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Nietzsche (the correct spelling, btw) said something about the ocean. Therefore, it links. No, this is not powertagged at all - what you talking 'bout, foo? It even mentions nihilism.

Nietchze, 82 (Friedrich, might have been a philosopher, "The Gay Science", Vantage Books)

We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us—indeed, we have gone farther and destroyed the land behind us. Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not always roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours will come when you will realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that felt free and now strikes the walls of this cage! Woe, when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more freedom—and there is no longer any "land."

 

This will probably win you the round. 10/10 would run.

Edited by jhiggins
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If you're reading a link that's actually specific to the aff then you're doing Nietzsche wrong

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I mean, you can't even spell his name sooooooooo

 

On a sidenote - pretty sure there have been Nietzschean scholars (Georges Bataille/Nick Land) that have written about the Ocean through a Nietzschean perspective; google is your friend  ;)

Edited by Theparanoiacmachine
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Nietzsche (the correct spelling, btw) said something about the ocean. Therefore, it links. No, this is not powertagged at all - what you talking 'bout, foo? It even mentions nihilism.

Nietchze, 82 (Friedrich, might have been a philosopher, "The Gay Science", Vantage Books)

We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us—indeed, we have gone farther and destroyed the land behind us. Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not always roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours will come when you will realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that felt free and now strikes the walls of this cage! Woe, when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more freedom—and there is no longer any "land."

 

This will probably win you the round. 10/10 would run.

TBH this is like an aff card; Land, Bataille, and Woodard all talk about the way in which all rational thought is like a dyke to the unknown, "...against the sea, against death."

 

I got that Land 92 evidence memorized where he describes how Kant and his enlightenment philosophy declared the age of reason to have begin, to create a wall against the unintelligibility of the sea 

 

Funny how Nick Lands last name is "Land" and how that Nietzsche evidence has "land" as the last word of the last sentence (ETERNAL RECURRENCE ANYONE?)

 

p.s. - I know that's not eternal recurrence, I just thought it was funny lol

Edited by Theparanoiacmachine

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We read this in one of our affs this year , might find it useful. Talks about the ocean and shit.

 

Only an Affirmation of the shipwreck in the face of the aff's desire for security allows us to answer the Foundational questions of politics. Before we pass a plan through congress or engage in the macropolitical we must understand why we drive towards life in the first place.

Conway 97  Daniel W. (professor and department head of philosophy at Texas A&M).  Nietzsche and the Political.  Page 1-4.//NotJacob

At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an “open sea.” —The Gay Science, 343 Nietzsche tends to cast modernity in a blindingly negative light, alternately describing it in terms of the onset of European nihilism, the inexorable spread of decadence, the advent of the last will, the flaccid reign of the last man, the twilight of the idols, and so forth. But the shipwreck of modernity also produces in him a cathartic, liberating effect, granting him a measure of freedom from the superlative (albeit fading) values of the age. The horizon of modernity may not be bright, but it is at long last free, and Nietzsche hopes to exploit this freedom to impress his signature onto the successor age to modernity. Nietzsche’s contributions to politics, and to political philosophy, are notoriously difficult to reckon. He not only stands in defiant opposition to the general political trends of modernitybut also refuses the “scientific” methodologies preferred by his contemporariesDeeply contemptuous of the reluctant advocates, unwitting valets, and involuntary memoirists who pose as original thinkers, he never undertakes to deliver a solemn, sonorous treatise on politics. Understandably wary of philosophical system-building, he conveys his political insights via lightning epigrams and apothegmatic proclamations, .generally ignoring the quaint Alexandrian custom of furnishing evidence, arguments, and justifications. While his contemporaries celebrate the triumphs of the new Reich or frolic in the surging tide of democratic reforms, he scours the premodern world for sober realists and exemplars of political wisdom. He chooses as his interlocutors such untimely figures as Homer, Manu, Thucydides, Socrates, Plato, Epicurus, Caesar, and St. Paul. It is now a commonplace for scholars to attribute the difficulty of Nietzsche’s political thinking to his writerly styles, experimental masks, pagan irreverence, antiquarian prejudices, arrested naiveté, resentment of modernity—even to the palpable dissatisfactions of his personal/sexual/ emotional/psychological life. These commonly cited idiosyncrasies collectively point, however, not so much to the difficulty of his political thinking, as to its inferiority. Nietzsche is commonly received as an incisive critic, or as an agent provocateur, but not as a political philosopher of the first rank. He is an erratic, iconoclastic genius, whose prurient excesses we might contemplate in hygienic detachment (perhaps as a naughty diversion from our more serious work in political philosophy), but in the end he is utterly harmless to the prevailing idols of modernity. Prematurely dismissive of the democratic reforms and liberal ideals that define the highest achievements and aspirations of the age, he has nothing constructive to say to us about political life in late modernity. An outrageous critic, to be sure, but undeniably secondrate, and perhaps downright naive. The difficulty of Nietzsche’s political thinking is attributable not to any personal or epistolary quirks, but to its unusually grandiose scope. He wishes to return to the very ground of politics itself, to excavate the site of politics, and to retrieve the founding question of politicsHe consequently has no use for the small-minded pomposity that often passes in modernity for political thinking. He is quite content to leave the details of government, regulation, production and distribution to his fussy German contemporaries. Although his philosophy has spawned many of the revolutionary, antifoundational insights that continue to contour postmodern and post-structuralist thought, his political thinking remains unmistakably modern (or even premodern) in its orientation and design. In fact, his political philosophy bears a closer resemblance to the conservative republicanism of his predecessors than to the progressive liberalism of his contemporaries.1 While most representatives of modernity are content to confect selfcongratulatory justifications for its misguided projects, Nietzsche is inclined to ask after modernity itself: does it warrant the future of humankind? What might be made of its modest successes and colossal follies? What, if anything, might follow in its turbulent wake? Unless we raise such basic, decisive questions, politics amounts to nothing more than busy work for the petty managers and bureaucrats whom modernity produces in such sterile abundanceUnlike those prudent seafarers who seek shelter and anchorage, Nietzsche relishes the danger of voyages on the “open seas.” No other critic of modernity has dared to venture so far from the terra firma of a (supposedly) foundational critical standpoint. No other seafarer has so boldly—and foolishly—renounced conventional routes and instruments of navigation: We sail right over morality, we crush, we destroy perhaps the remains of our own morality by daring to make our voyage there—but what matter are we! (BGE 23) To pursue Nietzsche’s critique of modernity is to set sail on uncharted seas. His odyssey transports him to various ports of call, none more exotic than the terra incognita of political legislation. Taking advantage of the palpable degeneration of modern political institutions, he dares to raise a calamitous, and previously unapproachable, question of political legislation: what ought humankind to become? Although this might fairly be viewed as the founding question of politics, to which all political thinkers and legislators ought carefully to attend, Nietzsche insists that it is in fact rarely considered at all. This neglect is partially attributable to historical circumstances, for such questions can be raised only in the twilight of an age, when widespread failure and dissolution call into question the very meaning of human existence. That Nietzsche can raise the founding question of politics thus constitutes sufficient proof that previously satisfying justifications of human existence are no longer viable. This is no idle question, raised to satisfy an academic curiosity: as modernity stumbles toward exhaustion, the last will of humankind, “the will to nothingness,” looms on the horizon. The prospect of the “will to nothingness” points to another reason for the pandemic neglect of the founding question of politics. Raised only in those historical periods in which humankind no longer feels worthy of its past glories, this question presupposes neither an affirmation nor a confirmation of the future of the species. Indeed, Nietzsche does not assume in advance of his daring voyages that humankind necessarily ought to become anything at all. He retrieves the founding question of politics in order to call humankind itself, and its future, into question. In light of the pervasive decay of modernity, he asks, should humankind capitulate to its “will to nothingness”? Or should political legislators devise measures to ensure the survival of humankind? If so, at what future expense to the species as a whole? At stake here is nothing less than the justification of humankind itself, the warrant for its future as a viable, thriving species. Of course, merely raising the founding question of politics implies neither one’s willingness, nor one’s capacity, to venture a definitive answer. Having raised the question, one might judge the extant responses to be adequate, or recoil in horror from the weight of the acquired responsibility, or defer the question to “others” (mortal or divine), or promptly shelve the question altogether. While Nietzsche is often criticized for failing to deliver a detailed articulation of “his” vision of the future of humankind, it is not clear that this is, or should be, his political task. Owing to the unique historical conditions under which this question becomes both intelligible and meaningful, those who would raise the question are in no position to answer it with any degree of specificity. Just as the crepuscular flight of the Owl of Minerva seals, for Hegel, the practical impotence of reason and understanding, so Nietzsche’s attention to the question of modernity signals the irreversible decline of modernity itself. Indeed, since his own critical perspective is tinctured by the decadence that besets modernity, we should receive any specific answer he might venture to the founding question of politics with heightened suspicions. Yet the inherent danger of raising—much less answering—the founding question of politics is nevertheless gravefor one thereby glimpses the shores of that undiscovered country that Nietzschean cartography locates “beyond good and evil.” Once raised, this question cannot be returned to oblivion, and it must change us forever—even if we refuse to answer it. Nietzsche likens the advent of European nihilism to the arrival at one’s door of an “uncanny” solicitor, who demands entry into one’s home, claiming it to be his home as well (WP 1). Just as one may choose to ignore the entreaties of this persistent guest, so one may choose either to refuse the founding question of politics, or to pretend that this question has already received a final, definitive answer. Toward this end, Nietzsche helpfully catalogs the various tricks, therapies, and penances devised over the years to distract human beings from the founding question of politics. What one may not choose, however, is never to have heard this guest at one’s door, never to have shunted off onto others the responsibility for determining the future of humankind. While a serious consideration of the founding question of politics need not commit one to a perfidious eugenics project, or to illiberal social engineering, it does commit one to a potentially crippling dalliance with Nietzsche’s “immoralism.” As astute critics have nervously warned throughout the twentieth century, nothing Nietzsche says definitively rules out the illiberal political regimes with which his name has been linked. He neither discerns nor acknowledges any prima facie restrictions on the type of answer a lawgiver might formulate to the founding question of politics. According to Nietzsche, political lawgivers are bound in their deliberations by no moral considerations whatsoever —all of which have been cast adrift in the passage beyond good and evil—but only by a fidelity to their own respective visions of the future of humankindThe supposed priority of a liberal response to this question, a response that aims to secure the future of humankind by eliminating suffering and promoting individual freedom, is “merely” an accident of history, which attests more convincingly to the advance of decadence than to the political merits of liberalism itself. Nietzsche proffers no assurance (and certainly no hope) that he will respect the liberal ideals of modernity, for he views the advent of the “will to nothingness” as a greater danger than the demise of liberalism. He aims simply to secure the future of the species, hoping to forestall the “suicidal nihilism” that threatens humankind. In light of the prevailing historical conditions of his political thinking, his account of his own “destiny” is perhaps fitting after all: I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous—a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience, a decision that was conjured up against everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no man, I am dynamite… It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics. (EH XIV:1)

Edited by MrEragonSaph

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