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What is your all time favorite Card/Argument?

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It can be for any reason, be it applicability to real life, a strategic move, or anything else.

 

Mine is the role of Gender Identity in International Relations, mostly because it matters, but also because it matters. (Thanks for this Snarf!)

 

My second are ballot commodification Kritiks, because it keeps people from abusing debate as a society.

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Royal '10.

 

JK. I'd probably have to say my favorite type of argument is the counterplan, but I don't really have a specific favorite.

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Morris '91

The card talks about how compliance with justice is the necessary requirement to make claims to be protected by justice. Violation of justice ultimately leads to one being stripped of full moral standing because of their disregard for the constraints that morality/justice places on them.

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Negarestani '08 - Lamassu are warmachines that create a State in which the conceptualization of the warmachine made by Deleuze and Guattari no longer makes sense; under the Axis of Evil-against-Evil, the Lamassu operates within the state, but also outside the State. It utilizes War as the autonomous entity, and it understands that War spews warmachines only to consume them, using dracospiral tactics to melt them down into the diabolical particles known as the "Fog of War." This Lamassu, however, is a double agent that protects the State (Assyria) from warmachines but it also corrodes it's base. 

Edited by Theparanoiacmachine
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Negarestani '08 - Lamassu are warmachines that create a State in which the conceptualization of the warmachine made by Deleuze and Guattari no longer makes sense; under the Axis of Evil-against-Evil, the Lamassu operates within the state, but also outside the State. It utilizes War as the autonomous entity, and it understands that War spews warmachines only to consume them, using dracospiral tactics to melt them down into the diabolical particles known as the "Fog of War." This Lamassu, however, is a double agent that protects the State (Assyria) from warmachines but it also corrodes it's base. 

Otherwise known as border patrol.

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It's tough to pick just one, but here's 3 from the 1980s that are timeless:

 

 

Elmore '80

(A-SPEC)

 

Lang '85

(Genocide)

 

Schell '82

(Nuclear War)

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Burke 7 (Anthony, Ph.D in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, founding editor and publisher of the journal borderlands, "Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason", Published in Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87¶ ¶ What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.¶ ¶ The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.¶ ¶ But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.¶ ¶ When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90¶ ¶ This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

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I really liked the Blaxland 13 card about Senkaku/SCS conflict because it was just so well-warranted and explained. Also, Caldicott

Edited by ktg9616

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A. Wind turbines kill raptors

USA Today 1/5/05 “Wind Turbines taking toll on birds of prey”

 

Royal '10.

shiggy diggy doo

Edited by Zuul
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Dillon and Reid is such a baller K thesis card. Like seriously, almost any Foucauldian or biopolitical K can use this evidence to set up the 1NC, the ballot, and preemptively answer several 2AC arguments.

Governmentality describes the way that life itself is made a problem by regimes of power and knowledge – what we know as politics is the management of life and society by self-interested policy specialists who function to protect policy from criticism, even at the cost of severe inequality and violence.

Dillon and Reid 2000.

Michael Dillon (Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster) and Julian Reed (Lecturer in international relations at Kings College in London). Alternatives vol. 25, iss. 1, spring 2000, EbscoHost.

 

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations.Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35]  Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

 

 

Another favorite of mine is the Ruddick 10 evidence that criticizes Cartesian epistemology from the standpoint of neo-Spinozist / Deleuzian understandings of the body and knowledge. It's a really lucidly explained card and it won tons of rounds last year.

 

Their top-down problem-solving approach assumes a rational, calculative subject that effaces the crucial affective dimension that determines how we come to make decisions in the first place. There is no knowledge outside affect.

Ruddick 10.

usan, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography/Program in Planning @ the Univ. of Toronto. “The Politics of Affect: Spinoza in the Work of Negri and Deleuze,” Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 27(4): 27. //DTAC

Spinoza’s investigation of affect does not simply enable us to reproduce a politics or phenomenology of the subject, a new version, as Grosz notes, of identity politics (Kontturi and Tiainen, 2007). It becomes the mechanism by which the subject itself can be undone,‘the opening up of the subject to that which is bigger than it’ (2007: 252), the co-production of something new. It confronts at its core Descartes’ conception of relationship between mind and body, reason and emotion, completely undoing a framework that places God in his heaven, man over nature (and woman), humans over animals, reason over emotion. Against this, it offers an affective politics that is deeply implicated within the process of thinking: affective in that it engages the body in a way that Descartes’ model does not, and not subordinated to mind but rather an active component in the production of thought. Against Descartes’ celebration of the cogito, the reasoned self is, for Spinoza, only a possibility among humans: what they share is the capacity to be affected – from which adequate ideas may or may not arise. The capacity to be affected remains a constant feature of the human condition and, in his Political Treatise, Spinoza apprehends this emotional register ‘not as vices of human nature but as properties pertaining to it in the same way that heat, cold, storm, thunder and such pertain to the nature of the atmosphere’ (2002: Ch4, P1). Affect is the experience of ‘affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, helped or hindered, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections’ (E III, Def. 3). But the social nature of this experience is not a guarantor of reasoned thought: a passive engagement of the emotions produces ‘inadequate ideas’ –  arguably a form of thought – certainly not an error, in contrast to the view of Descartes, but one which understands the interaction with external bodies simply in terms of the effect of the trace,7 a reaction (see Macherey, 1990: 43^97). The reactive nature of this interpretation is attributable to the lack of accurate understanding of the innate cause of a thing – its cause in/of itself and the potential to become active in relation to it, or an active engagement in the creation of adequate ideas and active feelings (Deleuze, 1978: n.p.). Affect is, nevertheless, necessary to this collaborative production of knowledge and immanent production of new subjectivities. As Spinoza argues in Ethics Part II: ‘the human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through ideas of the affections of its [own] body’ (P26), ideas which must involve ‘the nature of external bodies and of the human body itself’ (P28) experienced, in the first instance, as perceptions or hearsay arising from a casual experience or random encounter.The possibility, and it remains only a possibility, is that we may come to understand this connection positively when we appreciate both our own essence and the essence of the thing encountered, and thus the basis for their agreement. For Deleuze this demonstrates Spinoza’s framework as a: frenzied reaction against Descartes, since it argues from the moment we are born we are condemned to the hazards of the encounter. . . .We cannot come to know ourselves, and we cannot come to know external bodies except through the affections that external bodies produce on our own . . . .t excludes all apprehension of the thing ‘thinking by itself’ . . .all possibility of cogito. I never know anything except the commingling of bodies and I do not understand myself except by the action of other bodies upon me and by these comminglings. (Deleuze, 1978: 13^14; author’s translation) Thinking, then, is immediately implicated in the production of new ideas and new unions. But thought does not proceed outwards from the cogito, nor is it inscribed in transcendent principles: [thinking] is a social act emerging in combination. The body ‘itself’ – whether a social body or individual human being – is in a constant state of de- and re-composition in relation to other bodies, even in the most mundane acts of everyday reproduction. It becomes aware of itself in relation to the trace – the effect of other bodies upon it. Its awareness is the product of a multiplicity of encounters whose meanings themselves are deeply invested in the materiality of the social field. For example, Sarah Ahmed’s discussion (2004) of the Aryan nation shows how love and fear circulate together within that community in a complex regime which couples the love for one’s (white) children with the imagined threat from a (black) community, constituting subject positions and a sense of ‘nation’ at the same time. This: challenges any assumption that emotions are a private matter, that they simply belong to individuals and that they come from within and then move outwards towards others. It suggests that emotions are not simply ‘within’ or ‘without’, but that they define the contours of the multiple worlds that are inhabited by different subjects.

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Only kinda relevant, but I was just looking back through Harvard BS's old cites... and this is the text of one of their alternatives:

"OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO TAP THE COLLECTIVE ASS"

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Only kinda relevant, but I was just looking back through Harvard BS's old cites... and this is the text of one of their alternatives:

"OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO TAP THE COLLECTIVE ASS"

Alt solves case and literally everything else

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Alt solves case and literally everything else

So they stole the premise to my burrito CP*? Darn private school rich kids mooching off of the backs of us public schoolers!

 

 

 

*http://www.cross-x.com/topic/56253-the-not-un-official-not-trollsday-file/

 

 

Edit, but what does that card even say? (The Harvard one)

Edited by SnarkosaurusRex

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It's tough to pick just one, but here's 3 from the 1980s that are timeless:

 

 

Elmore '80

(A-SPEC)

 

 

Oh Elmore, so many tears have been shed by my opponents because of you, thanks.

 

"Pre-existing general values are too vague to be maxims for action. Only personal responsible choice creates new value in action. Sartre '47"

The first card of the counter-K that wins me every neg round against K-affs.

 

Also the intro the the D&G ego K, ran it so many times I have those few paragraphs memorized. 

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Edit, but what does that card even say? (The Harvard one)

 

Seriously, my curiosity has been activated.

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Only kinda relevant, but I was just looking back through Harvard BS's old cites... and this is the text of one of their alternatives:

"OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO TAP THE COLLECTIVE ASS"

I don't just want to know what the card says, but also just how old the argument is.

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I don't just want to know what the card says, but also just how old the argument is.

I found this from Harvard BS' cite page:

 

Pettman K 1NC

THE AFFIRMATIVE’S EMPHATIC DEPLOYMENT OF DRILLING AIMS AT A REPRESSION OF THEIR OWN SEXUAL IMPULSES BY CALLING ON THE BIG OTHER OF THE MARKET TO REGULATE IMPOSSIBLE GEOPOLITICS. EVISCERATES VALUE TO LIFE, CAUSES EXTINCTION

Pettman ‘11 (Dominic, associate professor of culture and media at The New School, Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines, p. 182-8)

Not content with Utopian images of reconciliation or redemption, Lyotard thus talks of ^

AND

to escape the terrifying duplicity of surfaces pervaded with pulsions" (256).

 

OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO TAP THE COLLECTIVE ASS

WE HAVE TO BEGIN FROM THE MICROPOLITICAL QUESTION OF DESIRE IN ORDER TO REASSEMBLE A RHIZOMATIC DEMOCRACY

Pettman ‘11 (Dominic, associate professor of culture and media at The New School, Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines, p. 189-90)

Later still, in another watershed year—1989—Guattari published The Three Ecologies

AND

be familiar to us, under the alternative name of "epiphylogenetic memory."

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I found this from Harvard BS' cite page:

 

Pettman K 1NC

THE AFFIRMATIVE’S EMPHATIC DEPLOYMENT OF DRILLING AIMS AT A REPRESSION OF THEIR OWN SEXUAL IMPULSES BY CALLING ON THE BIG OTHER OF THE MARKET TO REGULATE IMPOSSIBLE GEOPOLITICS. EVISCERATES VALUE TO LIFE, CAUSES EXTINCTION

Pettman ‘11 (Dominic, associate professor of culture and media at The New School, Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines, p. 182-8)

Not content with Utopian images of reconciliation or redemption, Lyotard thus talks of ^

AND

to escape the terrifying duplicity of surfaces pervaded with pulsions" (256).

 

OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO TAP THE COLLECTIVE ASS

WE HAVE TO BEGIN FROM THE MICROPOLITICAL QUESTION OF DESIRE IN ORDER TO REASSEMBLE A RHIZOMATIC DEMOCRACY

Pettman ‘11 (Dominic, associate professor of culture and media at The New School, Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines, p. 189-90)

Later still, in another watershed year—1989—Guattari published The Three Ecologies

AND

be familiar to us, under the alternative name of "epiphylogenetic memory."

 

I was not disappointing. This is something else.

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