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A2 econ decline leads to nuclear war

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What do you think are the best arguments/cards against this? I see it almost every round, but just use dedev and generic defense.

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There are a lot of generic answers available in econ cores if you need a lot of cards.  As for Royal '10, I believe there was a semi-recent topic about it where it was shown that the card talks about infighting and not major war. I'll try to find it.

 

Scroll up for a lot of cards and discussion.

http://www.cross-x.com/topic/56457-a-to-royal-10/?hl=%2Broyal&do=findComment&comment=888447

Edited by SnarkosaurusRex
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you can't answer it. economic collapse always causes nuclear war.

So are we all just ghostly spirits? Ooh, I'm going to haunt all your ***es

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Dedev Turn or Interdependece checks escalation, Nuclear Taboo, Etc. Its much easier to take out the escalation part than the actual war scenario. Also with a lay judge bring up emperics about 2008. That's what I do. It usually works

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What do you think are the best arguments/cards against this? I see it almost every round, but just use dedev and generic defense.

Baudrillard, or cap. pick one

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Nuclear deterrence is definitely an intuitive argument to make.

As for Royal '10 specifically, he never really makes a claim toward extinction or even nuclear escalation of any kind. He also seems to use vague wording to avoid outright drawing a causality; rather, he prefers to use data to say that economic decline is CORRELATED to outbreaks of violence, such as when he says "economic decline has been linked with an increase in terrorism" - not very conclusive.
Another one of the warrants of the evidence indicates economic declines causes a country to use military force to gain resources it once traded for - but this makes no sense since war is much more costly than simply trading.

His best warrant is "diversionary war theory" - essentially, that leaders will instigate or even fabricate military conflicts to produce a "rally around the flag" effect to distract the populace from the country's economic situation as well as solidify the ruler's power by inspiring nationalism. There are tons of authors who refute diversionary theory. It may be a outdated, but Bennet and Nordstrom 2K has pretty decent warrants as to why economic decline actually de-escalates conflict and it refutes diversionary theory

 

Economic collapse doesn't cause war - diversionary theory false and collapse forces a refocus that results in peace

Bennett and Nordstrom, Department of Political Science Professors at Pennsylvania State, 2k [scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,†Journal of Conflict Resolution, February, Ebsco]

In this analysis, we focus on using economic conditions to understand when rivalries are likely to escalate or end. Rivalries are an appropriate set of cases to use when examining substitutability both because leaders in rival states have clearly substitutable choices and because rivalries are a set of cases in which externalization is a particularly plausible policy option.7 In particular, when confronted with domestic problems, leaders in a rivalry have the clear alternatives of escalating the conflict with the rival to divert attention or to work to settle the rivalry as a means of freeing up a substantial amount of resources that can be directed toward solving internal problems. In the case of the diversion option, rivals provide logical, believable actors for leaders to target; the presence of a clear rival may offer unstable elites a particularly inviting target for hostile statements or actual conflict as necessary. The public and relevant elites already consider the rival a threat or else the rivalry would not have continued for an extended period; the presence of disputed issues also provides a casus belli with the rival that is always present. Rivals also may provide a target where the possible costs and risks of externalization are relatively controlled. If the goal is diversion, leaders willwant to divert attention without provoking an actual (and expensive)war. Over the course of many confrontations, rival states may learn to anticipate response patterns, leading to safer disputes or at least to leaders believing that they can control the risks of conflict when they initiate a new confrontation. In sum, rivals provide good targets for domestically challenged political leaders. This leads to our first hypothesis, which is as follows: Hypothesis 1: Poor economic conditions lead to diversionary actions against the rival. Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a “guns versus butter†world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States. Hypothesis 2: Poor economic conditions increase the probability of rivalry termination. Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit opposite behaviors in response to a single cause (internal economic problems). As such, they demand a research design that can account for substitutability between them. 

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No chance of war from economic decline—best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,†http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.  The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index†annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.â€38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.â€40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “Vâ€-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.â€41 The key word is “contained,†however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.â€42

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Basically the same thing as what Argogate posted, but more recent: 

 

 

No impact to economic decline – prefer new data

Drezner, 14 - IR prof at Tufts (Daniel, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession†World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, p. 123-164)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

 

 

Global economic governance institutions guarantee resiliency

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,†http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pd

Prior to 2008, numerous foreign policy analysts had predicted a looming crisis in global economic governance. Analysts only reinforced this perception since the financial crisis, declaring that we live in a “G-Zero†world. This paper takes a closer look at the global response to the financial crisis. It reveals a more optimistic picture. Despite initial shocks that were actually more severe than the 1929 financial crisis, global economic governance structures responded quickly and robustly. Whether one measures results by economic outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional flexibility, global economic governance has displayed surprising resiliency since 2008. Multilateral economic institutions performed well in crisis situations to reinforce open economic policies, especially in contrast to the 1930s. While there are areas where governance has either faltered or failed, on the whole, the system has worked. Misperceptions about global economic governance persist because the Great Recession has disproportionately affected the core economies – and because the efficiency of past periods of global economic governance has been badly overestimated. Why the system has worked better than expected remains an open question. The rest of this paper explores the possible role that the distribution of power, the robustness of international regimes, and the resilience of economic ideas might have played.

 

The fact that it worked well in response to 2008 means it’ll work even better next time

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,†http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy coordination. As John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.â€103 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime soon.

 

US not key to global—global economies decoupling

Caryl, Sr. Fellow @ MIT, 10 [Christian Caryl is a Editor at Foreign Policy and Newsweek and a Senior Fellow of the CSIS at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Crisis? What Crisis?†4/5/10 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis_what_crisis?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding. It was impossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing economies were going to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens impoverished. Many emerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect dramatically unemployment, and beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to democracy, and maybe for some cases it can also end in war." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast that net private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtually everyone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from growth in the years leading up to the crisis to suffer disproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it hasn't turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were far too many poor people in the world before the crisis, and that still remains the case. Some 3 billion people still live on less than $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis hasn't added appreciably to their ranks. Just take China, India, and Indonesia, Asia's three biggest emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse. China's robust growth through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well as Brazil and Russia, have rebounded dramatically. The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramatically skepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (double the 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it still seems remarkable in light of the dire predictions. In short, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are showing remarkable resilience. It wasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai government's devaluation of its currency triggered the Asian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government. The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estrada collapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world, culminating in the Russian government default and August 1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere, dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was the emerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So what's different this time around? The answers differ from place to place, but there are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma of the late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key profile this time around. (The fund has been most active in Africa, where they still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.) Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization and markets are starting to build social safety nets. And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly distributed throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some economists are talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold. Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: "People in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And that, she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself." This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runs so contrary to our habitual thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently published a report that attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, benchmarks that are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in the developing world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course, whether the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that the Great Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "The global economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it  notes. "But as the crisis unfolds, it is becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, these interconnections are proving to be much more resilient than anyone might have predicted earlier. As the report notes, receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Perhaps migrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us don't. So why should we care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to the story: "Certainly cutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding those connections, bringing in a larger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster and more individuals climb out of poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing their citizens with education and health care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs can fill important gaps -- as long as they aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook is bright on every front, of course. As the Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since 1970. The reason for that has more to do with the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice shot up?) We are still a long way from conquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and poor. Yet how remarkable it would be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the beginning of a more equitable global economy. 

 

 

No impact---Royal’s diversionary war thesis is wrong and doesn’t go nuclear

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,†Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

 

 

A2 EU Collapse

 

No impact to Eurozone collapse BMI, 12 [October, Business Monitor International, Would The Eurozone’s Collapse Lead To War?, http://www.riskwatchdog.com/2012/10/17/would-the-eurozone%E2%80%99s-collapse-lead-to-war/]

Since the worsening of the eurozone crisis, various European officials, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have warned that a collapse of the currency union could lead to war in Europe. UK Business Secretary Vince Cable became the latest figure to make such a statement, on Monday. Perhaps the Nobel committee was thinking along similar lines when it awarded the EU the Nobel Peace Prize last week. The eurozone is not the same as the EU, but if the eurozone collapses outright, then there would be a high risk that the EU would collapse, too.¶ Long Road From Eurozone Collapse To War¶ Overall, we find the talk of war overblown to say the least. There is clearly a risk of rising civil unrest, but this would fall far short of ‘war’. The Europe of the 2010s is vastly different from the Europe of the 1930s. It is far richer and politically mature. There are several stages the eurozone crisis would need to pass through before the continent would be even remotely at risk of war:¶ 1. Severe deterioration of intergovernmental cooperation: This would require governments to tear up existing EU treaties and laws and potentially adopt protectionist economic measures.¶ 2. Severe deterioration of economic conditions in European states: This could theoretically pave the way for extremist takeovers, although this would still be far from guaranteed. Severe economic crises in the Asian ‘tigers’ in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, Argentina in 2001-2002, the Baltic states in 2008-2010, and Greece in 2010-2012 have not led to ultra-right wing or ultra-left wing governments being elected or seizing power (although Argentina has in recent years moved in that direction). Even for the economically marginalised, living standards today are far higher than in the 1930s.¶ 3. Extremist takeovers in key states: Far-right or far-left parties would need to come to power. Even so, they would not necessarily lead their countries to war, since their immediate priority would be to restore economic growth. Conflict risks would rise, however, if a group of ‘moderate’ European states decided to sanction, isolate, or contain ‘extreme’ European states. The ‘extreme’ states could also conceivably seek to funnel their unemployed young people into their militaries, but this may not be affordable, financially. Military build-ups cost a lot of money.¶ 4. Revival of old territorial disputes: Europe’s 19th and 20th century wars were primarily about land-grabs. Territorial disputes used to be the norm. Nowadays, though, most territorial disputes are largely resolved. These could conceivably gain a new lease of life through manipulation by provocative politicians, but it is unclear if they would stir the passions of the public.¶ 5. Break-up of existing EU states: War could occur if an existing EU state were to break up violently. However, it is difficult to see the British or Spanish governments using force to prevent the secession of Scotland or Catalonia, or Belgium or Italy splitting up violently. All these countries and territories are much more politically and economically advanced than Yugoslavia was in 1990. However, if a group of EU states assisted the separation of a breakaway region, this could be a casus belli.¶ 6. Dissolution or neutralisation of NATO: Some European doomsayers forget that NATO still exists, and that the US still guarantees the security of Europe by basing tens of thousands of troops in Germany, the UK, and Italy. The existence of NATO means that even if the eurozone and EU were to collapse, any hypothetical march towards war would still have a powerful brake. Potential warring states would have to leave the Western alliance first, or conclude that NATO and the US military presence are meaningless or unreliable. This is certainly possible, given that NATO has been weakened by budget cuts in its member states, but would still require a major political gamble

Edited by ktg9616
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you can't answer it. economic collapse always causes nuclear war.

 

After all, empirics prove! 

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why not a baudrillard cap k...  

I thought Baudrillard believed that the problem with capitalism was consumption rather then production. What links to that?

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I thought Baudrillard believed that the problem with capitalism was consumption rather then production. What links to that?

 

Everything is commodified. Everything can be consumed. Everything links.

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Also, does anyone have a decent answer to Royal '10?

According to some teams I've talked to on my circuit, if you keep on reading his book, he actually concludes neg, but nobody reads past the intro (a couple schools on my circuit read it and pulled that on my novices). That's a decent analytic you could pull if you really needed it, but I'd actually read the book and cut the actual card if you can get the book.

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According to some teams I've talked to on my circuit, if you keep on reading his book, he actually concludes neg, but nobody reads past the intro (a couple schools on my circuit read it and pulled that on my novices). That's a decent analytic you could pull if you really needed it, but I'd actually read the book and cut the actual card if you can get the book.

Royal doesn't really conclude one way or the other

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The problem with a lot of econ defense cards is that they just say econ troubles don't cause war (like the '08 recession). Most offense cards say that econ COLLAPSE causes a bunch of bad stuff. In reality, a global collapse would have much more of an impact than just a recession. Very few No affs access legitimate links to COLLAPSE though, just decline. 

 

Royal is good for affs with sketchy internal links because he says econ decline causes the impacts, not collapse. He doesn't make any nuclear war global extinction claim though. I usually read Harris and Burrows with Royal and argue that statistics prove econ decline causes global instability and small scale wars (Royal) and that those wars can possibly escalate nuclear (H&B)

 

tl;dr Econ DECLINE =/= Econ COLLAPSE

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According to some teams I've talked to on my circuit, if you keep on reading his book, he actually concludes neg, but nobody reads past the intro (a couple schools on my circuit read it and pulled that on my novices). That's a decent analytic you could pull if you really needed it, but I'd actually read the book and cut the actual card if you can get the book.

 

 

This thread shows some discussion on this topic; Royal actually concludes aff. You are probably referring to this card that pops up occasionally:

 

Royal 10—director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crisesâ€, published in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books)

There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate levelreduces the ability of the state to coalesce a sufficiently strong political base required to undertake costly balancing measures such as economic costly signals. Schweller (2006)builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with decisions not to balance against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentivesthey will be least likely to enactbold and costly policies even when their nation's survival is at stake and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130). 

 

However, this excerpt is taken significantly out of context if you're trying to claim that ROYAL CONCLUDES NEG.

 

In this part of the book, Royal is making the argument that economic crises jeopardize balancing measures. In IR theory balancing is the concept that when a country's relative power increases, other countries will increase their relative power (or decrease an opponent's relative power) to maintain the balance of power. In this specific example of WWII, Royal says that the Allied countries should've employed sanctions and strict economic penalties against Nazi Germany's rise, but didn't because their poor economic situation post-depression forced political leaders to bypass these solutions, because they would've been extremely unpopular. Royal says this lead to appeasement and World War II.

 

Take the Crimean crisis for example. There seems to be some consensus amongst the Western foreign policy community that Europe and the US should launch a strict sanctions regime against Russia to penalize interference in Ukraine. However, much of Europe is dependent on Russian economic and energy ties, and European leaders are fearful of escalation that could cripple the European economy, especially with the Eurozone crisis ongoing. This means Russia can continue unfettered in Crimea and it sets a dangerous precedent that Russia can bully Europe without major consequences. Royal is saying that balancing prevents wars, because balancing prevents appeasement.

Edited by MisterTDebater

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