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Claims that U.S. Hegemony is on the decline are flat out wrong; it is in fact wealthier, more innovative, and militarily powerful; It is in the U.S. best interests to secure specifically the global economy and sustain its presence abroad—Beckley ‘12

Michael Beckley, Winter 2012, “China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure†pg. 41 [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; assistant professor of political science at Tufts University]

Two assumptions dominate current foreign policy debates in the United States and China. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. Both of these assumptions are wrong. The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. Moreover, globalization and hegemony do not erode U.S. power; they reinforce it. The United States derives competitive advantages from its hegemonic position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and maintain a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad.

 

“Declinist†perspectives would result in disengaging from the global economy and Asian influences; studies on the “decline†of Hegemony are mistaken and only conflate size with power not taking into account latent powers which are key to containing Chinese expansion—Beckley ‘12

Michael Beckley, Winter 2012, “China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure†pg. 42-43 [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; assistant professor of political science at Tufts University]

 

An alternative, though less prevalent, perspective rejects both of these assumptions. In this view, U.S. power is durable, and globalization and America’s hegemonic role are the main reasons why. The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or “declinist,†perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China’s growth by “[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy†and subdue China’s ambitions by “disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia.†If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia. With few exceptions, however, existing studies on the decline of the United States and the rise of China suffer from at least one of the following shortcomings. First, most studies do not look at a comprehensive set of indicators. Instead they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power, presenting tidbits of information on a handful of metrics. In general, this approach biases results in favor of the declinist perspective because most standard indicators of national power—for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumption—conflate size with power and thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries. For example, in a recent study Arvind Subramanian contends that “China’s dominance is a sure thing†based on “an index of dominance combining just three factors: a country’s GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.†The United States and China, however, are each declining by some measures while rising in terms of others. To distinguish between ascendance and decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to others. Second, many studies are static, presenting single-year snapshots of U.S. and Chinese power. This ºaw tends to bias results in favor of the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories.

 

U.S. Hegemony is uniquely sustainable by being able to manipulate the international system in its own favor in order to perpetuate its influence while also being able to leverage its Military superiority to employ force without war—Beckley ‘12

Michael Beckley, Winter 2012, “China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure†pg. 48 [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; assistant professor of political science at Tufts University]

 

Hegemony is indeed expensive and provocative, but these declinist arguments tell only part of the story. The United States is both “system-maker and privilege-takerâ€â€”it pays a large share of system-maintenance costs but takes a disproportionate share of the benefits. The basic claim of the alternative perspective is that these benefits outweigh the costs. Most obvious, the United States, as hegemon, possesses an array of tools with which to reward and punish. It can provide, restrict, or deny access to the U.S. market, technology, foreign aid, support for membership in international organizations, bribes, and White House visits. These tit-for-tat bargains with individual states, however, are not as consequential as the United States’ power over aspects of the international system itself. In the alternative perspective, hegemony is not just preponderan power, it is “structural power.†It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Seen in this light, the United States is neither benevolent nor feeble, but coercive and capable, and the goods it produces “are less collective goods than private ones, accruing primarily to the hegemon and thus helping maintain its hegemony.†Military superiority, for example, allows the United States to employ “force without war,†pressuring other countries into making concessions by shifting military units around or putting them on alert.

 

 

 

Obama doesn’t reject U.S. hegemony; he is only flipping the role of U.S. dominance from an aggressively militaristic strategy to a diplomatic and rhetorical position backed by the threat of Military might—Fay ‘11

Matt Fay, May 2011, “Does Obama Hate American Hegemony?†http://hegemonicobsessions.com/?p=443

 

There is no evidence whatsoever that Obama believes American hegemony to be a bad thing. In fact, it seems more likely that he believes the exact opposite to be true. Critics of the Obama administration like to point to the so-called “Apology Tour†that the president supposedly went on after taking office—as well as his one-time assertion that the British or Greeks might, at some level, believed in their exceptionalism just as America does—as proof that he is less-than-thrilled with America’s role as a world leader and would like to see that come to an end. But this is nonsense. The only difference between Obama’s view of America’s role in the world and that of his predecessor are that Obama believes a kinder, gentler rhetorical approach, backed by the threat of America’s military might, is the best way to facilitate Washington’s exercise of hegemonic power, while George W. Bush thought that American hegemony was better served by cowboy-like swagger and visible demonstrations of America’s military might. Obama generally seems to operate more or less along conventional, liberal internationalist lines. As they have shown time and again, liberal internationalists are just as wedded to notions of American hegemony as neoconservatives, but differ with them mostly on whether international institutions like the United Nations act as a facilitator or roadblock for expressing American power. It was this same thinking that led Obama to seek the Arab League’s acquiescence to the Libyan endeavor—not out of some manifestation of post-colonial angst, but because it was believed this would confer greater legitimacy on the operation in the eyes of Muslims in the region than a solely Western effort would. The administration’s desire to reorient U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward Asia is only more evidence that Obama sees defending American hegemony as a priority, considering the greatest challenge to America’s current position in the international system comes from China, not from Islamic terrorist groups. Even the ill-fated suggestion that America and China form a “G-2†was more a means to preserve American hegemony by relegating China to junior partner status in perpetuity and prevent a resource-sapping security competition. The idea was flawed from the outset, but it was further evidence that the Obama administration is as committed to hegemony as its critics.
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Thanks, it's always nice to see people posting cards. The first card is a bit short, but looks like it can be a good card.

 

For those of you wanting to cut more out of these journal articles:

The first one: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Century.pdf

Second one: http://hegemonicobsessions.com/?p=443

 

The first one is probably the better one to cut since it is more qualled.

 

Also, lol @ the second articles title.

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My gift to you...

 

 

 

Claims that U.S. Hegemony is on the decline are flat out wrong; it is in fact wealthier, more innovative, and militarily powerful; It is in the U.S. best interests to secure specifically the global economy and sustain its presence abroad—Beckley ‘12

Michael Beckley, Winter 2012, “China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure†pg. 41 [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; assistant professor of political science at Tufts University]

Two assumptions dominate current foreign policy debates in the United States and China. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. Both of these assumptions are wrong. The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. Moreover, globalization and hegemony do not erode U.S. power; they reinforce it. The United States derives competitive advantages from its hegemonic position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and maintain a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad.

 

“Declinist†perspectives would result in disengaging from the global economy and Asian influences; studies on the “decline†of Hegemony are mistaken and only conflate size with power not taking into account latent powers which are key to containing Chinese expansion—Beckley ‘12

Michael Beckley, Winter 2012, “China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure†pg. 42-43 [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; assistant professor of political science at Tufts University]

 

 

An alternative, though less prevalent, perspective rejects both of these assumptions. In this view, U.S. power is durable, and globalization and America’s hegemonic role are the main reasons why. The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or “declinist,†perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China’s growth by “[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy†and subdue China’s ambitions by “disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia.†If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia. With few exceptions, however, existing studies on the decline of the United States and the rise of China suffer from at least one of the following shortcomings. First, most studies do not look at a comprehensive set of indicators. Instead they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power, presenting tidbits of information on a handful of metrics. In general, this approach biases results in favor of the declinist perspective because most standard indicators of national power—for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumption—conflate size with power and thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries. For example, in a recent study Arvind Subramanian contends that “China’s dominance is a sure thing†based on “an index of dominance combining just three factors: a country’s GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.†The United States and China, however, are each declining by some measures while rising in terms of others. To distinguish between ascendance and decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to others. Second, many studies are static, presenting single-year snapshots of U.S. and Chinese power. This ºaw tends to bias results in favor of the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories.

 

U.S. Hegemony is uniquely sustainable by being able to manipulate the international system in its own favor in order to perpetuate its influence while also being able to leverage its Military superiority to employ force without war—Beckley ‘12

Michael Beckley, Winter 2012, “China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure†pg. 48 [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; assistant professor of political science at Tufts University]

 

 

Hegemony is indeed expensive and provocative, but these declinist arguments tell only part of the story. The United States is both “system-maker and privilege-takerâ€â€”it pays a large share of system-maintenance costs but takes a disproportionate share of the benefits. The basic claim of the alternative perspective is that these benefits outweigh the costs. Most obvious, the United States, as hegemon, possesses an array of tools with which to reward and punish. It can provide, restrict, or deny access to the U.S. market, technology, foreign aid, support for membership in international organizations, bribes, and White House visits. These tit-for-tat bargains with individual states, however, are not as consequential as the United States’ power over aspects of the international system itself. In the alternative perspective, hegemony is not just preponderan power, it is “structural power.†It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Seen in this light, the United States is neither benevolent nor feeble, but coercive and capable, and the goods it produces “are less collective goods than private ones, accruing primarily to the hegemon and thus helping maintain its hegemony.†Military superiority, for example, allows the United States to employ “force without war,†pressuring other countries into making concessions by shifting military units around or putting them on alert.

 

 

 

Obama doesn’t reject U.S. hegemony; he is only flipping the role of U.S. dominance from an aggressively militaristic strategy to a diplomatic and rhetorical position backed by the threat of Military might—Fay ‘11

Matt Fay, May 2011, “Does Obama Hate American Hegemony?†http://hegemonicobsessions.com/?p=443

 

 

There is no evidence whatsoever that Obama believes American hegemony to be a bad thing. In fact, it seems more likely that he believes the exact opposite to be true. Critics of the Obama administration like to point to the so-called “Apology Tour†that the president supposedly went on after taking office—as well as his one-time assertion that the British or Greeks might, at some level, believed in their exceptionalism just as America does—as proof that he is less-than-thrilled with America’s role as a world leader and would like to see that come to an end. But this is nonsense. The only difference between Obama’s view of America’s role in the world and that of his predecessor are that Obama believes a kinder, gentler rhetorical approach, backed by the threat of America’s military might, is the best way to facilitate Washington’s exercise of hegemonic power, while George W. Bush thought that American hegemony was better served by cowboy-like swagger and visible demonstrations of America’s military might. Obama generally seems to operate more or less along conventional, liberal internationalist lines. As they have shown time and again, liberal internationalists are just as wedded to notions of American hegemony as neoconservatives, but differ with them mostly on whether international institutions like the United Nations act as a facilitator or roadblock for expressing American power. It was this same thinking that led Obama to seek the Arab League’s acquiescence to the Libyan endeavor—not out of some manifestation of post-colonial angst, but because it was believed this would confer greater legitimacy on the operation in the eyes of Muslims in the region than a solely Western effort would. The administration’s desire to reorient U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward Asia is only more evidence that Obama sees defending American hegemony as a priority, considering the greatest challenge to America’s current position in the international system comes from China, not from Islamic terrorist groups. Even the ill-fated suggestion that America and China form a “G-2†was more a means to preserve American hegemony by relegating China to junior partner status in perpetuity and prevent a resource-sapping security competition. The idea was flawed from the outset, but it was further evidence that the Obama administration is as committed to hegemony as its critics.

 

Is it just me or does Hi-Dig-Air use "..." a lot?

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