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I'm trying to make a D&G cap K. How would I go about making a link argument here? I just feel like the traditional types of links are simply incompatible with D&G.

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I'm confused, are you criticizing an econ aff for using cap or a k aff that tries to solve cap?

 

Deleuze and Guattari believe capitalism is a self-propelled system that perpetuates itself by redefining it's own limits by finding and control new flows of capital. I usually see cap more of read as an impact for Deleuze, not necessarily as "link -their capitalist, impact that's bad"

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D&G doesn't work with Cap, as Deleuze believes capitalism to be the ultimate manifestation of smooth space.

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You can read cap against DnG by arguing an orthodox marxist perspective. Deleuze and Guattari basically throw materiality out the window, arguing that everything is constructed and social. DnG also reject economic metanarratives (econ always plays a role in making shit go / not go) which orthodox marxists embrace. 

 

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:qKWPWt1y1c4J:endi2010.wikispaces.com/file/view/Historical%2BMaterialism%2BK%2B-%2BSix%2BWeek%2B-%2BENDI%2B2010.doc+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjqSegI9ERz0mWsdDadUOzBjykBWc-hwGHhOSViaI5IsSR67_lC72MRQ7yl0UWZYRzwJfxDBiwFeJJH06nskbQmeHO69zqrFwJndUvaAMeoQuUxzCigzxRpZSKSrHwLaPBOZN2b&sig=AHIEtbRpDKMuHMO49MBqQGXfsJRWN81QyA

 

The affirmative’s rejection of truth claims about the material role of actors and structures in history conflates all knowledge with Enlightenment rationality-this ahistorical viewpoint precludes the most relevant and politicizing modes of analysis

Palmer '96 - Canada Research Chair in Canadian Labour History and Canadian Studies @ Trent University (Bryan D., "Old Positions/New Necessities: History, Class, and Marxist Metanarrative," in "In Defense of History," Ed. by E. Meiskins Wood & John Foster, p.65-72, RG)

 

On one level this is not particularly new. But postmodernists/poststruc-turalists have wrapped their antagonism to history in a series of intellectu­ally seductive tautologies which beg the fundamental questions of the historical process. Central to this outlook is a refusal of post-Enlightenment systems of rational thought, which are reduced to a form—narration—and a substance—accommodation of bourgeois rule—that relegates such "knowledge" to complicity with various oppressions.2 It is as though poststructuralism, in an immense social reconstruction of the deep historical past, would like to see the entire eighteenth-century Age of Revolution, which was, to be sure, a bourgeois project, jettisoned. In some staggering leap of idealism, it seeks to pole-vault over the class contents and transformations of thought associated with 1776,1789,1792, and the Industrial Revolution, leapfrogging the nineteenth century, the experience of colonial revolt, and the first workers' state (1917). Yet all of these occurred as historical process and have rich narrative structures of meaning in the politics and culture of modern times, from Blake and Beethoven to Marx and Munch to Veblen and Van Gogh. However incomplete the Enlightenment project, compromised as it was in its origins in the bourgeois proclamation of egalitarianism as a property-based legal right rather than a social condition of fulfillment, it was a revolutionary transcen­dence of the feudal order, which had been confined for centuries in caste­like conceptions of social station and the incarcerating thought of superstition, divinity, and absolutism. It was the purpose of Marxism, as the maturing worldview of the emerging proletariat, to materialize and radicalize Enlightenment rationality, extend­ing its potential not just to this or that privileged sector of society, but to all of humanity. Just as Mary Wollstonecraft took the possibilities inherent in the Enlightenment's Pandora's box of equality and extended her defense of the French Revolution and Thomas Paine's Rights of Man to a feminist articulation of the rights of woman, reaching well past patriarchy's powerful presence in bourgeois thought and practice, so too did Marx build on Enlightenment idealism to construct its oppositional challenge, historical materialism. Poststructuralism allows no such reading of distinctions and developments within Enlightenment thought, condemning all post-En­lightenment modes of discourse as hopelessly compromised with the pro­ject of subordination. Particularly suspect in current theory is the Enlightenment "metanarra-tive," with its "explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth."3 This obsolete discourse, a supposed product of the modernist crisis of metaphysical philosophy, merely masks the disintegrations of such narratives, and their dispersal into the unstable clouds of postmodernity's lofty discursiveness.4Postmodernists/poststructuralists thus disavow, in their formalist and ultimatist rejections, divergences of considerable, oppositional importance. They throw out Kant and Hegel as well as Marx, all of whom rely on metanarratives of one sort or another, little consideration being given to the funda­mental differences separating such systems of thought. All states are simply states, and hence oppressive, an anarchist might argue (Down with the Bolsheviks!); all wars are to be condemned, asserts the pacifist (We take no sides in Vietnam!); all metanarratives are suspect and compromised, there being no master categories of explanatory authority, proclaims the post-structuralist (Away with all interpretive pests!). In the comment that follows I concentrate on the Marxist "metanarra-tive," an unfulfilled project of radicalizing Enlightenment rationality that much contemporary theory refuses in its repudiation of historical materi­alism. Marxist metanarrative is rejected, ironically, at precisely the histori­cal moment that it is critically necessary, its insistence on reading history in class terms, as a succession of identifiable structures and agencies propelled by material interests, being fundamental to the interpretation of the movement from past to present, especially in the context of contempo­rary life, where humanity is more and more connected in the global dimen­sions of exploitation and oppression.5

 

Post-structuralism is useless absent a concrete view at historical context

Cox '95 - emeritus prof. of pol. sci. @ York Univ. (Robert W., "Critical Political Economy," in "International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder," Ed. by Bjorn Hette, p.31-32, RG)

First of all, there is no theory in itself, no theory independent of a concrete historical context. Theory is the way the mind works to understand the reality it confronts. It is the self-consciousness of that mind, the awareness of how facts experienced are perceived and organized so as to be understood. Theory thus follows reality in the sense that it is shaped by the world of experience. But it also precedes the making of reality in that it orients the minds of those who by their actions reproduce or change that reality. Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. We need to know the context in which theory is produced and used; and we need to know whether the aim of the user is to maintain the exist­ing social order or to change it. These two purposes lead to two kinds of theory. What I shall call 'problem-solving' theory takes the world as given (and on the whole as good) and provides guidance to correct dysfunctions or specific problems that arise within this existing order. The other kind of theory, which I shall call 'critical' (although I do not thereby affiliate with any particular tendencies that have heretofore adopted that word) is concerned with how the existing order came into being and what the possibilities are for change in that order. The first is concerned with specific reforms aimed at the maintenance of existing structures, the 'second with exploring the potential for structural change and the construction of strategies for change.

 

Historical materialist analysis is epistemologically superior to post-structuralism-it allows more effective analyses of power and the mobilization of discourses

Lapointe, 2007 [Thierry. "Beyond an Historicism Without Subject: Agency and the Elusive Genealogies of State Sovereignty" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Feb 28, 2007 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180176_index.html]

 

The primary objective of this volume is to bring social history back in IR in order to challenge its ahistorical and essentialist categories as much as its core postulates. As this chapter has shown, it has also been Poststructuralist contention to challenge IR selfimage in shedding light in its theoretical role as a practice of forgetting. Our contention is that despite their significant contributions in challenging the supremacist position of mainstream IR, their method of analysis have impeded their capacity to think about IR in terms of historical process. As I have stressed in the first section, its anti-foundationalist conception of power, its endeavour to analyse power relations on the basis of de-centring of the human subject, and its own historical analysis which focuses solely on moment of epistemic ruptures without adventuring into an explanation of its causes have left us with an image of “history without subjectâ€. If the imperative of thinking about social institutions—sovereignty—in dynamic terms necessitates that we abandon any attempt to fix meanings into rigid definitions, as suggested by Walker, we have to bring back agency at the heart of our theorizing since it is through its historically specific practices that human create and transform—albeit seldom as they have initially planed—their environments. As I have sought to highlight in the second and third part of this chapter, HM may develop better and richer analysis in thinking about the relationship between power relations, institutional and symbolic structures of enunciation in embedding them in a wider geopolitical environment. However, as I have argued, the focus on discourses and symbolic structures without a proper contextualization of the relations and dynamics of power they are an integral part of should be abandoned. Indeed, such method of investigation tends to reify language in giving too much unity to rules/structures of enunciation, which also tends to loose sight of the different ways in which different agents may mobilise discourses—make references to similar symbols and used them in following the same (proper) rules of enunciation—in order to achieve quite distinctive sets of objectives and reproducing quite different set of social practices.

 

Our critique turns all of their impacts. The alternative is a pre-requisite to an understanding of power as contingent or the use of counterhegemonies as resistance

Palmer '96 - Canada Research Chair in Canadian Labour History and Canadian Studies @ Trent University (Bryan D., "Old Positions/New Necessities: History, Class, and Marxist Metanarrative," in "In Defense of History," Ed. by E. Meiskins Wood & John Foster, p.65-72, RG)

 

It is worth reiterating the obvious, since the obvious is precisely what poststructuralism/postmodernism often obfuscates, or even denies. Marx­ist and historical materialist criticism of contemporary theory and its insis­tence on the politics and historically central practices of class do not rest only on a series of denials. The significance of the knowledge/power cou­pling, for instance, which is associated with Foucault, is hardly alien to the Marxist method. Marxism has always been attentive to the relationship of ideas, dominance, and social transformation. Representation, imagery, discourses, and texts can hardly be said to be understated in the theory and practice of historical materialism, which has consistently grappled, some­times for better, sometimes for worse, with the problematized meaning of the base-superstructure metaphor, most evident in the rich body of writing associated with British Marxist historians such as Christopher Hill, Edward Thompson, Rodney Hilton, and V.G. Kiernan, and the tradition of histo-ricized literary criticism associated with Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton.6 Finally, to claim that Marxism is a metanarrative of explanatory importance, resting unambiguously on the causality of productive forces and the determinative boundaries set by fundamentally economic relations, such as class, does not necessitate refusing the significance of other points of self-identification, such as race and gender. What separates Marxism's metanarrative from postmodernist incredulity of all master categories is not, however, this or that particular. Rather, there is a critical parting of the analytic seas in the two traditions' approaches to historical context as a material force, within which all struggles for eman­cipation and all acts of subordination take place. Poststructuralism/post-modernism sees history as an authorial creation, a conjuring up of the past to serve the discursive content of the present. Thus the past can only be textually created out of the imperatives of the ongoing instance. In its insistence that history be contextualized in the material world of possibili­ties of the past, rather than cut adrift to float freely in the cross-currents of attending to its obscured social relations and situating those corners of suppressed history within the larger ensemble of possibilities that were something more than the ideological fiction of the established archival record, attentive as it generally is to the instinctual preservationism of power. Moreover, Marxism's metanarrative tries to be true—believing that such a process can be located, just as it can be obscured or dis­torted—to the actors of the past, whatever side of the class divide their feet touch down upon. Thus, a major historiographical difference separates the essentially Marx­ist understanding of class formation, struggle, and consciousness evident in E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class (1963) and Gareth Stedman Jones's poststructurally inclined reading of Chartism in The Languages of Class (1983). Thompson, whose political practice and theory ran headlong into Stalinist and mainstream social democratic con­tainments, explores the opaque nooks and crannies of English popular radicalism, uncovering an underground insurrectionary tradition that flew in the face of constituted authority in the opening decades of the nineteenth century, as well as standing in stark revolutionary contrast to the stolid constitutionalism of later generations of working-class reformers and their Fabian historians. This is a long way from Stedman Jones, whose politics of the 1980s had been formed within the conservatizing and hostile drift of the Labour Party away from the working class. He reads Chartism's suc­cesses against the politics of mass upheaval in the 1830s and 1840s, seeing in the movement's ideas and actions not the class mobilizations of the time but the hangover of an eighteenth-century politics that somehow distanced itself from the class actualities of the historical context. There is no doubt that Thompson's Making is driven by a commitment to the revolutionary aspirations of the working class, past and present, but that does not under­mine his text's authority precisely because it is, for all of its dissident commitments, engaged with the complexities of the material world of the early nineteenth century. Stedman Jones, in contrast, searches for ways to distance himself from the specificities of Chartism's times. The supreme irony is that the "present" of Stedman Jones's text is nothing more than an ideological adaptation to Thatcher's Britain, a displacement of the past that paints a major history of working-class mobilization into a derivative corner of denigration and denial. Thompson's "present," in striking contrast, is a moment of revolution thwarted, a "heroic" challenge that, whatever its failures, remains significant to both the history of the working class and the class content of contemporary left politics.7 It is when postmodernist/poststructuralist readings of history are scruti­nized to see how metanarrative is suppressed, resulting inevitably in a particular structuring of past, present, and future, that the costs and content of abandoning metanarrative are most evident. When the French Revolu­tion is interpreted, not as a contest between aristocracy and bourgeoisie, mediated by the involvement of the sans-culottes, but as the unfolding symbolic will of a population galvanized as much by imagery as political principle, the condescending class dismissiveness of contemporary histo-riographic fashion is strikingly evident.8An ironic consequence of postcolo-nial deconstructive writing, with its understandable refusal of the Orientalist metanarrative, and its unfortunate textualization of imperialist plunder and indigenous resistance, is the further silencing of those margi­nalized "others," whose differences are celebrated, but whose umbilical link to class formation on a global sale is twisted in the obscured isolations of cultures and countries.9 In the words of David Harvey: Postmodernism has us accepting the reifications and partitionings, actu­ally celebrating the activity of masking and cover-up, all the fetishisras of locality, place, or social grouping, while denying the kind of meta-theory which can grasp the political-economic processes (money flows, interna­tional divisions of labour, financial markets, and the like) that are becom­ing ever more universalizing in their depth, intensity and reach over daily life.10 Postmodernistic antagonism to metanarrative thus carries with it a particular price tag, one in which the significance of class is almost universally marked down. That this process is embedded less in theory and more in the material politics of the late twentieth century, with their "retreat from class,"11 a withdrawal hastened by new offensives on the part of capital and the state, and conditioned by "actually existing socialism's" Stalinist deformations and ultimate collapse, is evident in one historian's confident statement. Patrick Joyce claims that British history, once explained in terms of class struggle, must now be regarded differently: There is a powerful sense in which class may be said to have "fallen." Instead of being a master category of historical explanation, it has become one term among many, sharing rough equality with these others (which is what I meant by the "fall" of class). The reasons for this are not hard to find. In Britain, economic decline and restructuring have led to the disintegration of the old manual sector of employment, and of what was, mistakenly, seen to be a "traditional" working class. The rise of the right from the 1970s, and the decline of the left, together with that of the trade unions, pointed in a similar direction to that of economic change, towards a loosening of the hold class and work-based categories had, not only on the academic mind, but also on a wider public. Changes going on in Britain were mirrored elsewhere, but the greatest change of all was the disinte­gration of world communism, and with it the retreat of intellectual Marx­ism.12 To "deconstruct" such a statement is to expose the transparent crudeness of its content, which bears a disappointing likeness to Time magazine. Even if trends in the 1990s were unambiguously of the sort pointed to by Joyce, it is most emphatically not the case that the analytic meanings of this period of supposed change could be transferred wholesale to a past society quite unlike it—what possible relevance can the fall of a degenerated and de­formed set of workers' states (the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, etc.) have on our exploration of the tangible class composition of early nineteenth-century society? Is it not rather unwholesome for supposed intellectuals to be bartering their interpretive integrity in the crass coin of political fashion, their supposedly pristine ideas dripping with the thoroughly partisan poli­tics of a particular historical period? Joyce's words, ironically, confirm rather than undermine historical ma­terialism. As Joyce alludes to the "fall" of class as a product of global restructuring, trade union and left defeat, the implosion of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the rise of the right, what are we to see but the actual confirmation of "intellectual Marxism?" Did not Marx write that, "The ideas of the ruling class are in eveiy epoch the ruling ideas," and suggest that at moments of "enthusiastic striving for innovation"—which is certainly a characteristic of the postmodern—such ideas might well result in a "more deeply rooted domination of the old routine?"13 Historical materialism would suggest that there is a profound difference between the trajectory of political economy in one epoch, and its attendant ideologies, and the actual social relations of production and contestation in another historical period. Joyce collapses the two. In doing so he does disservice, again, to both past and present. For while his simplified catalogue-like listing of the onward march of left defeat has some resonance in terms of contemporary political economic development, Joyce conveniently understates the presence of other dimensions. His accounting is one-sided and distortingly one-dimensional. Yes, to be sure, the Stalinist economies and their ruling castes have, outside of Cuba and (less so) China, taken a headlong plunge into the privatization despotisms of the 1990s, which Marxists from the Trotskyist tradition have been predicting since the publication of The Revolution Betrayed (1937). Against those who saw in the bureaucratic grip of Stalinism a fundamental, if flawed, blockade against the restoration of market relations, Trotsky wrote: "In reality a backslide to capitalism is wholly possible."14 Class politics were dealt a severe blow in the capitalist counterrevolutions and Stalinist implosions of the post-1989 years. Never­theless, there is no indication that this has lessened the importance of class as an agent of social transformation and human possibility (a master category of metanarrative). Indeed, it will be the revival of class mobiliza­tions that will retrieve for socialized humanity what was lost over the course of the 1990s in Russia and elsewhere, or there will be no gains forced from the already all-too-apparent losses of recent capitalist restorationism. Al­most a decade of tyrannical Yeltsin-like Great Russianism and the barba­rism of small "nation" chauvinisms should have made it apparent where the politics of national identity lead. Class, as both a category of potential and becoming and an agency of activism, has thus reasserted its fundamental importance. More and more of humanity now faces the ravages of capitalism's highly totalizing, essen-tializing, and homogenizing impulses, and these are currently unleashed with a tragic vengeance as even the once degenerate and deformed workers' states look to the ideological abstractions of the world market for suste­nance rather than relying on proletarian powers. Mass strikes now routinely challenge capital and its states, from France to Canada, from Korea to Brazil. Once-Soviet workers, who saw socialism sour in the stale breath of generations of Stalinism, are voting Communist again, whatever the prob­lematic connotations, in the 1990s. At the end of 1995, polls in the advanced capitalist economies of the West almost universally locate society's major discontents in the material failings of a social order that has visibly widened the gap between "haves" and "have-nots," undermining the mythical middle class and depressing the living conditions of those working poor fortunate enough to retain some hold on their jobs. There are no answers separate from those of class struggle, however much this metanarrative of materially structured resistance intersects with special oppressions. Class has not so much fallen as it has returned. It had never, of course, gone anywhere. Identified as simply one of many plural subjectivities, class has actually been obscured from analytic and political view by poststructuralism's analytic edifice, erected at just the moment that the left is in dire need of the clarity and direction that class, as a category and an agency, a structure and a politics, can provide. The legacy of Marxism in general, and of historical materialism in particular, is to challenge and oppose this obfuscation, providing an alternative to such material misreadings, building an oppositional worldview that can play some role in reversing the class struggle defeats and weakening of the international workers' movement that has taken place as capital and the state have been in the ascendant over the course of the last thirty years. Those thinkers who have failed to see the transitory nature of postmodernism/poststructuralism, many of them academic fair-weather friends of Marxism, and have instead invested so much in recent proclamations of their discursively constructed identity politics, may well be among the last to acknowledge the blunt revival of class in the face of contemporary capitalism's totalizing materiality. They will no doubt find some variant of "difference" to cling to, the better to avoid the necessity of engaging subjec­tivity and its oppressive objectification under capitalism, where class, in its singular capacity to assimilate other categories of being and congeal varie­ties of power, rules and is ruled, a metanarrative of exploitation within which all identities ultimately find their level of subordination/domination. This is indeed an old way of looking at the world. But postmodernism/post-structuralism notwithstanding, all that is old is not always without value. As one "Old Man" of Marxism, a lifelong defender of radicalized Enlighten­ment values, once proclaimed, in a maxim particularly suited to the linked fortunes of materialism's past, present, and future: "Those who cannot defend old positions will never conquer new ones."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The aff’s endorsement of a multiplicity of identities is the subjectivity that best suits contemporary capitalism. Capitalism NEEDS subjects in constant flux to create dynamic markets of consumption. By dividing society along lines of difference, which must be accepted and included, the affirmative soothes and mystifies class antagonism, which must be aggravated and exploded in order for total liberation.

 

Zizek 04 senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and professor at the European Graduate School

Slavoj, July,  http://www.believermag.com/issues/200407/?read=interview_zizek

Now with the antiglobalism movement, they are still, in a limited way, reemerging. But the idea is that the fundamental conflicting areas are no longer those of vertical up-vs.-down social struggle, but more horizontal differences between me and you, between different social groups: the problem of tolerance; the problem of tolerance of other races, religious minorities, and so on. So then the basic problem becomes that of tolerating differences. I am not saying this is bad, of course we should fight for this, but I don’t think that this horizon—within which the ultimate ethical value is then that of tolerating difference—is the fundamental place for question. My problem with liberalism is in principle. This move of the new Left, or new radicals, towards a problem of identity politics (minority politics, gay rights, etc.) lacks a certain more radical insight into the basically antagonistic character of society. This radical questioning has simply disappeared. For example, take my friend Judith Butler. Of course from time to time, she pays lip service to some kind of anticapitalism, but it’s totally abstract, what it’s basically saying is just how lesbians and other oppressed sexual minorities should perceive their situation not as the assertion of some kind of substantial sexual identity, but as constructing an identity which is contingent, which means that also the so-called straight normal sexuality is contingent, and everybody is constructed in a contingent way, and so on, and in this way, nobody should be excluded. There is no big line between normality identity and multiple roles. The problem I see here is that there is nothing inherently anticapitalist in this logic. But even worse is that what this kind of politically correct struggling for tolerance and so on advocates is basically not only not in conflict with the modern tendencies of global capitalism, but it fits perfectly. What I think is that today’s capitalism thrives on differences. I mean even naïve positivist psychologists propose to describe today’s subjectivity in terms like multiple subject, fixed-identity subject, a subject who constantly reinvents itself, and so on. So my big problem with this is the painting of the enemy as some kind of self-identified stable substantial patriarch to which these multiple identities and constant reinventing should be opposed. I think that this is a false problem; I am not impressed by this problem. I think that this is a certain logic, totally within the framework of today’s capitalism, where again, capitalism, in order to reproduce itself, to function in today’s condition of consumption society, the crazy dynamics of the market, no longer needs or can function with the traditional fixed patriarchal subject. It needs a subject constantly reinventing himself.

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Oh, I didn't get this, but now I think I do. You're trying to link a deleuze aff to the cap k? If so, it's not a hard link, as D&G have been advocates of the free market as the ultimate "smooth space"

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Oh, I didn't get this, but now I think I do. You're trying to link a deleuze aff to the cap k? If so, it's not a hard link, as D&G have been advocates of the free market as the ultimate "smooth space"

WRONG.  SO WRONG.

 

Deleuze and Guattari explain how capitalism as a systematic actor uses smooth space to open markets, yes, but that is NOT an endorsement of capitalism, it is a DESCRIPTION.  Smooth space, striated space, transcendence, immanence, rhizomes, war machines,  deterritorialization, reterritorialization, territorialization, preconscious microlibidinal investments, and desire: these are all descriptive terms, they have no inherent ethical relation and are neither inherently good nor bad.  Saying that capitalism creates smooth space is not the same as saying it is GOOD that capitalism creates smooth space.

 

But it's good to see Peter Hallward finally found cx.com.  

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Just because DnG speak about positively in one sense doesn't mean it's categorically good or bad. Capitalism is smooth space, however, it does have problematic consequences. Micro-fascism is described as a cancerous body without organs. The point is we shouldn't think in these absolutes, they often end up reforming into the same transcendent structures that Deleuze criticizes. DeLanda, for example, criticizes the way contemporary anti-capitalist scholars/writers frame the debate and the alternatives to it. Everybody has their own interpretation of Deleuze, just as there are authors who Deleuze to affirm radical anti-state politics and there are those that affirm Deleuzian politics and democracy.

 

I think on the transportation topic you can spin links to certain things into cap links, for instance a roads link probably has a warrant for how this allows the state to direct flows of capital.

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WRONG.  SO WRONG.

 

Deleuze and Guattari explain how capitalism as a systematic actor uses smooth space to open markets, yes, but that is NOT an endorsement of capitalism, it is a DESCRIPTION.  Smooth space, striated space, transcendence, immanence, rhizomes, war machines,  deterritorialization, reterritorialization, territorialization, preconscious microlibidinal investments, and desire: these are all descriptive terms, they have no inherent ethical relation and are neither inherently good nor bad.  Saying that capitalism creates smooth space is not the same as saying it is GOOD that capitalism creates smooth space.

 

But it's good to see Peter Hallward finally found cx.com.  

 

I've always thought that desire at least included an ethical judgement, but you say no and you know more. So, what is the basis of DnG's ethics then?

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Ethics are a totalizing system, I think there is an intersection here between Badiou and Deleuze here when Badiou talks about the 'fidelity to the simulacrum' versus the 'fidelity to the event'. By this, normative ethical systems create a form of conceptual stasis by trying to overlay a static series of representations over events that are vastly different than the hypothetical scenarios they formulate. A contingent ethic is in ways a multiplicity and an immanent process and prevents the sort of epistemological straightjacket that a universalized ethics requires. Interpretations of Deleuze will vary, but allowing for the possibility of ethics is different than things like ethical obligations/imperatives.

 

Edit: A clarification I mean by this, these universal ethical systems become transcendent and the same Oedipal power structures that Deleuze criticizes

 

There is a great DeLanda card in p. 66-70 of A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History both criticizing the idea of universal/categorical ethics and also explaining a Deleuzian (at least one of them) approach to ethical adjunctions

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There is a great DeLanda card in p. 66-70 of A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History both criticizing the idea of universal/categorical ethics and also explaining a Deleuzian (at least one of them) approach to ethical adjunctions

Are you sure those are the page numbers? I just read them in my .pdf for DeLanda's book and it was more about nonlinear causality than ethical systems. I ask because i'm pretty interested in finding this explanation of deleuzian ethics ha, I've never really understood how a post-nietzschean philosophy concludes anything other than total relativism.

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If this book displays a clear bias against large..............humanity, igneous humanity, and all their mixtures.

 

Look there, it's decently dense and probably requires a solid base in Deleuze and some Latour beforehand.

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I ask because i'm pretty interested in finding this explanation of deleuzian ethics ha, I've never really understood how a post-nietzschean philosophy concludes anything other than total relativism.

You and the rest of the academy lol

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Ethics are a totalizing system, I think there is an intersection here between Badiou and Deleuze here when Badiou talks about the 'fidelity to the simulacrum' versus the 'fidelity to the event'. By this, normative ethical systems create a form of conceptual stasis by trying to overlay a static series of representations over events that are vastly different than the hypothetical scenarios they formulate. A contingent ethic is in ways a multiplicity and an immanent process and prevents the sort of epistemological straightjacket that a universalized ethics requires. Interpretations of Deleuze will vary, but allowing for the possibility of ethics is different than things like ethical obligations/imperatives.

 

Edit: A clarification I mean by this, these universal ethical systems become transcendent and the same Oedipal power structures that Deleuze criticizes

 

There is a great DeLanda card in p. 66-70 of A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History both criticizing the idea of universal/categorical ethics and also explaining a Deleuzian (at least one of them) approach to ethical adjunctions

 

Okay. But I'm not asking for a universalizing system, I'm just asking why DnG prefer some things to others. My understanding was that desire basically is this specific and contingent system of ethics, and that desire is only bad when turned against itself. If that's wrong, DnG doesn't make much sense to me anymore.

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