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Heidegger Vs. Introna k

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Whats The difference between the heidegger K and the introna k?

Not an expert on the subject, but I think it's that Heidegger thinks people give meaning to the world through the Dasein, while Introna thinks the external world has intrinsic value.

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Heidegger believes that nature is part of our Dasein. First you should know what Dasein means "Being there" in German. Heidegger's argument is that we are so determined to "technological thought". Now "technological thought" DOES NOT mean our usage of technology but rather that we are always trying to be so technical with everything and within that process we are takingke control of nature. Hence, we don't let nature be itself so we never engage in Dasein. Our ontological meaning is deprive as humans towards nature.

 

As for Introna believes the opposite of what Heidegger argues. That our rejecting of nature (Dasein) is actually good.

 

Does this make sense? If not then just let me know and I will simplify it as much as I can.

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Heidegger writes about the idea of the Dasein, which is roughly the idea of being-in-the-world, or how humans relate to everything around us.  According to Heidegger, the Dasein is what gives meaning to the world; if a person isn't interacting with something, it doesn't have any value or purpose.  I'm not entirely sure how he arrives at this conclusion, but I believe it's because he follows Kant in holding that we can't actually directly engage the Real because everything is mediated through our senses and preconceptions about the world (Could somebody who's more familiar with the lit confirm or reject this?).

 

Introna, though he does draw on Heidegger for a lot of his ideas, particularly managerialism, disagrees with human-centric ethics and believes that all objects should be seen as ethically equivalent.  Because of this, he's often conflated with the Speculative Realists, who hold that everything is ontologically equivalent; that is, a rock is just as real as a person, though not necessarily as important or ethically valuable - I'm not sure how close the two end up in the literature, but most people don't distinguish them in debate.

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I'm not sure how close the two end up in the literature, but most people don't distinguish them in debate.

You rarely will see debates between these two fields of literature. Heidegger will probably best be criticized by speculative realists (OOO which i believe is a subset of speculative realism but correct me if i'm wrong) and basically any literature that says we should take action (for example Decolonial authors have great indicts of Heidegger and a few Marxists really are at odds with Heideggereans (if that's how you spell it).  If it comes down to a debate between the fields that you are talking about, Heidegger would probably clash with Introna on the positions that animals and non human beings manifest (Introna is more against species based discrimination and some Heidegger might be guilty of speciesm. 

Edited by Alwaysgoforinherency
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Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't Deleuze's rejection of pure Being for Becoming (or something like that, my terminology might be off) also do well against Heideggerian thinking? (I am also unsure about the spelling--I think it's "Heideggerian" mostly, but I've seen both "Deleuzean" and "Deleuzian" in roughly equal frequency, so I dunno)
 

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Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't Deleuze's rejection of pure Being for Becoming (or something like that, my terminology might be off) also do well against Heideggerian thinking? (I am also unsure about the spelling--I think it's "Heideggerian" mostly, but I've seen both "Deleuzean" and "Deleuzian" in roughly equal frequency, so I dunno)

 

 

Word - I think Deleuzians and process philosophers probably have a lot to say about Heideggerian notions of being and dasein - it's probably worth it to check out Phantom707's process philosophy K file on evazon, it has several cards that would be useful here.

 

Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics would be valuable - from the book's description:

 

 

 

In Without Criteria, Steven Shaviro proposes and explores a philosophical fantasy: imagine a world in which Alfred North Whitehead takes the place of Martin Heidegger. What if Whitehead, instead of Heidegger, had set the agenda for postmodern thought? Heidegger asks, “Why is there something, rather than nothing?” Whitehead asks, “How is it that there is always something new?” In a world where everything from popular music to DNA is being sampled and recombined, argues Shaviro, Whitehead’s question is the truly urgent one. Without Criteria is Shaviro’s experiment in rethinking postmodern theory, especially the theory of aesthetics, from a point of view that hearkens back to Whitehead rather than Heidegger. In working through the ideas of Whitehead and Deleuze, Shaviro also appeals to Kant, arguing that certain aspects of Kant’s thought pave the way for the philosophical “constructivism” embraced by both Whitehead and Deleuze. 

 

Sounds like exactly what you'd want for a process-philosophical or Deleuzian criticism of Heideggerian metaphysics.

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with respect to deleuze on heidegger: this card. "why is there something instead of nothing" is basically a paraphrasing of the first line of heidegger's "fundamental conceptions of metaphysics"

 

Deleuze ’88 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Zone Books, p. 17-18

COMPLEMENTARY RULE: False problems are of two sorts, "nonexistent problems," defined as problems whose very terms contain a confusion of the "more" and the "less"; and "badly stated" questions, so defined because their terms represent badly analyzed composites. To illustrate the first kind of problem Bergson cites the problems of 'non being, of disorder or of the possible (the problems of knowledge and being); as examples of the second type, there are the problems of freedom or of intensity.7 His analyses of these are famous. In the first case, they consist in showing that there is not less, but more in the idea of nonbeing than that of being, in disorder than in order, in the possible than in the real. In the idea of nonbeing there is in fact the idea of being, plus a logical operation of generalized negation, plus the particular psychological motive for that operation (such as when a being does not correspond to our expectation and we grasp it purely as the lack, the absence of what interests us). In the idea of disorder there is already the idea of order, plus its negation, plus the motive for that negation (when we encounter an order that is not the one we expected). And there is more in the idea of the possible than there is in the idea of the real: 'For the possible is only the real with the addition of an act of mind that throws its image back into the past once it has been enacted," and the motive of that act (when we confuse the upsurge of a reality in the universe with a succession of states in a closed system).8 When we ask "Why is there something rather than nothing?" or "Why is there order rather than disorder?" or "Why is there this rather than that (when that was equally possible)?" we fall into the same error: We mistake the more for the less, we behave as though nonbeing existed before being, disorder before order and the possible before existence. As though being came to fill in a void, order to organize a preceding disorder, the real to realize a primary possibility. Being, order or the existent are truth itself; but in the false problem there is a fundamental illusion, a "retrograde movement of the true," according to which being, order and the existent are supposed to precede themselves, or to precede the creative act that constitutes them, by projecting an image of themselves back into a possibility, a disorder, a nonbeing which are supposed to be primordial. This theme is a central one in Bergson's philosophy: It sums up his critique of the negative and of negation, in all its forms as sources of false problems.

 

this criticism of heidegger is actually really common in early Deleuze, it pops up in a bunch of other books he wrote in the 60s as well -- likely because heidegger was having something of a heyday in french philosophy at the time and deleuze felt compelled to answer it

Edited by Needs More Consult Japan
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