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I am about to enter my champ year and I have never written a K AFF before and I was wondering if anyone could explain the fundamentals of how to write a kritikal aff plan to me? I am thinking about basing my AFF for next year of the Managerialism K but I don't know how to write the AFF or how to write the plan text? If anyone has any examples of a K AFF, I would really appreciate seeing them. 

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there are some on open ev you could check out. also depends on what you mean by plan text. if you mean USFG should do X, then how you would normally read an aff. If you mean saying no to the rez, then your advocacy should probably look at least similar to whatever the advocacy would be for the K if you were reading it on the neg, though you would want it to be in the context of the aff (ex- you wouldn't want to just say you advocate JUST rejecting X)

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Warning: Speech Doc Ahead

 

 

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 (Http://clas.georgetown.edu/files/Trans-Mexican%20Migration%20-%20Felipe%20Jacome.pdf)

Julio, a middle aged Salvadorian, is a visibly more experienced migrant. Slightly older than the average migrant in his/her twenties, he stands out for his confidence and maturity. He travels with three younger men, two women, and a 10 year-old boy. Like for many other migrants, the route is not unknown for him, and neither is the United States. This is the second time Julio emigrates in the past few years. Like many migrants that go back to their countries for family reasons, he is coming back from having spent six months with his two daughters in El Salvador. Julio was a soldier in the Salvadorian armed forces during 12 years of civil war, and three years after the peace was signed. He left the army as a part of the demobilization process and became a bus driver in San Salvador. After some years, he became increasingly fearful of the violence affecting the streets of the city. In the street violence of San Salvador—and of many cities of the region—innocent civilians are the most common victims of an everyday war fought between rival gangs, and the police.

Bus drivers in particular have been targeted by gang members. Like many Central Americans, Julio remembers the days of the civil war with kind eyes. “It is true that there were massacres, but back then the war was between two sides, today they kill you for nothing…Give me a quarter! You don’t have it? Pum! You’re dead.†In light of this violence, and realizing that his wages would never allow him to educate his daughters, he took out his liquidation money from the army and left in search of the American dream. The first time he emigrated, he joined a group of migrants and took a boat from El Salvador to the coast of Oaxaca. Upon arriving to Mexico, the group approached the driver of a large trailer and paid him to smuggle them north. In Querétaro, they boarded another trailer to take them to the border. In that last stretch, the trailer got stuck in a street festival. The sun of the early afternoon turned the aluminum trailer into a hot box. “We started screaming and kicking the blanks above us. Thankfully, the people from the festival heard us, so they grabbed the driver by the neck and made him open the trailer. Nobody died, but a few girls were unconscious for several minutes.†This second time traveling north has been substantially harder. In their first attempt to reach Arriaga, the group he was traveling with was held up at gunpoint as they were circumventing one of the checkpoints. “They took all our clothes off and made us lay on the floor with our heads down. We were nine men, six women, and a small girl. They raped the women in front of us, even the little girl was watching. We couldn’t do anything. They were all armed, one even had an Aka (AK-47).†A few days after that incident the group was detained by the police just outside Arriaga and deported to their respective countries. In Julio’s second attempt, the group was held up again at La Arrocera. “Thank God this time around they just took our money and did not rape any of our companeras. When we got to Arriaga, however, we found that a group of three women had been raped in La Arrocera just two hours before we were held up. I would never bring my daughters through this path.â€

But even making it across the border isn’t enough. Immigrants suspected of being here illegally are kept in what amount to freezers

LA Times-December 5, 2013 (Cindy Carcamo and Richard Simon, “Immigrant groups complain of 'icebox' detention cellsâ€, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-detention-centers-20131206,0,1877630.story#axzz2nOuIfNr3)//AD

TUCSON — For months, even in the 100-degree-plus desert heat, Alejandro Castear always grabbed a heavy sweater when he left his southern Arizona home. The sweater wasn't to wear, he says, but to fend off chilling memories of his time in a freezing detention center for people suspected of being in the U.S. illegally. Castear says he experienced what immigrant rights groups say is a common practice — detaining immigrants in frigid cells to pressure them to agree to deportation. Among immigrants, the cells are pejoratively called hieleras â€” Spanish for iceboxes. Castear can imagine the cold even now. "The more I think of it, the colder it gets," said the 19-year-old, who was permitted to stay in the country temporarily after the Obama administration initiated a two-year reprieve from deportation for some young people in the U.S. illegally. One immigrant rights group, in complaints filed against U.S. Customs and Border Protection, asserts that the cells are so cold that some detainees' lips and fingers have turned blue, including those of a 30-year-old woman at a Texas facility this year. "Because of the cold, she and her sisters and her sister's child would huddle together on the floor for warmth," one complaint says.

The only justification for border securitization is fear. Even though the most vulnerable site for entry into a nation would be airports, we are still fixated on the idea of crossing through walls, swimming, and walking. Most who perform border crossings are NOT security threats

Agnew 2008 (John, Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). From 1975 until 1995 he was a professor at Syracuse University in New York. Dr. Agnew teaches courses on political geography, the history of geography, European cities, and the Mediterranean World., “Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking,†Ethics and Global Politics, pg 11, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf)

In addition, as is clear from the American media rhetoric about ‘broken borders’, the fanatical CNN news anchor Lou Dobbs uses this phrase regularly to refer specifically to the US-Mexico border, and my second point, the map image of the borders of the state still exercises a major influence on the territorial imagination of whose security is at stake and who most threatens it.Many of us still live in a world where political borders are the most important signs on a world map. Even though airports, for example, may well be major sites for the arrival of contested migrants and possible terrorists, the most popular idea is that of the former running, swimming, or otherwise penetrating land and sea borders. This powerful image of the border as a guardian of personal security akin to a security perimeter or fence around one’s home underwrites much of the hardening of border controls around the US and the European Union in recent years.62 Yet, of course, this is totally misleading; not only in the fact that most undocumented aliens/those without papers/ clandestini are not security threats (at least not in the sense frequently considered as involved in terrorist plots) and once they arrive fulfill a variety of economic functions that would otherwise go unfulfilled, but that the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks around the world have involved legal visitors from ‘friendly’ countries or local citizens. The notion of trespass or unregulated violation appears to provide the primary ethical basis to the imaginative emphasis on the physical border per se as‘the face of the nation to the world’, so to speak. Rarely is it immigrants tout court who are openly in question, it is those without legal recognition. Of course, it is their very illegality that is attractive to employers and consumers because of the lack of qualification for public services and the ever-present threat of deportation as a disciplinary measure. No one talks much about how difficult it usually is to be a legal immigrant. Yet, the discourse frequently is more ambiguous in simultaneously always seeming to worry about the cultural threat that foreign immigrants of whatever legal status pose to the national identity because blood and family ties often count so much (either officially or unofficially) in most definitions of who ‘really belongs’ within the national territory.63 Even in countries which officially claim more ‘open’ definitions of citizenship than is typically the norm, such as France and the US, nativist movements have little doubt about who is more and who is less deserving of recognition as French or American. Debates about who does and who does not belong draw attention to both the fluid and the contested character of national identities.64

The criminalization of migrants is rooted in a securitizing logic – results in a carceral state

Gledhill 9 – Professor of Social Anthropology specializing in Latin American and Caribbean Studies & co-Director of University College London’s inter-disciplinary Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (John Gledhill, “Securitization and the security of citizens in the crisis

of neoliberal capitalismâ€, University College London, most recent citation = 2009, http://jg.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/Conferences/Securitization%20and%20the%20security%20of%20citizens%20in%20the%20crisis%20of%20neoliberal%20capitalism.pdf)

The response embedded in the SPP and an increasing securitization of immigration across the US-Mexico border that the Obama administration seems to be endorsing is, however, to maximise the criminalization of all migrants. Although the presentation of migration to the North as a “terrorist threat†has tended to slip out of public discourse, the involvement of Homeland Security in migration affairs has deepened as the agenda has focused more on containing transnational “organized crimeâ€. The fortification of the northern border and vast increase in the number of border patrol agents has sometimes offended Anglo residents living in run-down frontier towns dependent on Mexican labour because the security forces are no longer embedded in their communities and tear up farmland with their vehicles in hot pursuit of migrants who are simply passing through.17 But it has also created a climate in which vigilantism can flourish.18 Securitization has, however, had an impact on the migrant condition far inside the United States, creating a situation in which arrest and deportation is far more likely than in the past. The new systems built by Homeland security deputize local police and are based on the premise that the hunt is on for criminal aliens.19 This seems to have come to mean any alien who can be found guilty of any kind of felony, however, minor. So we now have people guilty of minor traffic offences being incarcerated and deported. Workers who are legal residents of the United States can be deported for having a criminal record, and a broken tail light enables a traffic cop to make enquiries about a person’s migratory status. Using false papers to obtain work is now defined as the crime of “aggravated identity theftâ€. Although this regime is certainly tough on those who consume and possess drugs, albeit in a somewhat discriminatory way, targeting migrant workers is not likely even to pick up a great many people involved in the transnational criminal economy even at the most humble level. It is, however, clearly much easier for the Homeland Security Agencies involved in this drive to root out criminal aliens, ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and CBP, Customs and Border Protection, to justify their continuing budget demands by the spectacular results to be achieved by picking easy targets. What all this is doing is making a further contribution to the development of the carceral state and society. New detention facilities have been opened to support the apparatus of punishment and deportation, and most of these have been outsourced to private corporations such as the GEO corporation. GEO offers its services to governments worldwide, but it is particularly at home in the country that has the world’s largest prison population. But while the fact that someone who has served a sentence for some sort of felony can now be rearrested and transferred to ICE custody is making the prison industry recession proof, the most terrifying implication of these changes is that the list of crimes that justify deportation is growing. Legal residents can also be deported once the Department of Homeland Security discovers that they have committed a “removable offence†at some point in their lives, and this might occur, ironically, if they were actually to seek US citizenship. The phrase “criminal alien†plays strongly in wedding US public opinion to this policy, whilst immigrants themselves are becoming increasingly nervous of walking down the street. This, then, is the kind of security that breeds insecurity among relatively powerless people who have, nevertheless, tried to make their voices heard in US society through public protests that emphasized the economic contributions made by immigrant labour. Movements to gain public support for the immigrant cause are not aided by the tendency of Latino elites who see themselves as “Hispanic†to dissociate themselves from new immigrants, a process that is sometimes reinforced by the efforts of less affluent people who have achieved some stability in US society to do the same thing, particularly when they see their jobs as threatened. But mass street demonstrations by immigrant workers manifested an enormously significant possibility. One might argue that there is a broader economic rationality here in that DHS measures complement other laws that diminish the rights of immigrants as workers and their capacity to organize. However, the public and private security industry clearly possesses economic interests of its own through budget appropriations and contracts. Taxpayers might think again about supporting these policies if they were more conscious of the full costs of persecuting Latinos for traffic violations in order to deport them. Yet the other great argument against the carceral state, that it actually breeds more crime, has been around for a long time. This, like apparent ease with which “criminal aliens†can be painted as a threat, probably reflects the vicious circle through which fear of crime draws even less affluent citizens to favour retributive justice and the mano dura, as Teresa has shown so brilliantly in her work on São Paulo.20

The use of us/them dichotomies in Latin America is the basis for violence- dividing groups into “threats†is a prerequisite for violence

Crawford and Lipschutz 97 (BEVERLY,  Adjunct Professor of Political Science and International and Area Studies, Co-Director of the European Union Center of Excellence, and Associate director of Berkeley’s Institute of European Studies. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from U.C. Berkeley, as well as an M.A. in international relations from Boston University, and a B.A. in German from Chapman College, RONNIE, Professor of Politics, University of California,. Santa Cruz and Visiting Professor of Politics and IR, Royal Holloway University of London, Discourses of War: Security and the Case of Yugoslavia, http://guessoumiss.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/critical-security-studies.pdf, 1997)

 

Our account does not rest on the collapse of Communism as the determining factor. While a weakened state or the collapse of a central control is a permissive condition for the emergence of ethnic identity in a form that may lead to violent conflict, it does not follow that such a process is somehow natural. Ethnicity and religion are politicized through a set of historical processes. In specific historical periods, society offers raw material for multiple social divisions to become issues of contention; only some of those social cleavages are translated into political divisions that turn violent. Thus, despite a potential for ethnic conflict in Latin America, for example, ethnicity has, for the most part, remained largely unpoliticized. Instead, social class historically has provided the main basis for political divisions there. We argue that exclusive and oppositional identities are politically constructed during periods of upheaval by certain members of political and economic elites, who we can call “political entrepreneurs.†Such political entrepreneurs practice the politics of identity rather than the politics of interest. These elites politicize ethnic and sectarian divisions in order to mobilize political support in their struggle with other elites for power and wealth.31 If the rhetoric of mobilization that politicizes these identities is based on claims of superiority, exclusion, and intolerance, the potential for conflict emerges. When identity politics are accompanied by claims of collective exclusivity, xenophobia, and intolerance, they raise the potential for violence against individuals identified by ascriptive characteristics as part of the excluded group. By contrast, a politics of interest is quintessentially liberal, as it is based on the notion that individuals hold multiple and crosscutting identities and interests. Conflicts of interest can be negotiated, compromised, and settled peacefully. The identities fostered by political entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are nonnegotiable so long as the practices that follow produce generally positive returns to the practitioners. Thus, identity politics in its most extreme form increases the odds that political conflicts will escalate into repression and violence.32

Death and suffering on the border is increasing with each passing day—the government formulates border security in ways that funnel migrants into the harshest conditions of nature and most dangerous passageways into the US.  Thousands of deaths can be attributed to US border security.

Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgatesâ€, New York University Publication)

As of March 2006, the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation attributed [there were] more than 3,000 deaths to a single southern California border  operation known as Operation Gatekeeper.97 Numerous other operations  have been put into place in the U.S.-Mexico border region. All  have had similar deadly impacts. Despite the death toll, the U.S. government  continues to pursue enforcement operations with great vigor. Indeed,  Congress consistently enacts proposals designed to bolster border  enforcement, with such proposals often representing the only items of  political consensus when it comes to immigration reform.  Operation Gatekeeper demonstrates the U.S. government’s callous indifference  to the human suffering caused by its aggressive border enforcement  policy. In the words of one informed commentator, “[t]he real  tragedy of [Operation] Gatekeeper . . . is the direct link . . . to the staggering  rise in the number of deaths among border crossers. [The U.S.  government] has forced these crossers to attempt entry in areas plagued  by extreme weather conditions and rugged terrain that [the U.S. government]  know[n]s to present mortal danger.â€98  In planning Operation Gatekeeper, the U.S. government knew that its  strategy would risk many lives but proceeded nonetheless. As another  observer concludes, “Operation Gatekeeper, as an enforcement immigration  policy financed and politically supported by the U.S. government,  flagrantly violates international human rights because this policy  was deliberately formulated to maximize the physical risks of Mexican  migrant workers, thereby ensuring that hundreds of them would die.â€99  Apparently, the government rationalized the deaths of migrants as collateral  damage in the “war†on illegal immigration.  Even before the 1990s, the Border Patrol had a reputation for committing  human rights abuses against immigrants and U.S. citizens of  Mexican ancestry.100 Created to police the U.S.-Mexican border, the Border  Patrol has historically been plagued by reports of brutality, shootings,  beatings, and killings.101 Amnesty International, American Friends  Service Committee, and Human Rights Watch have all issued reports  documenting recent human rights abuses by the Border Patrol.102

The border is another front of the War on Terror

Homeland Security Studies Institute (No date) (“Counter Terrorism, Borders, and Immigration, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/CBI)//AD

The Counterterrorism, Borders, and Immigration Mission Area seeks to inform the decisions of DHS staffs in reducing risk and allocating scarce resources against terrorist threats. It includes a broad spectrum of security challenges and a diverse sponsor base within and outside DHS. The counterterrorism component informs and improves efforts to deter or defeat terrorist operations. The component also focuses on security operations, law enforcement, investigative activities, and efforts to mitigate unauthorized acquisition and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. The borders and immigration component develops strategies and improves operations to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants and contraband, and adjudicate applications for citizenship and legal residence.

The border region has been securitized, militarized, and dominated by the state, increasing striation

Ross 12 (Janell, “On Drug War Violence Along Texas Border, Testimonials And Data Differ (VIDEO)â€, Huffington Post, 9/4/12, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/04/drug-war-violence_n_1849680.html)//AD

The videos, the website and a series of closed meetings (no reporters or unknown members of the general public have been allowed access, for what Staples' staff said are safety reasons) for farmers and ranchers that began in March 2011 have created a space where many right-leaning -- or as one rancher told The Huffington Post, "right of the Republican Party" -- residents spend time calling for increased federal spending. Overall border security spending and staffing have expanded dramatically under the Obama administration, according to federal data. Many Democrats say that increased staffing and technology such as unmanned drones and camera-equipped blimps have brought the country closer to an impenetrable border than it has ever been before. In May 2011, Obama came to El Paso and gave a speech that Staples and others mention often. We now have more boots on the ground on the southwest border than at any time in our history. The Border Patrol has 20,000 agents -- more than twice as many as there were in 2004, a build-up that began under President Bush and that we have continued. They wanted a fence. Well, that fence is now basically complete. And we've gone further. We tripled the number of intelligence analysts working the border. I've deployed unmanned aerial vehicles to patrol the skies from Texas to California. We've forged a partnership with Mexico to fight the transnational criminal organizations that have affected both of our countries. And for the first time we are screening 100 percent of southbound rail shipments -- to seize guns and money going south even as we go after drugs coming north. So, we have gone above and beyond what was requested by the very Republicans who said they supported broader reform as long as we got serious about enforcement. But even though we've answered these concerns, I suspect there will be those who will try to move the goal posts one more time. They'll say we need to triple the border patrol. Or quadruple the border patrol. They'll say we need a higher fence ... Maybe they'll say we need a moat. Or alligators in the moat. When the president mentioned the moat, some people in the audience laughed. Mike Vickers, a veterinarian who wears a cowboy hat and occasionally fatigues, owns a ranch about 70 miles from the border in Brooks County, Texas. He wasn't at the speech, but he was not amused.

The state gains power by striating space, closing off territories and allocating them according to the needs of fascism.

Watson 2005 (Janell, Prof. @ Virginia Tech & Editor of Minnesota Review. “Oil Wars, or the Extrastate Conflict ‘Beyond the Line’: Schmitt’s Nomos, Deleuze’s War Machine, and the New Order of the Earth.†South Atlantic Quarterly 104:2.)

Because movement is the essential spatial aspect of oil, the Schmittian framework may be inadequate to fully understand the oil war. Like Schmitt, Gilles Deleuze and FeÅLlix Guattari also establish a spatial divide between state space and not–state space, which they define as sedentary and nomadic, respectively. They write that ‘‘the State itself has always been in a relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship.’’ 6However, whereas Schmitt dwelt on the legal differences among the terrestrial, maritime, and aerial, Deleuze and Guattari focus on the modes of organization of different spaces, and the different kinds of movement possible within each. In the striated space of the state, they explain, ‘‘one closes off a surface and ‘allocates’ it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks.’’ In the smooth space of the nomads, in contrast, ‘‘one ‘distributes’ oneself in an open space.’’7 The state allocates striated space, while nomads populate smooth space. Making a similar distinction, Schmitt emphasized that order and orientation divide land, in contrast to the indifferentiation of the free space of the sea—at least until the technology of the submarine transformed the sea by muddling the distinction between land war and sea war, which had previously been subjected to different legal regulations. 8 While Deleuze and Guattari agree that the sea and the desert have historically tended to be smooth spaces, any space may be striated, whether that space consists of land, sea, air, or digitized signals.

American military doctrine has radically shifted; terror is the new condition for war and our enemies are symbolic and immaterial. This shift has been reflected by the creation of a global war machine that has moved beyond the fascist to the post fascist which surpasses even total war

 

Buchanan 6 (Ian, Australian cultural theorist based at Cardiff University in the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, “Deleuze and the Contemporary World: Treaties on Militarism†Deleuze Connections, Edinburgh University Press. 30-35)

For Wallerstein (2003), the Vietnam War represented a rejection by the third-world of the 'Yalta accord', the less than gentlemanly agreement between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, to divide the planet into spheres of interest (the USA grabbing two-thirds and the USSR a third). He treats America's willingness to invest all its military strength in the struggle and more or less bankrupt itself in the process as testament to the felt geopolitical significance of the conflict. And yet, as he puts it, it was still defeated. While I accept the first part of his thesis, I disagree with his conclusion because I think the very premise on which it rests lost its validity in the course of the war. A pragmatically conceived intervention designed to stop the spread of revolutionary communism became the US military's own equivalent of a 'cultural revolution' as it underwent a profound rethinking of its mode of acting in the world.18 I do not mean to claim as military revisionists have done that Vietnam was actually a victory for the USA (the right wing rhetoric on this, so resonant of the early days of the Nazi party, is that the government and the people back home betrayed the soldiers on the front line and didn't allow them to win).19 With Baudrillard, I want to argue that there occurred a paradigm shift during the course of that protracted and, bitter struggle which resulted in the concepts of victory and defeat losing their meaning. Why did this American defeat (the largest reversal in the history of the USA) have no internal repercussions in America? If it had really signified the failure of the planetary strategy of the United States, it would necessarily have completely disrupted its internal balance and the American political system. Nothing of the sort occurred. Something else, then, took place. (Baudrillard 1994: 36) Baudrillard's answer to this question is that war ceased to be real; it ceased to be determined in terms of winning and losing and became instead 'simulation', a pure spectacle no less terrifying or deadly for its lack of reality. The consequences of this metaphysical adjustment are shocking and go a long way towards explaining the rise of terrorism in recent years. As Andrew Bacevich writes, it is not only the superpowers like the US that have relinquished the concept of victory. It is as though war itself has jettisoned it as so much extra baggage. The typical armed conflict today no longer pits like against like - field army v. field army or battle fleet v. battle fleet - and there usually is no longer even the theoretical prospect of a decisive outcome. In asymmetric conflicts, combatants employ violence indirectly. The aim is not to defeat but to intimidate and terrorise, with women a favoured target and sexual assault often the weapon of choice. (Bacevich 2005: 26) The B52 pilot unloading bombs on an unseen enemy below knows just as well as the suicide bomber in Iraq that his actions will not lead directly to a decisive change, that in a sense the gesture is futile; but, he also knows, as does the suicide bomber, that his actions will help create an atmosphere of fear that, it is hoped, will one day lead to change. Deprived of teleology, war thrives in an eternal present. Terror is not merely the weapon of the weak, it is the new condition of war, and no power can claim exception status. For Clausewitz and his spiritual tutor Machiavelli the only rational reason to wage war is to win where winning means achieving a predetermined and clearly prescribed goal. Britain's colonial wars are an obvious case in point. The self- serving claim that Britain acquired its empire in a fit of absence,owes its sense to the fact that it never set out to gain its eventually quite consid- erable empire (it was at least geographically true, albeit .not historically true, that the sun never set on the British Empire, encompassing as it did territories in virtually every region of the world) all at once, as Hitler and Hirohito were later to do, but built it one territory at a time over a two-century-long period. Through a sequence of limited wars it was able to deploy its limited means to obtain colossal riches. World War I essentially started out in the same way. Germany's goal was to secure a European empire before it was too late, but barbed wire, heavy artillery and the machine-gun put paid to that ambition and instead of a quick war returning a specific prize there irrupted ;a global conflagration that was to consume the wealth and youth of Europe. As Wallerstein argues, the true victor of World War I wasn't Britain or France, but American industry, and by extension the true loser wasn't Germany and its allies but Europe itself. Eric Hobsbawm has defined the twentieth century as the age when wars of limited means and limited aims gave way to wars of limited means and unlimited aims (Hobsbawm 1994: 29-30). The twenty-first century appears to be the age of wars of unlimited means and no precise aim. This, according to Deleuze and Guattari 'is the point at which Clausewitz's formula is effectively reversed'. When total war - for instance, war which not only places the annihilation of the enemy's army at its centre but its entire population and economy too - becomes the object of the state-appropriated war machine, 'then at this level in the set of all-possible conditions, the object and the aim enter into new relations that can reach the point of contradiction' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 421). In the first instance, the war machine unleashed by the state in pursuit of its object, total war, remains subordinate to the state and 'merely realises the maximal conditions' of its aims. Paradoxically, though, the more successful it is in realising the state's aims, the less controllable by the state it becomes. As the state's aims grow on the back of the success of its war machine, so the restrictions on the war machine's object shrink until - scorpion-like - it effectively subsumes the state, making it just one of its many moving parts. In Vietnam, the state was blamed for the failure of the war machine precisely because it attempted to set limits on its object. Its inability adequately to impose these limits not only cost it the war, but in effect its sovereignty too. Since then the state has been a puppet of a war machine global in scope and ambition. This is the status of militarism today and no-one has described its characteristics more chillingly than Deleuze and Guattari: This worldwide war machine, which in a way 'reissues' from the States, displays two successive figures: first, that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited movement with no other aim than itself; but fascism is only a rough sketch, and the second, postfascist, figure is that of a war machine that takes peace as its object, directly, as the peace of Terror or Survival. The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth. Total war is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 421) It is undoubtedly Chalmers Johnson who has done the most to bring to our attention the specific make-up of what Deleuze and Guattari call here the worldwide war machine (Johnson 2000, 2004). His description of a global 'empire of bases' is consistent with Deleuze. and Guattari's uptake of Paul Virilio's concept of the 'fleet in being'. This is the paradoxical transformation of the striated space of organisation into a new kind of 'reimparted' smooth space 'which outflanks all gridding and invents a neonomadism in the service of a war machine still more disturbing than the States' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 480). Bases do not by themselves secure territory but, as is the case with a battle fleet, their mobility and their firepower mean they can exert an uncontestable claim over territory that amounts to control. This smooth space surrounding the earth is, to put it back into Baudrillard's terms, the space of simulation. The empire of bases is a virtual construct with, real capability. Fittingly enough, it was Jean Baudrillard who first detected that a structural change in post-World War II militarism had taken place. In Simulacra and Simulation he argues that the Vietnam War was a demonstration of a new kind of will to war, one that no longer thought in terms of winning or losing, but defined itself instead in terms of perseverance (Baudrillard 1994: 37). It demonstrated to the US's enemies, clients and allies alike, its willingness to continue the fight even when defeat was certain, or had in a sense already been acknowledged (the US strategy of 'Vietnamising' the war which commenced shortly after the Tet offensive in 1968, and become official policy under Nixon, was patently an admission that the war couldn't be won - in the short term it was Johnson's way of putting off admitting defeat until after the election so as to give Hubert Humphrey some chance of victory; in the longer term it was a way of buying time for a diplomatic solution) (Kolko 1994: 321). It was a demonstration of the US's reach, of its ability to inflict destruction even when its troops were withdrawing and peace talks (however futile) were under way. It also demonstrated to the American people that the fight could be continued as the troops were withdrawn, a factor that, as I've already pointed out, would become decisive in reshaping militarism as an incorporeal system. It was also a demonstration to the American domestic population that the country's leaders were willing to continue to sacrifice lives to prove this point.20 The contrary view, that Nixon wanted to end the war sooner but was unable to do so because domestic politics didn't allow it, in no way contradicts this thesis. If anything it confirms it because if true it would mean, as Deleuze and Guattari have said of fascism 'at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions' the American people wanted Vietnam, and, as they add: 'It is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 29). While there can be no doubt Vietnam was an unpopular war that was eventually brought to a halt by popular pressure, it is a sobering thought to remind oneself that it was a war that lasted some ten years. If one takes 1967 as the decisive turning point in popular opinion, the moment when protest against the war became the prevailing view and support for it dwindled into a minority murmur, then, one still has to, take stock of the fact that it took a further six years for US troops to be fully withdrawn.21 The kind of sustained popular pressure that brought the Vietnam War to a close has not yet even begun to build in the US in spite of the fact that the death toll has passed 1,700 (as of August 2005). Wars are spectacles in the traditional sense of being events staged to convey a specific message, but also in the more radical or postmodern sense that spectacle is the final form of war, the form war takes when it takes peace as its object. Hence, the military's facilitation of the media (this backfired to a large degree in Vietnam, but the lessons learned then are put to good use today). Ultimately, though, as Baudrillard rightly argues, the 'media and official news services are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality, of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of the facts' (Baudrillard. 1994: 38). Chillingly, this is no longer an incisive criticism of the state, but its explicit outlook. In a conversation with a 'senior adviser' to President Bush, New York Times Magazine reporter Ron Suskind was told: We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're [i.e., the media] studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. (cited in Danner 2005a: 73) The creation of that reality - or what Tony Blair more pointedly referred to as the 'political context' for action - was, as Mark Danner has conclusively shown, the true purpose behind the spurious charge that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Planning for the Iraq war began as early as 21 November 2001, when Rumsfeld was ordered by Bush to explore military options for removing Saddam Hussein by force. The decision to execute these plans was made in mid-July 2002 - the only issue left to be decided at that point was how to justify it to the public. Not without some hesitation, the WMD card was played - it was a risky move because if the weapons inspectors were able to demonstrate that Iraq had in fact destroyed its WMDs then it would look like the UN process had worked. If Iraq could be made to look non-compliant, secretive and cunning, as was the case, then the failure to find WMDs could be explained away as evidence of preparation for war (Danner 2005a: 70). Ironically, as Hans Blix himself realised, the worst-case scenario for Iraq was not to be found hiding weapons, but the very opposite - 'It occurred to me', Blix wrote, 'that the Iraqis would be in greater difficulty if . . . there truly were no weapons of which they could "yield possession" ' because then they'd have no way of proving compliance (Danner 2005a: 73). By not having any WMDs to give up, they couldn't prove they didn't have any to begin with, nor could they demonstrate their good faith in wanting to get rid of WMDs. From this perspective, North Korea is clearly correct in its surmise that it is better off having WMDs because not only is not, having them no deterrent to invasion, it seems not having them is a positive invitation for invasion because it denies the targeted country the diplomatic 'out' of giving them up and conspicuously demonstrating to a world audience that a political solution is being actively pursued. Far from being a last-ditch effort to save peace and prevent war, the UN weapons inspection gambit was a calculated stratagem to make war possible. The US reluctance to involve the UN had nothing to do with its claimed inefficiencies and everything to do with its likely*success. What the US could not allow, if it wanted its war plans to proceed, was for the weapons inspection teams to-reveal - in Blix's words - that 'the UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it' (Danner 2005a: 73). Therefore, right from the start the whole process had to be cast as a failure, or more particularly as wasting precious time that might at any moment see those WMDs used against US targets. This then became the basis for the 'preventive war' rhetoric. The justification for war was stage-managed with the consummate skill of a corporate brand manager. The White House chief of staff Andrew Gard even put it that way to the New York Times, referring to the build- ing of a case for war as a product roll-out (cited in Danner 2005a: 72). At least since the start of World War II, when the Nazis dressed dead Polish soldiers in German uniforms and displayed their corpses to the world as justification for war, almost all modern wars have resorted to such media-friendly theatrical 'events'. A simulated event is needed to prove that no dissimulation has been involved in justifying the war. Chomsky's analyses of current trends in US imperialism lend further weight to this thesis that wars are spectacles by undercutting their reality in a different, more concrete fashion. As he argues, 'preventive' wars are only fought against the basically defenseless.22 Chomsky adds two further conditions that chime with what we have already adduced: there must be something in it for the aggressor, for instance, a fungible return not an intangible moral reward, and the opponent must be susceptible to a portrayal of them as 'evil', allowing the victory to be claimed in the name of a higher moral purpose and the actual venal purpose to be obscured (Chomsky 2003: 17). At first glance, waging war to prevent war appears to be as farcical as fucking for virginity, but that is only if we assume that the aim of the war is to prevent one potential aggressor from striking first. Or, rather, given that it is alleged that the putative enemy, Al Qaeda and its supposed supporters, took first blood (the Rambo reference is of course deliberate), we are asked to believe the current war is being fought to prevent a second, more damaging strike. The obsessive and suitably grave references to Weapons of Mass Destruction by the various mouthpieces of the Bush regime (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, but also Blair and Howard) are plainly calculated to compel us to accept that any such second strike will be of biblical, or worse, Hollywood proportions. As one joke put it, the Americans could be certain that Iraq had at least some Weapons of Mass Destruction because they had the receipts to prove it. The grain of truth in this joke reveals the true purpose of the war - it was a demonstration to all of America's clients that it wouldn't tolerate 'price-gouging'. Obviously I am speaking metaphorically here, but the fact is that Saddam's Iraq was a client of the US, it purchased arms and consumer goods and sold oil at a carefully controlled price. Why this arrangement suddenly became so unsatisfactory is subject to a great deal of speculation which centres on two basic theories: (1) when Iraq switched from the dollar to the euro it posed an intolerable threat to the stability of the US currency, (2) the US is positioning itself to monopolise oil ahead of growing Chinese demand. Either way, if one wants a metaphor to describe US imperialism it wouldn't be McDonald's, a comparatively benign operator, but the predatory retail giant Wal-Mart.23 In other words, today's wars are fought to demonstrate will. The age of gunboat diplomacy - when gunboats were used to open up markets and impose favourable market conditions for the foreign traders - has given way to the age of gunboat commerce, an era in which war does not precede commerce, but is integral to it.24 When war changed its object it was able to change its aim too, and it is this more than anything that has saved 'real' war from itself. Baudrillard's later work on the spectacle of war misses this point: through becoming spectacles the fact that real wars (for example, territorial wars) are no longer possible has not diminished their utility - the US isn't strong enough to take and hold Iraq, but it can use its force to demonstrate to other small nations that it can inflict massive damage and lasting pain on anyone who would dare defy it. Baudrillard's lament that the real Gulf War never took place can only be understood from this viewpoint - although he doesn't put it in these words, his insight is essentially that war in its idealised form is much more terrifying than peace. Again, although Baudrillard himself doesn't put it this way, the conclusion one might draw from the paradigm shift in war's rationalisatiomelucidated above - from pragmatic object (defeating North Vietnam) to symbolic object (defending the credibility of the fight forces) - is that war has become 'postmodern'. This shift-is what enables the US, ideologically, to justify war in the absence of a proper object and indeed in the absence of a known enemy. The Bush regime's 'war on terror' is the apotheosis of this change: the symbolic (terror) has been made to appear instrumental (terrorism), or more precisely the symbolic is now able to generate the instrumental according to its own needs. This is the moment when the war machine becomes militarism, the moment when doxa becomes doctrine. What is a war machine? The answer to this question must always be, it is a concept. But because of the way Deleuze and Guattari create their concepts, by abstracting from the historical, there is always a temptation to treat the war machine as primarily descriptive. More importantly, the war machine is only one element in a complex treatise which is ultimately a mordant critique of the present. Deleuze and Guattari's analysis proceeds via a threefold hypothesis: (1) the war machine is a nomad invention that does not have war as its primary object, war is rather a second-order objective, (2) the war machine is exterior to the state apparatus, but when the state appropriates the war machine its nature and function changes, its polarity is effectively reversed so that it is directed at the nomads themselves, (3) it is only when the war machine has been appropriated by the state that war becomes its primary object (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 418)Deleuze and Guattari are careful to clarify that their main purpose in assigning the invention of the war machine to the nomads is to assert its historical or 'invented' character. Their implication is that the nomadic people of the steppes and deserts do not hold the secret to understanding the war machine. We need to look past the concrete historical and geographical character of the war machine to see its eidetic core. Clearly, it is not 'the nomad who defines this constellation of characteristics'; on the contrary, 'it is this constellation that defines the nomad, and at the same time the essence of the war machine' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 422-3). In its nomad origins, the war machine does not have war as its primary objective. Deleuze and Guattari arrive at this conclusion by way of three questions. First of all they ask: is battle the object of war? Then they ask if war is the object of the war machine. And finally they ask if the war machine is the object of the state. The first question requires further and immediate clarification, they say, between when a battle is sought and when it is avoided. The difference between these two states of affairs Is not the difference between an offensive and defensive posture. And while it is true that at first glance war does seem to have battle as its object whereas the guerrilla has non-battle his object, this view is deceiving. Dropping bombs from 10,000 metres above the earth, firing missiles from a distance of hundreds of kilometres, using unpiloted drones to scout for targets, using satellite controlled and guided weapons, are the actions of a war-machine that has no interest at all in engaging in battle. The truism that the Viet Cong frustrated the US Army in Vietnam by failing to engage them in battle should not be taken to mean the US Army sought battle and the enemy did not. The Viet Cong frustrated the US Army by failing to succumb to its non-battle strategies and forced them into seeking battles with an elusive army with a better understanding of the terrain. If operation 'Rolling Thunder', or any of the many other battle-avoiding stratagems the US attempted had worked, they would not have sought battle at all.25 Ironically, too, as Gabriel Kolko points out, the more strategic the US tried to make its offensive operations, for example, the more it tried to disengage from face-to-face encounters on the battlefield, the more passive its posture became because of its escalating logistical support requirements and increasing reliance on high maintenance technology (Kolko 1994: 193). By the same token, it is clear that the guerilla armies of the Viet Cong did in fact seek battle, but did so on their own terms. As Mao said, the guerilla strikes where the other is weak and retreats whenever the stronger power attacks, the point being that the guerilla is constantly on the look-out for an opportunity to engage the enemy.26 Battle and non- battle 'are the double object of war, according to a criterion that does not coincide with the offensive and the defensive, or even with war proper and guerrilla warfare' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 417). For this reason the question has to be pushed further back to ask if war is even the object of the war machine? Too often the answer to this^question is automatically 'yes', but this reflects a precise set of historical circumstances and /fiofc arfessentialjcondition. It is true, throughout history, that nomads are regularly to be found in conflict situations, but this is because history is studded with collisions between war machines and the states and cities which would grind them into the dust. War is thrust upon the war machine, but its actual occupation is quite different. It could even be said to be peaceful were we not suspicious of that term. And as I have already argued, it is when the war machine takes peace itself as its object that it enters its most terrifying phase.

We embrace insecurity as a political statement – this is the only way to produce a fearlessness necessary to avoid the biopolitics of security.

Koppensteiner 9 [Norbert, “ON MOVING: NOMADISM AND (IN)SECURITYâ€; Norbert Koppensteiner is a peace researcher, currently based in Vienna and Innsbruck/Austria. He is the program coordinator of the MA Program in Peace, Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation and the research and publications coordinator of the UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies at the University of Innsbruck. 2009. http://www.kurator.org/media/uploads/publications/DB04/Koppensteiner.pdf]

 

Nomadicism today seems to be more important than ever, in a time when  contemporary geo- and biopolitics of security aim at intensifying striation, at  producing sedentary, stable - and thus predictable – subjects (Dillon 2007).  While in the past, nomads of all stripes were forced to become settled under  the master-signiï¬ers of progress, enlightenment, civilisation or development,  striation these days largely builds on the emotion of fear. Activating the memories of past traumas, security discourses narrate threats into existence,  which it afterwards pretends to ï¬ght. 9/11, terrorism, Muslim fundamentalism  are the chiffres around which this fear can be crystallised and what it turns into  are much broader categories - fear of the Other, fear of difference and of the  uncertainties of becoming. Those strategies aim to incite subjects to invest in  the identity positions so fabricated – the one of fearful citizens clamoring for security. The biopolitical move of striation is thus to make a certain form of  life that corresponds to the needs of the security apparatus for fearful citizens,  which then democratically provides it with the necessary legitimacy. Yet  whenever power takes life as its object, as Gilles Deleuze succinctly remarked, it  is inevitable that life becomes resistance to power (1988: 92). A nomadic politics would therefore aim at re-introducing smooth space into  the striation. At stake are concrete forms of living, possibilities of expression, of  living and thinking differently. If fear is the primary incentive to accept striation,then refusing to let one’s actions be guided by it turns into a political statement.  Yet this fearlessness can not be born out of certainty, out of a superior position  which knows better, but on the contrary out of embracing the very insecurity of  existence which striation tries to banish. Openness, fluidity, risk, connection and circulation are acknowledged as parts of daily existence and welcomed as such,  instead of feared. Not giving in to the striation also implies an openness towards  transformation, a willingness to let the new emerge out of the concrete situation.  This way the possibility for smooth space arises.  In a nomadic politics the stake is always also the own becoming. Nomadic living  and thinking lead to a form of resistance that tries to safeguard the possibilities  inherent to movement and the becoming-differently that it might engender. As  such, it is a risky strategy, for what is at stake is always the own becoming, the  continued possibilities for the own living and thinking. From the above rendering, it ï¬nally also follows that no prescriptive recipes for  action can be forthcoming. Nomadic becomings are notoriously hard to predict and enact rhizomatic fluctuations instead of following the pre-given paths of the  sedentary. This will be a disappointment for everybody looking for universal  ‘how-to’s’ and global strategies of resistance. Instead, responses will have to  be elicited (Lederach 1995) from the concrete situation. What is necessary is  situational awareness instead of pre-given strategies, nomadic movements of  displacement, which change together with the conditions. Just as smooth space  is formed with the paths that traverse it and thus remains constantly emergent,  nomadic movements cannot be charted once and for all. They afï¬rm and create  insecurity, instead of opting for the sedentariness and stability of the secured.  Therein lies their exhilarating freedom, their potential for becoming and therein  also lies, for whomever so inclined, their potential for resistance.

We must free politics from acting out of fear and securitization—reject fascism through embracing insecurity and the nomad

Foucault 83 (Michel, French philosopher and studied humanities at École Normale Supérieure “anti-oedipus†Preface xiil)

Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic adversary is  fascism (whereas Anti-Oedipus' opposition to the others is more of a  tactical engagement). And not only historical fascism, the fascism of  Hitler and Mussolini—which was able to mobilize and use the desire of  the masses so effectively—but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and  in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. I would say that Anti-Oedipus (may its authors forgive me) is a book  of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time (perhaps that explains why its success was not limited to a  particular "readership": being anti-oedipal has become a life style, a way  of thinking and living). How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our  behavior? The Christian moralists sought out the traces of the flesh  lodged deep within the soul. Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue  the slightest traces of fascism in the body. Paying a modest tribute to Saint Francis de Sales,* one might say ¶ that Anti-Oedipus is an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life. This art of living counter to all forms of fascism, whether already  present or impending, carries with it a certain number of essential  principles which I would summarize as follows if I were to make this  great book into a manual or guide to everyday life: • Free political action from all unitary and totalizing paranoia. ¶ • Develop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchiza-tion.  • Withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law,  limit, castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held  sacred as a form of power and an access to reality. Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities,  mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic. • Do not think that one has to be sad in order to be militant, even  though the thing one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the forms of representation) that  possesses revolutionary force. • Do not use thought to ground a political practice in Truth; nor political action to discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought. Use  political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier  of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action.  • Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the  individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be  the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization.  • Do not become enamored of power.  It could even be said that Deleuze and Guattari care so little for power that they have tried to neutralize the effects of power linked to  their own discourse. Hence the games and snares scattered throughout  the book, rendering its translation a feat of real prowess. But these are not the familiar traps of rhetoric; the latter work to sway the reader  without his being aware of the manipulation, and ultimately win him  over against his will. The traps of Anti-Oedipus ate those of humor: so many invitations to let oneself be put out, to take one's leave of the text ¶ and slam the door shut. The book often leads one to believe it is all fun  and games, when something essential is taking place, something of ¶ extreme seriousness: the tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from ¶ the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that  constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives.

 

 

Rejecting the state’s striated and securitized mode of thinking through embracing nomadology is key. The nomadic war machine undermines state philosophy and fascism while traditional forms of resistance feed back into statist flows. Nomadology creates new possibilities for becoming and smooths out space.

 

Bell 2010 (David, PhD candidate @ Univ. of Nottingham. “Fail Again. Fail Better: Nomadic Utopianism in Deleuze and Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin.†Political Perspectives, 4:1)

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop their nomadic thought further with the concept of the ‘nomadic war machine’. This is a vehicle (or ‘assemblage’ or relation of forces) of becoming entirely immanent to itself which ‘in no way has war as its object, but rather the emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passage of mutant flows (in this sense, every new creation is brought about by a war machine). There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 253). Although Deleuze and Guattari make no mention of anarchism in their work, the nomadic war machine is clearly an anarchistic concept operating ‘against State apparatus’ which form an almost religious entity that dominates its citizens (Newman, 2007: 99). Yet as Newman makes clear - and as I note above- the state in Deleuze and Guattari refers not just to a geopolitical entity but to the ‘abstract state’- a set of principles, values and norms whose aim is to ‘conserve’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 394) and thus to halt immanent life-flows. As Newman notes: ‘according to this analysis, most political philosophy - including even anarchism based on a rational critique of the state and a Manichean division between ‘rational’ society and ‘irrational’ power, would be considered state philosophy. It leaves the place of state power intact by subjecting revolutionary action to rational injunctions that channel it into state forms’ (2007: 99). Nomadic thought and its partner in practice - the nomadic war machine - is an attempt to escape this double-bind: it maps irrational ‘lines of flight’ and flees from rationally constructed transcendent schemas, creating what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘smooth space’: a ‘nomadic’ space which is ‘occupied without being counted’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 399) and in which ‘movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 389). Smooth space is ‘heterogenous, in continuous variation…amorphous and not homogenous’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 536). It is filled with ‘multiplicity which changes in nature when it divides’ (ibid.: 534), thus creating new arrangements of forces; new possibilities for life. This stands in contrast to striated space - an arrangement in which life is organized according to hierachical, transcendent principles: a ‘Euclidean space’9 in which linkages are defined and can only be effected in one way (ibid.: 535-6).

The war machine promotes revolutionary and disorganizing modes of desire while acting as a weapon against the state apparatus

 

Voithofer & Foley 2009 (Rick, Ohio State Univ., and Alan, Syracuse Univ. “(Re)territorializing Literacies in Urban Landscapes.†AERA Conference Paper, San Diego, CA.)

War, according to Deleuze, is comparable to thought. The war machine prevents the centralization of nomadic groups, based, for example, on race, class, ability, or gender into a homogenized set of values – what Deleuze calls “the stateâ€. War is exterior to the state which is unaware of the potential violence of reason and leads to “the drawing of a creative line of flight†(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 466) that reveal the power of becoming. Becoming involves a deterritorialization that disrupts the familiar, along new directions in new and experimental ways. Deterritorialization is inseparable from reterritorialization - they both serve to reinscribe order. The war machine must, in turn, distinguish between desire that is created, organized and maintained by prohibitionary mechanisms through regulation and codification by the state and a form of desire that is revolutionary and disorganizing and exists outsides [the] state regulations and codes. "The war machine does not in itself have war as its object, but necessarily adopts it as its object when it allows itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 513)

Borders must be made more porous—smooth space, undoes identity [i ran out of words okay]

Conley ‘06 (Verena Andermatt, professor of literature at Harvard, “Borderlines; Deleuze and the Contemporary World, 95-100)

Over the last few decades, decolonisation, transportation, and electronic revolutions have transformed the world. They have led to financial and population flows. Financial flows seem to be part of a borderless world. Today, human migrations occur on all continents. They are producing multiple crossings of external borders that in many places have resulted in local resistance and, in reaction, to the erection of more internal borders that inflect new striated spaces in the form of racism and immigration policy. The ultimate goal for the utopian thinker espousing the cause of rhizomatic thinking is smooth space that would entail the erasure of all borders and the advent of a global citizenry living in ease and without the slightest conflict over religion or ideology. In the transitional moment in which we find ourselves arguing for smooth space can easily lead to a non-distinction between alternative spaces in which goods and currencies circulate to the detriment of the world at large.To account for the transformation specifically of the state and its subjects in a global world, I will argue by way of recent writings by Etienne Balibar for the continued importance of rhizomatic connectivity and also for a qualified notion of smooth space. Striated spaces will have to be continually smoothed so that national borders would not simply encircle a territory. Borders would have to be made more porous and nationality disconnected from citizenship so as to undo striated space inside the state by inventing new ways of being in common. Such a rethinking of borders would lead to further transformations by decoupling the nation from the state. It would open possibilities of â€“ rhizomatic – connections and new spaces. It would produce new hybrids everywhere without simply a ‘withering away of the state’ as advocated by Deleuze and Guattari. Currently, subjects (defined as humans who are asseuttis [subjected] to paternal state power)also want to be citizens (who can individually and collectively define the qualities of their habitus or environment). Yet, the latter are still part of the state. They are not yet entirely global, transnational citizens or cyber-citizens. While information networks seem to operate like rhizomes, it is of continued importance to retain the notion of state but to define it with more porous, connective borderlines so as ultimately to disconnect citizens from nationality. Deleuze and Guattari figure with other philosophers, anthropologists or sociologists who, following 1968, pay renewed attention to space. Their focus on space reappears at the very time Cartesian philosophies undergo radical changes due to the acceleration of new technologies and rapid globalisation. Many thinkers – Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio – condemn what they perceive as the increasing encroachment of technologies that quickly replace more traditional ways of being in the world. People who find themselves out of synch with their environment urge recourse to the body and new ways of using language. Deleuze and Guattari insert themselves into that line of thinking. Their criticism of the static order is twofold. They criticise an inherited spatial model defined by vertical orderings that has dominated the West. In that model, space was considered to be pre-existing. It became a simple décor for human action. Deleuze and Guattari propose not only a criticism of the static model but also invent an entirely new way of thinking space. They propose a more horizontal – and, paradoxically, if seemingly two-dimensional, even more spatial – thinking of the world in terms of rhizomatic lines and networks. In accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s way of thinking through connections, the two regimes always coexist in an asymmetrical relation. They can never be entirely separated or opposed. In ‘Rhizome’, first published in French in 1976 and translated into English as ‘On the Line’, Deleuze and Guattari claim that for several hundred years it was believed that the world was developing vertically in the shape of a tree (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). The choice of a tree limits possibilities. The mature tree is already contained in the seed. There is some leeway as to form and size, but the seed will become nothing more than the tree that it is destined to be. In lieu of the tree, Deleuze and Guattari propose an adventitious network, a mobile structure that can be likened to underground filaments of grass or the mycelia of fungi. A rhizome moves horizontally and produces offshoots from multiple bifurcations at its meristems. It changes its form by connecting and reconnecting. It does not have a finite or ultimate shape. Space does not pre-exist the rhizome; rather, it is created through and between the proliferating lines. Rhizomes connect and open spaces in-between which, in the rooted world of the tree, an inside (the earth) is separated from an outside (the atmosphere). Unlike the tree, the rhizome can never be fixed or reduced to a single point or radical core. Its movement is contrasted with the stasis of the arborescent model. In ‘Rhizome’ the vertical, arborescent model contributes to the creation of striated spaces. In the ebullient imagination of the two authors it appears that the latter slow down and even prevent movement of the kind they associate with emancipation and creativity. Instead of imitating a tree, Deleuze and Guattari exhort their readers to make connections by following multiple itineraries of investigation, much as a rhizome moves about the surface it creates as it goes. Rhizomes form a territory that is neither fixed nor bears any clearly delimited borders. In addition to this novel way of thinking, rhizomatically, the philosophers make further distinctions between smooth and striated spaces. Smooth spaces allow optimal circulation and favour connections. Over time, however, smooth spaces tend to become striated. They lose their flexibility. Nodes and barriers appear that slow down circulation and reduce the number of possible connections. Writing Anti-Oedipus in a post-1968 climate, Deleuze and Guattari propose rhizomatic connections that continually rearticulate smooth space in order not only to criticise bourgeois capitalism with its institutions – the family, school, church, the medical establishment (especially psychiatry) – but also to avoid what they see as a deadened or zombified  state of things. They criticise the state for erecting mental and social barriers and for creating oppositions instead of furthering connections.Institutions and the state are seen as the villains that control and immobilize people from the top down. They argue that when the family, the church or the ‘psy’ instill guilt in a child, mental barriers and borders are erected. The child’s creativity, indeed its mental and physical mobility are diminished in the process. Such a condition cripples many adults who have trees growing in their heads. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of Little Hans, a child analysed by Freud and whose creativity, they declare, was blocked by adults who wrongly interpreted his attempts to trace lines of flight within and through the structure of the family into which he had been born (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 14). The state, too, functions by ordering, organizing and arresting movement, by creating relations of inclusion and exclusion. The state facilitates the creation of rigid and often ossified institutions. It enacts laws of inclusion and exclusion that order the family and the social in general. It tries to immobilize and dominate the social worldYet the social cannot be entirely dominated. The organising régime of the order-word is never stable. It is constantly being transformed. Lines detacthemselves from fuzzy borders and introduce variations in the constant of the dominant order. These variations can lead to a break and produce lines of flight that bring about entirely new configurations. Of importance in the late 1960s and 1970s is the doing away with institutions and the state that represses subjects. In Anti-Oedipus, the philosophers show how institutions like the family and psychiatry repress sexuality and desire in order to maximize their revenue. They argue for the creation of smooth spaces where desire can circulate freely. In A Thousand Plateaus, the bourgeois state ordered by the rules of capitalism is criticised. Deleuze and Guattari rarely contexualise the ‘state’ in any specific historical or political terms. Constructing a universal history of sorts, the philosophers note that the state apparatus appears at different times and in different places. This apparatus is always one of capture. It appropriates what they call a ‘nomadic war machine’ that never entirely disappears. The nomadic war machine eludes capture and traces its own lines of flight. It makes its own smooth spaces. Here Deleuze and Guattari have faith in â€˜subjects’ who undermine control by creating new lines of flight. These subjects deviate from the dominant order that uses ‘order-words’ to obtain control. Order-words produce repetitions and reduce differences. They produce molar structures and aggregates that make it more difficult for new lines to take flight. Yet something stirs, something affects a person enough to make her or him deviate from the prescriptive meanings of these words. Deleuze and Guattari would say that the subject molecularises the molar structures imposed by the state. People continually trace new maps and invent lines of flight that open smooth spaces. Deleuze and Guattari call it a ‘becoming-revolutionary’ of the people. In 1980, the philosophers also claim that humans inaugurate an age of becoming-minoritarian. The majority, symbolized by the 35-year-old, white, working male, they declare, no longer prevails. A new world is opening, a world of becoming-minoritarian in which women, Afro-American, post-colonial and queer subjects of all kinds put the dominant order into variation. Changes of this nature occur at the limit of mental and social territories, from unstable borders without any clearly defined division between inside and outside. They occur in and through affects, desire and language. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-minoritarian must be accompanied by a withering of the state and its institutions without which any generalized transformation would be impossible. Thought they make clear in ‘Rhizome’ that the connections they advocate are different from those of computers that function according to binary oppositions, the philosophers keep open the possibilities of transformations of subjectivities by means of technologies (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 475).Deleuze and Guattari are keenly aware both of the ways that technologies transform subjectivities and of writing in a postcolonial, geopolitical context. Nonetheless, they write about the state in a rather general and even monolithic way without specifically addressing a given ‘nation-state’. It is as if the real villain were a general European concept of state inherited from the romantic age. The institutional apparatus of the state dominates and orders its subjects, preventing them from being creative or pursuing their desires. It keeps them from making revolutionary connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 473). To construct rhizomes and create smooth spaces for an optimal circulation of desire, the state, armed with its ‘order-words’, has to be fought until, finally, it withers away and, in accord with any and every utopian scenario, all identity is undone.

You should act as a philosopher, and the role of your ballot is to maintain a transformative politics

Nail 12 (Thomas, postdoctoral lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Denver, “Returning to Revolutionâ€, ed. Claire Colebrook et al., p 8-9)-jn

 

So, if there are no universal foundations or categories for all political life, as Guattari argues, then the goal of political philosophy changes significantly. If the role of leadership and critique are forever bound by the question of political foundations, then the alternative task of an engaged political philosopher is to intervene and contribute immanently to political struggles themselves just like anyone else. Or as Subcomandante Marcos says, ‘We had to be honest and tell people that we had not come to lead anything of what might emerge. We came to release a demand, that could unleash others’ (Marcos 2001c). Or perhaps, as Foucault says of his own philosophical interventions, So, since there has to be an imperative, I would like the one underpinning the theoretical analysis we are attempting to be quite simply a conditional imperative of the kind: if you want to struggle, here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here are some constrictions and blockages. In other words, I would like these imperatives to be no more than tactical pointers. Of course, it’s up to me, and those who are working in the same direction, to know on what fields of real forces we need to get our bearings in order to make a tactically effective analysis. But this is, after all, the circle of struggle and truth, that is to say, precisely, of philosophical practice. (2007: 3) In sum, the aim of the present volume, in addition to the aforementioned three aims, following Marcos, Marx and Foucault, is not to interpret the world, but to transform it by outlining some revolutionary strategies that might unleash something else. Thus the ultimate criterion of success for this book is not that it has simply described the world, but that it will have been useful to those engaged in the present revolutionary task of changing the world.

State-centricity leads to the violent exclusion of other viewpoints

Bleiker 2k (Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understand­ing of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theor­ists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises cer­tain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a cer­tain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.22

 

 

 

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A major problem with managerialism as an aff is the lack of a solvency advocate for the aff. The McWhorter evidence is usually used as the alt on the k, the problem is that she advocates doing nothing. This might get in the way of the word "Resolved". However, you should focus this aff on kritiking the ontology of the rez. You should try to find an awesome card that talks about how nations understand the ocean as a giant "standing reserve". If you find this card, then you can kritik the rez by saying that ocean policies are grounding in this violent ontology and voting affirmative allows for better, non-managerial policies that don't link to this particular aff. Thus being good. However, writing a plan text for this aff will be difficult and unnecessary. You should focus your research on finding this card and then creating a solid "story" for the aff. Try to include some actually material impacts that are simply ontological. This aff is plausible but will require some dense research. If you can pull this off then it will be an awesome aff. 

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Don't. K debates and K debaters suck. If it ain't politics and inherency, it ain't right.

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Don't. K debates and K debaters suck. If it ain't politics and inherency, it ain't right.

Didn't you write a K AFF for next year? I thought that K AFF would be really popular due to the amount of variety in the topic or am i incorrect?

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Didn't you write a K AFF for next year? I thought that K AFF would be really popular due to the amount of variety in the topic or am i incorrect?

He's joking

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A major problem with managerialism as an aff is the lack of a solvency advocate for the aff. The McWhorter evidence is usually used as the alt on the k, the problem is that she advocates doing nothing. This might get in the way of the word "Resolved". However, you should focus this aff on kritiking the ontology of the rez. You should try to find an awesome card that talks about how nations understand the ocean as a giant "standing reserve". If you find this card, then you can kritik the rez by saying that ocean policies are grounding in this violent ontology and voting affirmative allows for better, non-managerial policies that don't link to this particular aff. Thus being good. However, writing a plan text for this aff will be difficult and unnecessary. You should focus your research on finding this card and then creating a solid "story" for the aff. Try to include some actually material impacts that are simply ontological. This aff is plausible but will require some dense research. If you can pull this off then it will be an awesome aff. 

 

I strongly disagree on theoretical grounds.  You should always have a plan text or at least advocacy statement.  You need to do *something*, and you need to have solvency.  Otherwise the 1AC is just 8 minutes of harms, and that's not a reason to vote affirmative.  It also abuses the negative, because any advocacy they advance can't find ground to compete - there's nothing to compete with.

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I strongly disagree on theoretical grounds.  You should always have a plan text or at least advocacy statement.  You need to do *something*, and you need to have solvency.  Otherwise the 1AC is just 8 minutes of harms, and that's not a reason to vote affirmative.  It also abuses the negative, because any advocacy they advance can't find ground to compete - there's nothing to compete with.

I don't think you need a specific line of the 1ac that serves as an advocacy statement as long as you clearly advocate for some action.  As long as you're defending some change from the status quo, there's still ground for the negative and a reason to vote aff, but not locking yourself into a single line of text makes it easier to recharacterize the aff in the context of the negative arguments.  While this may be mildly abusive, I think the framework debate will address any offense the neg tries to get on the fairness question, particularly since you're probably kritiking or impact turning fairness anyway.

 

Also, could you clarify the distinction between a plan text and an advocacy statement?

Edited by BobbyTables
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I don't think you need a specific line of the 1ac that serves as an advocacy statement as long as you clearly advocate for some action.  As long as you're defending some change from the status quo, there's still ground for the negative and a reason to vote aff, but not locking yourself into a single line of text makes it easier to recharacterize the aff in the context of the negative arguments.  While this may be mildly abusive, I think the framework debate will address any offense the neg tries to get on the fairness question, particularly since you're probably kritiking or impact turning fairness anyway.

 

Also, could you clarify the distinction between a plan text and an advocacy statement?

 

Bolded: This is more than just mildly abusive.  "Recharacterize the aff" is so sanitized, let's be honest about what it is - you're shifting goalposts to avoid negative offense.  Trust me, your fairness arguments aren't going to help you doing that, because it undermines the kritik itself.  You need to stick with your position if the kritik is to have value.  And this is why you should lock yourself into an advocacy statement, so there's predictable and stable affirmative advocacy that both sides and the judge can refer to.

 

Plan vs. advocacy text: I usually think of a plan text as using the federal government. ymmv.

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Bolded: This is more than just mildly abusive.  "Recharacterize the aff" is so sanitized, let's be honest about what it is - you're shifting goalposts to avoid negative offense.  Trust me, your fairness arguments aren't going to help you doing that, because it undermines the kritik itself.  You need to stick with your position if the kritik is to have value.  And this is why you should lock yourself into an advocacy statement, so there's predictable and stable affirmative advocacy that both sides and the judge can refer to.

I wouldn't say it's a shifting of goalposts as much as a way of framing the debate.  A substantial portion of debates against k affs comes down to who controls the characterization of the affirmative, and as long as the neg is contextualizing the K to the aff, they have fairly solid odds of winning that portion of the debate; that's what most of the link debate becomes, and I think that portion of the debate is so thoroughly developed in most such rounds that the aff really isn't going to be able to get away with trying to avoid the link unless their framing is actually a valid interpretation of the 1ac.  Most of the time it's the same as any other team leveraging the specific details of the aff to address negative arguments.  Sure, some teams may try to sever substantial parts of their aff, and I agree that that's problematic, but I don't think you can claim that's true of every instance.

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Didn't you write a K AFF for next year? I thought that K AFF would be really popular due to the amount of variety in the topic or am i incorrect?

I did, I was joking. In all seriousness if you go w/ a plan text, you should just have a plan text not ptext and an advocacy. If you are going to have a concrete plan or advocacy, only make it vague as it HAS to be, not intentionally shifty.

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I wouldn't say it's a shifting of goalposts as much as a way of framing the debate.  A substantial portion of debates against k affs comes down to who controls the characterization of the affirmative, and as long as the neg is contextualizing the K to the aff, they have fairly solid odds of winning that portion of the debate; that's what most of the link debate becomes, and I think that portion of the debate is so thoroughly developed in most such rounds that the aff really isn't going to be able to get away with trying to avoid the link unless their framing is actually a valid interpretation of the 1ac.  Most of the time it's the same as any other team leveraging the specific details of the aff to address negative arguments.  Sure, some teams may try to sever substantial parts of their aff, and I agree that that's problematic, but I don't think you can claim that's true of every instance.

more or less this is true, just for not only for strategic purposes, and even still, an advocacy statement only helps you. it'll help the judge if there is some sort of advocacy statement. and that's the person who matters the most. That's not to say that you shouldn't have different versions of the 1AC (In fact you should in case you get judges who won't listen to your shit), but I think you're wrong about that most affs won't try and be shady. It's the same reason most affs don't specify more than the USFG in the plan anymore, or why teams have to read xSPEC to get certain Pics or DA's. This is especially true for critical affs- if you don't want the neg to soley go for framework, then why be shifty? the more shifty you are, the less likely they are going to either want to, or do write a strat instead of just reading framework and the [insert generic K of choice]. But back to the judge. Judges matter and would prefer an advocacy text that doesn't shift. If you don't have a text, your offense on T/Framework gets worse, and the threshold or other means to what gets a judge to vote on T will go down because whatever you pull as tricks just becomes more neg offense and even the most anti-T judge would evaluate "must have an advocacy text theory". The other reason is, especially in clash rounds, judges won't get your arg the first time they hear it. no advocacy statement denies even the clues that would help a judge understand the argument. And even if you get a judge who knows your arg, being able to have a clear articulation, or even an idea on what to do will help rather than hurt in close rounds. Vague ideas on what the aff really does will not help if the neg can clearly explain, an argument and tell a story.

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It's the same reason most affs don't specify more than the USFG in the plan anymore, or why teams have to read xSPEC to get certain Pics or DA's.

 

Ug, this.  I hate this.  It makes solvency debates so annoying to listen to.  It creates plans that make me go 'what does that actually do?'  And it makes me extremely generous towards the negative in terms of letting them clarify what the affirmative is doing.  If you want to lose a round on inherency, failure to include enough information in the plan text to know what plan actually does is a good way to do that with me - and that includes specifying the actor where necessary.

 

Whenever I write a plan that just says 'USFG', I mean 'Congress passes a law and the president signs it'.  If I mean something else, I'll write exactly who is doing it, because it matters.  This is good for my kids, because they learn about how government actually functions.  Similarly, when I hear 'USFG' in a plan text, I assume it means Congress + President unless it can't possibly mean that.

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I did, I was joking. In all seriousness if you go w/ a plan text, you should just have a plan text not ptext and an advocacy. If you are going to have a concrete plan or advocacy, only make it vague as it HAS to be, not intentionally shifty.

I'm sorry, but what? I don't understand what this sentence means.

 

Now to the original question. Here's my wiki, there's a diverse range of affirmatives on here, from DnG to Wilderson to Introna. http://hspolicy.debatecoaches.org/bin/Homewood+Flossmoor/Swetz-Levinson+Aff

 

If you want to make your own K Aff, it has to be yours. You have to have an actual connection to it. In terms of managerialism, it'll be interesting. I actually haven't seen any managerialism affs, just affs that incorporate the elements into them. I don't foresee you having an actual plan text as in the USfg, but an advocacy statement.

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I'm sorry, but what? I don't understand what this sentence means.

 

Now to the original question. Here's my wiki, there's a diverse range of affirmatives on here, from DnG to Wilderson to Introna. http://hspolicy.debatecoaches.org/bin/Homewood+Flossmoor/Swetz-Levinson+Aff

 

If you want to make your own K Aff, it has to be yours. You have to have an actual connection to it. In terms of managerialism, it'll be interesting. I actually haven't seen any managerialism affs, just affs that incorporate the elements into them. I don't foresee you having an actual plan text as in the USfg, but an advocacy statement.

Would it be possible for a Managerialism K AFF to not be an advocacy? Or would that be the only way to write it?

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OP - likewise, here's my wiki from this year, with the affirmative that I ran at every tournament (except for a few, more conservative rounds, and TFA state): we advocated a demand on the United States federal government, rather than a plan or other critical avenues. I think that demand affs can be a neat middle ground between providing a stable locus for debate and incorporating alternative modes of political action in our affirmatives. http://hspolicy.debatecoaches.org/bin/Monsignor+Kelly/Flanagan-Conrad+Aff

 

 

I strongly disagree on theoretical grounds.  You should always have a plan text or at least advocacy statement.  You need to do *something*, and you need to have solvency.  Otherwise the 1AC is just 8 minutes of harms, and that's not a reason to vote affirmative.  It also abuses the negative, because any advocacy they advance can't find ground to compete - there's nothing to compete with.

 

I don't think a lot of this is very true. For instance, I've read advocacy-less 1ACs that are definitely more than "just 8 minutes of harms," that definitely can (and have, repeteadly) justify voting affirmative. Byrd's St. Marx 1AC is a good example of this. Also, an alternative text read against a plan-less 1AC doesn't necessarily ahve "nothing to compete with," it actually has every moment of the 1AC to compete with - every single word, concept, and phrase (because some of them might be problematic), as well as every argument, assumption, and conclusion within the speech. Negative teams can also compete with the way that the 1AC was given (spreading is not a good communicative strategy for many kritikal affirmatives, especially ones about critical pedagogy; poetry, rap, song, dance, image, video, and other forms of non-traditional communication often are linked to various kritiks), or even who ought to be the communicator of certain ideas (not that I agree with such criticisms, at least most of the time). I know for sure that on the college circuit and the progressive national level of high school debate, it's not uncommon for an advocacy-less 1AC to face arguments from T, FW, case-specific Ks, language Ks, and generic Ks (as in anthro/cap/wilderson/gbtl etc types of arguments) in the 1NC (or later speeches, for language and discourse critiques that become relevant after the 1NC).

 

Bolded: This is more than just mildly abusive.  "Recharacterize the aff" is so sanitized, let's be honest about what it is - you're shifting goalposts to avoid negative offense.  Trust me, your fairness arguments aren't going to help you doing that, because it undermines the kritik itself.  You need to stick with your position if the kritik is to have value.  And this is why you should lock yourself into an advocacy statement, so there's predictable and stable affirmative advocacy that both sides and the judge can refer to.

 

Plan vs. advocacy text: I usually think of a plan text as using the federal government. ymmv.

 

I'm not so sure about that. Almost all negative kritiks recharacterize the aff - and the debate space, and the role of the judge, too. If anything, it's contesting goalposts in order to garner negative offense. I agree about the fairness + K strat though, but only if they're both in the 2NR, which is unlikely (and highly unstrategic). The negative winning an unfair debate is just more impressive, is all - not necessarily an impossibility; that's why you can both stick to your (K) position while also sticking to your (T/FW) position throughout the negative block, by splitting it. That's what we encourage, right?

 

Firewater's kinda on-point in that latest comment, though. As much as I don't think that not having an advocacy text is bad, I do think that it's almost always the less strategic option if your aff could be ran with an advocacy text.

 

 

Ug, this.  I hate this.  It makes solvency debates so annoying to listen to.  It creates plans that make me go 'what does that actually do?'  And it makes me extremely generous towards the negative in terms of letting them clarify what the affirmative is doing.  If you want to lose a round on inherency, failure to include enough information in the plan text to know what plan actually does is a good way to do that with me - and that includes specifying the actor where necessary.

 

Whenever I write a plan that just says 'USFG', I mean 'Congress passes a law and the president signs it'.  If I mean something else, I'll write exactly who is doing it, because it matters.  This is good for my kids, because they learn about how government actually functions.  Similarly, when I hear 'USFG' in a plan text, I assume it means Congress + President unless it can't possibly mean that.

 

Word to all of that, although if the term "USFG" is used with reference to like a court case or something I'd probably be willing to interpret that as SCOTUS action, though I'm honestly not knowledgeable enough about political mechanisms to know if the other branches would have any implied action in the case of a courts aff.

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Would it be possible for a Managerialism K AFF to not be an advocacy? Or would that be the only way to write it?

Well you could always "question" the topic. Envision a new form of ocean exploration/development that does not manage the environment sorta thing.

This card would actually be a cool idea. It's tagged as "do nothing" but it talks about a new education about the environment. I'm sure some cards that say you create a paradigm shift or rupture the topic's epistemology would make a good combination with this card.

 

Vote negative to do nothing

Luke 2001 (Timothy [Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic];Education, Environment and Sustainability: what are the issues, where to intervene, what must be done?; Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2; kdf)

To create a truly more sustainable society, environmental education must unravel the complicated cycles of production and consumption, which are interwoven through most technological and economic practices in contemporary transnational commerce and this unravelling must show how these cycles are verging upon almost complete chaos. Highly planned programmes for economic growth are creating many unintended and unplanned outcomes of environmental destruction, boosting society’ s already high ecological risks to even higher levels. Most steps taken to mitigate these risks will not be executed with much certainty of successfully gaining their intended ends. Doing anything could make everything worse, doing nothing might make something better. At this juncture, environmental education must redefine some shared values for an ecological society. Unfortunately, most academic disciplines, from ecology to economics, are shackled by a set of disciplinary practices that constrain the imagination to ® t the approved scope and correct method of normal disciplinary inquiry. When Eugene Odum, for example, asserts that ecology is a `major interdisciplinary science that links together the biological, physical, and social sciences’ (Odum, 1975), very few biological, physical, or social scientists accept this broad interdisciplinary charge. Any ecology worth of its name would concede immediately that the economy and society are the Earth’ s main environments. This reality is acknowledged by Moscovici in his re¯ ections about the question of nature in the contemporary world system. That is, science and technology have reconstituted humanity as a new material force, working on planetary basis. `In 200 T. W. Luke short’ , he asserts, `the state of nature is not now just an economy of things; it has become at the same time the work of human beings. The fact is that we are dealing with a new nature’ (Moscovici, 1990). This fact and how the work of human beings continuously remediates this new nature are what environmental education must address to attain sustainability. Without sinking into a green foundationalist stance, environmental education must weave an analysis of power, politics and the state into an ecology’ s sense of sustainability, survival and the environment. This kind of interdisciplinary effort could develop a deeply contextual understanding of nature and society as holistic cluster of interdependent relations. This view should integrate a clear sense of how ecological constraints must reshape social/political/economic/cultural practices to move past the technological and environmental failings of the present global economy. In turn, this critical account of humanity’ s ecological failings, once it came common in environmental education classes, should open broader dialogues about how individuals, as both citizens and consumers, can intervene as defenders of their local habitats in many corners of today’ s global economy

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Word to all of that, although if the term "USFG" is used with reference to like a court case or something I'd probably be willing to interpret that as SCOTUS action, though I'm honestly not knowledgeable enough about political mechanisms to know if the other branches would have any implied action in the case of a courts aff.

 

SCOTUS action almost always requires saying 'SCOTUS decides a case', and then goes on to say something about the nature of the decision and the case involved.  It has to, otherwise it can't communicate what it's doing.  I suppose if someone said 'the USFG decides a case' I'd understand it as SCOTUS, but it would be really awkward, and I'd definitely comment on it.

 

Following a SCOTUS decision that changes US law, action by some part of the USFG to comply is almost certainly involved.  IANAL, but i doubt Congress is involved 99% of the time.  Some part of the executive branch will probably be (because they have to enforce the decision), but it probably won't involve the president much of the time.  A common occurrence, the striking down of a law, just means the law cannot be enforced, which does impact one or more federal agencies, but creates no new behavior.  SCOTUS can also clarify laws, and those will change enforcement.

 

And let's be honest, the whole point of SCOTUS decisions is that they compel the government to change how it acts - Affirmative fiat applies to the SCOTUS decision itself, other federal action by whichever organization is required isn't part of fiat, it's a consequence of fiat.

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Ug, this.  I hate this.  It makes solvency debates so annoying to listen to.  It creates plans that make me go 'what does that actually do?'  And it makes me extremely generous towards the negative in terms of letting them clarify what the affirmative is doing.  If you want to lose a round on inherency, failure to include enough information in the plan text to know what plan actually does is a good way to do that with me - and that includes specifying the actor where necessary.

 

Whenever I write a plan that just says 'USFG', I mean 'Congress passes a law and the president signs it'.  If I mean something else, I'll write exactly who is doing it, because it matters.  This is good for my kids, because they learn about how government actually functions.  Similarly, when I hear 'USFG' in a plan text, I assume it means Congress + President unless it can't possibly mean that.

I do agree with this sentiment entirely, was only an example though.

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SCOTUS action almost always requires saying 'SCOTUS decides a case', and then goes on to say something about the nature of the decision and the case involved.  It has to, otherwise it can't communicate what it's doing.  I suppose if someone said 'the USFG decides a case' I'd understand it as SCOTUS, but it would be really awkward, and I'd definitely comment on it.

 

Following a SCOTUS decision that changes US law, action by some part of the USFG to comply is almost certainly involved.  IANAL, but i doubt Congress is involved 99% of the time.  Some part of the executive branch will probably be (because they have to enforce the decision), but it probably won't involve the president much of the time.  A common occurrence, the striking down of a law, just means the law cannot be enforced, which does impact one or more federal agencies, but creates no new behavior.  SCOTUS can also clarify laws, and those will change enforcement.

 

And let's be honest, the whole point of SCOTUS decisions is that they compel the government to change how it acts - Affirmative fiat applies to the SCOTUS decision itself, other federal action by whichever organization is required isn't part of fiat, it's a consequence of fiat.

 

Thanks for the info! The only courts case I've ever seen was the Right to Development one that's on Open Evidence, and to be honest I don't think it made much sense using the courts as the actor (I had an RTD I-Law aff for this topic too, but it was just to have Congress lift the embargo; that's what the solvency advocate advocated specifically, too, who I think the Open Evidence RTD aff used as an author frequently as well, but I can't remember).

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SCOTUS action almost always requires saying 'SCOTUS decides a case', and then goes on to say something about the nature of the decision and the case involved.  

SCOTUS action has to have a case.  The absence of an actual controversy (meaning a material disagreement between two parties) strips the Court of jurisdiction - see Texas v Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) [cert denied.] (holding that the SCOTUS lacks jurisdiction where contested practice no longer exists).  

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SCOTUS action has to have a case.  The absence of an actual controversy (meaning a material disagreement between two parties) strips the Court of jurisdiction - see Texas v Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) [cert denied.] (holding that the SCOTUS lacks jurisdiction where contested practice no longer exists).  

Yes, but not everybody's plan text specifies a case is the distinction I believe Squirrelloid is making. Obviously that's silly, but some people do it.

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