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glg1995

Maquiladoras Neg

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what's the arg?

Femnicide. It's about how rapes in Juarez are considered legit, and patriarchy bad. advocacy statement is: We should critically analyze gender relations implicit in economic engagement with Mexico. So of course framework. I'm also running Nietzsche, for that is what I do. just looking for case stuff and possibly strategic off case. I'll probably be hitting this aff tomorrow. 

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So, they claim they critically analyze gender relations.  As far as I can tell, they just talk about how we should do that, they don't actually do it.  They also don't actually do anything about rape or feminicide, so while they're talking about critically analyzing, women are still being raped and killed.  I don't know why people think 8 minutes of harms are worth a win, at the very least they should actually do the critical analyzing and reach a conclusion, not just say we should do it.  (And the plan text should reflect that conclusion).

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So, they claim they critically analyze gender relations.  As far as I can tell, they just talk about how we should do that, they don't actually do it.  They also don't actually do anything about rape or feminicide, so while they're talking about critically analyzing, women are still being raped and killed.  I don't know why people think 8 minutes of harms are worth a win, at the very least they should actually do the critical analyzing and reach a conclusion, not just say we should do it.  (And the plan text should reflect that conclusion).

 

 

And then a team reads a speaking for others K against them and they lose. 

Though, they probobally still link to a speaking for others K the way the advocacy statement is read now, they can "no impact" it by saying that the plan doesn't take any action that could change anything for these women. If they say that, you've just made them concede that their advocacy is useless to anyone except (relatively speaking) privileged debaters. 

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A team at my school runs a similar aff and they usually go for discourse in the 2ar, so I think a good strat would be discourse doesn't shape reality and/or framework that says the judge should only evaluate the post-fiat implications of the plan.

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Rather than speaking for others, I think a stronger argument is suffering commodification. The suffering reps 7wk file that Michigan put out is a good place to start. T-Economic Engagement would be strong too. Also look at UTNIF's Maquiladoras Case Neg for some case arguments.

 

These cards might be helpful: (Feel free to retag them)

Starting politics from the standpoint of an excluded identity-group is a vengeful politics of ressentiment—it can only position itself reactively against a universal-like whiteness, inevitably re-instating the terms of oppression

Bhambra ‘10 [Gurminder K Bhambra, University of Warwick, “Identity Politics and the Need for a Tomorrow,†http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2258/1/WRAP_Bhambra_Identity_politics.pdf]

2 The Reification of Identity We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politics that can be best described as the problem of the reification of politicised identities. Brown (1995) positions herself within the debate about identity politics by seeking to elaborate on “the wounded character of politicised identity’s desire†(ibid: 55); that is, the problem of “wounded attachments†whereby a claim to identity becomes over-invested in its own historical suffering and perpetuates its injury through its refusal to give up its identity claim. Brown’s argument is that where politicised identity is founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, exclusion itself becomes perversely valorised in the continuance of that identity. In such cases, group activity operates to maintain and reproduce the identity created by injury (exclusion) rather than – and indeed, often in opposition to – resolving the injurious social relations that generated claims around that identity in the first place. If things have to have a history in order to have a future, then the problem becomes that of how history is constructed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for Brown, identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future for that identity is then already determined by the injury “as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history†(ibid 1995: 73). Brown’s suggestion that as it is not possible to undo the past, the focus backwards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is, we believe, too stark and we will pursue this later in the article. Politicised identity, Brown maintains, “emerges and obtains its unifying coherence through the politicisation of exclusion from an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion†(ibid: 65). Its continuing existence requires both a belief in the legitimacy of the universal ideal (for example, ideals of opportunity, and reward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from those ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that such identities, produced in reaction to conditions of disempowerment and inequality, then become invested in their own impotence through practices of, for example, reproach, complaint, and revenge. These are “reactions†in the Nietzschean sense since they are substitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of action. Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suffering is instead ameliorated (to some extent) through “the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue†(ibid 1995: 70), and is compensated for by the vengeful pleasures of recrimination. Such practices, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to – in fact, provide obstacles to – practices that would seek to dispel the conditions of exclusion. Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choice between past and future, and adapting Nietzsche, exhorts the adoption of a (collective) will that would become the “redeemer of history†(ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creating different futures. As Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thing that the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the “it wasâ€. Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of the past, the will is threatened with becoming simply an “angry spectator†mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness. The one hope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery over that past such that, although “what has happened†cannot be altered, the past can be denied the power of continuing to determine the present and future. It is only this focus on the future, Brown continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of human frailties and injustices that spares us from a rancorous decline into despair. Identity politics structured by ressentiment – that is, by suffering caused by past events – can only break out of the cycle of “slave morality†by remaking the present against the terms of the past, a remaking that requires a “forgetting†of that past. An act of liberation, of self-affirmation, this “forgetting of the past†requires an “overcoming†of the past that offers identity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in which identity is to be defined differently. In arguing thus, Brown’s work becomes aligned with a position that sees the way forward for emancipatory politics as residing in a movement away from a “politics of memory†(Kilby 2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices and suffering. While we agree that investment in identities premised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating the causes of that suffering, we believe that Brown’s argument as outlined is problematic. First, following Kilby (2002), we share a concern about any turn to the future that is figured as a complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those who have suffered oppression and exclusion, the injunction to give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel and impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the “turn to the future†that theorists such as Brown and Grosz call for, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, need not be conceived of as a brute rejection of the past. Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here, stating that [since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities [then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed Nietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74). She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in pain may be no more than the demand to exorcise that pain through recognition: “all that such pain may long for – more than revenge – is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised into self-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence, losing itself†(1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to establish the political importance of remembering “painful†historical events but with a crucial caveat: that the purpose of remembering pain is to enable its release. The challenge then, according to her, is to create a political culture in which this project does not mutate into one of remembering pain for its own sake. Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be “a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche†(1995: 74), then Freud may be a more suitable companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freud’s writings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remembering is often a condition of forgetting. The hysterical patient, who is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions a past she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that traumatic past in order then to move beyond it: she must remember in order to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in the present.7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for the dilemma articulated by both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002), insisting as it does that “forgetting†(at least, loosening the hold of the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved without first remembering the traumatic past. Indeed, this would seem to be similar to the message of Beloved, whose central motif of haunting (is the adult woman, “Belovedâ€, Sethe’s murdered child returned in spectral form?) dramatises the tendency of the unanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning, constraining, as it does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallowing the possibility of a future different from that past. As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, “in order to break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attachments that are hurtful, we must first bring them into the realm of political action†(2004: 33). We would add that the task of analysing the traumatic past, and thus opening up the possibility of political action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on their own, but that this, instead, requires a “community†of participants dedicated to the serious epistemic work of remembering and interpreting the objective social conditions that made up that past and continue in the present. The “pain†of historical injury is not simply an individual psychological issue, but stems from objective social conditions which perpetuate, for the most part, forms of injustice and inequality into the present.

 

The ballot won’t heal the aff’s pain and only serves to create a perverse competition for victimhood. This results in an endless pursuit of revenge, rather than provide emancipation to marginalized populations

Diane Enns, Associate Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University, 12 [The Violence of Victimhood, Penn State Press, Google Books, pg. 28-30, (Gender Modified)]

 

We need to think carefully about what is at stake here. Why is this perspective appealing, and what are its effects? At first glance, the argument appears simple: white, privileged women, in their theoretical and practical interventions, must take into account the experiences and conceptual work of women who are less fortunate and less powerful, have fewer resources, and are therefore more subject to systemic oppression. The lesson of feminism's mistakes in the civil rights era is that this “mainstream†group must not speak for other women. But such a view must be interrogated. Its effects, as I have argued, include a veneration of the other, moral currency for the victim, and an insidious competition for victimhood. We will see in later chapters that these effects are also common in situations of conflict where the stakes are much higher. We witness here a twofold appeal: otherness discourse in feminism appeals both to the guilt of the privileged and to the resentment, or ressentiment, of the other. Suleri's allusion to “embarrassed privilege†exposes the operation of guilt in the misunderstanding that often divides Western feminists from women in the developing world, or white women from women of color. The guilt of those who feel themselves deeply implicated in and responsible for imperialism merely reinforces an imperialist benevolence, polarizes us unambiguously by locking us into the categories of victim and perpetrator, and blinds us to the power and agency of the other. Many fail to see that it is embarrassing and insulting for those identified as victimized others not to be subjected to the same critical intervention and held to the same demands of moral and political responsibility. Though we are by no means equal in power and ability, wealth and advantage, we are all collectively responsible for the world we inhabit in common. The condition of victimhood does not absolve one of moral responsibility. I will return to this point repeatedly throughout this book. Mohanty's perspective ignores the possibility that one can become attached to one's subordinated status, which introduces the concept of ressentiment, the focus of much recent interest in the injury caused by racism and colonization. Nietzsche describes ressentiment as the overwhelming sentiment of “slave morality†the revolt that begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values.19 The sufferer in this schema seeks out a cause for [their] suffering—â€a guilty agent who is susceptible to sufferingâ€â€”someone on whom [they] can vent [their] affects and so procure the anesthesia necessary to ease the pain of injury. The motivation behind ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, is the desire “to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.â€20 In its contemporary manifestation, Wendy Brown argues that ressentiment acts as the “righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured,†which “delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the ‘injury’ of social subordination.†Identities are fixed in an economy of perpetrator and victim, in which revenge, rather than power or emancipation, is sought for the injured, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer does.†Such a concept is useful for understanding why an ethics of absolute responsibility to the other appeals to the victimized. Brown remarks that, for Nietzsche, the source of the triumph of a morality rooted in ressentiment is the denial that it has any access to power or contains a will to power. Politicized identities arise as both product of and reaction to this condition; the reaction is a substitute for action-an “imaginary revenge,†Nietzsche calls it. Suffering then becomes a social virtue at the same time that the sufferer attempts to displace [their] suffering onto another. The identity created by ressentiment, Brown explains, becomes invested in its own subjection not only through its discovery of someone to blame, and a new recognition and revaluation of that subjection, but also through the satisfaction of revenge.†The outcome of feminism's attraction to theories of difference and otherness is thus deeply contentious. First, we witness the further reification of the very oppositions in question and a simple reversal of the focus from the same to the other. This observation is not new and has been made by many critics of feminism, but it seems to have made no serious impact on mainstream feminist scholarship or teaching practices in women's studies programs. Second, in the eagerness to rectify the mistakes of “white, middle-class, liberal, western†feminism, the other has been uncritically exalted, which has led in turn to simplistic designations of marginal, “othered†status and, ultimately, a competition for victimhood. Ultimately, this approach has led to a new moral code in which ethics is equated with the responsibility of the privileged Western woman, while moral immunity is granted to the victimized other. Ranjana Khanna describes this operation aptly when she writes that in the field of transnational feminism, the reification of the other has produced “separate ethical universes†in which the privileged experience paralyzing guilt and the neocolonized, crippling resentment. The only “overarching imperative†is that one does not comment on another's ethical context. An ethical response turns out to be a nonresponse.†Let us turn now to an exploration of this third outcome.

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This might help

attachicon.gifneg.docx

The first spivak card is a reason why you must speak for others...and then gives a way to do so.

 

The other cards are pretty sweet though. 

 

Post a link to the Juarez aff on the wiki? You can usually find one form of fem that criticizes other forms of it. 

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