot of success for some time now.

 

That sounds good. We are going to be compiling answers to their case in preparation for this weekend (Oregon City). I'll be in touch when we have something more to trade you.

 

Ok that sounds good then. PM me whenever you finish.

 

 

 

This is Shawn from Clackamas. Just letting you know, I disclose all my affs on the wiki. I haven't gotten around to putting the new icebreakers version online yet, but it'll be up there soon once I figure stuff out (whenever I try to upload, my laptop crashes).

Email me at shawnwonlee@gmail.com if you have any questions

 

I don't really feel comfortable sharing my name online. But I'll email you once I have a case neg for your aff.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Anthony Burke, 2 works called

 

1. Beyond Security Ethics and Violence

2. Ontologies of war

 

they are great and fairly easy to cut

 

EDIT--this is for like, getting to know what a security K is and some generic stuff. more specifics come later

Edited by smdebater

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

What would that exactly look like? Are there any good places to start for security?

Your construction of the Arctic justifies increased military presence – turns conflict and causes environmental degradation

Dittmer et al '11 -- Professors in the Departments of Geography at University College London, University of Oulu, University College London, and Royal Holloway, respectively (Jason Dittmer, Sami Moisi, Alan Ingrama, Klaus Dodds, Political Geography, 2011, “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics,” http://www.uta.fi/jkk/jmc/studies/courses/reading1%20+%20arctic%20+%20moisio.pdf)

 

The idea of the Arctic as an open e or opening e and uncertain space also calls forth future-oriented imaginative techniques, notably scenario analysis and the booming trade in “Arctic futures” (Anderson, 2010). The rhetorical orientation of such exercises inevitably reproduces and gives free rein to divergent conceptualizations of the future. Thus, on the one hand are dystopian imaginations of the Arctic as a locus of social, political, economic, cultural and ecological disaster. While during the 1990s Arctic space was infused with political idealism and hope as the end of the Cold War seemed to open the possibility of a less explicitly territorialized governance regime (the Arctic Council), current interventions in Arctic space raise the spectres of conflict, environmental degradation and the “resource curse” (Emmerson, 2010). The notion of the Arctic as an open, ‘melting space’ is thus represented as posing a multi-faceted security risk. Scott Borgerson (2008) published a notably neo-realist intervention in Foreign Affairs which considered this kind of scenario in more detail; he argued that the decrease in sea ice cover is directly correlated to evidence of a new ‘scramble for resources’ in the region, involving the five Arctic Ocean coastal states and their national security interests. According to Borgerson (2008: 65), the Arctic “region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources”. More generally, melting ice is correlated with enhanced accessibility and hence opportunities for new actors ranging from commercial shipping to illegal migrants and terrorist groups to migrate within and beyond the Arctic. At the most extreme, neorealists have contended that Arctic installations such as pipelines or terminals might be potential targets for terrorist organizations hell-bent on undermining North American energy security (Byers, 2009). At the same time, the Arctic is also framed as a space of promise: the locus of a potential oil bonanza, new strategic trade routes and huge fishing grounds (Powell, 2008a). No wonder then that the Arctic possibilities have resulted in a number of scenarios on the relationship between Arctic resources and Arctic geopolitical order. Lawson Brigham, a well known Arctic expert, has imagined an “Arctic race”, a scenario in which “high demand and unstable governance set the stage for a ‘no holds barred’ rush for Arctic wealth and resources” (described in Bennett, 2010, n.p.). This vision, which is opposite to “Arctic saga”, can be regarded as a liberal warning message. Accordingly, without new governance structures based on new international agreements, high demand in the Arctic region could lead to political chaos which could also jeopardize Arctic ecosystems and cultures. The emphasis on the economic potential of the Arctic maritime areas further highlights the dominance of future over present in contemporary geopolitical discourses. The image of disaster (as epitomised by the Exxon Valdez sinking in 1989) thus forms a counterpoint to the image of a treasure chest (the Russian flagplanting in 2007).We suggest that these assertions of Arctic disaster are used to justify a strengthened military presence in Arctic waters in the name of national security along with a range of futuristic possibilities (Jensen & Rottem, 2009). Here neo-realism feeds off the idea of the Arctic as opening, shifting and potentially chaotic space. It thus has an affective as well as descriptive quality e invoking a mood change and associated “calls to arms” (Dodds, 2010). This theme of ‘fearing the future’ has emerged periodically within Canadian political discourse, with Stephen Harper’s famous “use it or lose it” dictum traceable through previous governments, which have emphasized the threat of incursion by the Soviets or the United States (Dodds, in press; Head, 1963; Huebert, 2003). The disaster argumentation (Berkman & Young, 2009) also underwrites liberal calls for a new multilateral Arctic legal agreement which would set out rules, for example, on how to exploit Arctic resources. In these representations, “multilateralism” denotes peace, prosperity, stability and environmental rescue whilst national control and interest denote increasing tension, environmental degradation and conflict. Arctic ‘openness’ is central to the performance of Arctic geopolitics, enabling sabre-rattling by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states. The region’s coding as a feminine space to be tamed by masculine exploits provides an arena for national magnification. The remoteness and difficulty of maintaining permanent occupation of the far north also makes it a space where overlapping territorial claims and competing understandings of access to transit passages can (at the moment) co-exist with relatively little chance of actual combat (Baev, 2007). As we shall see, this is particularly true of the US/Canadian arguments over the legal status of the NorthWest Passage. In this way the discursive formation of Arctic geopolitics is also bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendencies of ‘states’ towards ‘conflict’ over ‘resources’, ‘sovereignty’ and so on e ideas that have been subject to extensive critical deconstruction in IR and political geography, but which are being rapidly reassembled in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is thus a space in which the foundational myths of orthodox international relations are being reasserted. It might be said that it is not just the Arctic climate that is changing, with knock on effects for state politics and international relations, but rather that the region is being reconstituted within a discursive formation that renders it amenable to neo-realist understandings and practices inconceivable for other, more inhabited regions. Accepting the premises of ‘Arctic geopolitics’ risks both obscuring the liveliness of Arctic geography (Vannini, Baldacchino, Guay, Royle, & Steinberg, 2009) and enabling the sovereign fantasy that coastal states and their civilian and military representatives have previously enjoyed security via effective territorial control and may establish it once again.

 

 

Russian Arctic threat representations are false and guarantee serial policy failure

Van Efferink '12 -- PhD student, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London (Leonhardt, 3/12, "Polar Partners or Poles Apart? On the discourses of two US think tanks on Russia’s presence in the ‘High North’," The Geographical Journal 178(1), EBSCO)

 

Implicitly providing a representation of the region, Cohen argues that the US government should take action because ‘[t]here is too much at stake to leave the Arctic to [Russia]’ (Cohen 2007, 2). This line seems to depict the Arctic as the reward of a zero-sum game by speaking of ‘leave the Arctic to’, assuming there is no room for shared sovereignty or joint resource exploration. Alternatively, the Arctic is assumed to be one indivisible space where a co-existence of different countries is impossible. This is in line with the observation by Dodds (2010) that some neo-realist representations of the region speak of an anarchic Arctic Ocean where competing geopolitical actors seek dominance. Cohen uses numerous representational practices to depict Russia as a threat. As Dodds (1994, 188) observed, ‘[such] practices have increasingly been recognized as vital to the practices of foreign policy’. First, Cohen claims that ‘[t]he U.S. and its allies are not interested in the new Cold War in the Arctic’ (2007, 2). He suggests that Russia singlehandedly started a Cold War in the region, without explaining what he exactly means by this. Using the analogy with a period when Russia (actually the Soviet Union) was considered a danger gives the impression that contemporary Russia is a threat to the USA as well. The notion of a dangerous Russia is reinforced when Cohen (2007, 1–2) attempts to put the current government of Russia on a par with past governments of the Soviet Union: ‘[t]oday’s Russian rhetoric is reminiscent of the triumphant totalitarianism of the 1930s and the mindset of the Cold War’. The Arctic was already high on the political agenda of the Soviet Union by 1930 due to its large share in the country’s landmass, its strategic location and its large resources reserves (McCannon 1998). Regarding the flag planting ceremony in August 2007, Cohen contends that with this act and its claims in the Arctic, ‘[Russia] has created a new source of international tension, seemingly out of the blue’ (2007, 1). He forgets to mention that the Arctic has known territorial disputes between all circumpolar countries for decades. Moreover, Cohen argues that ‘[g]eopolitics and geo-economics are driving Moscow’s latest moves’ (2007, 1). The presence of natural resources explains why the Russian government indeed considers the Arctic a top priority, with Russia’s ruling elite considering oil and gas the country’s most effective foreign policy tool (Trenin 2009). However, the last sentence of Cohen is a clear example of narrative closure as the geopolitical and geo-economical agendas of the USA and the other Arctic countries are left unmentioned. Furthermore, the article emphasises Russia’s willingness to use military force and strong language when dealing with Arctic matters. Accordingly, Cohen (2007, 1) recommends that the US government formulate ‘a strong response’ to Russia’s policies. In his view, the planting of the flag reflected a little civilised and rather uncooperative attitude (2007, 2): ‘[a] crisis over Russian claims in the Arctic is avoidable if Russia is prepared to behave in a more civilized manner [and explore] the Arctic’s wealth in a cooperative fashion’. Finally, Cohen implicitly depicts Russia as an ‘unfriendly’ and ‘un-Western’ country, and stresses the importance of alliances: ‘[Russia] has left the U.S., Canada, and the Nordic countries little choice but to forge a cooperative High North strategy and invite other friendly countries, such as Great Britain, to help build a Western presence in the Arctic’ (2007, 2). This seems what Dalby (1990, 22) calls ‘the essential geopolitical moment’, referring to ‘[t]he exclusion of the Other and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same’. Conclusion The comparison of the discourses of two US think tanks shows how different representations of the region and its actors could make the difference between either an inclusionary or exclusionary Arctic regime. This finding is in line with Campbell’s (2007, 216) definition of discourse that demonstrates well how representations can affect policy: ‘a specific series of representations and practises through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible’. Furthermore, the comparison lends support to Powell’s (2010) view that geographers should participate in the debate on a regional governance framework. One constructive way to do so is by stressing and explaining the complexity and uncertainty that the region characterises, in order to limit the (re)construction in policy circles of degeographicalised representations of the Arctic. After all, leaving the production of geographical knowledge to those with narrow interests could be detrimental to Arctic stability.

Edited by Theparanoiacmachine
  • Upvote 2

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Your construction of the Arctic justifies increased military presence – turns conflict and causes environmental degradation

Dittmer et al '11 -- Professors in the Departments of Geography at University College London, University of Oulu, University College London, and Royal Holloway, respectively (Jason Dittmer, Sami Moisi, Alan Ingrama, Klaus Dodds, Political Geography, 2011, “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics,” http://www.uta.fi/jkk/jmc/studies/courses/reading1%20+%20arctic%20+%20moisio.pdf)

 

The idea of the Arctic as an open e or opening e and uncertain space also calls forth future-oriented imaginative techniques, notably scenario analysis and the booming trade in “Arctic futures” (Anderson, 2010). The rhetorical orientation of such exercises inevitably reproduces and gives free rein to divergent conceptualizations of the future. Thus, on the one hand are dystopian imaginations of the Arctic as a locus of social, political, economic, cultural and ecological disaster. While during the 1990s Arctic space was infused with political idealism and hope as the end of the Cold War seemed to open the possibility of a less explicitly territorialized governance regime (the Arctic Council), current interventions in Arctic space raise the spectres of conflict, environmental degradation and the “resource curse” (Emmerson, 2010). The notion of the Arctic as an open, ‘melting space’ is thus represented as posing a multi-faceted security risk. Scott Borgerson (2008) published a notably neo-realist intervention in Foreign Affairs which considered this kind of scenario in more detail; he argued that the decrease in sea ice cover is directly correlated to evidence of a new ‘scramble for resources’ in the region, involving the five Arctic Ocean coastal states and their national security interests. According to Borgerson (2008: 65), the Arctic “region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources”. More generally, melting ice is correlated with enhanced accessibility and hence opportunities for new actors ranging from commercial shipping to illegal migrants and terrorist groups to migrate within and beyond the Arctic. At the most extreme, neorealists have contended that Arctic installations such as pipelines or terminals might be potential targets for terrorist organizations hell-bent on undermining North American energy security (Byers, 2009). At the same time, the Arctic is also framed as a space of promise: the locus of a potential oil bonanza, new strategic trade routes and huge fishing grounds (Powell, 2008a). No wonder then that the Arctic possibilities have resulted in a number of scenarios on the relationship between Arctic resources and Arctic geopolitical order. Lawson Brigham, a well known Arctic expert, has imagined an “Arctic race”, a scenario in which “high demand and unstable governance set the stage for a ‘no holds barred’ rush for Arctic wealth and resources” (described in Bennett, 2010, n.p.). This vision, which is opposite to “Arctic saga”, can be regarded as a liberal warning message. Accordingly, without new governance structures based on new international agreements, high demand in the Arctic region could lead to political chaos which could also jeopardize Arctic ecosystems and cultures. The emphasis on the economic potential of the Arctic maritime areas further highlights the dominance of future over present in contemporary geopolitical discourses. The image of disaster (as epitomised by the Exxon Valdez sinking in 1989) thus forms a counterpoint to the image of a treasure chest (the Russian flagplanting in 2007).We suggest that these assertions of Arctic disaster are used to justify a strengthened military presence in Arctic waters in the name of national security along with a range of futuristic possibilities (Jensen & Rottem, 2009). Here neo-realism feeds off the idea of the Arctic as opening, shifting and potentially chaotic space. It thus has an affective as well as descriptive quality e invoking a mood change and associated “calls to arms” (Dodds, 2010). This theme of ‘fearing the future’ has emerged periodically within Canadian political discourse, with Stephen Harper’s famous “use it or lose it” dictum traceable through previous governments, which have emphasized the threat of incursion by the Soviets or the United States (Dodds, in press; Head, 1963; Huebert, 2003). The disaster argumentation (Berkman & Young, 2009) also underwrites liberal calls for a new multilateral Arctic legal agreement which would set out rules, for example, on how to exploit Arctic resources. In these representations, “multilateralism” denotes peace, prosperity, stability and environmental rescue whilst national control and interest denote increasing tension, environmental degradation and conflict. Arctic ‘openness’ is central to the performance of Arctic geopolitics, enabling sabre-rattling by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states. The region’s coding as a feminine space to be tamed by masculine exploits provides an arena for national magnification. The remoteness and difficulty of maintaining permanent occupation of the far north also makes it a space where overlapping territorial claims and competing understandings of access to transit passages can (at the moment) co-exist with relatively little chance of actual combat (Baev, 2007). As we shall see, this is particularly true of the US/Canadian arguments over the legal status of the NorthWest Passage. In this way the discursive formation of Arctic geopolitics is also bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendencies of ‘states’ towards ‘conflict’ over ‘resources’, ‘sovereignty’ and so on e ideas that have been subject to extensive critical deconstruction in IR and political geography, but which are being rapidly reassembled in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is thus a space in which the foundational myths of orthodox international relations are being reasserted. It might be said that it is not just the Arctic climate that is changing, with knock on effects for state politics and international relations, but rather that the region is being reconstituted within a discursive formation that renders it amenable to neo-realist understandings and practices inconceivable for other, more inhabited regions. Accepting the premises of ‘Arctic geopolitics’ risks both obscuring the liveliness of Arctic geography (Vannini, Baldacchino, Guay, Royle, & Steinberg, 2009) and enabling the sovereign fantasy that coastal states and their civilian and military representatives have previously enjoyed security via effective territorial control and may establish it once again.

 

 

Russian Arctic threat representations are false and guarantee serial policy failure

Van Efferink '12 -- PhD student, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London (Leonhardt, 3/12, "Polar Partners or Poles Apart? On the discourses of two US think tanks on Russia’s presence in the ‘High North’," The Geographical Journal 178(1), EBSCO)

 

Implicitly providing a representation of the region, Cohen argues that the US government should take action because ‘[t]here is too much at stake to leave the Arctic to [Russia]’ (Cohen 2007, 2). This line seems to depict the Arctic as the reward of a zero-sum game by speaking of ‘leave the Arctic to’, assuming there is no room for shared sovereignty or joint resource exploration. Alternatively, the Arctic is assumed to be one indivisible space where a co-existence of different countries is impossible. This is in line with the observation by Dodds (2010) that some neo-realist representations of the region speak of an anarchic Arctic Ocean where competing geopolitical actors seek dominance. Cohen uses numerous representational practices to depict Russia as a threat. As Dodds (1994, 188) observed, ‘[such] practices have increasingly been recognized as vital to the practices of foreign policy’. First, Cohen claims that ‘[t]he U.S. and its allies are not interested in the new Cold War in the Arctic’ (2007, 2). He suggests that Russia singlehandedly started a Cold War in the region, without explaining what he exactly means by this. Using the analogy with a period when Russia (actually the Soviet Union) was considered a danger gives the impression that contemporary Russia is a threat to the USA as well. The notion of a dangerous Russia is reinforced when Cohen (2007, 1–2) attempts to put the current government of Russia on a par with past governments of the Soviet Union: ‘[t]oday’s Russian rhetoric is reminiscent of the triumphant totalitarianism of the 1930s and the mindset of the Cold War’. The Arctic was already high on the political agenda of the Soviet Union by 1930 due to its large share in the country’s landmass, its strategic location and its large resources reserves (McCannon 1998). Regarding the flag planting ceremony in August 2007, Cohen contends that with this act and its claims in the Arctic, ‘[Russia] has created a new source of international tension, seemingly out of the blue’ (2007, 1). He forgets to mention that the Arctic has known territorial disputes between all circumpolar countries for decades. Moreover, Cohen argues that ‘[g]eopolitics and geo-economics are driving Moscow’s latest moves’ (2007, 1). The presence of natural resources explains why the Russian government indeed considers the Arctic a top priority, with Russia’s ruling elite considering oil and gas the country’s most effective foreign policy tool (Trenin 2009). However, the last sentence of Cohen is a clear example of narrative closure as the geopolitical and geo-economical agendas of the USA and the other Arctic countries are left unmentioned. Furthermore, the article emphasises Russia’s willingness to use military force and strong language when dealing with Arctic matters. Accordingly, Cohen (2007, 1) recommends that the US government formulate ‘a strong response’ to Russia’s policies. In his view, the planting of the flag reflected a little civilised and rather uncooperative attitude (2007, 2): ‘[a] crisis over Russian claims in the Arctic is avoidable if Russia is prepared to behave in a more civilized manner [and explore] the Arctic’s wealth in a cooperative fashion’. Finally, Cohen implicitly depicts Russia as an ‘unfriendly’ and ‘un-Western’ country, and stresses the importance of alliances: ‘[Russia] has left the U.S., Canada, and the Nordic countries little choice but to forge a cooperative High North strategy and invite other friendly countries, such as Great Britain, to help build a Western presence in the Arctic’ (2007, 2). This seems what Dalby (1990, 22) calls ‘the essential geopolitical moment’, referring to ‘[t]he exclusion of the Other and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same’. Conclusion The comparison of the discourses of two US think tanks shows how different representations of the region and its actors could make the difference between either an inclusionary or exclusionary Arctic regime. This finding is in line with Campbell’s (2007, 216) definition of discourse that demonstrates well how representations can affect policy: ‘a specific series of representations and practises through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible’. Furthermore, the comparison lends support to Powell’s (2010) view that geographers should participate in the debate on a regional governance framework. One constructive way to do so is by stressing and explaining the complexity and uncertainty that the region characterises, in order to limit the (re)construction in policy circles of degeographicalised representations of the Arctic. After all, leaving the production of geographical knowledge to those with narrow interests could be detrimental to Arctic stability.

That would work for the typical Icebreakers aff, but I believe that Clackamas runs an Antarctic icebreakers aff, not an Arctic one.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

×