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is there anyway at all to make the aff next year link to heg or make it revolve around heg? if so where can i find some good solid cards i cant find anything as of right now anything with the word "heg" brings me to this year topic still :(

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yes, Co/op on something with, Russia, China, etc. but make sure it has a STRONG literature base. For example my team next year will be running the tkm-world link aff. They have tons of advantage ground and the negative ground? Crazy. so much so I told them if they ever hear ground loss laugh and read a laundry list of things that could've been read against the aff. The only problem is the T- debate. You'd have to worry about "its is possesive", "investment not action", "in means US only", and some BS infastructure T that the camps will come out with. All of which are easily won with a quick fix "shut up and take this butt kicking like a man" T-shell. Furthermore if you wanted some offense make your standards be Aff ground, fairness, and education, then impact then on ground and education call them out for time skew so if they drop T -even though by nature they should be able to- you can spend like 10secs revive it, call them out, & try to win in round abuse as reason to still look at T and a reason to vote affirmative. I may have said that wrong but I did it a nationals quals this year if I can find my flows I could tell you. but i digress Co/op bro if you want heg you'll co/op. pm me if you have any co/op questions.

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OH wait Brain blast, bro you could do the launch infastructure tier of ORS or SSA and claim the effects of the plan increases heg. (to answer effects T say framers intent or some bs standard "every plan is effects under the res the neg would diminish aff ground to nothing"). you could contract some private company to build a launch site for the air force, uhm same thing for the navy. (problem there is the states cp i think) uhm you could build missile launchers. you'd just need heavy lit and good t-blocks *shrugs* thats why I'm happy I'm in college now, this HS debate res sucks lol like bro go on the wiki go back to 2009 and you have the Alt-energy topic thats what this is going to turn into bro. (also cut A LOT OF ANSWERS TO DEDEV NOW)

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yes, Co/op on something with, Russia, China, etc. but make sure it has a STRONG literature base. For example my team next year will be running the tkm-world link aff. They have tons of advantage ground and the negative ground? Crazy. so much so I told them if they ever hear ground loss laugh and read a laundry list of things that could've been read against the aff. The only problem is the T- debate. You'd have to worry about "its is possesive", "investment not action", "in means US only", and some BS infastructure T that the camps will come out with. All of which are easily won with a quick fix "shut up and take this butt kicking like a man" T-shell. Furthermore if you wanted some offense make your standards be Aff ground, fairness, and education, then impact then on ground and education call them out for time skew so if they drop T -even though by nature they should be able to- you can spend like 10secs revive it, call them out, & try to win in round abuse as reason to still look at T and a reason to vote affirmative. I may have said that wrong but I did it a nationals quals this year if I can find my flows I could tell you. but i digress Co/op bro if you want heg you'll co/op. pm me if you have any co/op questions.

OH wait Brain blast, bro you could do the launch infastructure tier of ORS or SSA and claim the effects of the plan increases heg. (to answer effects T say framers intent or some bs standard "every plan is effects under the res the neg would diminish aff ground to nothing"). you could contract some private company to build a launch site for the air force, uhm same thing for the navy. (problem there is the states cp i think) uhm you could build missile launchers. you'd just need heavy lit and good t-blocks *shrugs* thats why I'm happy I'm in college now, this HS debate res sucks lol like bro go on the wiki go back to 2009 and you have the Alt-energy topic thats what this is going to turn into bro. (also cut A LOT OF ANSWERS TO DEDEV NOW)

 

I don't think you have to cooperate with Russia or China or just recycle old topic literature to get good internal links to hegemony. (Also, how did your advice about hegemony turn in to a recommendation to say that T is a reverse voting issue?)

 

Everyone and their mother will be reading a competitiveness advantage as an internal link to hege and the economy. Check out these articles to see what I'm talking about.

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/documents/transportationreport100410.pdf

http://www.cfr.org/united-states/infrastructure-investment-us-competitiveness/p24585

http://www.cfr.org/economics/banking-us-infrastructure-revival/p25782

http://www.cfr.org/economic-development/transportation-infrastructure-moving-america/p18611

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Transportation Infrastructure key to effective mobilization of troops – independently key to Heg

Cox, L.A. County Transportation Commission member and chair of national committees on energy conservation and urban transit planning; and Love editor of comprehensive public policy manual, ’96

Wendell Cox L.A. County Transportation Commission member and chair of national committees on energy conservation and urban transit planning; and Jean Love editor of comprehensive public policy manual June 1996

http://www.publicpurpose.com/freeway1.htm#intro

 

One of the principal reasons for building the interstate highway system was to support national defense. When the system was approved --- during one of the most instable periods of the Cold War, national security dictated development of an efficient national highway system that could move large numbers of military personnel and huge quantities of military equipment and supplies. The interstate highway system effectively performs that function, but perhaps more importantly, its availability provides the nation with a potential resource that could have been reliably called upon if greater military conflict had arisen. Throughout the Cold War (and even to today), America's strategic advantage in effective surface transportation was unchallenged. Even today, no constituent nation of the late Soviet Union has begun to develop such a comprehensive surface transportation system. In the post-communist world, it may be tempting to underestimate the role of the interstate highway system in national defense. But the interstate highway system continues to play a critical role. The U.S. military's Strategic Highway Corridor Network (STAHNET) relies primarily on the interstate highway network, which represents 75 percent of network mileage. The U.S. Army cited the system as being critical to the success of the 1990-1991 "Desert Shield-Desert Storm operation (the U.S. led operation to free Kuwait from Iraq): Much of the success of the operation was due to our logistical ability to rapidly move troops to the theater. The capacity of the U.S. highway system to support the mobilization of troops and to move equipment and forces to U.S. ports of embarkation was key to successful deployment. The Army also noted the "modal redundancy" of the highway system, which provided rapid and effective movements of a military division when difficulties with a rail line precluded the planned transport by rail. This illustrates the fact that the interstate highway system continues to play an important role in national defense, even in the post-Cold War era.

 

A Strong Infrastructure system is crucial to rapid troop deployment and hegemony

FHA 09

(Federal Highway Administration, “Introduction to Current Military Deployment Conceptsâ€, March 27th 2009, http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop05029/chapter_1.htm)

 

The U.S. military has changed significantly to meet the challenges of our uncertain world. An understanding of the evolving international environment, the national security strategy, and the capabilities required for full-spectrum dominance have guided the military's transformation from a forward-deployed Cold War force to a capabilities-based, power-projection force located largely in the United States. The military has reduced its size, redistributed its forces, closed and realigned bases, reorganized its overseas equipment prepositioned, and improved active and reserve component integration to become leaner, more versatile, and more deployable. Increased deployment activity has become the normal operational standard within the continental United States, which may regularly affect the planning and operations for State Departments of Transportation (SDOT). As a consequence, all States are experiencing increased cross-State movements of military assets with destinations beyond State borders. Within a State with major military installations, such as those with power projection platforms (PPP), current deployment strategies may require 24x7 operations with enhanced security for increased equipment and personnel movements. This chapter provides a broad overview of current military doctrine and policies relevant to military deployments on public roads. The range of size and scope for deployments is discussed, including preferred travel modes and recent lessons learned. The major agencies and organizations are introduced, with greater definition of roles and responsibilities to be examined in chapter 2. Finally, the role of advisory systems and implications for military deployment are presented.[1] Strategic mobility and readiness are keys to the military’s ability to project power worldwide. Each of the military services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as their component Reserve, National Guard, and Coast Guard counterparts—has made great strides in implementing the specific recommendations of the congressionally mandated 2001 Mobility Requirements Study and more recent findings from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as well as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The ability to deploy equipment and personnel rapidly is an imperative of the national military strategy. That strategy expects the military to defend the homeland, deter aggression in four regions of the world, swiftly defeat adversaries in two other conflicts, and conduct a limited number of small operations. Implied in these missions is the requirement to deploy forces within the United States and from the United States to anywhere in the world. To assist the military services in their planning and better prepare for future operations, the Department of Defense has established an objective of being able to deploy to a theater within 10 days sufficient combat power to defeat an enemy during the next 30 days and be ready for the next fight within another 30 days. Key to meeting these deployment goals is the capability of units to move rapidly from their installations to land, sea, and aerial ports of embarkation or to designated locations within the United States. Military units use various methods to move equipment and personnel to seaports. Heavy equipment usually will be shipped by rail; however, some equipment must be deployed on public roads, either driven by military personnel or consigned to commercial carriers, to arrive at the seaport on specific dates and times for loading onto ships. When the military uses public roads, it organizes the equipment into convoys for control and protection. Appendix B provides detailed information about the military's organization of convoys and standard highway procedures for convoys. Insights from OIF highlight the dynamic and changing nature of military deployment needs. During the spring of 2003, shipment volumes of military assets from military installations through the nation to strategic seaports increased 29 percent. This increase created a 15 percent increase in required truck capacity just for military needs.[2] For certain States with destination ports, the increase in truck volume was greater than 15 percent because vehicles were traveling from multiple States to a designated port within a State. Consequently, some States with PPPs became concerned about regional and local roadway congestion and extended hours of operation involving greater than average volumes. Rail carriers experienced similar volume increases. While most rail carriers accommodated the increased demand for their services between military installations (with rail connections) and ports, logistical and operational issues in selected regions of the country prevented certain equipment from moving by rail. For example, some military installations did not have rail accessibility but needed to move assets. Also, the special rail cars used for transporting military assets ("X-cars") were not always available in convenient locations, creating additional shortfalls in rail capacity. Figure 1 illustrates a typical use of DoD X-cars. While rail operations were generally successful, operational and capacity shortfalls required truck carriers to complete the deployment mission, resulting in the addition of commercial carriers on the public roadways.

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Transportation Infrastructure key to effective mobilization of troops – independently key to Heg

Cox, L.A. County Transportation Commission member and chair of national committees on energy conservation and urban transit planning; and Love editor of comprehensive public policy manual, ’96

Wendell Cox L.A. County Transportation Commission member and chair of national committees on energy conservation and urban transit planning; and Jean Love editor of comprehensive public policy manual June 1996

http://www.publicpur...eway1.htm#intro

 

One of the principal reasons for building the interstate highway system was to support national defense. When the system was approved --- during one of the most instable periods of the Cold War, national security dictated development of an efficient national highway system that could move large numbers of military personnel and huge quantities of military equipment and supplies. The interstate highway system effectively performs that function, but perhaps more importantly, its availability provides the nation with a potential resource that could have been reliably called upon if greater military conflict had arisen. Throughout the Cold War (and even to today), America's strategic advantage in effective surface transportation was unchallenged. Even today, no constituent nation of the late Soviet Union has begun to develop such a comprehensive surface transportation system. In the post-communist world, it may be tempting to underestimate the role of the interstate highway system in national defense. But the interstate highway system continues to play a critical role. The U.S. military's Strategic Highway Corridor Network (STAHNET) relies primarily on the interstate highway network, which represents 75 percent of network mileage. The U.S. Army cited the system as being critical to the success of the 1990-1991 "Desert Shield-Desert Storm operation (the U.S. led operation to free Kuwait from Iraq): Much of the success of the operation was due to our logistical ability to rapidly move troops to the theater. The capacity of the U.S. highway system to support the mobilization of troops and to move equipment and forces to U.S. ports of embarkation was key to successful deployment. The Army also noted the "modal redundancy" of the highway system, which provided rapid and effective movements of a military division when difficulties with a rail line precluded the planned transport by rail. This illustrates the fact that the interstate highway system continues to play an important role in national defense, even in the post-Cold War era.

 

A Strong Infrastructure system is crucial to rapid troop deployment and hegemony

FHA 09

(Federal Highway Administration, “Introduction to Current Military Deployment Conceptsâ€, March 27th 2009, http://ops.fhwa.dot....9/chapter_1.htm)

 

The U.S. military has changed significantly to meet the challenges of our uncertain world. An understanding of the evolving international environment, the national security strategy, and the capabilities required for full-spectrum dominance have guided the military's transformation from a forward-deployed Cold War force to a capabilities-based, power-projection force located largely in the United States. The military has reduced its size, redistributed its forces, closed and realigned bases, reorganized its overseas equipment prepositioned, and improved active and reserve component integration to become leaner, more versatile, and more deployable. Increased deployment activity has become the normal operational standard within the continental United States, which may regularly affect the planning and operations for State Departments of Transportation (SDOT). As a consequence, all States are experiencing increased cross-State movements of military assets with destinations beyond State borders. Within a State with major military installations, such as those with power projection platforms (PPP), current deployment strategies may require 24x7 operations with enhanced security for increased equipment and personnel movements. This chapter provides a broad overview of current military doctrine and policies relevant to military deployments on public roads. The range of size and scope for deployments is discussed, including preferred travel modes and recent lessons learned. The major agencies and organizations are introduced, with greater definition of roles and responsibilities to be examined in chapter 2. Finally, the role of advisory systems and implications for military deployment are presented.[1] Strategic mobility and readiness are keys to the military’s ability to project power worldwide. Each of the military services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as their component Reserve, National Guard, and Coast Guard counterparts—has made great strides in implementing the specific recommendations of the congressionally mandated 2001 Mobility Requirements Study and more recent findings from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as well as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The ability to deploy equipment and personnel rapidly is an imperative of the national military strategy. That strategy expects the military to defend the homeland, deter aggression in four regions of the world, swiftly defeat adversaries in two other conflicts, and conduct a limited number of small operations. Implied in these missions is the requirement to deploy forces within the United States and from the United States to anywhere in the world. To assist the military services in their planning and better prepare for future operations, the Department of Defense has established an objective of being able to deploy to a theater within 10 days sufficient combat power to defeat an enemy during the next 30 days and be ready for the next fight within another 30 days. Key to meeting these deployment goals is the capability of units to move rapidly from their installations to land, sea, and aerial ports of embarkation or to designated locations within the United States. Military units use various methods to move equipment and personnel to seaports. Heavy equipment usually will be shipped by rail; however, some equipment must be deployed on public roads, either driven by military personnel or consigned to commercial carriers, to arrive at the seaport on specific dates and times for loading onto ships. When the military uses public roads, it organizes the equipment into convoys for control and protection. Appendix B provides detailed information about the military's organization of convoys and standard highway procedures for convoys. Insights from OIF highlight the dynamic and changing nature of military deployment needs. During the spring of 2003, shipment volumes of military assets from military installations through the nation to strategic seaports increased 29 percent. This increase created a 15 percent increase in required truck capacity just for military needs.[2] For certain States with destination ports, the increase in truck volume was greater than 15 percent because vehicles were traveling from multiple States to a designated port within a State. Consequently, some States with PPPs became concerned about regional and local roadway congestion and extended hours of operation involving greater than average volumes. Rail carriers experienced similar volume increases. While most rail carriers accommodated the increased demand for their services between military installations (with rail connections) and ports, logistical and operational issues in selected regions of the country prevented certain equipment from moving by rail. For example, some military installations did not have rail accessibility but needed to move assets. Also, the special rail cars used for transporting military assets ("X-cars") were not always available in convenient locations, creating additional shortfalls in rail capacity. Figure 1 illustrates a typical use of DoD X-cars. While rail operations were generally successful, operational and capacity shortfalls required truck carriers to complete the deployment mission, resulting in the addition of commercial carriers on the public roadways.

 

 

Leave it to Khalizhad to have heg cards

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Transportation Infrastructure key to effective mobilization of troops – independently key to Heg

Cox, L.A. County Transportation Commission member and chair of national committees on energy conservation and urban transit planning; and Love editor of comprehensive public policy manual, ’96

Wendell Cox L.A. County Transportation Commission member and chair of national committees on energy conservation and urban transit planning; and Jean Love editor of comprehensive public policy manual June 1996

http://www.publicpur...eway1.htm#intro

 

One of the principal reasons for building the interstate highway system was to support national defense. When the system was approved --- during one of the most instable periods of the Cold War, national security dictated development of an efficient national highway system that could move large numbers of military personnel and huge quantities of military equipment and supplies. The interstate highway system effectively performs that function, but perhaps more importantly, its availability provides the nation with a potential resource that could have been reliably called upon if greater military conflict had arisen. Throughout the Cold War (and even to today), America's strategic advantage in effective surface transportation was unchallenged. Even today, no constituent nation of the late Soviet Union has begun to develop such a comprehensive surface transportation system. In the post-communist world, it may be tempting to underestimate the role of the interstate highway system in national defense. But the interstate highway system continues to play a critical role. The U.S. military's Strategic Highway Corridor Network (STAHNET) relies primarily on the interstate highway network, which represents 75 percent of network mileage. The U.S. Army cited the system as being critical to the success of the 1990-1991 "Desert Shield-Desert Storm operation (the U.S. led operation to free Kuwait from Iraq): Much of the success of the operation was due to our logistical ability to rapidly move troops to the theater. The capacity of the U.S. highway system to support the mobilization of troops and to move equipment and forces to U.S. ports of embarkation was key to successful deployment. The Army also noted the "modal redundancy" of the highway system, which provided rapid and effective movements of a military division when difficulties with a rail line precluded the planned transport by rail. This illustrates the fact that the interstate highway system continues to play an important role in national defense, even in the post-Cold War era.

 

A Strong Infrastructure system is crucial to rapid troop deployment and hegemony

FHA 09

(Federal Highway Administration, “Introduction to Current Military Deployment Conceptsâ€, March 27th 2009, http://ops.fhwa.dot....9/chapter_1.htm)

 

The U.S. military has changed significantly to meet the challenges of our uncertain world. An understanding of the evolving international environment, the national security strategy, and the capabilities required for full-spectrum dominance have guided the military's transformation from a forward-deployed Cold War force to a capabilities-based, power-projection force located largely in the United States. The military has reduced its size, redistributed its forces, closed and realigned bases, reorganized its overseas equipment prepositioned, and improved active and reserve component integration to become leaner, more versatile, and more deployable. Increased deployment activity has become the normal operational standard within the continental United States, which may regularly affect the planning and operations for State Departments of Transportation (SDOT). As a consequence, all States are experiencing increased cross-State movements of military assets with destinations beyond State borders. Within a State with major military installations, such as those with power projection platforms (PPP), current deployment strategies may require 24x7 operations with enhanced security for increased equipment and personnel movements. This chapter provides a broad overview of current military doctrine and policies relevant to military deployments on public roads. The range of size and scope for deployments is discussed, including preferred travel modes and recent lessons learned. The major agencies and organizations are introduced, with greater definition of roles and responsibilities to be examined in chapter 2. Finally, the role of advisory systems and implications for military deployment are presented.[1] Strategic mobility and readiness are keys to the military’s ability to project power worldwide. Each of the military services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as their component Reserve, National Guard, and Coast Guard counterparts—has made great strides in implementing the specific recommendations of the congressionally mandated 2001 Mobility Requirements Study and more recent findings from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as well as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The ability to deploy equipment and personnel rapidly is an imperative of the national military strategy. That strategy expects the military to defend the homeland, deter aggression in four regions of the world, swiftly defeat adversaries in two other conflicts, and conduct a limited number of small operations. Implied in these missions is the requirement to deploy forces within the United States and from the United States to anywhere in the world. To assist the military services in their planning and better prepare for future operations, the Department of Defense has established an objective of being able to deploy to a theater within 10 days sufficient combat power to defeat an enemy during the next 30 days and be ready for the next fight within another 30 days. Key to meeting these deployment goals is the capability of units to move rapidly from their installations to land, sea, and aerial ports of embarkation or to designated locations within the United States. Military units use various methods to move equipment and personnel to seaports. Heavy equipment usually will be shipped by rail; however, some equipment must be deployed on public roads, either driven by military personnel or consigned to commercial carriers, to arrive at the seaport on specific dates and times for loading onto ships. When the military uses public roads, it organizes the equipment into convoys for control and protection. Appendix B provides detailed information about the military's organization of convoys and standard highway procedures for convoys. Insights from OIF highlight the dynamic and changing nature of military deployment needs. During the spring of 2003, shipment volumes of military assets from military installations through the nation to strategic seaports increased 29 percent. This increase created a 15 percent increase in required truck capacity just for military needs.[2] For certain States with destination ports, the increase in truck volume was greater than 15 percent because vehicles were traveling from multiple States to a designated port within a State. Consequently, some States with PPPs became concerned about regional and local roadway congestion and extended hours of operation involving greater than average volumes. Rail carriers experienced similar volume increases. While most rail carriers accommodated the increased demand for their services between military installations (with rail connections) and ports, logistical and operational issues in selected regions of the country prevented certain equipment from moving by rail. For example, some military installations did not have rail accessibility but needed to move assets. Also, the special rail cars used for transporting military assets ("X-cars") were not always available in convenient locations, creating additional shortfalls in rail capacity. Figure 1 illustrates a typical use of DoD X-cars. While rail operations were generally successful, operational and capacity shortfalls required truck carriers to complete the deployment mission, resulting in the addition of commercial carriers on the public roadways.

 

I love you....

 

 

 

and Rawrcat. Mostly Rawrcat's dick.

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I love you....

 

 

 

and Rawrcat. Mostly Rawrcat's dick.

 

You would be in to beastiality...

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I want your body.

 

This is probably bad, but I'm actually taking a liking to this guys post. I feel like they've actually begun being funny (sometimes).

 

Example: I actually somewhat enjoyed his virtual debate with himself.

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This is probably bad, but I'm actually taking a liking to this guys post. I feel like they've actually begun being funny (sometimes).

 

 

Yes.

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This is the kind of bullshit that happens when we let Colin be moderator.

TROLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLO JKLUVU RAWRCATZ

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I feel happy about myself now :D

 

why? that little bar with your rep in it is finally green? good job.

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