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re: strateg(er)y: Permissibility affs are hella cool. Pretty sure "a just society" means insofar as it's generally permitted, the infinitude of potential just societies would include one in which external circumstances compel an obligation, if even for reasons that satisfy an imperfect duty the AC doesn't speak to (this seems like a problematic argument but I haven't considered it in its entirety, so if I'm making a huge mistake here, let me know). Just win theory, also insert random permissibility affirms args: "absent permissibility flowing aff the neg has a 3-1 structural skew with prohibition, permissibility, and skep. Even if permissibility is qualitatively easier to prove, a) structural skews outweigh substantive ones because [substantive abuse is unverifiable while structural skews aren't], B) skep is also qualitatively easier than proving a prohibition so giving me permissibility ground is the only way to solve"

Not sure this works.  It seems to me that the more reasonable interpretation of "A just society ought" is as being synonymous with "if a society is just, it ought" or "a society that is just ought, because it is just", rather than "there exists a society that both is just and ought".  It also seems to not get you anywhere, because you have no specific offense and any generic neg arguments are still applicable, especially since you don't have the specificity of the aff as a defense of it.  For example, Chaos's arguments about "presuming consent" being unjust are still just as true as against a more specific defense and Chaos doesn't even have to say harvesting organs still fine because you don't actually have a defense of the action (unless you want to say there exists a hypothetical society in which presuming consent is good or in which the need for organs outweighs, which proves abuse on the theory debate and is still insufficient if Chaos is willing to defend a universal moral prohibition).

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Thanks, LDr, I obviously hadn't read that passage closely enough.

 

re: "A just society ought"

 

That's why it's probably strategic to develop deontological arguments that don't rely on specific states of affairs, if one is planning to run that argument. I haven't come up with (m)any complete ideas in that arena, but I'm sure some general claim about the state's duty to provide public health services could be adapted.

 

I don't see how the two interpretations "if a society is just, it ought" or "a society that is just ought, because it is just" exclude this argument at all. Neither of them presuppose (or justify) restricting the resolution to actually-existing societies (and I think that'd be horrible ground because any aff that discussed specific instances in countries could be rendered untopical by the argument "that society's just not just"). But I'm not sure my interpretation is even necessarily treating "a" as an existential quantifier--after all, I don't need to say "there exists a just society such that the need for organs outweighs"--the claim is "presuming consent is [generally] permissible and [possibly] in potential specific instances obligatory." Again, this argument probably doesn't exclude the same claim by the negative, and it might fall short altogether of proving an obligation, but I don't see the strategic harm to substantively (and theoretically) justifying taking more ground. "Permissibility aff" was disingenuous--you should be able to trigger permissibility in the 1/2AR and extend permissibility affirms, but delimiting your strategic options at the beginning of the AC seems shortsighted at best.

 

tl;dr The theory arguments are probably better than the substantive ones, but if there's not some argument you're dying to include, why not do both?

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re: "A just society ought"

 

That's why it's probably strategic to develop deontological arguments that don't rely on specific states of affairs, if one is planning to run that argument. I haven't come up with (m)any complete ideas in that arena, but I'm sure some general claim about the state's duty to provide public health services could be adapted. Agreed; I misinterpreted the argument, sorry.  

 

I don't see how the two interpretations "if a society is just, it ought" or "a society that is just ought, because it is just" exclude this argument at all. Neither of them presuppose (or justify) restricting the resolution to actually-existing societies (and I think that'd be horrible ground because any aff that discussed specific instances in countries could be rendered untopical by the argument "that society's just not just"). But I'm not sure my interpretation is even necessarily treating "a" as an existential quantifier--after all, I don't need to say "there exists a just society such that the need for organs outweighs"--the claim is "presuming consent is [generally] permissible and [possibly] in potential specific instances obligatory." Again, this argument probably doesn't exclude the same claim by the negative, and it might fall short altogether of proving an obligation, but I don't see the strategic harm to substantively (and theoretically) justifying taking more ground. "Permissibility aff" was disingenuous--you should be able to trigger permissibility in the 1/2AR and extend permissibility affirms, but delimiting your strategic options at the beginning of the AC seems shortsighted at best.  The issue is that both of the interpretations above seem to me to indicate that you must prove that there exists an obligation to do something because the society is just; even if you aren't restricted to actually existing societies, I don't think you get to make the argument that the reason to presume consent comes from some factor external to the justness of the society.  Also, "ought" means you should have to prove that presuming consent is obligatory, not just permissible, in all instances.  Substancewise, it doesn't seem that the ground you're taking really is all that advantageous, but it has more utility than I thought it did at first, so it does seem reasonable to include as an option as long as you don't rely on it.

 

tl;dr The theory arguments are probably better than the substantive ones, but if there's not some argument you're dying to include, why not do both?

 

Incidentally, has anybody thought of an answer to Chaos's argument about PIC out of presuming consent, other than theory?

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We don't disagree on permissibility. It remains but one of many strategic outs.

 

Incidentally, has anybody thought of an answer to Chaos's argument about PIC out of presuming consent, other than theory?

 

The best answer seems to be some advantage that follows from presuming consent rather than ignoring it altogether (because the PIC would have to say "take the organs anyway" or something like that, no?). I don't know if there exist sources in the topic literature that make these arguments, but:

  • "Ignoring consent causes more backlash"
  • "Presuming consent means their consent is still legitimating" then faux-deontological reasons why having the ability to consent to things is good in a utilitarian system.
  • Defend a marginally abusive system of presuming consent that is basically taking the organs anyway (at least mitigatory defense on the PIC's net benefit) then perm the heart out of it (quite literally).
  • Reasons similar in structure to responses to lie perms on consult X counterplans (not v familiar with either of the latter so this might be wrong)
  • Probably the most util-trutil thing to do would be taking terminally-ill patients' organs and other living peoples' organs as well, so if you want to go extratopical offense and intrinsic perm on that, go ahead. Run your own theory shell to leverage against the 2NR.

Probably more, that's all I could think of for now.

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I really dislike this resolution because it doesn't allow for much strategic creativity outside abusive ideas.
 

If the affirmative doesn't talk about utilitarianism, the generic negative arguments about the importance of explicit consent will still apply. If the negative doesn't talk about explicit consent, the generic affirmative arguments about the importance of utilitarianism will still apply. Therefore, both debaters have a strong strategic incentive to center their cases around the morality of utilitarianism vs. deontological ideas about consent so that they can argue against their opponent on broad metaethical grounds in addition to narrower ethical ones.

Not even arguments on the contention will be viable. The utilitarian morality of organ donation is essentially indisputable. And only a very bad negative speaker would introduce a deontological moral framework that didn't support distinguishing between implicit and explicit consent. Also, that distinction is an obvious one so the affirmative will expect it.

The tactical execution of arguments does still allow for creativity so debates will still be somewhat interesting. But I wish there was strategic flexibility as well. I can understand wanting to give novices some training wheels, but boring them to death is not a good recruiting strategy.

Edited by Chaos
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If we take organs from dead people, then people won't take them from live people.

Deleuze K?

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Does anyone have any AT Mandated Choice? if so I'm willing to trade, just pm me or email me at chriscoles454@yahoo.com

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As a generalized decision making process, opt-out systems are more reasonable and less intrusive. If we asked for permission about all ideas where opt-out is the norm, getting anything done would be extremely difficult. Asking for explicit choice might seem reasonable for any individual policy question, but that is quickly exposed as an illusion if you imagine running many programs in such a way. I do not know if there's a formal name for this type of reasoning for you to research or whether judges would be receptive to it, but to me at least it seems like a good argument. Literature on the universalizability of moral reasoning might be somewhat applicable here.

If explicit choice is good, it seems to me we should give people the explicit choice whether or not to choose on organ donation. The underlying justification is muddled.

Argue that explicit consent / consent in general does not matter, of course, and that utilitarian lives saved is a net benefit favoring the resolution. Theory as well.

The CP seems like an attempt to have some cake and eat it too. It occupies a strategic no mans land, where it is pointless if utilitarianism is true because there is no net benefit and pointless if utilitarianism is false because it is redundant. Its main threat is rhetorical, frankly, since it could persuade dumb judges or could help your opponent to get unusual emphasis or framing on a few arguments. But if you can win case, you shouldn't have anything serious to fear from this position.

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Thanks so much, this will totally help me out a lot! ill look into the two cites you gave me!

Edited by LKR
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MFW Pierre Schlag has written articles on libertarian paternalism. 

 

:eek2:

 

And if you guys aren't doing searches on libertarian paternalism, you're going to be in trouble once the first tournaments roll around. Get started on that. Mush.

 

Speaking of which, I've actually found this pdf that should explain it fairly well in a way that is simple to understand, if anyone is interested

 

http://carneades.pomona.edu/2008-Law/hdo-0416.pdf

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Bit late to ask for advice on this topic, but I never really did anything but complain before so I'll try to be more useful. What have you been doing up until now?

If you haven't tried it, I recommend you defend some vague deontology not specific to any one philosopher and go heavy on ethos, zero-off. The strategic possibilities are too limited for anything else to work more than once or twice. Although predictable arguments have big downsides, they are not predictable by accident, but for good reasons. If you must be predictable then you should embrace it. Your NC should crush the AC under an extremely large pile of distinct arguments. Beating you on the line by line of every individual argument would be impossible, so the 1AR will be forced to focus on two or three arguments from their own case which justify ignoring yours, by making extensive cross-applications. If you make similar cross-applications of your own in addition to rebutting theirs, the round then becomes a contest that the negative should win easily due to time pressure. Rebutting or avoiding their broad cross-applied arguments will be easier if you utilize a wide breadth of arguments compatible with many different sets of assumptions, which is why I recommend some strategic vagueness. But don't be obviously abusive about it, and don't be vague if it doesn't further the goal of countering such arguments.

There are three different points that the 1AR can consolidate on. The first is framework. The second is consequentialism. The third is that deontology doesn't oppose the idea of implied consent. You need to have sufficient arguments in your NC to deal with all of these, but it's the third that is the greatest threat by far. Therefore, you should invest a disproportionate amount of time arguing that deontology indeed opposes the idea of implied consent. But also, you should try to direct their attention away from the third argument and towards the other two areas. You might even want to bait them into underestimating you on one of those other areas, writing an intentional flaw or two in some relatively unimportant arguments, perhaps mispronouncing an important word or reading an old argument that's fallen far out of style. Lose battles, win wars.

I recommend heavy use of ethos for two reasons. First, ethos will be effective at redirecting their attention away from your vulnerabilities. If you make bold claims about how consequentialists justify slavery and view human beings as nothing more than meat, your opponent will naturally feel compelled to respond. Provided that you're careful to avoid irritating the judge or making yourself look stupid, this will work very well at moving the debate where you want it to go. Second, ethos will be your last line of defense other than pure skill if they decide to focus on the claim that implied consent is compatible with deontology. Ethos can win unwinnable rounds.

In opposing implied consent, you might argue the affirmative speaker's advocacy was either not deontological or else not a moral version of deontology. Even if deontology could hypothetically be competitive with implied consent, it clearly is not in this specific instance. This argument is rather abusive because it conflates the resolution with the affirmative's justification for it, but if you brainstorm on the idea for a while I think you can come up with multiple justifications that sound good and fair. Arguably, they relied on such conflation first, at the time they claimed deontology was compatible with implied consent they brought the question of intent into the matter. And besides, if you bait them into a theory debate, you're already better off.

Happy hunting.

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Bit late to ask for advice on this topic, but I never really did anything but complain before so I'll try to be more useful. What have you been doing up until now?

 

If you haven't tried it, I recommend you defend some vague deontology not specific to any one philosopher and go heavy on ethos, zero-off. The strategic possibilities are too limited for anything else to work more than once or twice. Although predictable arguments have big downsides, they are not predictable by accident, but for good reasons. If you must be predictable then you should embrace it. Your NC should crush the AC under an extremely large pile of distinct arguments. Beating you on the line by line of every individual argument would be impossible, so the 1AR will be forced to focus on two or three arguments from their own case which justify ignoring yours, by making extensive cross-applications. If you make similar cross-applications of your own in addition to rebutting theirs, the round then becomes a contest that the negative should win easily due to time pressure. Rebutting or avoiding their broad cross-applied arguments will be easier if you utilize a wide breadth of arguments compatible with many different sets of assumptions, which is why I recommend some strategic vagueness. But don't be obviously abusive about it, and don't be vague if it doesn't further the goal of countering such arguments.

 

There are three different points that the 1AR can consolidate on. The first is framework. The second is consequentialism. The third is that deontology doesn't oppose the idea of implied consent. You need to have sufficient arguments in your NC to deal with all of these, but it's the third that is the greatest threat by far. Therefore, you should invest a disproportionate amount of time arguing that deontology indeed opposes the idea of implied consent. But also, you should try to direct their attention away from the third argument and towards the other two areas. You might even want to bait them into underestimating you on one of those other areas, writing an intentional flaw or two in some relatively unimportant arguments, perhaps mispronouncing an important word or reading an old argument that's fallen far out of style. Lose battles, win wars.

 

I recommend heavy use of ethos for two reasons. First, ethos will be effective at redirecting their attention away from your vulnerabilities. If you make bold claims about how consequentialists justify slavery and view human beings as nothing more than meat, your opponent will naturally feel compelled to respond. Provided that you're careful to avoid irritating the judge or making yourself look stupid, this will work very well at moving the debate where you want it to go. Second, ethos will be your last line of defense other than pure skill if they decide to focus on the claim that implied consent is compatible with deontology. Ethos can win unwinnable rounds.

 

In opposing implied consent, you might argue the affirmative speaker's advocacy was either not deontological or else not a moral version of deontology. Even if deontology could hypothetically be competitive with implied consent, it clearly is not in this specific instance. This argument is rather abusive because it conflates the resolution with the affirmative's justification for it, but if you brainstorm on the idea for a while I think you can come up with multiple justifications that sound good and fair. Arguably, they relied on such conflation first, at the time they claimed deontology was compatible with implied consent they brought the question of intent into the matter. And besides, if you bait them into a theory debate, you're already better off.

 

Happy hunting.

Thanks man.

 

I was thinking that I don't personally find any of the CP's very strong, unless you run a conscription cp vs an aff's util case, but other than that I don't see much strong neg ground, unless you have a Wilderson K which I haven't personally invested too much time into myself.

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What's wrong with Wilderson K's?

The statement that the mystical author wilderson is the only neg argument and his philosophy is titled 'the wilderson'

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