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So I've decided to use the summer to learn the security K. I need good books and articles to read. What are the most influental writers/books for the security K? What are the different angles you can take when running it? Advice?

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Off the top of my head - James Campbell, James Der Derian and the "virtuous war", Hardt and Negri, especially their work outside of Empire, Julian Reid, Michael Dillon, Coviello

 

Oh, and people have made plenty of original approaches to the kritik - readings of Camus or Kafka, for example.

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Off the top of my head - James Campbell, James Der Derian and the "virtuous war", Hardt and Negri, especially their work outside of Empire, Julian Reid, Michael Dillon, Coviello

neocleus, burke

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Michael Dillon, 1996, Lecturer International Relations, U Lancaster, Politics of Security: Political Philosophy of Continental Thought 

On the one hand, the very lethality and globality, and the potentially terminal paradox, of the modern political condition have not only called into question the specific institutional structures, vocabularies and practices which comprise our contemporary (inter)national politics of security. The late modern apprehension of danger also calls into question the entire political imagination that underpins that politics of security, the very limits provided by the grounds of its thinking. Our contemporary (inter)national politics of security drive us back, in other words, to the very presuppositions of the political itself. This metaphysical is at an end in the sense that it is now gathered � in the technology of our modern politics of security ï¿½ into its own extreme possibilities. On the other hand, post-Nietzschean thought has called into question the metaphysical reserve of philosophy from which our political thinking has traditionally derived its very suppositional support. Consequently, while sensibility to the dangers which our contemporary civilization has engendered demands that we ask how we came to be in the now terminal paradox of security, post-Nietzschean thought, responding to somewhat different impulses, complements this regress and pushes it one stage further. In asking directly about the Being in virtue of which there are beings at all, and without always falling into the metaphysical trap of representing it as a being (even a supreme Being, hence onto-theology, the other name for metaphysics) � recalling, in other words the ontological difference between Being and beings � it calls into question not simply the vocabulary or institutions of (inter)national politics as such, but the very metaphysical grammar, or scheme, according to which the political has come to be variously thematised and schematized. The provocation for my question is, therefore, furnished both by material and philosophical concerns; by the conjunction of an ontic with an ontological crisis in which the one compounds the other, and a renewed violence, pertinency and urgency is lent to the conjunction of philosophy and politics. To put it crudely, and ignoring for the moment Heidegger�s so-called anti-humanism (he thought humanism was not uncannily human enough) hostility to the anthropocentricism of Western thought. As the real prospect of human species extinction is a function of how human being has come to dwell in the world, then human being has a pressing reason to reconsider, in the most originary way possible, notwithstanding other arguments that may be advanced for doing so, the derivation of its understanding of what it is to dwell in the world, and how it should comport itself if it is to continue to do so. Such a predicament ineluctably poses two fundamental and inescapable questions about both philosophy and politics back to philosophy and politics and of the relation between them: first, if such is their end, what must their origins have been? Second, in the midst of all that is, in precisely what does the creativity of new beginnings inhere and how can it be preserved, celebrated and extended? No matter how much we may want to elide these questions, or, alternatively, provide a whole series of edifying answers to them, human beings cannot ignore them, ironically, even if they remain anthropocentric in their concerns, if they wish to survive. Our present does not allow it. This joint regress of the philosophical and political to the very limits of their thinking and of their possibility therefore brings the question of Being (which has been the question of philosophy, even though it has always been directed towards beings in the answers it has offered) into explicit conjunction with the question of the political once more through the attention it draws to the ontological difference between Being and beings, and emphasizes the abiding reciprocity that exists between them. We now know that neither metaphysics nor our politics of security can secure the security of truth and of life which was their reciprocating raison d�etre (and, raison d�etat). More importantly, we now know that the very will to security ï¿½ the will to power of sovereign presence in both metaphysics and modern politics � is not only a prime incitement to violence in the Western tradition of thought, and to the globalization of its (inter)national politics, but also self-defeating; in that it does not in its turn merely endanger, but actually engenders danger in response to its own discursive dynamic. One does not have to be persuaded of the destinal sending of Being, therefore, to be persuaded of the profundity � and the profound danger � of this the modern human condition. That, then, is why the crisis of Western thought is as much a fundamental crisis of (inter)national politics, as the crisis of (inter)national politics is a crisis of thought. Moreover, that is why in doubting the value of security, and doubting in a Nietzschean mode better than Descartes, we are also enjoined by the circumstances of this critical conjunction of the philosophical and the political to doubt metaphysical truth. For the political truth of security is the metaphysical truth of correspondence and adequation in declension to mathesisthe mere, but rigorously insistent, mensuratiuon of calculability. To bring the value of security into question in the radical way required by the way it now, ironically, radically endangers us, correspondingly requires that we attend to metaphysics� own continuous process of deconstruction. In doing this, however, we go beyond mere doubting � which, after all, is the mere counterpart of the desire for certainty � and find non-apocalyptic ways of affirming and so continuing to enjoy and celebrate (in)security; that is to say human being�s own obligatory freedom. Ultimately now, our (inter)national politics of security is no longer even distinguished or driven by humanistic considerations. It is a security simply ordering to order. But it is only by virtue of the fact that our (inter)national politics of security has come to this end that we can in fact begin to consider the relationship between its end and its beginning. Through this we do not, in a sense, go back to anything at all. Neither does this turn disguise some covert nostalgia for a phantom past. Rather, attention is turned towards consideration of what is entailed in the preparation and inception of continuous new political growth. This is also why, at the limit, it is useful to think about these origins and limits again. Not because they hold an answer that is now lost but because, antecedent to metaphysics, they make us think about the very liminal character of origins and limits, of the relationship which obtain between them, and of what proceeds from them, in ways that are not utterly determined by metaphysics. That way we may get some clues to some ways of thinking that are not metaphysical; nor indeed, pre-metaphysical, because we cannot be pre-metaphysical at the end of metaphysics. What happens, instead, is that the whole question of emergence and origination, of the very possibility of repeating ourselves, opens-up again; specifically in the sense of the historical possibilities of the obligatory freedom of human being now terminally endangered globally by its own (inter)national civilizing practices. There is not going back, but there is also no stepping outside of this condition, Humankind has attained a certain limit here in our time and our thinking. And this limit, by virtue of the globalization of Western thought and politics, now increasingly conditions the future of human being. Politics at the end, or rather in the extremis, of security consequently confronts the same tasks as philosophy at the end, or in the extremis, of metaphysics. That extremis, or limit, is the insecurity of security itself. Because there is no overcoming this limit, modern thought and modern politics are each an encounter, therefore, with that limit. An encounter that has to be designed to defer both the closure of thought and the termination of politics threatened by the terminal construal of limits in general, and of this limit in particular. That, critically, means thinking limits differently. This global conjunction of the limit of the philosophical and the political, therefore itself, constitutes a new political experience. It is one which compounds the deconstruction of the way political experience, or rather the understanding of political life, has hitherto been thought, because that new experience cannot be addressed � much less �resolved� � in the traditional terms and categories of political philosophy. Everything, for example, has now become possibleBut what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculationFor only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seems to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further � the surrender to the necessity of realizing everything that is possible � and that this found its paradigmatic expression, for example, in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. This logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics ï¿½ the axioms of inter-State security relations, popularized, for example, through strategic discourse � even if the details have changed. What is most at issue here, then, is the question of the limit and of how to finesse the closure of the fatally deterministic or apocalyptic thinking to which the issue of limits ordinarily gives rise in onto-theological thought: as the authoritative specification of an eschaton; as the invocation of our submission to it; or in terms of the closure of what it is possible for us to say, do and be in virtue of the operation of it. The question of the limit has therefore to be posed in a way that invokes a thinking which resists the siren calls of fatal philosophers and historians alike. That is why limits have to be thought differently, and why the question concerning limits has to be posed, instead, in terms of that which keeps things in play (for where demarcation is lacking nothing can come to presence as it is); exciting a thinking, in particular, which seeks continuously to keep �open the play of [political] possibility by subtraction the sense of necessity, completeness, and smugness from established organ-izations of life�, all of which are promoted by an insistence upon security.

 

edit: ew it lost its underlining but i think you could figure it out

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Don't bother with Hardt and Negri, they pretty much got the direction of the international system wrong in empire. Mitchell's article On terrorism is pretty good for a Heidegger version of the security K. Zizek has some good stuff in the subjective vs. objective violence, death drive arguments. Basically everyone critiques security it's just which flavor you want to run.

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I'm interested in running a borderline complexity K version- pretty much saying that by creating threats they create a self-fullfilling prophecy and the policy fails because they understand IR wrong. What are good books to read on this?

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To the above, the argument you describe isn't really complexity, that's pretty much just security. I don't think you reading should differ much from the OPs, honestly complexity type arguments aren't too difficult to grasp so I would focus less on the reading there and more on the straight up security stuff. However, you might be interested in Nassim Taleb's books on the idea of the Black Swan, they might fit into what you are getting at.

 

For reading, it depends on the flavor you like taking the security K. There are traditional ones, Foucauldian focused versions (more closer to the actual Security discipline), Nietzsche-influenced ones, Heideggerian versions, Gender/Fem ones, Psychoanalytic ones, Deleuzian ones, etc..

 

My recommendation (really, the best-of of security studies) would be anything by Michael Dillon, James Der Derian, and Anthony Burke (who takes a Heideggerian approach).

 

While I don't per se agree with totally disregarding Hardt and Negri (they will make big appearances on next years topic I think), they really aren't as necessary and applicable to the Security K.

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ooooh boy nope-- Zenko and Cohen are in my K toolbox as the most useful cards to beat down case impacts

 

Pm me...something like 70 or 80% of 2nrs this year were security...it's the truthiest argument in debate imho and i'd love to talk about it and share a lot of the stuff i've gotten from it over 3 years of running it (useless on the poverty topic)

 

Security logic leads to threat exaggeration and failed interventions

Zenko & Cohen 12—Micah Zenko, fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations AND Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91(2)

The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threatmongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against gop attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government-defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments. There is also a pernicious feedback loop at work. Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States, Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many that could best be solved by nonmilitary means). The militarization of foreign policy leads, in turn, to further dark warnings about the potentially harmful effects of any effort to rebalance U.S. national security spending or trim the massive military budget- warnings that are inevitably bolstered by more threat exaggeration. Last fall, General Norton Schwartz, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, said that defense cuts that would return military spending to its 2007 level would undermine the military's "ability to protect the nation" and could create "dire consequences." Along the same lines, Panetta warned that the same reductions would "invite aggression" from enemies. These are a puzzling statements given that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries' defense budgets combined and that the United States still maintains weapons systems designed to fight an enemy that disappeared 20 years ago. Of course, threat inflation is not new. During the Cold War, although the United States faced genuine existential threats, American political leaders nevertheless hyped smaller threats or conflated them with larger ones. Today, there are no dangers to the United States remotely resembling those of the Cold War era, yet policymakers routinely talk in the alarmist terms once used to describe superpower conflict.

 

Two ways to tag this next part: 

 

 

Hypermilitarization makes transition wars inevitable—try-or-die.

Zenko & Cohen 12—Micah Zenko, fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations AND Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91(2)

Defenders of the status quo might contend that chronic threat inflation and an overmilitarized foreign policy have not prevented the United States from preserving a high degree of safety and security and therefore are not pressing problems. Others might argue that although the world might not be dangerous now, it could quickly become so if the United States grows too sanguine about global risks and reduces its military strength. Both positions underestimate the costs and risks of the status quo and overestimate the need for the United States to rely on an aggressive military posture driven by outsized fears. Since the end of the Cold War, most improvements in U.S. security have not depended primarily on the country's massive military, nor have they resulted from the constantly expanding definition of U.S. national security interests. The United States deserves praise for promoting greater international economic interdependence and open markets and, along with a host of international and regional organizations and private actors, more limited credit for improving global public health and assisting in the development of democratic governance. But although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors. The record of an overgrown post-Cold War U.S. military is far more mixed. Although some U.S.-led military eaorts, such as the nato intervention in the Balkans, have contributed to safer regional environments, the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened regional and global security, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties and refugee crises (according to the O/ce of the un High Commissioner for Refugees, 45 percent of all refugees today are fleeing the violence provoked by those two wars). Indeed, overreactions to perceived security threats, mainly from terrorism, have done significant damage to U.S. interests and threaten to weaken the global norms and institutions that helped create and sustain the current era of peace and security. None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a diaerent role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups.

 

Threat construction generates the WRONG actions—diverts funding from root causes.

Zenko & Cohen 12—Micah Zenko, fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations AND Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91(2)

Defenders of the status quo might contend that chronic threat inflation and an overmilitarized foreign policy have not prevented the United States from preserving a high degree of safety and security and therefore are not pressing problems. Others might argue that although the world might not be dangerous now, it could quickly become so if the United States grows too sanguine about global risks and reduces its military strength. Both positions underestimate the costs and risks of the status quo and overestimate the need for the United States to rely on an aggressive military posture driven by outsized fears. Since the end of the Cold War, most improvements in U.S. security have not depended primarily on the country's massive military, nor have they resulted from the constantly expanding definition of U.S. national security interests. The United States deserves praise for promoting greater international economic interdependence and open markets and, along with a host of international and regional organizations and private actors, more limited credit for improving global public health and assisting in the development of democratic governance. But although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors. The record of an overgrown post-Cold War U.S. military is far more mixed. Although some U.S.-led military eaorts, such as the nato intervention in the Balkans, have contributed to safer regional environments, the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened regional and global security, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties and refugee crises (according to the O/ce of the un High Commissioner for Refugees, 45 percent of all refugees today are fleeing the violence provoked by those two wars). Indeed, overreactions to perceived security threats, mainly from terrorism, have done significant damage to U.S. interests and threaten to weaken the global norms and institutions that helped create and sustain the current era of peace and security. None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a diaerent role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups.

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Hadrt and Negri are simply put wrong, they are not used at all anymore for good reason. The cards they wrote were great, but the international system doesn't operate under the rubric that Empire outlined (IE the United Nations has become largely irrelvant, and it's disagreement isn't occuring). Along with tense relationships between russia, china and the United States where it is clearly not a co-operative international relationship in regards to security or anything really, yes it is safe to say you can ignore Hardt and Negri.

The multitude could of been sweet but that larger is becoming unworkable, I think there is potential for a Terrorism good argument with multitude thought along with other stuff about terrorism.

 

And he is describing the complexity K that georgetown read vs. NW at the NDT finals. It is important to note that was more a testament to Georgetowns preparation than the quality of that as an argument. I'd argue Georgetown won that debate because they had insane quality of intel on how Northwestern answers the critique and went with one that is a outlier of that set of responses ( Not liberal, has a better claim to this is how IR really is, is a epistemology argument as well for there advs). Burke is less of a security author than Mitchell, Burke makes a wider argument with security components.

 

I would not recommended Foucault as a security K. It is a lot harder to win a biopolitics explanation internal link to violence that will occur, instead Foucault's strength lays in A. being a sick epistemology argument ( I think this will be harder for you to pull off, it requires a much more exetensive knowledge of the background of the author as well as the politics of the area the affirmative is talking about) B. Different role of the ballot (This is the future of the critique and has impacted college critiques in a big way in the last year or two. Foucault has one of the few we should stop imagining ourselves as activist and start thinking of ourselves as intellectuals thinking about history rather than acting, this requires that you have access to a coach/camp lecturer to work through how to make these arguments. that's fine but it sounds like since you are asking this very broad question of what K should I read you don't have access to either.)

Edited by Shadow22

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There are two books which are directly associated with the Security argument.
• On Security, this has a ton of authors. 10 chapters by some of the most cited authors on the topic
• Writing Security, by David Campbell

A third, might be Jim George,
he indicts realism/neo-realism for being eurocentric.

The two articles I would associate with the critique:
• Dillion & Reid article (I think from Millennium)
• Burke article (from Alternatives)

Both of these publications should be available from perhaps 50 to 75% of university libraries. Alternatives I believe is available via EBSCO (I'm not entirely sure), and so should be even more available.

Both of these publications have critical oriented authors & arguments mostly of the critical international relations theory variety (aka which take issue with realism & hegemony, etc..).

 

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The real core of the security debate comes down to being able to implicate why the securitizing practice of the 1AC complicates plan.  I think there are lots of very strategic ways to read the security K, but all the best teams always have a lot to say about why the plan or the advantages are wrong/bad. You can find the core security stuff everywhere (evazon, wikis) and construct the generic center of the argument without having to read too much; instead spend time going over all of those cards in depth and making sure you can explain them to your grandmother.  You should focus your cutting/research efforts to things related to the topic - historical discussions of securitizing Cuba/Venezuela, oil security, banana republics, etc - so you can go deeper on the case much earlier in the year.  

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