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I have my last debate of the year this weekend and I'm really hoping to make it to the finals.


I was just curious what are the best Neg strats for:


Inland Waterways

Keystone Pipeline

Mass Transit

Next Gen


Port Security

Super Corridor


I have generic strats to these cases but I was just thinking what other teams are running against these cases. 

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Gotta read this for next gen



Hackers will be able to spoof Next Gen system and cause mayhem, in the skies— Turns all solvency

Greenberg ‘12(, Andy. "Next-Gen Air Traffic Control Vulnerable To Hackers Spoofing Planes Out Of Thin Air." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 25 July 2012. Web. 18 Jan. 2013. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/07/25/next-gen-air-traffic-control-vulnerable-to-hackers-spoofing-planes-out-of-thin-air/>.)

A hacker attack that leads to planes dropping from the sky is the stuff of every cyberwar doomsday prophesy. But some security researchers imagine a less sensational, if equally troubling possibility: Hundreds or thousands of aircraft radioing their approach to an air traffic control tower, and no way to sort through which are real and which are ghost plane signals crafted by a malicious hacker. At the Black Hat and Defcon security conference this week in Las Vegas, two security researchers plan to give separate talks on the same troubling issue: By 2020, a new system known as Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B will be required as the primary mode of aircraft tracking and control for commercial aircraft in the U.S.–earlier in other countries such as Australia. And both researchers say that ADS-B lacks both the encryption necessary to keep those communications private and the authentication necessary to prevent spoofed communications from mixing with real ones, potentially allowing hackers to fabricate messages and even entire aircraft with radio tools that are cheaper and more accessible than ever before. “Anyone can technically transmit these messages,†says Andrei Costin, a Ph.D. candidate at the French security institute Eurecom who plans to give a talk called “Ghosts In The Air (Traffic)†at Black Hat. “It’s practically possible for a medium-technical savvy person to mount an attack and impersonate a plane that’s not there.†ADS-B promises to make air traffic control easier, cheaper and in many ways safer by allowing planes to transmit their locations by radio frequency instead of depending on towers to use radar to track and coordinate them. But without encryption or authentication, ADS-B both exposes flyers to more potential tracking and fails to provide a trusted authority for planes’ location to the same degree as radar, says Costin. Anyone with a radio tuned to the system’s 1090 megaherz frequency can listen in and track planes. That’s a notion that may disturb some privacy-conscious flyers, but it’s hardly a new phenomenon—sites and apps like FlightAware and PlaneTracker already make that data available from the FAA’s databases. More troubling is the ability to fabricate fake signals that are indistinguishable from real ones. Using a software-defined radio, a PC-based receiver and transmitter that’s far more versatile than the average consumer radio, anyone from a prankster to a determined attacker could create a message alerting a tower or a plane to an oncoming jet that doesn’t exist. “This is the most important problem,† says Costin. “You can put out a method that looks valid in the ether, and they can’t verify whether it’s real or malicious.†Pilots and air traffic controllers wouldn’t be entirely helpless against that kind of spoofing attack; They could still check the purported messages against radar signals and against their database of flight plans. But the trick could be scaled up to hundreds or thousands of fake signals, much like a denial-of-service attack that uses thousands of computers to choke a website with a flood of fraudulent requests for information, Costin says. “Imagine 100,000 fake airplanes targeted at a specific air control tower, and it has to manually check them. It’s almost impossible to do,†says Costin. In some cases, the spoofed signals could trigger a so-called â€short term conflict alert†that forces air traffic controllers to attempt space out the non-existent planes at regulated intervals, causing mayhem in the control room and potentially in the sky. I reached out to the FAA for comment, and a spokesperson responded in a statement that “The FAA has a thorough process in place to identify and mitigate possible risks to ADS-B, such as intentional jamming, †and “ conducts ongoing assessments of ADS-B signal vulnerabilities. The contract for the ADS-B ground station network requires continual independent validation of the accuracy and reliability of ADS-B and aircraft avionics signals. An FAA ADS-B security action plan identified and mitigated risks and monitors the progress of corrective action. These risks are security sensitive and are not publicly available.â€Perhaps the most comforting part of the FAA’s response was its assurance of  â€redundancies to ensure safe operations.†The agency says it plans to maintain half its current network of radar systems “as a backup to ADS-B in the unlikely event it is needed.†While it’s unlikely the spoofing attack could cause a collision–as the FAA says, the planes could be checked against radar or visual cues–it it might cause momentary panic for pilots or air traffic controllers and even scare them into rash, unpredictable actions, says Dustin Hoffman, a pilot and security who plans to give a talk on air traffic control privacy at the hacker conference Defcon following Black Hat. “If a pilot sees a plane suddenly coming at him from half a mile away, he might yank the hell out of the yoke before looking out the window. Or he could cause the plane to dive erratically and without warning,†says Hoffman. “It’s illegal. But how would you track down the transmtter? The possibility for chaos is substantial.


And this for Mass transit 



People won’t ride JARC mass transit – requires exact change

Steven Dutch (Professor of Natural and Applied Sciences, University of Wisconsin - Green Bay) “Why People Don't Use Mass Transit,†June 02, 2010.

Is there a single, more stupid tactic for discouraging mass transit than requiring exact change? Especially when fares change frequently enough that a new user can't find out the fare except by calling the transit company? Hopefully, rechargeable fare cards will become universal enough to remedy this problem. Systems like BART and many European systems that use vending machines for fare, of course, don't have this problem.

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Other than that, get a good CP and a good K that can be run against them all. It'll take too much time to prep a solid strat against all those that soon. 


Are you a relative of nathan_debate?

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