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Ld Sept/oct Topic Discussion: Terrorist Rights

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Well any ideas? I was thinking maybe a full on torture impacts aff and maybe a k neg or even a politics DA. Your ideas?

Oh and if you have links to camp files about this topic please post a link to them. Thanks in advance.

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Full topic is resolved: The United States ought to extend to non-citizens accused of terrorism the same constitutional due process protections it grant to citizens.

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[quote name=lasers :D' timestamp='1345045549' post='860474]

Well any ideas? I was thinking maybe a full on torture impacts aff and maybe a k neg or even a politics DA. Your ideas?

Oh and if you have links to camp files about this topic please post a link to them. Thanks in advance.

 

I think there are much more strategic positions that do not have a consequentialism/utilitarian framework. This could be something as simple as cosmopolitanism for instance, all though there are a lot better aff positions.

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Good topic, unless it gets legalistic.

The wording is slightly annoying because I wish it said "citizens accused of terrorism". Although that's implicit it will still cause stupid debates occasionally.

 

Thoughts:

 

The obvious point for both teams to be very prepared for a lot of clash on is whether noncitizens are more likely to be terrorists or not. I think people might get caught up on the due process point though, and overlook what's essentially nationalism inherent in the resolution. There's really no other argument besides the likelihood one to support restricting the due process for foreigners especially, except for dumb social contract arguments.

 

Does due process preclude catching real terrorists? I think there's a decent double bind argument to be made here: either foreigners will be caught through the due process system, or they're almost certainly not terrorists. "Due process works well" arguments will be important on this topic. A tricky rebuttal extension of this argument would go as follows: "if the due process DOESN'T work, then US citizens should also have it revoked. Both US citizens and noncitizens should have the same constitutional protections, that is, neither of them should have any sort of these protections because it increases the risk of terrorism". Phrasing it that way is also nice because it allows you to still contest that the due process argument does work (although if you're in a tricky strategic situation a wholesale concession might be here your best interest here). At the very least, your opponents will get time skewed a lot by this argument. I love cheating.

 

The resolution is sort of skewed because locking up nonterrorists probably won't do too much harm, empirics prove, etc; but letting terrorists go could be really really really bad. Arguments about the unintended utilitarian consequences of locking up citizens and the probability that it causes extinction are probably necessary here, or good arguments along the lines of a Securitization K would also be nice. Or have a really sweet metaethical system that ISN'T utilitarianism, although that will be sort of difficult because deontology is generally awful and other arguments like egoism don't really apply so well. I think this is probably the best bet you'll have, strategically, but it will be hard. Add to that the general neg bias, and I think this resolution will ultimately skew negative very strongly.

 

Don't forget about the "states aren't moral actors" argument. It's a classic, yet I guarantee many people will overlook it at the first tournament.

 

People should read Butler's book again, although I've forgotten the title. At least the first chapter.

 

I'll probably edit this later to add more.

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The resolution is sort of skewed because locking up nonterrorists probably won't do too much harm, empirics prove, etc; but letting terrorists go could be really really really bad. Arguments about the unintended utilitarian consequences of locking up citizens and the probability that it causes extinction are probably necessary here, or good arguments along the lines of a Securitization K would also be nice. Or have a really sweet metaethical system that ISN'T utilitarianism, although that will be sort of difficult because deontology is generally awful and other arguments like egoism don't really apply so well. I think this is probably the best bet you'll have, strategically, but it will be hard. Add to that the general neg bias, and I think this resolution will ultimately skew negative very strongly.

 

Why do you think so? I've seen you bring up the same general opinion in the past and I was just wondering why you thought so.

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Well, I hate Kant specifically, if that's what we need to go into. Pure reason is stupid because Hume, other parts of Kant are dumb because Nietzsche.

 

I just think the other deontological ethics are wrong and sort of dumb, not that they're totally awful. No one else comes even close to Kant.

 

Basically I think that deontology makes no sense unless it's a disguised form of rule utilitarianism, or something similar.

 

Evaluating consequences is necessary to evaluate almost anything. Take the classic deontology vs. consequentialism thought experiment (there's also utilitarianism involved but you can ignore that) - the trolley situation where you can kill one person to save five. If the deontologist were truly only evaluating his action and not the consequences, he wouldn't care whether or not he threw the lever. The death of one person is not the action that the deontologist does, it's the action they cause. Its the mechanism that the lever triggers that's really at fault. Similarly, shooting someone wouldn't be equivalent to murder because there was a chemical reaction in the gun and the bullet touched them, not you. Pretty much nothing that you do directly effects morally relevant things, so refusing to be consequentialist makes no sense except as a total moral negation.

 

I do think that an egoist deontology can be very strong if you argue that future instances of you are distinct from the present you and that you can only experience your current experiences so you should only worry about the present and not the future or the past. But even then, you'd only do actions because they're pleasant in themselves, not because of their consequences. And no one ever means that when they say that they're defending deontology, so it's basically irrelevant.

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Well, I hate Kant specifically, if that's what we need to go into. Pure reason is stupid because Hume, other parts of Kant are dumb because Nietzsche.

 

Which arguments by Hume and Nietzsche are you referring to specifically, since they both make a fair number of arguments against those concepts.

 

I just think the other deontological ethics are wrong and sort of dumb, not that they're totally awful. No one else comes even close to Kant.

 

Basically I think that deontology makes no sense unless it's a disguised form of rule utilitarianism, or something similar.

 

Evaluating consequences is necessary to evaluate almost anything. Take the classic deontology vs. consequentialism thought experiment (there's also utilitarianism involved but you can ignore that) - the trolley situation where you can kill one person to save five. If the deontologist were truly only evaluating his action and not the consequences, he wouldn't care whether or not he threw the lever. The death of one person is not the action that the deontologist does, it's the action they cause. Its the mechanism that the lever triggers that's really at fault. Similarly, shooting someone wouldn't be equivalent to murder because there was a chemical reaction in the gun and the bullet touched them, not you. Pretty much nothing that you do directly effects morally relevant things, so refusing to be consequentialist makes no sense except as a total moral negation.

 

 

How would that be the deontologist's moral conclusion? It seems like this problem could be remedied by evaluating the intentions of the action, assuming Kantianism or neo-Kantianism. Otherwise, the person acting, in the case of the gun, is only causing the chemical reaction as an accidental feature of him greater action to shoot the gun.

 

I personally think that intentions need to be evaluated, otherwise you get absurd conclusions such as saying a flood is morally wrong. You cannot properly assign blame unless you evaluate intentions. Also, I think that the common deontologists critique of consequentialism is true. It basically says that consequentialism simply describes states of affairs in the empirical world, but does not provide any a priori reason we should be bound to those states in a moral sense. Kant, and later Korsgaard's whole argument is that they have provided a moral theory which would bind any human, whereas people could be born who care nothing about the consequences of an action. Under that light, consequentialism seems more like a social theory to be used for practical concerns rather than something morally binding.

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Which arguments by Hume and Nietzsche are you referring to specifically, since they both make a fair number of arguments against those concepts.

 

Pretty much anything by Hume on metaethics in an Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

 

From Nietzsche, his essay On Truth and Lies, and this bit from the Gay Science.

 

Kant is a stupid asshole.

Moustache Man, a long time ago.

Cheers for Physics! How many men are there who know how to observe? And among the few who do know-how many observe themselves? "Everyone is furthest from himself"-all the "triers of the reins" know that to their discomfort; and the saying, "Know thyself," in the mouth of a God and spoken to man, is almost a mockery. But that the case of self-observation is so desperate, is attested best of all by the manner in which almost everybody talks of the nature of a moral action, that prompt, willing, convinced, loquacious manner, with its look, its smile, and its pleasing eagerness! Everyone seems inclined to say to you: "Why, my dear Sir, that is precisely my affair! You address yourself with your question to him who is authorized to answer, for I happen to be wiser with regard to this matter than in anything else. Therefore, when a man decides that 'this is right,' when he accordingly concludes that 'it must therefore be done,' and thereupon does what he has thus recognized as right and designated as necessary-then the nature of his action is moral". But, my friend, you are talking to me about three actions instead of one: your deciding, for instance, that "this is right," is also an action-could one not judge either morally or immorally? Why do you regard this, and just this, as right? "Because my conscience tells me so; conscience never speaks immorally, indeed it determines in the first place what shall be moral! "-But why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? And in how far are you justified in regarding such a judgment as true and infallible? This belief-is there no further conscience for it? Do you know nothing of an intellectual conscience? a conscience behind your "conscience"? Your decision, "this is right," has a previous history in your impulses, your likes and dislikes, your experiences and non- experiences; "how has it originated?" you must ask, and afterwards the further question: "what really impels me to give ear to it?" You can listen to its command like a brave soldier who hears the command of his officer. Or like a woman who loves him who commands. Or like a flatterer and coward, afraid of the commander. Or like a blockhead who follows because he has nothing to say to the contrary. In short, you can give ear to your conscience in a hundred different ways. But that you hear this or that judgment as the voice of conscience, consequently, that you feel a thing to be right-may have its cause in the fact that you have never thought about your nature, and have blindly accepted from your childhood what has been designated to you as right: or in the fact that hitherto bread and honors have fallen to your share with that which you call your duty-it is "right" to you, because it seems to be your "condition of existence" (that you, however, have a right to existence seems to you irrefutable!). The persistency of your moral judgment might still be just a proof of personal wretchedness or impersonality; your "moral force" might have its source in your obstinacy-or in your incapacity to perceive new ideals! And to be brief: if you had thought more acutely, observed more accurately, and had learned more, you would no longer under all circumstances call this and that your "duty" and your "conscience": the knowledge how moral judgments have in general always originated would make you tired of these pathetic words-as you have already grown tired of other pathetic words, for instance "sin," "salvation," and "redemption."-And now, my friend, do not talk to me about the categorical imperative! That word tickles my ear, and I must laugh in spite of your presence and your seriousness. In this connection I recollect old Kant, who, as a punishment for having gained possession surreptitiously of the "thing in itself"-also a very ludicrous affair! was imposed upon by the categorical imperative, and with that in his heart strayed back again to "God," the "soul," "freedom," and "immortality," like a fox which strays back into its cage: and it had been his strength and shrewdness which had broken open this cage! What? You admire the categorical imperative in you? This "persistency" of your so called moral judgment? This absoluteness of the feeling that "as I think on this matter, so must everyone think"? Admire rather your selfishness therein! And the blindness, paltriness, and modesty of your selfishness! For it is selfishness in a person to regard his judgment as universal law, and a blind, paltry and modest selfishness besides, because it betrays that you have not yet discovered yourself, that you have not yet created for yourself any personal, quite personal ideal-for this could never be the ideal of another, to say nothing of all, of every one! -He who still thinks that "each would have to act in this manner in this case," has not yet advanced half a dozen paces in self-knowledge: otherwise he would know that there neither are, nor can be, similar actions-that every action that has been done, has been done in an entirely unique and inimitable manner, and that it will be the same with regard to all future actions; that all precepts of conduct (and even the most esoteric and subtle precepts of all moralities up to the present), apply only to the coarse exterior,-that by means of them, indeed, a semblance of equality can be attained, but only a semblance-that in outlook and retrospect, every action is, and remains, an impenetrable affair - that our opinions of the "good," "noble" and "great" can never be proved by our actions, because no action is cognizable -that our opinions, estimates, and tables of values are certainly among the most powerful levers in the mechanism of our actions, that in every single case, nevertheless, the law of their mechanism is untraceable. Let us confine ourselves, therefore, to the purification of our opinions and appreciations, and to the construction of new tables of value of our own-we will, however, brood no longer over the "moral worth of our actions"! Yes, my friends! As regards the whole moral twaddle of people about one another, it is time to be disgusted with it! To sit in judgment morally ought to be opposed to our taste! Let us leave this nonsense and this bad taste to those who have nothing else to do, save to drag the past a little distance further through time, and who are never themselves the present-consequently to the many, to the majority! We, however, would seek to become what we are-the new, the unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves and creating ourselves! And for this purpose we must become the best students and discoverers of all the laws and necessities in the world. We must be physicists in order to be creators in that sense whereas hitherto all appreciations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics, or in contradiction thereto. And therefore, three cheers for physics! And still louder cheers for that which impels us there to our honesty.

 

How would that be the deontologist's moral conclusion? It seems like this problem could be remedied by evaluating the intentions of the action, assuming Kantianism or neo-Kantianism. Otherwise, the person acting, in the case of the gun, is only causing the chemical reaction as an accidental feature of him greater action to shoot the gun. I personally think that intentions need to be evaluated, otherwise you get absurd conclusions such as saying a flood is morally wrong. You cannot properly assign blame unless you evaluate intentions.

 

Sure. But then the conclusion needs to be "intend to do things with good consequences" as opposed to "intend to do things in accordance with deontological ethical systems".

 

Also, I think that the common deontologists critique of consequentialism is true. It basically says that consequentialism simply describes states of affairs in the empirical world, but does not provide any a priori reason we should be bound to those states in a moral sense. Kant, and later Korsgaard's whole argument is that they have provided a moral theory which would bind any human, whereas people could be born who care nothing about the consequences of an action. Under that light, consequentialism seems more like a social theory to be used for practical concerns rather than something morally binding.

 

True, but only because logic itself cannot provide motivation or value. "The only true Archimedean point would be the absolute void" - Arendt.

 

Value is biological and every human has a value system because their neurons are configured in a certain way, although specifics vary.

 

You can only ever your own natural values; only already internalized reasons to act can generate normative force. Rejecting those in favor of abstract thought is equivalent to nihilism and changes morality from a meaningful internal experience to a series of arbitrary and baseless rules with no connection to things that you actually care about. The ultimate purpose of morality isn't to provide objective epistemic consistencies but to provide a conception of value that allows for meaning and purpose within our everyday lives. There's no reason we should care about abstract thought problems, but there are fantastic reasons that we should care about our own belief systems and values, even if those reasons only come into play on a more subjective level.

 

Any moral system founded on reason and reason alone is broken. Only by treating value as a neurological fact can you have a system of ethics that corresponds to the way humans are actually built. People with brain damage in certain emotional regions of their brains are literally unable to make decisions about anything or to execute any actions at all because they just don't care, this proves pure reason can't do anything useful. Telling people that they have an obligation to care about rules they don't care about instead of about things and actions they do is like telling a paraplegic that they have an obligation to rescue drowning children: it makes no sense and it won't do any good anyways.

 

And, pure objectivity is epistemically inaccessible so true deontological ethics can't exist.

Baudrillard 05 // Jean, French Guy, Translated by Chris Turner // “On the World in Its Profound Illusoriness†in The Intelligence of Evil or The Lucidity Pact p. 39 //

We always imagine the Real as something face on. We think of ourselves always as facing the Real. Well, there is no face-to-face. There is no objectivity. Nor any subjectivity either: a twofold illusion. Since consciousness is an integral part of the world and the world is an integral part of consciousness, I think it and it thinks me. One need only reflect that even if objects exist outside of us, we can know absolutely nothing of their objective reality. For things are given to us only through our representation.

Edited by Chaos
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Value is biological and every human has a value system because their neurons are configured in a certain way, although specifics vary.

 

You can only ever your own natural values; only already internalized reasons to act can generate normative force. Rejecting those in favor of abstract thought is equivalent to nihilism and changes morality from a meaningful internal experience to a series of arbitrary and baseless rules with no connection to things that you actually care about. The ultimate purpose of morality isn't to provide objective epistemic consistencies but to provide a conception of value that allows for meaning and purpose within our everyday lives. There's no reason we should care about abstract thought problems, but there are fantastic reasons that we should care about our own belief systems and values, even if those reasons only come into play on a more subjective level.

 

Any moral system founded on reason and reason alone is broken. Only by treating value as a neurological fact can you have a system of ethics that corresponds to the way humans are actually built. People with brain damage in certain emotional regions of their brains are literally unable to make decisions about anything or to execute any actions at all because they just don't care, this proves pure reason can't do anything useful. Telling people that they have an obligation to care about rules they don't care about instead of about things and actions they do is like telling a paraplegic that they have an obligation to rescue drowning children: it makes no sense and it won't do any good anyways.

 

And, pure objectivity is epistemically inaccessible so true deontological ethics can't exist.

Baudrillard 05 // Jean, French Guy, Translated by Chris Turner // “On the World in Its Profound Illusoriness†in The Intelligence of Evil or The Lucidity Pact p. 39 //

We always imagine the Real as something face on. We think of ourselves always as facing the Real. Well, there is no face-to-face. There is no objectivity. Nor any subjectivity either: a twofold illusion. Since consciousness is an integral part of the world and the world is an integral part of consciousness, I think it and it thinks me. One need only reflect that even if objects exist outside of us, we can know absolutely nothing of their objective reality. For things are given to us only through our representation.

 

I am pretty sure that Kant actually answers a good deal of this in his Groundwork. Kant concedes that we each tend to value different things, in fact that is where he bases his Formula for Humanity (treat everyone as an end in itself). What he says is that we think that things are good because of certain inclinations, which we know now realte to nerological states. From this he gathers that these values are contingent, i.e. they are based upon some previous goal, which itself is contingent on another goal. The problem with contingent goals is that without a noncontingent value or goal they would not actually provide any value because of their very nature as contingent. The way that we can call something noncontingent is if it is absurd t claim that it has no value, for example if it leads to a contradiction. He uses this idea to then say that the only noncontingent value is the ability to confer value upon things (which he has shown\defined as the rational or human nature) because it would be a contradiction to use our ability to sat value to say that such an ability is not valueable. Christine Korsgaard gives a good explanation of this in her article The Formula of Humanity. This not only provides a movitation on a subjective level for this, but it also deals with all the claims about pure reason.

 

Kant also answers the baudrillard argument in The Critique of Pure Reason, where he proves that the empirical world exists. I cannot really quoe him on this because I am out of the country at the moment and the computers in the business center have weird keyboards, as well as the inability to load my documents. I believe this is what he calls the Transcendental Deduction, if you want to look it up\are familliar with it.

 

Also Kantian deontology is distinct from other forms of deontology since it does not provide a list of rules and side constraints, rather it provides a way to determine if a given action is moral\immoral or shows a perfect\imperfect duty. This is the central concept in both the Categorical Imperative and the Formula of Humanity. Actually, Kantian deontologuy seems to fit exactly what you are saying, since Kant structured it so it is self-legislating.

 

I am not entirely sure of all of the different arguments made by Nietzsche, so I cannot really respond to that, but I believe that Kant responds to the Humean arguents in both his Groundwork and The Critique of Pure Reason. This is why he first proves the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions (the type of logical argument he uses to derive his ethics) before he actually proves the existence of the categorical imperative.

 

Also, I have no clue who the Moustache Man is, but it seems like his argument would apply to any ethical philosopher, since they all propose that other people accept their ethical conclusions as true. In fact, this would reject science as well as metaphysics, since they all provide claims which are meant to be true and it would simply be "obstinacy" to claim otherwise. Once again, Kantian philosophy is self-legislating, Kant just provides the ways to determine if somthing is a real rule.

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What do you guys think about a PTSD aff?

Goes like torture creates PTSD (Both the torturer and torturee)-> That leads cycle of decreasing QoL?

And maybe another advantage saying torturing increases terrorism-> That leads to further occupation and some death -> more PTSD.

It'd be a cycle of PTSD within a cylce :o

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I have no clue who the Moustache Man is

 

I refuse to continue this debate any further until you recognize his glory.

 

wallls.com-30410.jpg

 

[quote name=lasers :D' timestamp='1345222767' post='860567]

It'd be a cycle of PTSD within a cylce :o

 

OMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMG

 

But I don't like this idea because there are simpler and easier to prove reasons that terrorism and torture are bad than by impacting back to PTSD.

 

If there were some defensible moral theory that made PTSD the only impact, then this might be strategic. But there really isn't one.

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First, By labeling the government and groups as “terrorist†we legitimize the blurring of “war†and “peace†and deny individuals the ability to be “agents†in the international sphere—This encourages the perpetual objectification of those individuals as well as the prompting of our own nation in a reproductive heteronormative fashion – This turns the root of their impacts

 

Spivak ’04, GayatriChakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 “Terror: A Speech After 9-11†Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities Libraries—Project Muse 10/8/2008.

 

I have been trying to open up that abstraction—‘‘terror’’—to figure¶ out some possibilities. During these efforts, it has seemed increasingly¶ clear to me that ‘‘terror’’ is the name loosely assigned to the flip side of¶ social movements—extra-state collective action—when such movements¶ use physical violence. (When a state is named a ‘‘terrorist state,’’ the intent¶ implicit in the naming is to withold state status from it, so that, technically, it¶ enters the category of ‘‘extra-state collective action.’’)20 ‘‘Terror’’ is, of course,¶ also the name of an affect. In the policy-making arena, ‘‘terror’’ as social¶ movement and ‘‘terror’’ as affect come together to provide a plausible field¶ for group psychological speculation. The social movement is declared to¶ have psychological identity. In other words, making terror both civil and¶ natural provides a rationale for exercising psychological diagnostics, the¶ most malign ingredient of racism. I have neither the training nor the taste¶ for such exercises. But I must still say that in the case of ‘‘terror’’—sliding¶ imperceptibly into ‘‘terrorism’’—as social movement, the word is perhaps¶ no more than an antonym—for ‘‘war,’’ which names legitimate violence, but¶ also, paradoxically, for peace. And here we could wander in the labyrinth¶ where war and peace become interchangeable terms, although the status¶ of war as agent and peace as object never wavers. We have come to accept¶the oxymoron: ‘‘peacekeeping forces.’’ The United Nations High Commission¶ for Refugees and Save the Children-UK, in a report of February 2002,¶ asked peacekeeping missions to stop trafficking in women and girl children.¶ Feminists agitate against the sexually rapacious behavior of ‘‘peacekeeping¶ personnel.’’ 21 The scandal of rape within the US Army is now well known.¶ At the same time, Barbara Crossette offers the conventional wisdom, in¶ an article entitled ‘‘How to Put a Nation Back Together Again,’’ that ‘‘fastermoving¶ armies are necessary.’’22 Here is the usual division between the various¶ spheres of discourse, but they work within the same cultural imaginary,¶ this time almost global: Conquering armies violate women.¶ Where ‘‘terror’’ is an affect, the line between agent and object wavers.¶ On the one hand, the terrorists terrorize a community, fill their everyday with¶ terror. But there is also a sense in which the terrorist is taken to be numbed¶ to terror, does not feel the terror of terror, and has become unlike the rest¶ of us by virtue of this transformation. When the soldier is not afraid to die,¶ s/he is brave. When the terrorist is not afraid to die, s/he is a coward. The¶ soldier kills, or is supposed to kill, designated persons. The terrorist kills, or¶ may kill, just persons. In the space between ‘‘terrorism’’ as a social movement¶ and terror as affect, we can declare victory. Although civil liberties,¶ including intellectual freedom, are curtailed, and military permissiveness¶ exacerbated, although racial profiling deforms the polity and the entire culture¶ redesigns itself for prevention, and although, starting on September 28,¶ 2001, the UN Security Council adopts wide-ranging antiterrorism measures,¶ we can still transfer the register to affect and say, ‘‘We are not terrorized,¶ we have won.’’ And the old topos of intervening for the sake of women continues¶ to be deployed. It is to save Afghan women from terror that we must¶ keep the peace by force of arms. I want to distinguish the suicide bomber,¶ the kamikaze pilot, from these received binaries.¶

 

 

 

I cut this a day ago and it may be applicable.

 

 

Also, perhaps, applicable

 

 

- Terrorism (1/2)

 

Political responses to terrorism are destined to fail – a thinking of terrorism is a prior question.

 

Mitchell '05 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

 

This does not mean that being exists unperturbed somewhere behind or beyond these beings. The withdrawal of being is found in these abandoned beings themselves and is determinative for the way they exist. Heideggerian thinking, then, allows us to ask the question of our times and to think terrorism. My contention in the following is that the withdrawal of being shows itself today in terrorism, where beings exist as terrorized. Terrorism, in other words, is not simply the sum total of activities carried out by terrorist groups, but a challenge directed at beings as a whole.Terrorism is consequently a metaphysical issue, and it names the way in which beings show themselves today, i.e., as terrorized. This "ontological" point demands that there be the "ontic" threat of real terrorists. Further, this metaphysical aspect of terrorism also indicates that a purely political response to terrorism is destined to fail. Political reactions to terrorism, which depict terrorism from the outset as a political problem, miss the fact that terrorism itself, qua metaphysical issue, is coincident with a transformation in politics . That is to say, political responses to terrorism fail to think terrorism. In what follows I will elaborate some of the consequences of thinking terrorism as a question of being and sketch a few characteristics of the politicotechnological landscape against which terrorism takes place.

 

- Terrorism (2/2)

 

It's the aff's technological enframing that makes terrorism inevitable – we should recognize that true security is impossible and not look at the metaphysical issue of terrorism in a technological view.

 

Mitchell '05 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

 

Insofar as Heideggerian thinking is a thinking of being, then it must be able to think terrorism, for the simple reason that terrorism names the current countenance of being for our times, and without such a correspondence to being, Heideggerian thinking is nothing. The issue is not one of applying a preestablished Heideggerian doctrine to an object or situation that would remain outside of thought. Rather, the issue is one of recognizing that the objects and situations of our world themselves call for thought , and that in thinking the world, we enter into a correspondence with being. But what sort of correspondence can be achieved between the thinking of being and terrorism? Heidegger's articulation of the age of technology already contains in germ four routes of access for the thinking of terrorism. First, Heidegger himself witnessed a transformation in the making of war, such that he was led to think beyond the Clausewitzian model of modem warfare and to open the possibility for a "warfare" of a different sort. This thought beyond war is itself an opening to terrorism. Second, Heidegger prioritizes terror (Erschrecken) as a fundamental mood appropriate to our age of technological enframing. Terror is a positive mood, not a privative one, and it corresponds to the way that being gives itself today. Third, Heidegger thinks threat and danger in an "ontological" manner that calls into question traditional notions of presence and absence. Terrorism attends this transformation in presence. Finally, and following from all of this, Heidegger rethinks the notion of security in a manner that alerts us to the oxymoronic character of "homeland security" and the impossibility of ever achieving a condition of complete safety from terrorism. In each of these ways, Heideggerian thinking responds to this most uncommon of challenges.

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This seems relevant, although it might need to be reunderlined. This could work for terror talk, or like an aff which said that arbitrary distinctions between groups are bad and the burden of the negative is to prove a morally relevant difference between citizens and noncitizens. If the aff focused the debate onto ontology and personality as opposed to possible future actions they'd benefit a lot.

 

Byles 2003 // Joanna did her Undergraduate studies at the University of London and University of Syracuse, USA (B.A. 1967), graduate studies at the Syracuse University, USA. (M.A. 1969 and Ph.D. 1978 // Department of English Studies University of Cyprus Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification http://www.clas.ufl....t_byles01.shtml //

It is here of course that language plays an important role in imagining the other, the other within the self, and the other as self, as well as the enormously influential visual images each group can have of the other. In the need to emphasize similarity in difference, both verbal and visual metaphor can play a meaningful role in creating a climate for peaceful understanding, and this is where literature, especially the social world of the drama and of film, but also the more private world of poetry, can be immensely significant. Of course not all literature is equally transparent. In conclusion, war, in all its manifestations, is a phenomenon put into action by individuals who have been politicized as a group to give and receive violent death, to appropriate the enemy's land, homes, women, children, and goods, and perhaps to lose their own. As we have seen, in wartime the splitting of the self and other into friend and enemy enormously relieves the normal psychic tension caused by human ambivalence when love and hate find two separate objects of attention. Hence the soldier's and terrorist's willingness to sacrifice her/his life for "a just cause," which may be a Nation, a Group, or a Leader with whom he has close emotional ties and identity. In this way s/he does not feel guilty: the destructive impulses, mobilised by her/his own superego, together with that of the social superego, have projected the guilt s/he might feel at killing strangers onto the enemy. In other words, the charging of the enemy with guilt by which the superego of the State mobilizes the individual's superego seems to be of fundamental importance in escaping the sense of guilt which war provokes in those engaged in the killing; yet the mobilization of superego activities can still involve the individual's self-punitive mechanisms, even though most of his/her guilt has been projected onto the enemy in the name of his own civilization and culture. As we all know, this guilt can become a problem at the end of a war, leading to varying degrees of misery and mental illness. For some, the killing of an enemy and a stranger cannot be truly mourned, and there remains a blank space, an irretrievable act or event to be lived through over and over again. This dilemma is poignantly expressed in Wilfred Owen's World War One poem "Strange Meeting" the final lines of which read as follows: I am the enemy you killed, my friend. I knew you in this dark: for so you frowned Yesterday through me as you jabbed and killed. I parried; but my hands were loath and cold. Let us sleep now. ... (Owen 126) The problem for us today is how to create the psychological climate of opinion, a mentality, that will reject war, genocide, and terrorism as viable solutions to internal and external situations of conflict; to recognize our projections for what they are dangerously irresponsible psychic acts based on superego hatred and violence. We must challenge the way in which the State superego can manipulate our responses in its own interests, even take away our subjectivities. We should acknowledge and learn to displace the violence in ourselves in socially harmless ways, getting rid of our fears and anxieties of the other and of difference by relating and identifying with the other and thus creating the serious desire to live together in a peaceful world. What seems to be needed is for the superego to regain its developmental role of mitigating omniscient protective identification by ensuring an intact, integrated object world, a world that will be able to contain unconscious fears, hatred, and anxieties without the need for splitting and projection. As Bion has pointed out, omnipotence replaces thinking and omniscience replaces learning. We must learn to link our internal and external worlds so as to act as a container of the other's fears and anxieties, and thus in turn to encourage the other to reciprocate as a container of our hatreds and fears. If war represents cultural formations that in turn represent objectifications of the psyche via the super-ego of the individual and of the State, then perhaps we can reformulate these psychic social mechanisms of projection and superego aggression. Here, that old peace-time ego and the reparative component of the individual and State superego will have to play a large part. The greater the clash of [identities] cultural formations, for example, Western Modernism and Islamic Fundamentalism, the more urgent the need. "The knowledge now most worth having" is an authentic way of internalizing what it is we understand about war and international terrorism that will liberate us from the history of our collective traumatic past and the imperatives it has imposed on us. The inner psychic world of the individual has an enormously important adaptive role to play here in developing mechanisms of protective identification not as a means of damaging and destroying the other, but as a means of empathy, of containing the other, and in turn being contained. Furthermore, we should learn not to project too much into our group, and our nation, for this allows the group to tyrannize us, so that we follow like lost sheep. But speaking our minds takes courage because groups do not like open dissenters. These radical psychic changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual rather than speedy; however, my proposition that [and] understanding the other so that we can reduce her/his motivation to kill requires urgent action. Peace is not just an absence of war, but a state of mind and, most importantly, a way of thinking.

 

The psychological tension argument seems like it could be blown up into a huge impact by a clever affirmative. Something about mental thresholds and psychology and justifies limitless violence and no going back. I'm having a difficult time putting my intuitions into words here. This card would also be relevant to the psychology argument, although again it needs to be reunderlined (and retagged, but I'll leave the original [power]tag to clarify the card's meaning).

 

 

Rationalizing evil actions turns us into evil people. Every atrocity in history has been perpetuated through excuses related to the actions of others. Excusing evil is easy; even the abusers manage to do it almost daily. Opposing evil can be hard, but violence is always wrong. Murder is never moral.

Zimbardo 2007 // Phillip is the Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Stanford University, and was the director of the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment // The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil. // Random House, 1st Edition. // March 27, 2007. //

This model begins by assuming that most people adopt moral standards because of undergoing normal socialization processes during their upbringing. Those standards act as guides for prosocial behavior and deterrents of antisocial behavior as defined by their family and social community. Over time, these external moral standards imposed by parents, teachers, and other authorities become internalized as codes of personal conduct. People develop personal controls over their thoughts and actions that become satisfying and provide a sense of self- worth. They learn to sanction themselves to prevent acting inhumanely and to foster humane actions. The self-regulatory mechanisms are not fixed and static in their relation to a person's moral standards. Rather, they are governed by a dynamic process in which moral self-censure can be selectively activated to engage in acceptable conduct; or, at other times, moral self-censure can be disengaged from reprehensible conduct. Individuals and groups can maintain their sense of moral standards by simply disengaging their usual moral functioning at certain times, in certain situations, for certain purposes, it is as if they shift their morality into neutral gear and coast along without concern for hitting pedestrians until they later shift back to a higher gear, returning to higher moral ground. Bandura's model goes further in elucidating the specific psychological mechanisms individuals generate to convert their harmful actions into morally acceptable ones as they selectively disengage the self-sanctions that regulate their behavior. Because this is such a fundamental human process, Bandura argues that it helps to explain not only political, military, and terrorist violence but also "everyday situations in which decent people routinely perform activities that further their interests but have injurious human effects."17 It becomes possible for any of us to disengage morally from any sort of destructive or evil conduct when we activate one or more of the following four types of cognitive mechanisms. First, we can redefine our harmful behavior as honorable. Creating moral justification for the action, by adopting moral imperatives that sanctify violence, does this. Creating advantageous comparisons that contrast our righteous behavior to the evil behavior of our enemies [or] also does this. (We only torture them; they behead us.) Using euphemistic language that sanitizes the reality of our cruel actions does this as well. ("Collateral damage" means that civilians have been bombed into dust; "friendly fire" means that a soldier has been murdered by the stupidity or intentional efforts of his buddies.) Second, we can minimize our sense of a direct link between our actions and its harmful outcomes by diffusing or displacing personal responsibility. We spare ourselves self-condemnation if we do not perceive ourselves as the agents of crimes against humanity. Third, we can change the way we think about the actual harm done by our actions. We can ignore, distort, minimize, or disbelieve any negative consequences of our conduct. Finally, we can reconstruct our perception of victims as deserving their punishment, by blaming them [and] for the consequences, and of course, by dehumanizing them, perceiving them to be beneath the righteous concerns we reserve for fellow human beings.

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I refuse to continue this debate any further until you recognize his glory.

 

wallls.com-30410.jpg

 

 

 

OMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMGOMG

 

But I don't like this idea because there are simpler and easier to prove reasons that terrorism and torture are bad than by impacting back to PTSD.

 

If there were some defensible moral theory that made PTSD the only impact, then this might be strategic. But there really isn't one.

 

I saw some stuff when I was looking through some backfiles about the psyche.

It's tag is

"The psyche exists and comes first – it shapes our understanding of the world – everything depends on it. The resolution should only be evaluated on its psychological qualities."

 

I could probably do something with it. Maybe an applied ethics standard and I just impact it with this?

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I think a sneaky AR gut punch would be better. Like, put it in the AC as a standard, but then blow it up massively in the rebuttal. Don't totally cheat, just surprise them. Orienting a whole case around it sounds bad because it's not a fantastic argument at this point, and probably won't be at any point. It's okay, and useful in that context, but not super duper enough to be your frontline of attack.

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I think a sneaky AR gut punch would be better. Like, put it in the AC as a standard, but then blow it up massively in the rebuttal. Don't totally cheat, just surprise them. Orienting a whole case around it sounds bad because it's not a fantastic argument at this point, and probably won't be at any point. It's okay, and useful in that context, but not super duper enough to be your frontline of attack.

I don't see why It wouldn't be very strong. You're gaining a fair amount of offense off of psychological impacts. This being a reoccurring cycle means that you're going to be granted a more "systemic impact." With some callahan cards and the monkeys throwing dart card you could be pretty set to handle most negs with impacts.

Another thing is that, it has a simple base with statistics backing up the link it's rather an easy extension, so rather than having to rescue a bunch of parts of it during the 1 AR all you have to do is cover the impact and outweigh.

Maybe would it be a good idea to put some psychological effects of torture. I might have a hard time reaching the "PTSD = Worse psych impact ever" argument but maybe adding the psychological effects of tourture we would have a stronger link/impact?

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Torture is bad for nonpsychological reasons, those seem more relevant. It's simpler and easier to prove that pain is bad than to prove that PTSD is bad.

 

When I posted the psychology cards, I still wasn't endorsing the PTSD idea. Sorry for vagueness.

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why can you not run aspec in LD? :(

 

I had this idea a couple years ago about a fake ASPEC shell that turns into a K in the block. It would involve some DnG cards that you may have seen, along with other cards about treating large entities as homogenous and coherently unified agents. I don't have my notes or outlines on it anymore though. :(. If someone else wants to do the work from almost-scratch, feel free.

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