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So a team in my circuit likes to run a k as neg and aff it's basically saying that we need to focus on real world impacts like helping women in debate, if anyone could give me some tips on how to answer that, that would be amazing! 

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Is helping women just an example of the "real world impacts" they claim, or is it uniquely about helping women.

The whole argument is helping women in debate. I should of mentioned the team is 2 guys.

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Might be able to K their advocacy based on how they phrase it.  Women "need help", not "the debate social environment needs to change to accomodate women"?  Sounds like blaming the victim to me.

 

There's plenty of SSD / policy debate good cards out there - teaches portable skills like evidence analysis, logical thinking, etc...

 

There's cards out there saying rejecting the resolution is an attempt to exclude the negative, and that's abusive and bad for debate.

 

Run real world impacts based on a knowledgeable populace. Debating policy topics increases awareness of the issues in the public, which leads to better scrutiny of political system.  The SQ is awful, people don't understand and don't care about policy, especially foreign policy, and saying that discussing it is not valuable only recreates a world in which we go to war with countries like Iraq for bad reasons.

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Might be able to K their advocacy based on how they phrase it.  Women "need help", not "the debate social environment needs to change to accomodate women"?  Sounds like blaming the victim to me.

 

There's plenty of SSD / policy debate good cards out there - teaches portable skills like evidence analysis, logical thinking, etc...

 

There's cards out there saying rejecting the resolution is an attempt to exclude the negative, and that's abusive and bad for debate.

 

Run real world impacts based on a knowledgeable populace. Debating policy topics increases awareness of the issues in the public, which leads to better scrutiny of political system.  The SQ is awful, people don't understand and don't care about policy, especially foreign policy, and saying that discussing it is not valuable only recreates a world in which we go to war with countries like Iraq for bad reasons.

 

Thanks for the help, I also have a speaking for others K, since the team is two guys and they never have personally been affected by this could we run the speaking for others K?

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Thanks for the help, I also have a speaking for others K, since the team is two guys and they never have personally been affected by this could we run the speaking for others K?

 

I both dislike that position, and think its really weak.

 

1 - You don't have to be a woman, or black, or latino, or queer to think that the way society (debate or general) treats those groups of people is wrong, and that something should be done about it. 

 

2 - That leads to a powerful turn of your argument.  It creates a world in which the only men who can speak up on this important issue are the chauvinists who would defend the patriarchal status quo.  You're silencing the men whose agreement and participation you need to transform society.

 

3 - They don't have to be speaking for others.  Men can believe that current treatment of women is wrong.  They're speaking for themselves about how they feel about SQ treatment of women. 

 

4 - They might also read testimonials of women speaking about their mistreatment, and let the women speak for themselves.  As debaters, we function a lot like lawyers in that we make arguments but do not normally give testimony.  We rely on evidence to provide the testimony.  Its the evidence that 'speaks', that is, provides testimony.  Arguments are different. An argument is equally valid (or invalid) regardless of who makes it.  Ultimately, accusing the opponents of speaking for others is an ad hominem, and that's a fallacy against someone who is making an argument.  Ad hominem is only justified if they provide testimony, which I can't imagine they would.

 

5 - There's good evidence out there which says men have a moral obligation to defend women's equality and protest their ill-treatment.

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I both dislike that position, and think its really weak.

 

1 - You don't have to be a woman, or black, or latino, or queer to think that the way society (debate or general) treats those groups of people is wrong, and that something should be done about it. 

 

2 - That leads to a powerful turn of your argument.  It creates a world in which the only men who can speak up on this important issue are the chauvinists who would defend the patriarchal status quo.  You're silencing the men whose agreement and participation you need to transform society.

 

3 - They don't have to be speaking for others.  Men can believe that current treatment of women is wrong.  They're speaking for themselves about how they feel about SQ treatment of women. 

 

4 - They might also read testimonials of women speaking about their mistreatment, and let the women speak for themselves.  As debaters, we function a lot like lawyers in that we make arguments but do not normally give testimony.  We rely on evidence to provide the testimony.  Its the evidence that 'speaks', that is, provides testimony.  Arguments are different. An argument is equally valid (or invalid) regardless of who makes it.  Ultimately, accusing the opponents of speaking for others is an ad hominem, and that's a fallacy against someone who is making an argument.  Ad hominem is only justified if they provide testimony, which I can't imagine they would.

 

5 - There's good evidence out there which says men have a moral obligation to defend women's equality and protest their ill-treatment.

I agree that men can believe that the treatment of women is wrong and something should be done about it, couldn't we read the K when they advocate what we should do in order to end the mistreatment, without consulting those being affected by it?

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def speaking for others w. narratives bad IMO, here's a shell from one of the first google links

 

 

The affirmative’s act of speaking on behalf of the oppressed only relegates them to further oppression.

Professor Linda Alcoff 92 writes[1]

 

Feminist discourse is not the only site in which the problem of speaking for others has been acknowledged and addressed. In anthropology there is similar discussion about whether it is possible to speak for others either adequately or justifiably. Trinh T. Minh-ha explains the grounds for skepticism when she says that anthropology is "mainly a conversation of `us' with `us' about `them,' of the white man with the white man about the primitive-nature man...in which `them' is silenced. `Them' always stands on the other side of the hill, naked and speechless...`them' is only admitted among `us', the discussing subjects, when accompanied or introduced by an `us'..." Given this analysis, even ethnographies written by progressive anthropologists are a priori regressive because of the structural features of anthropological discursive practice.

 

Instead, we should allow the oppressed to speak for themselves. Focusing on the voices of the oppressed is necessary to account for their unique social location.

 

Alcoff-2 continues[2]

 

The recognition that there is a problem in speaking for others has followed from the widespread acceptance of two claims. First, there has been a growing awareness that where one speaks from affects both the meaning and truth of what one says, and thus that one cannot assume an ability to transcend her location. In other words, a speaker's location (which I take here to refer to her social location or social identity) has an epistemically significant impact on that speaker's claims, and can serve either to authorize or dis-authorize one's speech. The creation of Women's Studies and African American Studies departments were founded on this very belief: that both the study of and the advocacy for the oppressed must come to be done principally by the oppressed themselves, and that we must finally acknowledge that systematic divergences in social location between speakers and those spoken for will have a significant effect on the content of what is said. The unspoken premise here is simply that a speaker's location is epistemically salient. I shall explore this issue further in the next section.

 

The role of the ballot is to reject the affirmative’s representation of women. You cannot separate his discourse from his advocacy. Representations frame and alter the actions we take.

 

Professor Michael Ryan 90 writes[3]

 

Representations signify and produce different kinds of attitudes and actions. They have an active power: they make things happen, usually by painting the world in such a way that certain policies -- from domestic slavery to Cold War militarism -- will appear justified. More importantly, perhaps, the very act of painting itself enacts the policy. The mapping out of a social terrain as an exploitable field of economic possibilities already in effect transforms that terrain, denying other possibilities and producing an object that can be acted on without certain constraints which might have come into play if the social world had been conceived (pictured, mapped, represented) differently. This is particularly clear when representations, which are supposedly the effects of the things they represent, come to take the place of their cause, the things themselves. If the images are powerful and pervasive, they can act on the things they supposedly represent by transforming them to make them conform to the prevalent images of those things. Victims of violence are especially susceptible to this process. Rendered passive and subdued by violence, they are represented as somehow deserving of violence, as wanting or needing it. An effect of violence, a particular representation, thus comes to justify violence. The representations produced by acts of violence come to be justifications for further acts of violence. That violence then furthers the transformation of its victims into people whose behavior conforms with the dominant representations of them.


[1] Linda Martín Alcoff (Dept of Philo, Syracuse University) “The Problem with Speaking for Others†Cultural Critique (Winter 91-92)

[2] Linda Martín Alcoff (Dept of Philo, Syracuse University) “The Problem with Speaking for Others†Cultural Critique (Winter 91-92)

[3] Michael Ryan, Prof of English @ Northeastern Univ., November, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1771, lexis, 1990

 

The affirmatives choice to include narratives is an attempt to speak for the oppressed—the choice of narrative exemplifies the affirmatives position of privilege.

Linda Martín Alcoff (Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. “The Problem of Speaking For Others†Cultural Critique Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32.) [Gunnarsdottir]

In the examples used above, there may appear to be a conflation between the issue of speaking for others and the issue of speaking about others. This conflation was intentional on my part, because it is difficult to distinguish speaking about from speaking for in all cases. There is an ambiguity in the two phrases: when one is speaking for another one may be describing their situation and thus also speaking about them. In fact, it may be impossible to speak for another without simultaneously conferring information about them. Similarly, when one is speaking about another, or simply trying to describe their situation or some aspect of it, one may also be speaking in place of them, i.e. speaking for them. One may be speaking about another as an advocate or a messenger if the person cannot speak for herself. Thus I would maintain that if the practice of speaking for others is problematic, so too must be the practice of speaking about others. This is partly the case because of what has been called the "crisis of representation." For in both the practice of speaking for as well as the practice of speaking about others, I am engaging in the act of representing the other's needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are, based on my own situated interpretation. In post-structuralist terms, I am participating in the construction of their subject-positions rather than simply discovering their true selves. Once we pose it as a problem of representation, we see that, not only are speaking for and speaking about analytically close, so too are the practices of speaking for others and speaking for myself. For, in speaking for myself, I am also representing my self in a certain way, as occupying a specific subject-position, having certain characteristics and not others, and so on. In speaking for myself, I (momentarily) create my self—just as much as when I speak for others I create them as a public, discursive self, a self which is more unified than any subjective experience can support. And this public self will in most cases have an effect on the self experienced as interiority. The point here is that the problem of representation underlies all cases of speaking for, whether I am speaking for myself or for others. This is not to suggest that all representations are fictions: they have very real material effects, as well as material origins, but they are always mediated in complex ways by discourse, power, and location. However, the problem of speaking for others is more specific than the problem of representation generally, and requires its own particular analysis. There is one final point I want to make before we can pursue this analysis. The way I have articulated this problem may imply that individuals make conscious choices about their discursive practice free of ideology and the constraints of material reality. This is not what I wish to imply. The problem of speaking for others is a social one, the options available to us are socially constructed, and the practices we engage in cannot be understood as simply the results of autonomous individual choice. Yet to replace both "I" and "we" with a passive voice that erases agency results in an erasure of responsibility and accountability for one's speech, an erasure I would strenuously argue against (there is too little responsibility-taking already in Western practice!). When we sit down to write, or get up to speak, we experience ourselves as making choices. We may experience hesitation from fear of being criticized or from fear of exacerbating a problem we would like to remedy, or we may experience a resolve to speak despite existing obstacles, but in many cases we experience having the possibility to speak or not to speak. On the one hand, a theory which explains this experience as involving autonomous choices free of material structures would be false and ideological, but on the other hand, if we do not acknowledge the activity of choice and the experience of individual doubt, we are denying a reality of our experiential lives.9 So I see the argument of this paper as addressing that small space of discursive agency we all experience, however multi-layered, fictional, and constrained it in fact is. Ultimately, the question of speaking for others bears crucially on the possibility of political effectivity. Both collective action and coalitions would seem to require the possibility of speaking for. Yet influential postmodernists such as Gilles Deleuze have characterized as "absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others"10 and important feminist theorists have renounced the practice as irretrievably harmful. What is at stake in rejecting or validating speaking for others as a discursive practice? To answer this, we must become clearer on the epistemological and metaphysical claims which are implicit in the articulation of the problem. A plethora of sources have argued in this century that the neutrality of the theorizer can no longer, can never again, be sustained, even for a moment. Critical theory, discourses of empowerment, psychoanalytic theory, post-structuralism, feminist and anti-colonialist theories have all concurred on this point. Who is speaking to whom turns out to be as important for meaning and truth as what is said; in fact what is said turns out to change according to who is speaking and who is listening. Following Foucault, I will call these "rituals of speaking" to identify discursive practices of speaking or writing which involve not only the text or utterance but their position within a social space which includes the persons involved in, acting upon, and/or affected by the words. Two elements within these rituals will deserve our attention: the positionality or location of the speaker and the discursive context. We can take the latter to refer to the connections and relations of involvement between the utterance/text and other utterances and texts as well as the material practices in the relevant environment, which should not be confused with an environment spatially adjacent to the particular discursive event. Rituals of speaking are constitutive of meaning, the meaning of the words spoken as well as the meaning of the event. This claim requires us to shift the ontology of meaning from its location in a text or utterance to a larger space, a space which includes the text or utterance but which also includes the discursive context. And an important implication of this claim is that meaning must be understood as plural and shifting, since a single text can engender diverse meanings given diverse contexts. Not only what is emphasized, noticed, and how it is understood will be affected by the location of both speaker and hearer, but the truth-value or epistemic status will also be affected. For example, in many situations when a woman speaks the presumption is against her; when a man speaks he is usually taken seriously (unless his speech patterns mark him as socially inferior by dominant standards). When writers from oppressed races and nationalities have insisted that all writing is political the claim has been dismissed as foolish or grounded in ressentiment or it is simply ignored; when prestigious European philosophers say that all writing is political it is taken up as a new and original "truth" (Judith Wilson calls this "the intellectual equivalent of the `cover record'.")11 The rituals of speaking which involve the location of speaker and listeners affect whether a claim is taken as true, well-reasoned, a compelling argument, or a significant idea. Thus, how what is said gets heard depends on who says it, and who says it will affect the style and language in which it is stated. The discursive style in which some European post-structuralists have made the claim that all writing is political marks it as important and likely to be true for a certain (powerful) milieu; whereas the style in which African-American writers made the same claim marked their speech as dismissable in the eyes of the same milieu. This point might be conceded by those who admit to the political mutability of interpretation, but they might continue to maintain that truth is a different matter altogether. And they would be right that acknowledging the effect of location on meaning and even on whether something is taken as true within a particular discursive context does not entail that the "actual" truth of the claim is contingent upon its context. However, this objection presupposes a particular conception of truth, one in which the truth of a statement can be distinguished from its interpretation and its acceptance. Such a concept would require truth to be independent of the speakers' or listeners' embodied and perspectival location. Thus, the question of whether location bears simply on what is taken to be true or what is really true, and whether such a distinction can be upheld, involves the very difficult problem of the meaning of truth. In the history of Western philosophy, there have existed multiple, competing definitions and ontologies of truth: correspondence, idealist, pragmatist, coherentist, and consensual notions. The dominant modernist view has been that truth represents a relationship of correspondence between a proposition and an extra-discursive reality. On this view, truth is about a realm completely independent of human action and expresses things "as they are in themselves," that is, free of human interpretation.

 

Speaking for others re-inscribes hierarchies and instills patterns of control

 

Linda Martín Alcoff (Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. “The Problem of Speaking For Others†Cultural Critique Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32.) [Gunnarsdottir]

The emphasis on effects should not imply, therefore, that an examination of the speaker's location is any less crucial. This latter examination might be called a kind of genealogy. In this sense, a genealogy involves asking how a position or view is mediated and constituted through and within the conjunction and conflict of historical, cultural, economic, psychological, and sexual practices. But it seems to me that the importance of the source of a view, and the importance of doing a genealogy, should be subsumed within an overall analysis of effects, making the central question what the effects are of the view on material and discursive practices through which it traverses and the particular configuration of power relations emergent from these. Source is relevant only to the extent that it has an impact on effect. As Gayatri Spivak likes to say, the invention of the telephone by a European upper class male in no way preempts its being put to the use of an anti-imperialist revolution.
In conclusion, I would stress that
the practice of speaking for others is often born of a desire for mastery, to privilege oneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about another's situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise. And the effect of the practice of speaking for others is often, though not always, erasure and a reinscription of sexual, national, and other kinds of hierarchies. I hope that this analysis will contribute toward rather than diminish the important discussion going on today about how to develop strategies for a more equitable, just distribution of the ability to speak and be heard. But this development should not be taken as an absolute dis-authorization of all practices of speaking for. It is not always the case that when others unlike me speak for me I have ended up worse off, or that when we speak for others they end up worse off. Sometimes, as Loyce Stewart has argued, we do need a "messenger" to advocate for our needs.
The source of a claim or discursive practice in suspect motives or maneuvers or in privileged social locations, I have argued, though it is always relevant, cannot be sufficient to repudiate it. We must ask further questions about its effects, questions which amount to the following: will it enable the empowerment of oppressed peoples? 

Edited by georgebushsdogpaintings
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I both dislike that position, and think its really weak.

 

1 - You don't have to be a woman, or black, or latino, or queer to think that the way society (debate or general) treats those groups of people is wrong, and that something should be done about it. 

 

No, but you need to be a member of one of those groups to figure out what solutions would be best to deal with these problems. If those who are human trafficked believe that it is better to not use armed raids as a way to stop trafficking because of the collateral damage, who am I as a non-trafficked person to say that they're wrong? 

 

2 - That leads to a powerful turn of your argument.  It creates a world in which the only men who can speak up on this important issue are the chauvinists who would defend the patriarchal status quo.  You're silencing the men whose agreement and participation you need to transform society.

 

Allies and intersectionality is super legit, but the movement shouldn't be led by those who benefit from the status quo. 

 

3 - They don't have to be speaking for others.  Men can believe that current treatment of women is wrong.  They're speaking for themselves about how they feel about SQ treatment of women. 

 

By speaking about the possible action that needs to be done to help a group like women or those-who-are-not-CIS, they are indeed speaking for others. Realizing that said groups are treated badly is a GOOD thing, but there advocacy of what to do about it not always is. 

 

4 - They might also read testimonials of women speaking about their mistreatment, and let the women speak for themselves.  As debaters, we function a lot like lawyers in that we make arguments but do not normally give testimony.  We rely on evidence to provide the testimony.  Its the evidence that 'speaks', that is, provides testimony.  Arguments are different. An argument is equally valid (or invalid) regardless of who makes it.  Ultimately, accusing the opponents of speaking for others is an ad hominem, and that's a fallacy against someone who is making an argument.  Ad hominem is only justified if they provide testimony, which I can't imagine they would.

 

If they read testimonials of women, or whomever they are K'ing, then that likely solves the K and means you shouldn't run it. You can make the argument that in general it is NOT feminist authors who are writing the solvency, rather just the impact and link cards of the things that the K try's to solve for, but the second you have one who writes a solvency card who is from a disadvantaged group, the K should go away. 

 

5 - There's good evidence out there which says men have a moral obligation to defend women's equality and protest their ill-treatment.

 

"Moral Obligation"... Anyway, all of that is fine, speaking out is fine. It's at the point that men are trying to create the implementation of a policy to stop the structural violence that they are speaking for others. This is why K aff's w/o a plantext usually don't (or rather, shouldn't) link into a speaking for others K. 

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Alright other then the speaking for others k, what should I read, Squirrelloid mentioned cards that say Policy debate good cards, and rejecting the resolution as aff bad cards where could I find these?

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For the policy debate good arguments a starting point is looking in framework files on the NDCA open evidence project.

Alright thanks!

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Some cards from the final round of the NDT A.     Decision making is the only portable skill---means our framework turns case

Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

 

 

 

B.     Discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: students already have preconceived and ideological notions about how the world operates---government policy discussion is vital to force engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes, however those outcomes may be defined---and, it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

Esberg & Sagan 12 *Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND **Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,†2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

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Well you could run framework + speaking for others + maybe some answers to feminism K's? I'll look through my files to see what I have, but I don't research fem k's so I can't promise anything.

 

Edit: What about cede the political?

 

 

Okay, I'm not familiar with the literature so don't flame me if these actually are sucky answers, but they seemed relevant:

 

It’s impossible to transform politics without addressing the state—criticism that refuses the state cedes the most important political battles to the right

Shaw ’99 (Shaw, professor of IR at the University of Sussex, 1999  (Martin, “The Unfinished Global Revolution: Intellectuals and the New Politics of International Relationsâ€, http://sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/unfinished.pdf)

 

The mistakes in this passage are also twofold. First, the myth of globalisation as threat or onslaught – which can only be resisted – is combined with the myth of the weakening of the state.56 Second, hopes for ‘an alternative social order’ are vested in the ‘resurrection’ of civil society, but Cox himself identifies a fundamental difficulty with this scenario, the ‘the still small development of civil society.’57 The expansion of civil society is indeed crucial to the long-term consolidation of a worldwide democratic order. But civil society is not only too weak to take the full weight of global transformation, it is also still too national in form.58 Moreover, it is theoretically and practically inconceivable that we can advance emancipation without simultaneously transforming state power.59 While Booth explicitly rejects world government, Cox largely avoids the role of internationalised state organisations. He sees nation-states as playing ‘the role of agencies of the global economy’60 and seems incapable either of understanding the global transformations of state power, or envisaging a constructive role for them. Critical international theorists have dug themselves into a hole over this issue. In committing themselves to ‘globalization from below’, as Richard Falk61 calls it, they are simply missing political battles that matter in today’s world. Falk is certainly moving towards a new position when he writes: An immediate goal of those disparate social forces that constitute globalizationfrom-below is to reinstrumentalize the state to the extent that it redefines its role as mediating between the logic of capital the priorities of its peoples, including their short-term and longer-term goals.62 But this tortuous language is hardly necessary. People’s movements have been on the streets throughout the last decade, trying to make both national and international state organisations responsive and accountable. The real question is how could this question ever have been marginalised in any serious radical project? It often seems that international theorists like Cox and Falk have left the state – and war – aside.63 Critics evacuate the harsher edges of world politics for the soft ‘non-realist’ territory of political economy, gender and civil society. No such refuge is possible, however. Economic and gender inequalities will not be solved so long as the repressive state is untamed. The new international relations will have to formulate its response the continuing role of organised violence in the world order. A loose ‘governance without government’ is all too fashionable in international circles.64 However, while Booth is obviously right that all government is imperfect, the differences between 'relatively decent' and tyrannical government, both nationally and globally, are absolutely critical. Without addressing the nature of contemporary global state networks, and a serious discussion of the ways in which they can be developed into an adequate global authority framework sustained by and sustaining local democracies, we have hardly begun to fashion a new agenda.

 

This totalitarian regime legitimizes scapegoating and violence against people in and out of the state – turns all your security arguments

Boggs ‘5 (Carl, Professor of Social Science at National University, Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless War, p. 87 -88)

 

If any single event could further eviscerate the public sphere, especially in foreign affairs, that would be the terrorist attack of 9/11. One might argue that terrorism in general tends to favor a mood of antipolittcs in which security concerns, authoritarian politics, and conservative agendas come to the core. The depoliticizing impact of the Red Brigades in Italy and Baader-Meinhof in Germany during the 1970s offers two excellent cases in point. The "strategy of tension" adopted by terrorist groups hoping that dramatic acts of political violence will bring chaos and instability, creating new space for insurgency, has, usually brought just the opposite: new levels of legitimacy and heightened coercive powers to security states long de­pendent on heavy doses of patriotic mobilization, intelligence gathering, surveillance, police controls, and militarism. After 9/11 nominally liberal-democratic system began moving ever faster along the road to corporatism, undemocratic practices, and narrowing public discourses, If the terrorist methodology of al Qaeda and kindred groups is designed to generate crisis and an opening for change, its actual consequences have run counter to that aim—that is, toward a diminution of public life endemic to psychological retreat, collective fear, and social conservatism. In the United States, such trends were at least partly reversed during Bush's buildup to the second Iraq war. Terrorism as both political act and imminent possibility is usually ac­companied by tear, despair, and paranoia--emotional responses hardly con­ducive to open discourses and democratic politics. People find themselves isolated atomized, and thus more vulnerable to governmental controls. Dis­sent and protest are stigmatized and marginalized, negated or crowded out within an atmosphere of super patriotism, demonization of enemies, and scapegoating; political complexities and nuances quickly vanish, In the United States after 9/11, differences between Republicans and Democrats, Bush supporters and loyal opposition—already narrowed after decades of bipartisan foreign policy—became hard to distinguish. The terrorist attacks generated a united patriotic response that continued into the second Golf War. Congressional action was hurriedly taken without the distractions and impediments of debate: both the nearly carte-blanche war powers delivered to Bush and the Patriot Act, for example, won quick passage in both Houses, over minimal and easily discredited opposition. Bush's military op­tion, starting with the bombing of Afghanistan in October 2001, short-circuited discussion of possible alternative courses of action. The jingoism and ethnocentrism that-came to define patriotic unity seemed to repeat the popular mood of the Desert Storm period, again legitimating many of the symbols and rituals vital to militarism and Empire

 

 

Relying on “gender†as a category for mobilization forces us to ignore the complexities of identity.

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 3)

A part from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion the subject, however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common identity Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, women, even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety. As Denise Riley’s title suggests, Am I That Name? is a question produced by the very possibility of the name’s multiple significations. If one “is†a woman that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pre-gendered “person†transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out “gender†from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced.

 

Gender must be rejected as a category for mobilization. Emancipatory gender models can only reify existing power relations.

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 94)

In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the univocal construct of “sex (one is one’s sex and, therefore, not the other) is (a) produced in the service of the social regulation and control of sexuality and (B) conceals and artificially unifies a variety of disparate and unrelated sexual functions and then © postures within discourse as a cause, an inferior essence which both produces and renders intelligible all manner of sensation, pleasure and desire as sex-specific. In other words, bodily pleasures are not merely casually reducible to this ostensibly sex-specific essence, but they become readily interpretable as manifestations or signs of this “sex.†In opposition to this false construction of sex as both univocal and casual, Foucault engages a reverse-discourse which treats sex as an effect rather than an origin. In the place of “sex†as the original and continuous case and signification of bodily pleasures, he proposes “sexuality†as an open and complex historical system of discourse and power that produces the misnomer of “sex†as part of a strategy to conceal and, hence, to perpetuate power-relations. One way in which power is both perpetuated and concealed is through the establishment of an external or arbitrary relation between power, conceived as repression or domination, and sex, conceived as a brave but thwarted energy waiting for release or authentic self-expression. The use of this juridical model presumes that the relation between power and sexuality is not only ontologically distinct, but that power always and only works to subdue or liberate a sex which is fundamentally intact, self-sufficient, and other than power itself. When “sex†is essentially in this way, it becomes ontologically immunized from power relations and from its own historicity. As a result, the analysis of sexuality is collapsed into the analysis of “sex,†and any inquiry into the historical production of the category of “sex†itself is precluded by this inverted ad falsifying causality. According to Foucault, “sex†must not only be contextualized within the terms of sexuality, but juridical power must be reconceived as a construction produced by a generative power which, in turn, conceals the mechanism of is own productivity. The notion of sex brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it possible to invert the representation of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as being rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to dominate. Foucault explicitly takes a stand against emancipatory or liberationist models of sexuality in The History of Sexuality because they subscribe to a juridical model that does not acknowledge the historical production of “sex†as a category, that is, as a mystifying “effect†of power relations. His ostensible problem with feminism seems also to emerge here: Where feminist analysis takes the category of sex and, thus, according to him, the binary restriction of gender as its point of departure. Foucault understands his own project to be an inquiry into how the category of “sex†and sexual difference are constructed within discourse as necessary features of bodily identity. The juridical model of law which structures the feminist emancipatory model presumes, in his view, that the subject of emancipation, “the sexed boy†in some sense is not itself in need of a critical deconstruction. As Foucault remarks about some humanist efforts at prison reform, the criminal subject who gets emancipated may be even more deeply shackled than the humanist originally thought. To be sexed, for Foucault, is to be subjected to a set of social regulations, to have the law that directs those regulations reside both as the formative principle of one’s sex, gender, pleasures and desires and as the hermeneutic principle of self-interpretation. The category of sex is thus inevitably regulative, and any analysis which makes that category pre-suppositional uncritically extends and further legitimates that regulative strategy as a power knowledge regime.

 

Identity politics in the context of preventing violence against women ignore intragroup differences and cause tension between groups.

 

Kimberle Crenshaw, prof law @ UCLA, 1993, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, p. 1242

 

The embrace of identity politics, however, has been in tension with dominant conceptions of social justice. Race, gender, and other identity categories are most often treated in mainstream liberal discourse as vestiges of bias or domination—that is, as intrinsically negative frameworks in which social power works to exclude or marginalize those who are different. According to this understanding, our liberatory objective should be to empty such categories of any social significance. Yet implicit in certain strands of feminist and racial liberation movements, for example is the view that the social power in delineating difference need not be the power of domination; it can instead be the source of social empowerment and reconstruction.

 

The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite—that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences. In the context of violence against women, this elision of difference in identity politics is problematic, fundamentally because the violence that many women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and class. Moreover, ignoring difference within groups contributes to tension among groups, another problem of identity politics that bears on efforts to politicize violence against women. Feminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains. Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the practices expound identity as woman or person of color as an either/or proposition, they relegate the identity of women of color to a location that resists telling.

 

 

Feminism relies on an essential an universal women that reinforces the same stereotypes produced under patriarchy

 

Witworth, prof of political science and female studies @ York U, 94 (Feminism and International Relations, pg 20, 1994)

 

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a ‘re-thinking’ from the perspective of women.  What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women.  Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism’s reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of ‘women’.  As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal ‘man’, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal ‘woman’.  And indeed, that notion of ‘woman’ not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchyThose women who do not fit the mould – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – are quickly dismissed as expressing ‘negative’ or ‘inauthentic’ feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men).  In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism.  It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes.  Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right.  As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.

 

 

Turn – the K’s essentialization of the male as belligerent and the female as peaceful collapses into patriarchy – turns the K 

Tickner, feminist IR theorist and a distinguished scholar in residence at the School of International Services, American University, 01

[J. Ann, Gendering World Politics, p. 59-60, MM]

 

In a context of a male-dominated society, the association of men with war and women with peace also reinforces gender hierarchies and false dichotomies that contribute to the devaluation of both women and peace. The association of women and peace with idealism in IR, which I have argued is a deeply gendered concept, has rendered it less legitimate in the discourse of international relations. Although peace movements that have relied on maternal images may have had some success, they do nothing to change existing gender relations; this allows men to remain in control and continue to dominate the agenda of world politics, and it continues to render women’s voices as inauthentic in matters of foreign policymaking. An example of the negative consequences of associating women with peace is Francis Fukuyama’s discussion of the biological roots of human aggression and its association with war. Fukuyama claims that women are more peaceful than men—a fact that, he believes, for the most part is biologically determined. Therefore, a world run by women would be a more peaceful world. However, Fukuyama claims that only in the West is the realization of what he calls a “feminized†world likely; since areas outside the West will continue to be run by younger aggressive men, Western men, who can stand up to threats posed by dangers from outside, must remain in charge, particularly in the area of international politics.79 Besides its implications for reinforcing a disturbing North/South split, this argument is deeply conservative; given the dangers of an aggressive world, women must be kept in their place and out of international politics.80 The leap from aggressive men to aggressive states is also problematic. There is little evidence to suggest that men are “naturally†aggressive and women are “naturally†peaceful; as bell hooks reminds us, black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent and militaristic in their support of racism.81 Traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity that sustain war require an exercise of power: they are not inevitable. 82

Edited by Atlas0Smirked

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It sounds like you'll have a great link story for Speaking for Others and maybe you can start looking into a Butler kritik of their feminism - Queer Theory could be a good kritik here. In particular you should read the first like, 45 or so pages of Gender Trouble to get a good understanding of her criticism of feminisms that presuppose a stable identity category of "women," since they usually either look for an "essential" notion of the female in a biological or 'self-identifying' fashion that makes feminism harder or excludes, say, trans* or intersexed people for instance. There are some Butler cards on the college and high school debate wikis that might help you make a queer theory K of their aff. It'd be interesting to research at least - I've not finished Gender Trouble so I haven't gotten to the gender performativity bits, but it'd be cool to see how their social location as men interacts with the performance of gender tropes that inform both an understanding of men as maybe 'saviors' and women as maybe 'damsels in distress'? You could certainly question whether their alt of speaking for women is better than, say, having discussions with female debaters in the region, maybe having an open (or closed!) forum with them and discussing females in debate in y'alls circuit, etc. The alt/perm debate would be cool there.

 

These are just ideas off the top of my head though and I'd look into what scholars (Butler herself plus many others writing about gender and sexuality in the vein of performativity & tropes - Snarf probably knows a lot about that) have written. The literature base will at least be there for you to tap into. 

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Rather than K them for speaking for others, I'd probably try to find a way to PIC their advocacy/performance.  You may find the speaking for others cards useful to do that.  If they really do say 'help women' rather than 'change the debate environment', i'd totally PIC out of their representation of women as the ones needing to change.  Victim blaming is never cool.

 

@RainSilves

I'm having a hard time imagining running a Feminism K aff without having women authors speak to solvency, I'd certainly never write such a K aff without that.  But okay, i can see speaking for others as a K if their solvency advocates are men.  Actually, I could see speaking for others in that case even if it was women running the case.  Its the *testimony* that matters, not who the arguers are.  Making this clear in the judge's mind would be the key element.

 

Of course, this gets to your 'leading' the movement.  The debaters in the round never make a claim to leading the movement at all.  They're using testimony (evidence) to make arguments.  To the degree that their arguments avoid personal experience, their personal identity is completely inconsequential.  The arguer is irrelevant to the validity of an argument.  (And in my platonic ideal of debate, the debaters never provide testimony themselves, but occupy the role of adversary in the legal sense - their identity should not constrain their argumentation, only their evidence can do that).

 

Basically, Speaking for Others is an ad hominem attack when its directed at the debaters on the other team.  Ad hominem is *always* a fallacy in response to argument.  The only ways a Speaking for Others K would be a legitimate position would be (1) targeted at the opponent's authors OR (2) the debaters provided testimony themselves, and that testimony alone could be indicted with the K (because that's when ad hominem is legitimate).

 

(Aside: if anyone in the round is the 'leader' of the movement, its the judge who is making the decision about whether to adopt the aff advocacy or not. The act of decision-making is the only act of leadership that occurs. Debaters occupy positions of persuasive power where they try to convince someone with more actual power - over the ballot - than them to endorse their position).

 

Finally, not all men benefit from the status quo.  Ideas of masculinity that go hand-in-hand with chauvinism harm men as well.

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I wouldn't run Cede the Political , because there not anti-political and they don't problematize the state. I personally dislike SFO, mainly for the reason Squirreloid listed above, i.e. because it instills the idea that only woman can speak on behalf of woman's rights and the K essentially tells Men they should either ignore the suffering or speak in support of patriarchy, but its probably still winnable.  If i was aff and they were neg, I'd probably just read framework, atchison+panetta backlash turns, and permutations (unless they link sexist discourse to the aff, there's no reason you can't endorse both methods of debate).  If they're aff, you've got better choices like queer theory, Cap, Chow (which is similar to SFO), along with framework.

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I wouldn't run Cede the Political , because there not anti-political and they don't problematize the state. I personally dislike SFO, mainly for the reason Squirreloid listed above, i.e. because it instills the idea that only woman can speak on behalf of woman's rights and the K essentially tells Men they should either ignore the suffering or speak in support of patriarchy, but its probably still winnable.  If i was aff and they were neg, I'd probably just read framework, atchison+panetta backlash turns, and permutations (unless they link sexist discourse to the aff, there's no reason you can't endorse both methods of debate).  If they're aff, you've got better choices like queer theory, Cap, Chow (which is similar to SFO), along with framework.

Alright thanks! So speaking for others is mostly likely out, could you explain to me what queer theory is?

Edited by Solax10

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do you have their advocacy text? you could PIK out of some stuff. ex. if they identify women in debate (or whatever else their aff talks about) as victims you could read the victim PIK. there's one on evazon. 

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@feldsy

they aren't limited to speaking for others or defending the patriarchy -- they can speak WITH others. it's possible for a man and woman to partner you know.

 

also personally i'd do queer theory and talk about how i'm oppressed by debate and how their advocacy excludes me

Edited by georgebushsdogpaintings

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do you have their advocacy text? you could PIK out of some stuff. ex. if they identify women in debate (or whatever else their aff talks about) as victims you could read the victim PIK. there's one on evazon. 

I haven't faced their narrative so I don't know what their advocacy text is.

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@feldsy

they aren't limited to speaking for others or defending the patriarchy -- they can speak WITH others. it's possible for a man and woman to partner you know.

 

also personally i'd do queer theory and talk about how i'm oppressed by debate and how their advocacy excludes me

So does the queer theory basically state that they are only helping women, and aren't helping others who are discriminated in debate like those apart of the LGBQT community?

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I think that although the advice you're receiving is well intentioned, it may be above your skill level right now. Focus on creating a solid framework argument first, then consider adding other elements to your strategy.

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I think that although the advice you're receiving is well intentioned, it may be above your skill level right now. Focus on creating a solid framework argument first, then consider adding other elements to your strategy.

I completely agree, I am in a lay area so narratives are a rarity here, but with nat quals coming up more K judges will be judging those rounds so I need a solid strategy against them.

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