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Tomak

Everyone should make a global warming 1AC

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Yup. If you have a robust defense of your solvency mechanism that somehow kills counterplan solvency then, by all means, go ahead. I'd just caution this route if you don't

 

 

1) Right, but these are long-term scenarios, and it is more of a case of warming "subsuming" than "turning" the impact.

Take, for example, a heg aff that hits a Ukrainian dipcap disad (impact is a Ukrainian civil war). The aff (assuming we "get" the benefits of heg prior to the DA's link being triggered) can use heg to effectively mitigate the neg's offense. The US could leverage its various sources of influence to deescalate a DA, and military heg raises the cost of going to war through deterrence which solves the terminal impact to the DA (I'm not really in hegemony's batting corner, here, I'm just saying that it has a lot of utility in this regard).

 

Whereas, a big laundry list warming impact (like the Takacks 96 environment impact) mentions a lot of impact scenarios that result from warming, but there's no reverse causal relationship that the aff can wield against the neg's offense. While a Ukrainian civil war might be a long-term consequence of warming, solving warming does not prevent that scenario from occuring as a result of the DA.

 

So warming might be a very "big" impact (in that it will subsume the negative's offense), but it doesn't "turn" the neg's scenarios because it doesn't mitigate the risk of the DA's terminal impact.

 

 

2) Yeah, this is a definitely a strategic benefit of the 1 adv warming aff. If you're good at defending no war and you have up-to-date evidence, then go for it.

But this has diminishing utility when not hitting novices. A good team will have yes war prepped decently well (with answers to specific warrants - i.e., nuclear deterrence fails, liberal ir wrong, etc.), and they won't have to win a tremendous risk of the DA in order to justify voting for the advantage counterplan (again, if you have adv cps figured out, it's another story - warming+no war suddenly becomes way more of a downhill debate).

 

And idk about Ks. I always impact turned ks with imperialism good when I was the 2a, so I guess this is a consideration if you don't want to, lol.

 

 

7) squo solves (natural gas)

8) Negative feedbacks check

9) No warming (modelling fails, cooling now, no tipping point,etc.)

10) Not anthro

11) Effect distribution

12) Resiliency/Decreased sensitivity

13) You covered this with "warming good", but remember just how many impact turn scenarios there are

(ice age, russia econ, canada econ, arctic resources good, desertification/greening, agriculture, etc. etc.)

Probably other no warming args, but I can't science

 

 

I'm sure every warming debater is prepped against all of those (well... probably not, but most of them), but that's not the point. The point is that, contrary to what OP would lead us to believe, negs don't just roll over when they hit warming advantages. There are a variety of arguments to be read against warming - that doesn't make it a weak impact, but my point is that there's nothing speci0al about warming that makes it a particularly strong impact.

 

Relations scenarios, for example, are not easily impact turnable (credible authors generally don't write things like "Russia relations bad" or "EU relations bad"). As I explained in the previous section, there's not a huge amount of offensive utility against DAs for warming (you can inflate your impact all you want - e.g. warming subsumes Arctic war et al -, but that doesn't mitigate the risk of the DA very much. You don't get to really "turn" the disad by taking out the internal link chain escalation to war). And it's not something 'surprising' that negs won't know how to answer (I read a European centralization scenario this year - European economic decline causes political integration, leads to hegemonic security competition in Eurasia, intercivilizational nuclear war. Good teams obviously don't just give up against this, but they don't really have the evidence to attack this advantage on the terminal impact level. The point being, this advantage had strategic utility because it was something nobody had any substantive defense to - warming doesn't have that utility).

 

The point is not that warming's a garbage impact and everyone should be running heg (but, seriously though, you all should be running heg). The point is that there's no overwhelming strategic benefit to warming as an impact. The real benefit is the ability to "no war" all the neg's offense away, but that doesn't pay off when you

A) hit a good team

B) hit an advantage CP you aren't prepared for

 

 

Now, if you can competently beat every conceivable advantage counterplan (then you've found a good aff...) and you are very good on the no war debate, then you get to reap the benefits of the 1 advantage warming aff (you get to lazily disregard the technics of the disad debate and basically win rounds based on impact-heavy overviews... not a bad thing at all: also the main benefit of the heg adv!).

 

I'd just caution against this route if you don't think this is the case of your aff, because then you leave yourself open to a few critical vulnerabilities.

 

It's not so simple as OP suggests: "Just pick a technology that is developed in the ocean and reduces or reverses global warming. Cut a few cards saying the technology works, attach your favorite GW cards from camp. Boom, you have a throwaway 1AC for quarterfinals against that team that sucks at warming debates."

 

The fact that, as OP reminds us, "There are dozens of reasonable cases to choose" is probably reason to be very concerned with these vulnerabilities - there are dozens upon dozens of advantage counterplans you're susceptible to.

 

Rambling done, I'd basically sum up my objections to the warming aff with:

1) Advantage counterplan problems

2) Disutility against DAs

 

If you're prepped for these, then you're good to go.

What exactly does "Negative feedbacks check" say?

And how would you answer effect distribution and resiliency?

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What exactly does "Negative feedbacks check" say?

And how would you answer effect distribution and resiliency?

1) Negative feedbacks are natural phenomena that warming causes that, in turn, reduce the actual effect of warming. Here's a common one:

Warming increases heat/sunlight hitting earth.

That increases the amount of water vapor in the earth's atmosphere (because of accelerated evaporation).

That increased water vapor (cloud cover) is very reflective.

That increased reflection of sunlight reduces the effect of warming.

 

This is essentially a resiliency argument - as warming increases, negative feedbacks check the effects of warming, so each new marginal amount of warming actually impacts the environment in incrementally smaller ways.

 

2) I'd answer both by claiming that there exists a difference in the hypothetical magnitude of warming that their authors fail to take into account (read, like, Guterl 12. Guterl uses a different method for calculating warming impacts than do most authors, and this method lends itself to very inflated impacts that occur very rapidly). This sounds silly, but essentially just say "no, warming is very, very big". Resiliency authors are answering claim that warming will be harmful, but not that it will be an extinction-level event. Provide reasons for why warming will be devastating - positive feedbacks, for example (things that warming triggers that, in turn, accelerate warming. Ex: warming melts arctic ice caps, causes release of methane, which ramps up warming).

 

As for effect distribution, the above sort of answers that (they say warming occurs mostly in cold climates, we say warming is so devastating that any distribution of its effects is unacceptable... even if cold climates are disproportionately effected, we're all gonna melt anyway). But I'd also indict their studies with the opposite claim (there are authors who claim that the effects are mostly concentrated in warm areas with a gradient running the opposite way - this means it'll be extremely devastating to the places where most people live). And say that warming in cold areas is just as bad (due to global flooding, etc.).

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1) Negative feedbacks are natural phenomena that warming causes that, in turn, reduce the actual effect of warming. Here's a common one:

Warming increases heat/sunlight hitting earth.

That increases the amount of water vapor in the earth's atmosphere (because of accelerated evaporation).

That increased water vapor (cloud cover) is very reflective.

That increased reflection of sunlight reduces the effect of warming.

 

This is essentially a resiliency argument - as warming increases, negative feedbacks check the effects of warming, so each new marginal amount of warming actually impacts the environment in incrementally smaller ways.

 

2) I'd answer both by claiming that there exists a difference in the hypothetical magnitude of warming that their authors fail to take into account (read, like, Guterl 12. Guterl uses a different method for calculating warming impacts than do most authors, and this method lends itself to very inflated impacts that occur very rapidly). This sounds silly, but essentially just say "no, warming is very, very big". Resiliency authors are answering claim that warming will be harmful, but not that it will be an extinction-level event. Provide reasons for why warming will be devastating - positive feedbacks, for example (things that warming triggers that, in turn, accelerate warming. Ex: warming melts arctic ice caps, causes release of methane, which ramps up warming).

 

As for effect distribution, the above sort of answers that (they say warming occurs mostly in cold climates, we say warming is so devastating that any distribution of its effects is unacceptable... even if cold climates are disproportionately effected, we're all gonna melt anyway). But I'd also indict their studies with the opposite claim (there are authors who claim that the effects are mostly concentrated in warm areas with a gradient running the opposite way - this means it'll be extremely devastating to the places where most people live). And say that warming in cold areas is just as bad (due to global flooding, etc.).

ohh ok

If possible, can you post the cards for negative feedback answers and the Guterl card?

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Tipping points are likely – leads to runaway warming

Guterl 12 – Award–Winning Journalist and expert on Climate and Environment, Executive Editor @ Scientific American, citing NASA Scientist James Hanson

(Fred, “Climate Armageddon: How the World's Weather Could Quickly Run Amok: Climate scientists think a perfect storm of climate "flips" could cause massive upheavals in a matter of years, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how–worlds–weather–could–quickly–run–amok)

One of the most productive scientists in applying dynamical systems theory to climate is Tim Lenton at the University of East Anglia in England. Lenton is a Lovelockian two generations removed— his mentors were mentored by Lovelock. "We are looking quite hard at past data and observational data that can tell us something," says Lenton. "Classical case studies in which you've seen abrupt changes in climate data. For example, in the Greenland ice–core records, you're seeing climate jump. And the end of the Younger Dryas," about fifteen thousand years ago, "you get a striking climate change." So far, he says, nobody has found a big reason for such an abrupt change in these past events—no meteorite or volcano or other event that is an obvious cause—which suggests that perhaps something about the way these climate shifts occur simply makes them sudden. Lenton is mainly interested in the future. He has tried to look for things that could possibly change suddenly and drastically even though nothing obvious may trigger them. He's come up with a short list of nine tipping points—nine weather systems, regional in scope, that could make a rapid transition from one state to another. Each year, the sun shines down on the dark surface of the Indian Ocean, and moist, warm air rises and forms clouds. This rising heat and the moisture form a powerful weather system, a natural pump that pulls up water and moves it in vast quantities hundreds of miles to the mainland. This is the Indian monsoon, which deposits rainfall on thousands of square miles of farmland. About a billion people, most of them poor, depend for their daily bread on crops that depend in turn on the reliability and regularity of the Indian monsoons. India is a rapidly developing country with hundreds of millions of citizens who want to move into the middle class, drive cars and cool their homes with air–conditioning. It is also a country of poor people, many who still rely on burning agricultural waste to heat their homes and cook their suppers. Smoke from household fires has been a big source of pollution in the subcontinent, and it could disrupt the monsoons, too. The soot from these fires and from automobiles and buses in the ever more crowded cities rises into the atmosphere and drifts out over the Indian Ocean, changing the atmospheric dynamics upon which the monsoons depend. Aerosols (soot) keep much of the sun's energy from reaching the surface, which means the monsoon doesn't get going with the same force and takes longer to gather up a head of steam. Less rain makes it to crops. At the same time, the buildup of greenhouse gases, coming mainly from developed countries in the northern hemisphere, has a very different effect on the Indian summer monsoons: it acts to make them stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject to instability. A small influence—a bit more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and a bit more brown haze—could have an out– size effect. Lenton believes that the monsoons could flip from one state to another as quickly as one year. What happens then is not a question that Lenton can answer with certainty, but he foresees two possibilities. One is that the monsoons grow in force and intensity, but come less frequently. We have already seen hints of this in the newspapers. In the last few years rains have grown erratic and less frequent, but when they do come, they tend to dump an enormous amount of water, and in places where they wouldn't normally do so. This is almost as bad for farmers as drought, since the rain falls on parched ground with extra force, and much of it runs off without soaking into the ground, and it causes damage to boot by washing away soil and plants. The flooding that devastated Pakistan in 2011 is a case in point. If this trend continued and strengthened in intensity, it would be bad news for the two thirds of the Indian workforce that depends on farming. It would be nasty for the Indian economy—agriculture accounts for 25 percent of GDP. A permanently erratic and harsh monsoon would depress crop yields, increase erosion on farms, and cause a rise in global food prices as India is forced to import more food. The other possibility is even worse: the monsoons could shut down entirely. This would be an unmitigated catastrophe. A sudden stopping of monsoon rain, which accounts for 80 percent of rainfall in India, could throw a billion people into danger of starvation. It would change the Indian landscape, wiping out native species of plants and animals, force farms into bankruptcy, and exacerbate water shortages that are already creating conflict. The Indian government would almost certainly be unable to cope with a disaster of such proportions. Refugees by the hundreds of millions would stream into big cities such as Mumbai and Bangalore, looking for some hope of survival. It would create a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. Lenton foresees a similar danger of sudden change in the West African monsoon, the second tipping point. Tipping point number three in Lenton's list is the sea ice of the north pole. For years the ice has been thinning and retreating more and more during the summer. Soon it may disappear completely during the summer months. We may already have reached this tipping point—a transition to a new state in which the north pole is ice–free during summer months is already at hand. Eventually the north pole may flip and be free of ice year–round. The knock–on effects of such a transition would be huge—they would cause marked increase of warming at the pole, since open water absorbs more of the sun's energy than ice–covered seas. The effect of a year–round ice–free north pole would be like heating Greenland on a skillet. The fourth tipping point is Greenland's glaciers, which hold enough water to cause sea levels to rise by more than twenty feet. It takes a while for that much ice to melt, of course. Currently, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projections say it will take on the order of a thou– sand years. Scientists currently don't have a good handle on how such a big hunk of ice melts. For plenty of reasons it could happen much more quickly—recent observations suggest that the melting has not only exceeded what models predict, but has also begun to accelerate. A marked retreat of ice in coastal areas has led to an infusion of ocean water, which is relatively warm and promotes melting. All this leads Lenton to conclude that the Greenland ice sheets could make a transition to an alternate state in three hundred years, rather than a thousand or more. Such a quick melting of Greenland would have a knock–on effect on the ocean currents that run up the Atlantic, bringing warmth to northern Europe and Scandinavia, the Atlantic thermohaline circulation. A sudden change in this current could plunge much of Europe back into an ice age. Scientists were getting nervous about this possibility a few years ago, until further research suggested that any switch in current is a long way off—perhaps a thousand years off. Lenton argues that an accelerated melting of Greenland would throw more freshwater on the northern Atlantic than these reassuring calculations have taken into account. "The canary in the coal mine is the Arctic losing its summer sea–ice cover," says Lenton. "I am really worried about the Greenland ice sheet. It's already losing mass and shrinking." If Greenland flipped into a completely ice–free state, it would cause massive rises in sea level—on the order of six or seven meters. Even if this took three hundred years to happen, "it would be an absolute disaster," says Lenton, "a real game changer." At such a rate of sea–level rise, it would be– come more and more difficult to protect coastlines. Low–lying areas would have to be abandoned. That includes cities such as New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong, not to mention the entire state of Florida and vast swaths of Indochina. Tipping point number six—the west Antarctic ice sheet—is even scarier. It has enough ice on it to raise sea levels by about eighty meters. The ice is melting, but slowly—most worst–case scenarios give the ice centuries to melt. But there are some niggling doubts about whether the West Antarctic Ice Sheet could calve into the sea more quickly than expected, as the glaciers contract. If that happened, it would push sea levels up by five meters in as short a time as a century. Most experts consider this unlikely, but if it did happen, Lenton thinks the sheet could flip in as little time as three hundred years—three times faster than most models predict. Water and ice aren't the only worries. The Amazon rain forest, the seventh of Lenton's tipping points, is also in jeopardy. Rain forests are always pretty wet, but they have dry seasons, and those dry seasons turn out to be a limiting factor on the survival of flora and fauna. As loggers reduce the number of trees that produce moisture to feed the gathering rains, the drier the dry seasons get, and the longer they last. Lately dry seasons in the Amazon have gotten more severe and have put a crimp on the survival of many of the trees that form the forest canopy, which is the backbone of the rain–forest ecosystem. As the dry season continues to lengthen, the flora draw more and more water from the soil, which eventually begins to dry out. The trees get stressed and begin to die. There's more fodder on the forest floor for wildfires. This is not hypothetical; it's already begun to happen. We saw this during the estimated twelve thousand wildfires that occurred in the Amazon during the drought of 2010. As the forest loses more and more trees, it loses its ability to feed the weather patterns with warm, moist air. If and when the Amazon flips into a drier state, it would have an big effect of weather patterns. The Amazon is basically a big spot of wet tropics. Knock out the trees and lose that moist air, and the regional circulation pattern changes as well.  A similar flip could occur in Canada's boreal forests (tipping point number eight). A die–off of these forests would release much of the 50 billion to 100 billion tons of carbon now trapped in permafrost

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ohh ok

If possible, can you post the cards for negative feedback answers and the Guterl card?

Here's my version of the Guterl card. Reposting because the formatting is prettier:

 

Best methodology shows positive feedbacks will push us past the tipping point – causes extinction.

Guterl 12 – Executive Editor of Scientific American, expert in Climate and Environment, Science Policy, citing James Hanson, a NASA scientist (Fred, “Climate Armageddon: How the World’s Weather Could Quickly Run Amokâ€, 5/25/12; < http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-worlds-weather-could-quickly-run-amok>)//Beddow

The world has warmed since those heady days of Gaia, and scientists have grown gloomier in their assessment of the state of the world's climate. NASA climate scientist James Hanson has warned of a "Venus effect," in which runaway warming turns Earth into an uninhabitable desert, with a surface temperature high enough to melt lead, sometime in the next few centuries. Even Hanson, though, is beginning to look downright optimistic compared to a new crop of climate scientists, who fret that things could head south as quickly as a handful of years, or even months, if we're particularly unlucky. Ironically, some of them are intellectual offspring of Lovelock, the original optimist gone sour. The true gloomsters are scientists who look at climate through the lens of "dynamical systems," a mathematics that describes things that tend to change suddenly and are difficult to predict. It is the mathematics of the tipping point—the moment at which a "system" that has been changing slowly and predictably will suddenly "flip." The colloquial example is the straw that breaks that camel's back. Or you can also think of it as a ship that is stable until it tips too far in one direction and then capsizes. In this view, Earth's climate is, or could soon be, ready to capsize, causing sudden, perhaps catastrophic, changes. And once it capsizes, it could be next to impossible to right it again. The idea that climate behaves like a dynamical system addresses some of the key shortcomings of the conventional view of climate change—the view that looks at the planet as a whole, in terms of averages. A dynamical systems approach, by contrast, consider climate as a sum of many different parts, each with its own properties, all of them interdependent in ways that are hard to predict. One of the most productive scientists in applying dynamical systems theory to climate is Tim Lenton at the University of East Anglia in England. Lenton is a Lovelockian two generations removed— his mentors were mentored by Lovelock. "We are looking quite hard at past data and observational data that can tell us something," says Lenton. "Classical case studies in which you've seen abrupt changes in climate data. For example, in the Greenland ice-core records, you're seeing climate jump. And the end of the Younger Dryas," about fifteen thousand years ago, "you get a striking climate change." So far, he says, nobody has found a big reason for such an abrupt change in these past events—no meteorite or volcano or other event that is an obvious cause—which suggests that perhaps something about the way these climate shifts occur simply makes them sudden. Lenton is mainly interested in the future. He has tried to look for things that could possibly change suddenly and drastically even though nothing obvious may trigger them. He's come up with a short list of nine tipping points—nine weather systems, regional in scope, that could make a rapid transition from one state to another.

 

 

I haven't actually cut many positive feedback cards - you can go through old warming files or, better yet, do more research of your own if you want to run warming (I have very rarely, if ever, gone for warming - all my affs are heg). Here's an answer to adaptation, though, that implicitly refers to positive feedbacks: it should provide some weight when answering the impact turns/defense:

 

 

Adaptation fails – warming is just too extreme.

Stabinsky 12 – Professor at College of the Atlantic USA, compiled for WWF International Global Climate and Energy Initiative (Doreen, “Tackling the Limits to Adaptation: An International Framework to Address ‘Loss and Damage’ From Climate Change Impactsâ€, November 2012; < http://www.careclimatechange.org/files/Doha_COP_18/tackling_the_limits_lr.pdf>)//Beddow

When mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by responsible countries is insufficient to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate systemâ€, 22 countries are forced to undertake disaster risk reduction and adaptation measures to prevent permanent loss and damage. There are, however, limits to how far disaster risk reduction and adaptation can reduce loss and damage. In the case of disaster risk reduction, some types of disasters will increase in frequency and severity (see Box 1 on the latest intergovernmental panel on climate Change (IPCC) findings regarding extreme events), overwhelming both risk reduction measures and generally the ability of most developing countries to cope with the impacts of those disasters. Moreover, loss and damage from extreme events extend beyond immediate losses of property and life. In St. Lucia, damage from hurricane Tomas was estimated at about 34% of total gdp. 23 Such devastating impact has a serious effect on long-term prospects for sustainable development. 24 Adaptation to 2°C of warming will be more difficult than for 1.5° c . Adapting to 4° c or 6° c of warming may be impossible. Moreover, given the changing nature of the global climate, adaptation will always be insufficient, requiring a continuous learning process towards a constantly moving boundary. The greater the warming, the more loss and damage that can be anticipated from the adverse effects of climate change. Similarly, the less support for adaptation in terms of finance, technology and capacity, the more loss and damage will result. A country’s level of development will also affect how its population experiences loss and damage, as poverty and related socio-economic and infrastructure weaknesses exacerbate the impacts and adverse effects of climate change. But a country’s lack of development or status of development is not an excuse for inaction by the global community to help them respond to severe climate loss and damage. There are very real limits to how far human systems and ecosystems can adapt to most of the slow-onset processes identified in UNFCCC decision 1/CP.16. This is true particularly for rises in temperature and sea levels, ocean acidification, loss of biodiversity, salinization and desertification. Because such processes progress and increase their impact over time – and often at large scale, adaptation gradually becomes less possible. As temperatures and sea levels rise, territory will become uninhabitable and unproductive. s oil moisture levels will decrease to the point that cultivation of crops is no longer viable in entire regions. Groundwater sources in coastal areas will become too saline to be used as drinking water. Adaptation will become impossible on low-lying islands, in settlements close to sea level, and in the most arid regions. This will lead to permanent loss of lands, livelihoods and cultural resources. 26 Permanent loss and damage from slow-onset disasters will go far beyond economic loss – livelihoods will be lost, territory will have to be abandoned, and migrants from non-productive lands will lose their homes, culture and community.

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This thread is about global warming on the affirmative, but anyone have any idea for some good generic warming disads? 

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This thread is about global warming on the affirmative, but anyone have any idea for some good generic warming disads?

 

Well, oil is a novice case area so it'll probably pop up in varsity fairly often in some circuits, which offers easy links. As far as renewables go, you could look for stuff along the lines of US leadership bad if you want to screw with people. I don't see things like fishing regulations having particularly strong links but I could be wrong.

There's also the ice age DA if you felt so inclined.

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