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MarekIntan

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Does anyone have a card that says something about how we shouldn't be paralyzed to inaction by the past? 

 

For reference, I'm thinking of writing a tag that says, "While [insert idea/action] has been used for evil in the past, to reject it now, in an entirely different context of culture and intent, is to be irrationally paralyzed into inaction by the past." 

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Does anyone have a card that says something about how we shouldn't be paralyzed to inaction by the past? 

 

For reference, I'm thinking of writing a tag that says, "While [insert idea/action] has been used for evil in the past, to reject it now, in an entirely different context of culture and intent, is to be irrationally paralyzed into inaction by the past." 

This assertion is probably too generic (as phrased) to have a literature base. You could cut cards about how linguistic meaning changes over time, but that's probably not exactly what you're looking for. You could also simply make the argument analytically (which would be better because it forces you to specifically identify the ways the cultural changes/different intent distinguish previous uses from present uses). You could finally post the actual substance of the argument here (e.g. fill in the blank for [insert idea]) and we could see if there's a lit base.

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You seem to be asking for a wounded attachments arg. He's two cards that may help 

 

The affirmative orientation to the world is fundamental reactive – tethered to a system that seems to identify catastrophe and problems and seeks ‘revenge’ in order to solve – this move reinscribes exclusion and foreclosures emancipatory political change

Brown, 93 – Professor at UC Berkeley (Wendy, “Wounded Attachments” Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3, Aug., 1993, pp. 390-410)ajh *We don’t endorse ableist/sexist/racist language

Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and "reaction" to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning that Nietzsche ascribed to it, namely, as an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in "reaction"-the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds-and not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought, Identity . . . does not consist of an active component, but is a reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures.21 If ressentiment's "cause" is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds."22 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does"23 (accomplished especially through Brown / WOUNDED ATTACHMENTS 403 the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege" as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery."24 But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressenti- ment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This invest- ment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recogni- tion predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfac- tions of revenge that ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alter- nately denies the very possibility of these things or blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverses without subverting this blaming structure: it does not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal indi- vidualism presupposes nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."25 Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reac- tion to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impo- tence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impo- tence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation. Indeed it is more likely to punish and reproach-"punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it creates a good conscience for itself'-than to find venues of self-affirming action.26 But contemporary politicized identity's desire is not only shaped by the extent to which the sovereign will of the liberal subject, articulated ever more nakedly by disciplinary individuation and capitalist disinternments, is dom- inated by late twentieth-century configurations of political and economic powers. It is shaped as well by the contemporary problematic of history itself, by the late modern rupture of history as a narrative, history as ended because it has lost its end, a rupture that paradoxically produces an immeasurable heaviness to history. As the grim experience of reading Discipline and Punish 404 POLITICAL THEORY / August 1993 makes clear, there is a sense in which the gravitational force of history is multiplied at precisely the moment that history's narrative coherence and objectivist foundation is refuted. As the problematic of power in history is resituated from subject positioning to subject formation, power is seen to operate spatially, infiltrationally, "microphysically" rather than only tempo- rally; it is also seen to permeate and construct every heretofore designated "interior" space in social orders and in subjects. As the erosion of historical metanarratives takes with them both laws of history and the futurity such laws purported to assure, the presumed continuity of history is replaced with a sense of its violent, contingent, and ubiquitousforce. History becomes that which has weight but no trajectory, mass but no coherence, force but no direction; it is war without ends or end. Thus the extent to which "dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living" is today unparalleled even as history itself disintegrates as coherent category or practice. We know ourselves to be saturated by history, we feel the extraor- dinary force of its determinations; we are also steeped in a discourse of its insignificance, and above all, we know that history will no longer (always already did not) act as our redeemer. I raise the question of history because in thinking about late moder politicized identity's structuring by ressentiment, I have thus far focused on its foundation in the sufferings of a subordinated sovereign subject. But Nietzsche's account of the logic of ressentiment is also tethered to that feature of the will that is stricken by history, that rails against time itself, that cannot "will backwards," that cannot exert its power over the past-either as a specific set of events or as time itself: Willing liberates but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? 'It was'-that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, angry spectator of all that is past.... He cannot break time and time's covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy.27 Although Nietzsche appears here to be speaking of the will as such, Zarathustra's own relationship to the will as a "redeemer of history" makes clear that this "angry spectatorship" can with great difficulty be reworked as a perverse kind of mastery, a mastery that triumphs over the past by reducing its power, by remaking the present against the terms of the past-in short, by a project of self-transformation that arrays itself against its own genealogical consciousness. In contrast with the human ruin he sees everywhere around him-"fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents"-it is Zarathustra's own capacity to discern and to make a future that spares him from a rancorous Brown / WOUNDED ATTACHMENTS 405 sensibility, from crushing disappointment in the liberatory promise of his will: The now and the past on earth-alas, my friends, that is what I find most unendurable; and I should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which much come. A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future-and alas, also as it were, a cripple at this bridge: all this is Zarathustra.28 Nietzsche here discerns both the necessity and the near impossibility-the extraordinary and fragile achievement-of formulating oneself as a creator of the future and a bridge to the future in order to appease the otherwise inevitable rancor of the will against time, in order to redeem the past by lifting the weight of it, by reducing the scope of its determinations. "And how could I bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and redeemer of accidents?"29 Of course, Zarathustra's exceptionality in what he is willing to confront and bear, in his capacities to overcome in order to create, is Nietzsche's device for revealing us to ourselves. The ordinary will, steeped in the economy of slave morality, devises means "to get rid of his melancholy and to mock his dungeon" that reiterate the cause of the melancholy, that continually reinfect the narcissistic wound to its capaciousness inflicted by the past. "Alas," says Nietzsche, "every prisoner becomes a fool; and the imprisoned will redeems himself foolishly."30 From this foolish redemption-foolish because it does not resolve the will's rancor but only makes a world in its image-is born the wrath of revenge: 'that which was' is the name of the stone [the will] cannot move. And so he moves stones out of wrath and displeasure, and he wreaks revenge on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does. Thus the will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to o backwards. This ... is what revenge is: the will's ill will against time and its 'it was.' Revenge as a "reaction," a substitute for the capacity to act, produces identity as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present that embodies that history. The will that "took to hurting" in its own impotence against its past becomes (in the form of an identity whose very existence is due to heightened consciousness of the immovability of its "it was," its history of subordination) a will that makes not only a psychological but a political practice of revenge, a practice that reiterates the existence of an identity whose present past is one of insistently unredeemable injury. This past cannot be redeemed unless the identity ceases to be invested in it, and it cannot cease to be invested in it without giving up its identity as such, thus giving up its economy of avenging and at the same time perpetuating its hurt-"when he then stills the pain of the wound, he at the same time reinfects the wound."32 In its emergence as a marginalization or subordination, politicized identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion both because it is premised on this exclusion for its very existence as identity and because the formation of identity at the site of exclusion, as exclusion, augments or "alters the direction of the suffering" entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding a site of blame for it. But in so doing, it installs its pain over its unredeemed history in the very foundation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as identity. In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past, as a past of injury, a past as a hurt will, and locating a "reason" for the "unendurable pain" of social powerlessness in the present, it converts this reasoning into an ethicizing politics, a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it. Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics and can hold out no future-for itself or others-that triumphs over this pain. The loss of historical direction, and with it the loss of futurity characteristic of the late modern age, is thus homologically refigured in the structure of desire of the dominant political expression of the age-identity politics. In the same way, the generalized political impotence produced by the ubiquitous yet discontinuous networks of late modern political and economic power is reiterated in the investments of late modern democracy's primary oppositional political formations.

 

The alternative is to embrace a collective future of want and reframe desire not in terms of negation and evil but rather a proactive affirmation of their affirmative absent their antithesized identity to the wound – only in this way can politics truly become radical

Brown, 93 – Professor at UC Berkeley (Wendy, “Wounded Attachments” Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3, Aug., 1993, pp. 390-410)ajh *We don’t endorse ableist/sexist/racist language

What might be entailed in transforming these investments in an effort to fashion a more radically democratic and emancipatory political culture? One avenue of exploration may lie in Nietzsche's counsel on the virtues of "forgetting," for if identity structured in part by ressentiment resubjugates itself through its investment in its own pain, through its refusal to make itself in the present, memory is the house of this activity and this refusal. Yet erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities that the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed Nietzschean form, seems inappropriate, if not cruel.33 Indeed, it is also possible that we have reached a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche, whose skills as diagnostician usually reach the limits of their political efficacy in his privileging of individual character and capacity over the transformative possibilities of collective political inven- tion, in his remove from the refigurative possibilities of political conversation or transformative cultural practices. For if I am right about the problematic of pain installed at the heart of many contemporary contradictory demands for political recognition, all that such pain may long for more than revenge is the chance to be heard into a certain reprieve, recognized into self-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence losing, itself. Our challenge, then, would be to configure a radically democratic political culture that can sustain such a project in its midst without being overtaken by it, a challenge that includes guarding against abetting the steady slide of political into therapeutic discourse, even as we acknowledge the elements of suffering and healing we might be negotiating. What if it were possible to incite a slight shift in the character of political expression and political claims common to much politicized identity? What if we sought to supplant the language of "I am"-with its defensive closure on identity, its insistence on the fixity of position, and its equation of social with moral positioning-with the language of reflexive "wanting"? What if it were possible to rehabilitate the memory of desire within identificatory processes, the moment in desire-either "to have" or "to be"-prior to its wounding and thus prior to the formation of identity at the site of the wound? What if "wanting to be" or "wanting to have" were taken up as modes of political speech that could destabilize the formulation of identity as fixed position, as entrenchment by history, and as having necessary moral entail- ments, even as they affirm "position" and "history" as that which makes the speaking subject intelligible and locatable, as that which contributes to a hermeneutics for adjudicating desires? If every "I am" is something of a resolution of desire into fixed and sovereign identity, then this project might involve not only learning to speak but to read "I am" this way, as in motion, as temporal, as not-I, as deconstructable according to a genealogy of want rather than as fixed interests or experiences. The subject understood as an effect of a (ongoing) genealogy of desire, including the social processes constitutive of, fulfilling, or frustrating desire, is in this way revealed as neither sovereign nor conclusive even as it is affirmed as an "I." In short, this partial dissolution of sovereignty into desire could be that which reopens a desire for futurity where Nietzsche saw it sealed shut by festering wounds expressed as rancor and ressentiment. "This instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed ... incarcerated within."34 Such a slight shift in the character of the political discourse of identity eschews the kinds of ahistorical or utopian turns against identity politics made by a nostalgic and broken humanist Left as well as the reactionary and disingenuous assaults on politicized identity tendered by the Right. Rather than opposing or seeking to transcend identity investments, the replacement- even the complex admixture-of the language of "being" with "wanting" would seek to exploit politically a recovery of the more expansive moments in the genealogy of identity formation. It would seek to reopen the moment prior to its own foreclosure against its want, prior to the point at which its sovereign subjectivity is established through such foreclosure and through eternal repetition of its pain. How might democratic discourse itself be invigorated by such a shift from ontological claims to these kinds of more expressly political ones, claims which, rather than dispensing blame for an unlivable present, inhabited the necessarily agonistic theater of discursively forging an alternative future?

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Just a quick thing, the tags to the cards should probably be framed along the lines of 

 

The affirmative's presencing of historical suffering through the lens of <<the Middle Passage/Slavery/historical scenario>> is a wounded attachment which turns the case--identity framed around historical suffering dooms any attempt to <<insert whatever the aff does here>> because without that suffering the identity will lose meaning, thus ensuring that pain and suffering become inevitable as the aff's politics clings to their oppression

 

In this tag

tethered to a system that seems to identify catastrophe and problems and seeks ‘revenge’ in order to solve – this move reinscribes exclusion and foreclosures emancipatory political change

There's no warrant, and since a lot of judges flow just the tags it's better to remove the risk that the judge doesn't get any warrants on the flow. Contextualizing your tags will also help improve your speaks.

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The closest thing I can think of would be wounded attachments, but that might not apply depending on the context of what you're wanting to not reject. Could you be more specific?

 

http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/191795?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21105276347403

 

Yeah, I was looking for something to answer things like Cap, Middle Passage, and Coloniality Ks. 

 

Thanks to both you and ...Hi... You y'all helped me big-time. 

 

Note: Edited for gendered language. 

Edited by MarekIntan
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Yeah, I was looking for something to answer things like Cap, Middle Passage, and Coloniality Ks. 

 

Thanks to both you and ...Hi... You y'all helped me big-time. 

 

Note: Edited for gendered language. 

A. I don't think that is how you use y'all in a way that makes grammatical sense-- you don't just sub "y'all" for the 'guys' in "you guys"

B. You edit for the gendered language but not for the ableist lang? c'mon 

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