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No War Contention

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Can anyone help me put together a no war contention? One that I can read in the 1AC. I'd really like any help you all could give me

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GDI and SDI No War Files

http://openevidence.debatecoaches.org/bin/2013/Impact+Files

 

No war – economic interdependence and nuclear weapons check

Deudney 9 - professor of political science at John Hopkins et al (Daniel, and John Ikenberry, professor of international affairs at Princeton, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63721/daniel-deudney-and-g-john-ikenberry/the-myth-of-the-autocratic-revival)

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities-of pushes and pulls-that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international.  Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

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No war – great powers are responsible, nukes deter, and conflicts remain local.

Kennedy 13 - Dilworth Professor of History and director of International Security Studies at Yale University (Paul, “The Great Powers, Then and Nowâ€, 8/13/13; < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/opinion/global/the-great-powers-then-and-now.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>)//Beddow

All of these Great Powers are egoistic, more or less blinkered, with governments chiefly bent upon surviving a few more years. But none of them are troublemakers; nor are they, in any really significant sense, a source of trouble. Would they but realize it, they all have a substantial interest in preserving the international status quo, since they do not know what negative consequences would follow a changed world order. The troublemakers, and the sources of trouble, lie elsewhere: in the unpredictable, overmilitarized lunatic asylum that is North Korea; in an Iran that sometimes seems to be daring an Israeli air strike; in a brutal and autistic Syrian regime; in a Yemen that both houses terrorists and pretends to be killing them off; and, far less purposefully, in the conflict-torn, crumbling polities of Central Africa, Egypt and Afghanistan, and many nations in between. Here are the world’s problem cases. If there are neurotic Kaiser Wilhelms or bullying Mussolinis or murderous Stalins around today, they are not — thank heavens — to be found in Beijing, Moscow or New Delhi. If this thesis is correct, and the Great Powers, while sometimes complaining about one another’s actions, generally act in a restrained manner, then perhaps we may look forward to a long period without a major war, rather like the unprecedented peace among the Great Powers that existed after 1815 under the Concert of Europe. Many wars would still take place, but they would be local conflicts, not cause enough, despite their atrocities and inhumanity, to drag a major actor directly into the fighting. The Great Powers, in turn, would set aside their own differences to keep the bloodshed local, putting pressure upon their own client states if necessary to stop them from upsetting the international apple cart. In no way would this be a “democratic peace.†Rather, it would continue to be an Old Boys’ club, even if it has new members like India and Brazil. The myth of the equality of all nation-states would indeed remain a myth. Such is the price that liberal internationalists would have to pay to ensure the avoidance of a Third World War. The price the Great Powers have to pay is self-restraint, year after year, decade after decade. If this is forgotten, then another 1914-like crisis could occur. At that time, it will be remembered, Russia failed to rein in its “trouble-making†satellite, Serbia. Austria-Hungary recklessly sent Belgrade an impossible-to-accept ultimatum. Berlin, forgetting Bismarck’s cautions, foolishly supported Vienna. A weak czar lost control of his country’s military plans. The Prussian army struck westwards, occupying Belgium, and bringing in the British Empire. Are we sure some equivalent follies will never happen again, even though nuclear weapons surely help keep governments from going over the brink? When you say your prayers, spare one for the leaders of the Great Powers. They may not be attractive individuals — some are nasty, blinkered and devious. But so long as they realize their responsibilities to prevent any actions that might lead to a world war, we should all be happy. Their job is simply to hold firm the iron frame that keeps the international system secure. It is our job, not theirs, to work within that frame, to advance the dignity and prosperity of humanity. But that will never be achieved without the Great Powers acting reasonably well.

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No War---Shared interests and cooperation check

Robb, 12 [Lieutenant, Doug US Navy, “Now Hear This – Why the Age of Great-Power War Is Overâ€, US Naval Institute, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over, RH]

In addition to geopolitical and diplomacy issues, globalization continues to transform the world. This interdependence has blurred the lines between economic security and physical security. Increasingly, great-power interests demand cooperation rather than conflict. To that end, maritime nations such as the United States and China desire open sea lines of communication and protected trade routes, a common security challenge that could bring these powers together, rather than drive them apart (witness China’s response to the issue of piracy in its backyard). Facing these security tasks cooperatively is both mutually advantageous and common sense. Democratic Peace Theory—championed by Thomas Paine and international relations theorists such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman—presumes that great-power war will likely occur between a democratic and non-democratic state. However, as information flows freely and people find outlets for and access to new ideas, authoritarian leaders will find it harder to cultivate popular support for total war—an argument advanced by philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.†Consider, for example, China’s unceasing attempts to control Internet access. The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated that organized opposition to unpopular despotic rule has begun to reshape the political order, a change galvanized largely by social media. Moreover, few would argue that China today is not socially more liberal, economically more capitalistic, and governmentally more inclusive than during Mao Tse-tung’s regime. As these trends continue, nations will find large-scale conflict increasingly disagreeable. In terms of the military, ongoing fiscal constraints and socio-economic problems likely will marginalize defense issues. All the more reason why great powers will find it mutually beneficial to work together to find solutions to common security problems, such as countering drug smuggling, piracy, climate change, human trafficking, and terrorism—missions that Admiral Robert F. Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called “deterrence and reassurance.†As the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a formidable deterrent against unlimited war. They make conflict irrational; in other words, the concept of mutually assured destruction—however unpalatable—actually had a stabilizing effect on both national behaviors and nuclear policies for decades. These tools thus render great-power war infinitely less likely by guaranteeing catastrophic results for both sides. As Bob Dylan warned, “When you ain’t got nothing, you ain’t got nothing to lose.†Great-power war is not an end in itself, but rather a way for nations to achieve their strategic aims. In the current security environment, such a war is equal parts costly, counterproductive, archaic, and improbable.

 

Nuclear winter is a myth---we have the best studies and their authors are hacks

Seitz 2011

(Russell, Harvard University Center for International Affairs visiting scholar, “Nuclear winter was and is debatable,†Nature, 7-7-11, Vol 475, pg37, accessed 9-27-11, CMR)

Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling. Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens†(C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory,†(see http://go.nature.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/yujz84) and climatologist Kerry Emanuel observed that the subject had “become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity†(Nature 319, 259; 1986). Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the very term 'nuclear winter' into question. 

 

Factors preventing war aren’t reversible- err aff on probability risk of war is almost ZERO

Fettweis, professor of political science at Tulane University, 2006

(Christopher J., December, “A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?†International Studies Review, Volume 8, Issue 4, EB)

However, one need not be convinced about the potential for ideas to transform international politics to believe that major war is extremely unlikely to recur. Mueller, Mandelbaum, Ray, and others may give primary credit for the end of major war to ideational evolution akin to that which made slavery and dueling obsolete, but others have interpreted the causal chain quite differently. Neoliberal institutionalists have long argued that complex economic interdependence can have a pacifying effect upon state behavior (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) has contended that evolution in socio-economic organization has altered the shortest, most rational route to state prosperity in ways that make war unlikely. Finally, many others have argued that credit for great power peace can be given to the existence of nuclear weapons, which make aggression irrational ( Jervis 1989; Kagan et al. 1999). With so many overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations, at times the end of major war may seem to be overdetermined ( Jervis 2002:8–9). For purposes of the present discussion, successful identiï¬cation of the exact cause of this fundamental change in state behavior is probably not as important as belief in its existence. In other words, the outcome is far more important than the mechanism. The importance of Mueller’s argument for the ï¬eld of IR is ultimately not dependent upon why major war has become obsolete, only that it has. Almost as significant, all these proposed explanations have one important point in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution is typically unidirectional. Few would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this century. The complexity of economic interdependence is deepening as time goes on and going at a quicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) no foolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination of forces that may have brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy and religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difï¬cult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerable institution of war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become plausible, perhaps even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proof would seem to be on those who maintain that the ‘‘rules of the game’’ of international politics, including the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune to fundamental evolution and that, due to these immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather than ask how major war could have grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could not. 

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Christopher Fettweis wrote a paper called "Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace" that's worth reading

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Any leader attempting to launch a nuclear attack would be assassinated. Walsh 85 (Edward, Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force, “Nuclear War Opposing Viewpoints, p. 51)

No president or dictator, madman or otherwise would take it upon himself [sic] to launch an all out nuclear attack without due consultation with his [sic] staff.  It is a natural human phenomenon that there would be certain members of this staff with an invincible sense of survival who would resort to assassination before allowing themselves and their nation to be subjected to a retaliatory holocaust.

 

 

most realistic scenario ever right here. 

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