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Counterplan: The Signing Pen of the President of the United States should repeal the embargo toward Cuba

Counterplan: The court building of the Supreme Court of the United States should declare the embargo unconstitutional

Counterplan: John Boehner's gavel should repeal the embargo toward Cuba

 

Etc. Why do you have the constitution of the US declaring something unconstitutional? I understand the whole OOO idea, but it doesn't really make sense in the context of the 1AC...

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we made this aff for our last real tournament of the year and never had any problems with this 

 

The counterplans that you mention always sound like a good idea but they have problems dodging the causality indight

 

problems tend to arise when you think about things like "how does the net benefit to the counterplan dodge the causality indight (morton)?" or "how does the net benefit address and respond to the agency of nonhuman objects" 

 

theoretically you could just read a bunch of embargo lift bad arguments against us and have a counterplan that has john boehners gavel tell congress to accept its agency, but whatever net benefit you could get would always link back into the idea of causality 

 

we have the constitution lift the embargo mainly to dodge topicality and or framework arguments because at the most basic level the constitution is the usfg, and when your in kansas if your aff seems at all critical people will just go for one off framework and not touch case so... that always helps

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What would you read against a "Speaking for Others" kritik? I feel like that would be a hilarious round to judge

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Why does the withdrawal of causal relata not indict the aff as much as potential CPs/NBs?

 

How is the capital-B Being cited in advantage 3 not an example of a philosophy of access (Harman) or a "screen" which covers over objective multiplicity (Morton)?

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I think all three of your contentions contradict very much, especially considering that every card in the Exceptionalism advantage posits a Hedeggarian understanding of Being that almost all OOO theorists argue is flawed (literally Bryant has extensive series of articles on why Heidegger and Spanos are wrong). I think the OOO understanding of nonhuman agency isn't just predicated on this imaginary notion of object's literally being able to do things, which means I don't think that because your plan text has the constitution 'doing' something means you access the framing evidence of OOO.

 

I think in order to make this aff actually OOO, you need to talk about the way that trade patterns and the relationships within the embargo between entities like the US and Cuba or maybe the physical land divisions or port security checks involved with the embargo have created issues that are unable to be addressed in a frame that privileges human agency and fails to account for nonhuman agency.

 

I think OOO is kind of hard to run this year because the resolution doesn't really include nonhuman actors, instead it focuses on the relationship between human actors, and since much of OOO's criticism is on the conceptual flaws of the relationship between nonhuman and human actors there isn't really a solid link on the aff side and really the neg side. In fact, I've seen a lot of awful attempts at running the K this year because of people trying to run very stupidly generic links. Last year, there was a very clear link argument to be made because authors like Bryant and Connolly actually talked about it and the topic was actually concerned with aforementioned relationship.

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What's your answer to: "The constitution doesn't believe it has the power to declare things unconstitutional.  It reserves that right to the supreme court."

 

I suppose this gets into fiat issues, but belief in capability and actual capability is near the line of what can and can't be fiated.  Ie, you can't fiat a person to fly like a bird.  You might be able to fiat they believe they can fly like a bird, but they still fail to fly like one.

So perhaps rephrase as "The constitution does not have that power, it reserves that right to the supreme court" to avoid the fiat issue.

 

Also, what's your answer to T-USFG?  (The constitution establishes the USFG, but it is not itself part of the USFG, as per its own text which does not include itself as part of the government).

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@ktg

 

The reason we utilize the constitution is because it has force of law and is topical. Boehner's gavel cannot actually repeal the embargo, it could just call the house to order. Too be fair, advantage counterplans are pretty effective, but that is why we include reasons why the embargo is bad.

 

@dancon

 

Speaking for other is a rather odd argument in the context of this aff. The plan text is not so much a statement of what the constitution thinks of the embargo, but what the constitution should do with regards to the embargo. Reading Speaking for Other is like saying a traditional policy aff's plan text is a instance of speaking for others cuz we make congress do something. Alcoff's argument is more about making statements on behalf of others, whereas we just say a particular course of action should occur.

 

@Consult Japan

 

The morton evidence criticizes linear casual claims like "A -> B -> C" but the Morton evidence still allows for a "region of traces and footprints." Our impacts are relational rather than specific or casual. For example, the Royal "economic decline causes war" evidence indicates their is a statistical relationship between economic decline and war. We are OK with these types of claims. The trouble is when a disad makes a prediction of a particular economic decline. The world is too withdrawn to make linear predictions.

 

@Ganondorf

 

We will defend the arguments we make. Objected oriented ontology is an umbrella term that includes lots of distinct theorists and will defend Bennett's particular flavor. I don't think Jane Bennett is as hardcore as the fellows that you listed and doesn't make any claims that contradict the claims of our exceptionalism advantage. I think the more broad term "posthumanism" is more accurate to the aff. Spanos specifically describes his work as "posthumanist" rather than orthodox Heideggerian. If in the event the opposing team sticks us with a particular ontology, we will defend it. For example, although Levinas has a powerful critique of Heidegger, he argues that Heideggerian ideas are necessary and good for philosophy overall.

 

@Squirrelloid

 

These arguments are functionally like inherent barriers. Obviously, in traditional policy debate the status quo government doesn't believe in making change, that change is impossible now. That is why we fiat things. All fiat is inherently designed to overcome impossible things. If flying like a bird was topical action, I think we ought to be able to fiat it, especially consider the Bennett evidence talks about the importance of "utopian imagination." I don't know how you would know what the constitution does or doesn't believes in, so I'm not concern about the initial question. On T-USFG we argue a counter interpretation that the federal government definitions are in bedded within a humanist politics and that we should expand the definition of the political to include non-human actors.

 

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@ktg

 

The reason we utilize the constitution is because it has force of law and is topical. Boehner's gavel cannot actually repeal the embargo, it could just call the house to order. Too be fair, advantage counterplans are pretty effective, but that is why we include reasons why the embargo is bad.

The Constitution does not "force of law." It gives OTHER actors the force of law and lays the guidelines for how institutions and people USE the force of law. 

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@Squirrelloid

 

These arguments are functionally like inherent barriers. Obviously, in traditional policy debate the status quo government doesn't believe in making change, that change is impossible now. That is why we fiat things. All fiat is inherently designed to overcome impossible things. If flying like a bird was topical action, I think we ought to be able to fiat it, especially consider the Bennett evidence talks about the importance of "utopian imagination." I don't know how you would know what the constitution does or doesn't believes in, so I'm not concern about the initial question. On T-USFG we argue a counter interpretation that the federal government definitions are in bedded within a humanist politics and that we should expand the definition of the political to include non-human actors.

 

Perfcon / turn: OOO believes in an objectively real world (about which we can know things, although not everything).  Utopian fiat is strictly in violation of the K.

 

1. Ontology is about what is, not what should be. OOO is fundamentally bounded by the nature of reality.

Bryant 11/12/2013 http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/political-ontology-and-the-place-of-ontology-in-politics/#more-7535

 

The problem is this: Ontology is about what is, about what it means to be, how things are, and what types of things– in the broadest terms possible –are. At its best, it makes no claims about what ought to be. Rather, ontology is concerned with the being of beings in their pure beingness (how’s that for a sentence!). By contrast, politics is a machine that evaluates how things ought to be and develops strategies and techniques for attempting to bring this selection and arrangement of being into existence. If, building on Thorne’s example, our ontology says “all is fireâ€, that ontology has nothing to say about what sorts of fires we ought to promote. It doesn’t tell us whether we ought to prefer neoliberal fires or anarchist fires, but just argues that both of these forms of being are fire and gives an account of how fire comes to take the form of one or the other of these conf(lag)igurations.

read on!

We need something different than ontology to determine what sorts of being and organization are to be desired. We need normative machines. Knowledge of the being of being alone no more tells us what sorts of things ought to exist than chemistry tells us what sorts of compounds ought to be produced or how the compounds that do exist ought to be put to use. Chemistry tells us that uranium exists and why it behaves as it does, but it says nothing about whether we ought to use this substance to make nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants, etc. This is how it is with ontology. This is also why we should never evoke a political or ethical reason to critique an ontological claim. Don’t like nuclear weapons? That’s fine. I don’t either. But my belief that nuclear weapons are morally wrong has nothing to do with whether or not uranium behaves in these ways under these conditions. Don’t like evolutionary psychology? I think it’s ridiculous as well. However, pointing to the noxious political consequences that follow from it at the level of social policy has nothing to do with whether it’s true. If you want to debunk evolutionary psychology and sociobiology you have to show that it is mistaken in its description of human beings or that it is methodologically flawed, not bitch about its political consequences. Fortunately, there’s plenty of evidence that shows this is the case. I wince and gag whenever I see my Marxist brothers and sisters denounce this or that science on political grounds. Do we really want to go the way of Lysenkoism again?

 

2. Utopian imagination is not the same as fiat.  We should try to imagine the impossible to find the boundaries between achievable and fancy, but we have to work within the possible to do.  Only by understanding how systems actually function can we take effective action.

Bryant 11

(Levi R. Bryant, prof of phil @ Collin College, Worries About OOO and Politics, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/29/worries-about-ooo-and-politics/)

 

Now, as I have said, both here and elsewhere, I have no desire to abandon this form of analysis. As I argue, all entities translate other entities in particular ways and this is no less true of humans. However, the problem with this style of analysis is that it renders invisible the differences contributed by nonhuman objects to social assemblages. We come to think that it is just significations that structure social assemblages and that if we want to change social assemblages all we have to do is critique and debunk significations or ideologies. Clearly critiquing and debunking ideologies is a part of changing social assemblages, but it is not the only part. And because correlationism functions as a theoretical axiom where we don’t even recognize the existence of this other part– say rice –because it treats the only real difference as signifying difference, we find ourselves surprised when we’ve adequately critiqued and debunked signifying systems and the social system doesn’t change. Perhaps this would clue us into the possibility that perhaps there are other actors involved in these social assemblages, holding people in place in particular ways. The problem is that correlationism tends to rendernon-signifying differences in social assemblages invisible because it begins from the axiom that nonhuman things are just blank slates awaiting our inscription. Anyone who’s ever gardened knows that this can’t possibly be true. The diacritical nature of how I signify “tomato†will not make my tomatoes grow any better. No, to grow tomatoes I have to navigate soil conditions, sunlight and heat (which are quite substantial here in Texas), the gangs of roving rabbits that populate my back yard, insects, worms, water, etc. I am enmeshed in an entire network of actors that contribute to whether or not the tomatoes will grow and, more importantly, I must constantly attend to these nonhuman actors. The point here is not, as Berry suggests, to diminish human political interventions and promote a troubling conservatism, but to expand the sites of political intervention as well as our possibilities of acting. We cannot effectively act and change things if we don’t know how the assemblages within which we are enmeshed are put together, what actors are present in those assemblages, and how we might intervene on these actors to change our social possibilities. Correlationism tends to draw our attention to only one type of actor– the signifier –and while this is a real actor it is not the only one.

Edited by Squirrelloid

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The Constitution does not "force of law." It gives OTHER actors the force of law and lays the guidelines for how institutions and people USE the force of law. 

I had accidentally clicked the downvote button, but I've since upvoted you elsewhere. Since I haven't actually read the aff, I'm just going to make a vague comment while vacuously waving my hand. Yeah, what they said. I agree with what everyone else said.

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I'm just going to make a vague comment while vacuously waving my hand. 

Pics or it didn't happen

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