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Well if you have USFG key warrants then you should probably read those, actually you should definitely make sure to have those. State good can also function as an answer, specifically being able to turn their impacts if possible would be good. Depending on who their agent is, solvency take outs or specific turns would be good to have.

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Alright thanks, I do have USFG specific warrants and i'll work on some more turns/solvency takeouts. Any theory besides PIC theory I should work on?

I think you will best off with offense then theory. You should put up a good fight with state good and state key arguments, make that your priority arguments and then theory as second. Just make it a back up don't rely so much on that.

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There's a good literature on "institutional ethics good" which answer "PIC out of the plan / state" arguments well. Northwestern had excellent answers to that on their trafficking aff from the college immigration topic - search "institutional ethics good" and you'll likely find stuff.

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You can't answer the State PIC, the state is bad, Obama is a radical Muslim Atheist Kenyan Hawaiian here to take our guns and jobs. 

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You can't answer the State PIC, the state is bad, Obama is a radical Muslim Atheist Kenyan Hawaiian here to take our guns and jobs. 

God dammit you're right, I have no way of winning a debate against State PIC  :sob:

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There's a good literature on "institutional ethics good" which answer "PIC out of the plan / state" arguments well. Northwestern had excellent answers to that on their trafficking aff from the college immigration topic - search "institutional ethics good" and you'll likely find stuff.

Do you have a link to that? 

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Depending on your aff biopower blocks, you could probably find institutional ethics good or at least govt. good. (Even though we know it's a lie #TeaParty2016 #FoxNews4Life)

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You can't answer the State PIC, the state is bad, Obama is a radical Muslim Atheist Kenyan Hawaiian here to take our guns and jobs. 

I'm from Hawaii...

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Depending on your aff biopower blocks, you could probably find institutional ethics good or at least govt. good. (Even though we know it's a lie #TeaParty2016 #FoxNews4Life)

If you want a good argument to Government Good, you should read Thomas Hobbes. It's a bit antiquated but if people still look to Locke, then Hobbes is just as important. I wrote up a good argument with Leviathan last year that says without the state/government or even a powerful state then people revert back to chaos and destruction. It worked on pretty much all the non-state plans that people ran in aff Ks for example. 

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And just for clarification, this states pic is about the state as an entity and its oversight/power right? Is it also like the Transportation Infrastructure states CP that divided the action to the 50 states or has the title of "States PIC" now switched to a whole different argument.

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I'm from Hawaii...

I'm not knocking Hawaii, it's just sarcasm. Typically closed-minded right-wing (not generalizing republicans, just saying EXTREME right-wing) reporters say things like what i said in my original post, it was just a parody of them. Also, what's it like there?

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To add to the topic, cede the political would be a disadvantage to the counterplan. Also, you could run a theory violation of individual fiat bad. I know that it doesn't always apply (since the counterplan "fiats" the neg team themselves), but if you have time, it can be an interesting thing to spin.

 

I'm not knocking Hawaii, it's just sarcasm. Typically closed-minded right-wing (not generalizing republicans, just saying EXTREME right-wing) reporters say things like what i said in my original post, it was just a parody of them. Also, what's it like there?

I knew it was sarcasm, but I stand by my downvote! :P

 

TL;DR - It's really nice, and I wish I could go back soon some time. Everything is expensive, but growing up there means that you have a standard of living to meet that. It's also kind of xenophobic, but not in a way that causes much problems (as long as you stay out of the ghettos).

 

It's been a while since I last was there, but I really liked it. I've since lived in Florida and Tennessee (join Vanderbilt debate! #shamelessplug), and Hawaii is by far my favorite.

 

I grew up on Oahu (the island with the capital, Honolulu), in what would be considered the "ghetto" (I only later learned that people near my road weren't just standing around but were instead dealing drugs). Also, understand that it's a fairly small place; you can pretty much get to any other point within a 1.5 hour drive (I may be exaggerating, but probably not by much). If you want me to get really K, I'll say that I was able to see pretty much the richest places in the city area and then the poorer places out in the mountains (I lived on a chicken farm in the mountains), and it all felt normal to me. Like, there wasn't much difference in terms of how people enjoyed themselves since the majority of recreational activities were open to everyone (think going to the beach and swimming). The only real exception was the hotel, but for everyone who actually lived in the area, it was fairly equal.

 

In terms of culture, it's interesting. Locals (people who grew up/have lived in the islands for a while, as opposed to native Hawaiians) are fairly xenophobic. The term in Hawaiian pidgin is haole, which can either be understood as any foreigner, any white person, or any foreign white person. Racism obviously exists, but the fact that the term has such multiple meanings is kind of interesting now that I think about it. By the way, the xenophobia is really only pronounced in the more "ghetto" parts, functionally the mountains. The cities and beaches are reliant upon tourist funds, so even though locals may think ill of tourists, the tourists are still treated well. Part of it is just a sort of callousness that needs to be developed since tourists inevitably leave, so you kind of have to not care much.

 

Racism as a topic is interesting. I'm noticeably Asian (I've been told I can sometimes pass as Hispanic), and Hawaii has a lot of Asians (the only state without a majority white population since there's a minority majority), and I didn't think about race literally at all until I moved to Florida. In my own words, Florida made me racist (after I left Hawaii).

 

Things are really expensive compared to the mainland. An exception is basically anything Asian. I soooo miss all of the Asian food (since I attend university in Tennessee and live regularly in Florida). Also, that means that you can get a lot of tech stuff for really cheap prices. Also, if you actually live and work there, the wages are able to keep up (for the most part) with prices.

 

If you ever go, do all the touristy things. It's a good experience to have. Also, go to freaking China Town in Honolulu. I've never been to the one in New York City, but I would say the one in Honolulu is the best one in the US.

 

If you have any specific questions (because I got kind of rambly), feel free to ask.

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Nice. That was actually pretty descriptive (even including shameless college plugs) I appreciate it. 

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Can somebody actually explain the State PIC to me?

Instead of the Federal Government, all 50 states should do it.

 

Edit: someone pointed out that that would be a states counterplan, not a state pic. Ignore this post

Edited by Zuul

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Instead of the Federal Government, all 50 states should do it.

That's commonly called the states counterplan. I'm fairly certain that when people say the state PIC, they mean a counterplan that advocates not using any form of government and that we as debaters should advocate the plan. It advocates individuals within the debate room.

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Do you have a link to that? 

I'll grab one after work

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Thanks

2AC Institutionalized Ethics Good

 

Institutionalization of ethics is vital. Only the liberal state can reconcile our obligations to the other while creating a space for compassion and justice to flourish.

 

Fagana ‘9 (Madeleine, PhD Candidate in Int’l Pol. Dept. – Aberystwyth U., Contemporary Political Theory, “The Inseperability of Ethics and Politics: Rethinking the Third in Emmanuel Levinas”, 8, doi:10.1057/cpt.2008.20)

However, we can never live up to what the Other demands of us. We can never fulfil our responsibilities, never be assured that we have taken the responsible course of action, 'done the right thing'. The demands of the Other upon us are already infinite, because we are charged even with their responsibilities to Others, and we are always confronted also with our infinite responsibilities to the Third.    If the face-to-face, my complete responsibility to the Other, is necessarily a one-on-one situation, the presence of a Third immediately moves relations into a different realm, for in absolute responsibility to the first person I betray my duty to the second, and so on. The Third for Levinas creates a problem for the idea of infinite responsibility in the face-to-face relation: 'responsibility for the Other [...] is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party enters' (2004, p. 157).    If the Third is immediate, this problematization of responsibility is immediate. What this shift in focus does is to emphasize the way in which we are always obligated to one Other and to all the other Others, the generality, rules, institutions and norms. These demands are, necessarily, incompatible, because responding to the one Other via duty, rules or law is immediately to do violence to their alterity by approaching them as an instance of a type and to deny the immediacy of the face and its demands. This is, emphatically, not to say that the general, universal, rules, norms, law and so on have no place in Levinas's thought. Nor are they in any way secondary. What is key about Levinas's approach is the interpenetration of the general and the particular – he is concerned with 'Totality and Infinity' [emphasis added] rather than a hierarchy or choice between the two terms, as suggested by Dooley (2001, p. 43).    The Third means that our obligations are not clear; we can never fulfil them because the infinite responsibility we have to the Other and to the Third are necessarily completely incompatible because of the excessive nature of these responsibilities. We are, then, always irresponsible in any attempt to be responsible. The difficulty arises in the fact that there is always more than one Other or that the Other is not a unitary self-identical subject, which means that any taking up of responsibility in response to one Other is necessarily a dereliction of duty with regard to another Other. It is also, by extension, a dereliction of duty to the generality of rules and norms which would adjudicate between the claims of the Other and the other Others. We are in this sense always turning away from the face of the Other, sacrificing them and reneging on our responsibility to them, in part because what is demanded of us is infinite and excessive but also because the demand itself and the structure of the way that demands are relayed to us are always impossible because the Third is already there, in the demand, in the face of the Other. And, importantly, this impossibility is not a limit, weakness, or oversight in Levinas's work. It is the very fact that the call of the Other does not determine a particular response and that it is always in competition with the incompatible calls of other Others and provides no way of adjudicating between these demands that means that the possibility of responsibility, rather than the violence of an obsession with the one Other, or a clear knowledge of what we should do, is maintained.    Further, Levinas's approach of aligning responsibility with the choice to respond to the Other as face rather than in a totalizing way means that even in some hypothetical face-to-face relationship without the Third, 'being responsible' would not be possible. In a face-to-face without the Third there would be no possibility of decision and as such no possibility of responsibility. It is the possibility of the approach of proceeding from universality, entering into a totalizing relation with the Other that conditions the possibility of the response not being pre-determined; we could approach the face as face or we could approach it in a totalizing way. This possibility of there being a decision only happens when the Third enters (otherwise we would be completely commanded and our response determined by the face of the one Other), so the element of choice that Levinas seems to see as necessary for responsibility, or goodness, is only possible with the Third; it would not be possible to be responsible in this sense in the face-to-face. In the face-to-face we would know what to do, our obligations would be clear. But the Third is always already there in the face, our obligations are never clear, and rather than making responsibility impossible it is this which conditions its possibility. Responsibility (in terms of a responsible response rather than in terms of obligation) as a concept only makes sense with an appreciation of the Third in Levinas's work. It is the Third which conditions the possibility of responding in some un-predetermined way, of responding responsibly, but the Third simultaneously makes this responsibility impossible because there is no response which could meet my responsibilities to both the Other and the Third.    It is in this sense that Levinas must be seen as confronting an aporia of responsibility and in this sense that he does not attempt to offer a way out of the aporia, not because of a failure of his theorizing at this point, but through an acknowledgement that it is the aporia itself, and perhaps its foregrounding and recognition, which conditions the possibility of responsibility. As such, the idea of Levinas's face-to-face relation as providing the horizon or grounding for thinking about responsibility and politics becomes problematic.  Problematizing Ethics and Politics: The Ethico-Political    This interpenetration of the responsible and the irresponsible in the figure of the Third is mirrored in Levinas's discussion of ethics and politics. Levinas is sometimes read as calling for a critique or disruption of the political in the name of the ethical (Critchley, 1992, p. 223; Simmons, 1999, p. 98; Critchley, 2004, p. 182; Thomson, 2005, p. 101). Similarly, the idea of the passage or movement from ethics to knowledge, the Other to the Third and so on characterizes much of the debate regarding Levinas's political utility (Critchley, 1992, p. xiv; Simmons, 1999, p. 96). However, this approach relies on a distinction, both categorical and temporal, between these realms, which I do not think is to be found in much of Levinas's work. His understanding of ethics and politics, charity and justice is, I argue, more complex than this separation suggests and can be more usefully characterized by the idea of the ethico-political.    Levinas's approach to politics concerns the need to create institutions, rules, universalizable and generalizable structures as required by the Third. It also encompasses a more traditional, concrete understanding of politics, addressing issues such as the state and democracy, although these issues arise out of the same concerns.    It is justice that demands institutionalization and politics for Levinas. He is definite about the requirement for justice, which for him is in the realm of the general, abstract and universalizable: 'Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematisation, the visibility of faces' (Levinas, 2004, p. 157). Justice is, he argues, the only way to regulate relations with other Others, the mechanism by which the claims of Others are compared and judged. Justice, as calculation and legislation, plays an important role: 'against the persecution which targets Others and especially those close by, one has to have recourse to justice' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 100).    Justice is necessary because of the Third, immediately present in the face of the Other. In approaching the Other, 'A third party is also approached; and the relationship between the neighbour and the third party cannot be indifferent to me when I approach. There must be a justice among noncomparable ones' (Levinas, 2004, p. 16). The demand for responsibility to the Third, and in this to a multiplicity of Others, requires that what may seem initially a commitment to infinite responsibility to one Other is in fact in Levinas's work an argument that there must be a comparison between incomparables.    It is this comparison and calculation, in the form of justice, that makes charity or responsibility possible among many Others: 'justice and the just state constitute the forum enabling the existence of charity within the human multiplicity' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 230). However, it is also this calculation and comparison which threatens this possibility, if separated from a continued concern with the infinite responsibility of the face-to-face (as discussed below).    Levinas's introduction of the Third then requires a consideration of justice, which demands politics. The Third means that justice and comparison are required, in the name of infinite responsibility, and it is the state which institutionalizes this necessity for Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 66); 'This multiplicity of human beings must be organised, calculated. I can cede my responsibility within a society organised in a State, in justice'. The state is not put forward as purely positive or negative, as ethical or unethical (although these categories are themselves problematic in this context). The Third both extends and limits our responsibility and this very difficulty is reflected in the state and in institutions. It is, for Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 67), 'necessary in order to make comparisons, judge, have institutions and juridical procedures, which are necessary'. However, as well as being necessary, the state is unavoidably violent, as all limits to infinite responsibility to one singular Other are violent: 'You find [...] the necessity of the state. Violence, of course, in relation to the charity rendered necessary precisely by the charity inspired by the face of the neighbour' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 67). The state both supplements and denies the 'work of interpersonal responsibility' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 67). As such, the state or institutionalization are not necessarily a corruption of some ethical relationship which needs to be interrupted in the name of that relationship; the relationship between ethics, charity and politics or justice is more complex than this.    Levinas is however concerned with an approach which separates politics and justice out from concerns of charity. Although charity for Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 181) is impossible without justice and the state, justice is 'warped' without charity. It is in this sense that Levinas criticizes the state and justice, as problematic when approached as sufficient in, or legitimized by, themselves. Again, this is a reflection of the aporia of the ethico-political relation, the insufficiency of either the face-to-face or the relation to the Third to the demands of responsibility. Justice, taken by itself, inseparable from formalized and sedimented institutions or the 'pure' politics criticized above 'risks causing us to misrecognise the face of the other man' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 223). The judgement required by justice is, for Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 115), violent, in that it transforms faces into "[O]bjective and plastic forms, into figures which are visible but defaced, the appearing of men, of individuals, who are unique but restituted to their genera. With intentions to scrutinise and acts to remember."    It is in response to this (unavoidable) violence that Levinas argues that 'love must always watch over justice', in order to provide a foil to its possible totalizing tendencies, to negotiate the violence done in its name (although in the name of another violence aimed at the Third) (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 169). Justice is for Levinas an impossible concept, precisely because of its position with regard to the competing demands of the Other and the Third. Justice, Levinas argues, 'remains justice only in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there remains the impossibility of passing by the closest' (2004, p. 159). Justice is then in a sense the very impossibility at the heart of the ethico-political relation whereby we are under obligation both to the immediate absolute demand of the Other and to the generality, rules and norms which adjudicate between Others.    The complexity of the relationship between justice and charity is what complicates Levinas's approach to politics and the state. Levinas does not see all politics as totalizing, as inimical to a concern with the ethical. What, I argue, Levinas is concerned to emphasize is the danger in some kind of idea of pure politics, of generalization, univeralization, a concern only with the Third in an abstract sense: 'Politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the Other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in absentia' (Levinas, 2005, p. 300). For him, this approach does not make sense, in the same way that a 'pure' ethics does not. Politics is always already about a negotiation between the Other and the Third, always already the ethico-political.    Levinas contrasts the liberal state with a totalizing state arguing that one leaves space for charity and the interpersonal where the other attempts to bring everything within 'pure' politics or institutionalization. Although Levinas's commitment to the liberal state is problematic, even (or especially) on his own terms, this question of the relative merits of various types of state is not central to this stage of the argument being made here.1 Levinas's work on the liberal state is relevant in this context because of the way he uses it to highlight the importance of charity within justice, in contrast to the totalitarian state which he sees as an attempt at closing down this dimension of charity and the interpersonal but which, importantly, always fails in this task. His discussion of the totalizing state also acts to illustrate his concern with the fragility of charity in the face of totalizing 'pure' justice and politics. Whether Levinas is correct in his approach to various forms of state does not impact on the conclusions regarding the relationship between justice and charity in his work.    Levinas suggests that the liberal state recognizes, at least to an extent, the impossibility of the concept of 'pure' politics. Because the state is an institutionalization of the aporetic ethico-political interpersonal relationship it contains within itself contradictory elements, and so an openness: space for the personal and the institutional and an acknowledgement of the singular and particular as that which demands the universal and general and the liberal state recognizes this. For Levinas and Robbins (2001, p. 69) there is 'an appeal to mercy behind justice' in the liberal state, an acknowledgement of the duty we have to the Other at the same time as our duties to the Third and the generality, that is, to justice. The state is viewed not as a result of some 'war of all against all', a limitation of violence, but rather as a tool to control and limit our excessive responsibilities (Levinas, 1985, p. 80). A state which recognizes this has the possibility, for Levinas, of not excluding charity, it is an acknowledgement of 'the presence of the singular in the universal' (Levinas and Robbins, 2001, p. 69).

 

The ethical obligation to aid the other demands use of the state to engage violence.

Delhom ‘9 (Pascal, Phil. – U. Flensburg, in “Levinas in Jerusalem: Phenomology, Ethics, Politics, Aesthetics”, Ed. Joelle Hansel, p. 80-82)

Nevertheless, according to Levinas it would be wrong to separate the  domain of ethical responsibility and of political action. Certainly, the  claim of justice concerns primarily the justice of my actions for others.  The first question of justice is: “What do I have to do with justice?” But  my claim to justice cannot be reduced to my own actions. Its meaning  cannot be reduced to the limitation of my own violence. In a world in  which there is violence, wars and oppression, it is not enough to assist  the victims and to be attentive to their suffering. One has to put an end  to violence against human beings, or at least one has to try to reduce it.  What do I have to do if a third person hurts my neighbour? I cannot  oblige the victim to forgive, for according to Levinas8 this would be  an exhortation to human sacrifice. Nor can I command the person  who is hurting my neighbour not to do this, because an ethical com-  mandment cannot come from outside of the relationship. But I also  cannot be indifferent to the injury of the one who is being hurt. What  do I have to do? In an interview published in De Dieu qui vient à  l’Idée, Levinas says: “It is the third party who is the source of justice,  and hence of justified repression: the violence suffered by the third  party justifies using violence to put an end to the other’s violence.”9  The necessity of using violence to put an end to the other’s violence  against the third person is the ethical foundation of the necessity of the  State. For repressive violence cannot only and not even primarily be  mine, except perhaps in special cases of immediate defence of the person  attacked. Self-defence is problematic for Levinas, but the defence  of the other might justify my violence in cases which are similar to  cases of self-defence. But these cases are exceptional and have to  remain the exception. Generally, repressive violence has to be that of a  State.  There is here a certain proximity to Thomas Hobbes in the thinking  of Emmanuel Levinas. Even if the necessity of a State is based  upon a claim to justice and presupposes the brotherhood and sisterhood  of human beings, the state must react with violence to the violence  of human beings. Levinas writes: “Already the City, whatever its  order, guarantees the right of humans against their fellow-creatures,  imagined as still in a state of nature, men as wolves to other men, as  Hobbes would have had it. Although Israel sees itself born of an irreducible  fraternity, it is not ignorant of the temptation, within itself and  surrounding it, of war between all.”10  As I said, there is here a certain proximity between Levinas and  Hobbes, but there is also a decisive difference: for Hobbes, the necessity  of the State is a consequence of everyone’s fear of their own death  and of a rational and reasonable decision to live in a commonwealth in  order to protect their own lives. For Levinas, the necessity of the State  is for me a consequence of my fear of the death of my neighbour. It is a  consequence of my claim to justice for my neighbour and for the third  person for whom I am responsible before any contract and covenant.  The question of justice does not arise after the conclusion of the contract  as it does for Hobbes. On the contrary, the claim to justice is prior  to any contract and to the State and founds the necessity of the State.  For this reason, institutions and the State should be in the service of  justice and not beyond it. And the state should be evaluated and  judged according to its justice.

 

Institutional ethics is vital to mediate competing ethical demands.

Simmons ’99 (William Paul, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. MA Program in Social Justice and Human Rights – ASU, Philosophy & Social Criticism, “The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move From An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics” 25:6, Sage)

However, it is impossible to have a face-to-face relationship with  each member of humanity. Those far away can only be reached indirectly.  Thus, the appearance of the Third extends the an-archical  responsibility for the Other into the realm of the said, ushering in the  latent birth of language, justice and politics.  The an-archical relationship with the Other is the pre-linguistic  world of the saying. Language is unnecessary to respond to the Other.  The Third, however, demands an explanation. ‘In its frankness it [language]  refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and  meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party looks at me  in the eyes of the Other – language is justice.’38 The appearance of the  Third also opens up the dimension of justice. Judgements must be made.  The ego must compare incomparable Others. ‘It is consequently necessary  to weigh, to think, to judge, in comparing the incomparable. The  interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish  with other men.’39 Therefore, Levinas distinguishes the ethical relationship  with the Other from justice which involves three or more people.40  Finally, the Third introduces the realm of politics. The ego’s infinite  responsibility must be extended to all humanity, no matter how far off.  Ethics must be universalized and institutionalized to affect the others.  To the extent that someone else’s Face brings us in relation with a third  party, My metaphysical relation to the Other is transformed into a We, and  works toward a State, institutions and laws which form the source of universality.  41

 

Political institutions are key to ethics. They’re essential to secure peace.

Simmons ’99 (William Paul, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. MA Program in Social Justice and Human Rights – ASU, Philosophy & Social Criticism, “The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move From An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics” 25:6, Sage)

Levinas’ critique of the foundations of political thought changes the  very nature of politics. A politics based on the battle between autonomous  selves, like Hobbes’, is a negative politics whose primary purpose  is to constrain individual desires. Levinas, on the other hand, insists that  politics must have a positive role. Politics must serve ethics.  The occidental ethic always proceeds from the fact that the other is a limitation  for me. Hobbes says you can come directly to philosophy from this  mutual hatred. Thus we could attain a better society without love for the  other, in which the other is taken into account. That would be a politics  that could lead to ethics. I believe, on the contrary, that politics must be  controlled by ethics: the other concerns me.32  Although Levinas is suspicious of the Western political tradition, his  thought is not apolitical as some have charged. His philosophy begins  and ends with politics. For example, Peperzak argues that ‘the point of  orientation and the background of all other questions’ in Totality and  Infinity is ‘the question of how the violence that seems inherent to all  politics (and thus also to history) can be overcome by true peace’.33 Politics  is also a necessary step that Levinas’ ethical thought must take. Just  as the an-archical saying requires the ontological said, an-archical ethics  requires politics. The mutually interdependent relationship between the  saying and the said serves as the paradigm for the relationship between  ethics and politics. Ethics, which is a manifestation of the saying, has  been traditionally subordinated by politics, a manifestation of the said.  A resuscitation of the ethical is needed to check the political. However,  the political should not be abandoned. Ethics requires the political to be  universalized into laws and institutions.

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