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So i was thinking of writing a Deleuze and Guattari K. The only thing im really having trouble finding are good link arguments. Anybody know of some good books to cut link args for this?

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thanks a bunch. i also have the transcendence link arg by smith that just says that reducing the subject to producing a morally good world is a form of fascist thinking causing us to desire our own repression. Do they discuss thinks like security aswell or can i just insert some stuff from Nietzsche as well such as the turanli card? My understanding is that although D&G somewhat break from Nietzsche they also follow his arguments very closely, "world is will to power" = "world is desire", eternal recurrence = schizoanalysis, resentiment = desiring repression (somewhat).

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You should read the Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus if you want to find some good links. Also, the preface by Michel Foucault at the front of AO is really good at explaining the link arguments you want to look for.

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You should read the Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus if you want to find some good links. Also, the preface by Michel Foucault at the front of AO is really good at explaining the link arguments you want to look for.

 

This. Especially the last part.

 

A lot of people say that both books are really hard to read (and some argue that D&G made it that way purposefully); I found that Anti-Oedipus was really difficult, but A Thousand Plateaus was much, much easier for me.

 

thanks a bunch. i also have the transcendence link arg by smith that just says that reducing the subject to producing a morally good world is a form of fascist thinking causing us to desire our own repression. Do they discuss thinks like security aswell or can i just insert some stuff from Nietzsche as well such as the turanli card? My understanding is that although D&G somewhat break from Nietzsche they also follow his arguments very closely, "world is will to power" = "world is desire", eternal recurrence = schizoanalysis, resentiment = desiring repression (somewhat).

 

I've cut some security links for Deleuze; I'd look at Mark Seem's introduction to Anti-Oedipus. I used from "In confronting and finally overturning the... ...history"), the schizophrenic process of desire." The Nietzsche stuff might not be as good of an idea; the concept of Oedipus, to me at least, seems to differ from the Real vs Apparent World. The drive for the Real World is created by a desire for an end to suffering, and while Oedipus is also a desiring for an end to suffering, Deleuze and Guattari put a lot of emphasis on how the subject, instead of taking action to achieve their Real World, looks to the State to do so at any cost (repression).

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The Nietzsche stuff might not be as good of an idea; the concept of Oedipus, to me at least, seems to differ from the Real vs Apparent World. The drive for the Real World is created by a desire for an end to suffering, and while Oedipus is also a desiring for an end to suffering, Deleuze and Guattari put a lot of emphasis on how the subject, instead of taking action to achieve their Real World, looks to the State to do so at any cost (repression).

 

I understand what your saying but i find it difficult to see them as that different. First,

Turanli, 03 (The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University).

 

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle"

 

 

 

And then,

 

Smith ’07 (Daniel W. “Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward and Immanent Theory of Ethics”. Parrhesia, No. 2. Pg 66-78)

 

What an ethics of immanence will criticize, then, is anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting—and what separates us form our power of acting are, ultimately, the illusions of transcendence. (We should immediately point out that the illusions of transcendence go afar beyond the transcendence of God; in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had already critiqued the concepts of the Self, the World, and God as the three great illusions of transcendence; and what he calls the “moral law” in the second critique is, by Kant’s own admission, a transcendent law.) When Spinoza and Nietzsche criticize transcendence, their interest is not merely theoretical or speculative—exposing its fictional or illusory status—but rather practical and ethical. 10 This is no doubt the point that separates Deleuze most from the ethical thinking of Emmanuel Levinas the great philosopher of transcendence, insofar as the Other is the paradigmatic concept of transcendence—as well as Jacques Derrida, who was much closer to Levinas than Deleuze on these matters. The ethical themes one finds in transcendent philosophies like those of Levinas and Derrida—an absolute responsibility for the other that I can never assume, or an infinite call to justice that I can never satisfy—would be, from the Deleuzian point of view of immanence, akin to imperatives whose effect is to separate me from my capacity to act. From the viewpoint of immanence, in other words, transcendence, far from being our salvation, represents our slavery and impotence reduced to its lowest point: the demand to do the impossible (a frequent Derridean theme) is nothing other than the concept of impotence raised to infinity. But this is precisely why the question of desire is linked with the theme of an immanent ethics, and becomes a political question. For one of most difficult problems posed by an immanent ethics is the following: if transcendence represents my impotence (at the limit, my power reduced to zero), then under what conditions can I have actually been led to desire transcendence? What are the conditions that could have led, in Nietzsche’s words, to “the inversion of the value-positing eye”—that is, to the whole history of nihilism that Nietzsche analyses (and nihilism, for Nietzsche, is nothing other than the triumph of transcendence, the point where life itself it given a value of nil, nihil)? This is the fundamental political problem posed by an immanent ethics: How can people reach a point where they actually desire their servitude and slavery as if it were their salvation—for those in power have an obvious interest in separating us from our capacity to act? How, in other words, can we desire to be separated from power, from out capacity to act? As Deleuze writes, following Reich: “The astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike” (AO 29). In other words, whereas other moral theories see transcendence as a necessary principle—the transcendence of the moral law in Kant, for instance, or the transcendence of the Other in Levinas—for Deleuze transcendence is the fundamental problem of ethics, what prevents ethics from taking place, so to speak. So we’ve developed two aspects of an immanent ethics: it focuses on the differences between modes of existence, in terms of their immanent capabilities or power (active versus reactive, in Nietzsche; active versus passive, in Spinoza), and it poses, as one of its fundamental problems, the urge toward transcendence that effectively “perverts” desire, to the point where we can actually desire our own repression, a separation from our own capacities and powers.

 

 

 

Both of these arguments use different word choices however they are very similar. For instance, the turanli card discusses the drive for a truthful world as being based off transcendence. The smith card discusses desiring repression through transcendence. My understanding of these two cards anyway (not to say that is the way D&G would argue it) is that smith links transcendence to desiring repression (resentment) where we channel our view of existence through the state where it becomes a war machine, Nietzsche leaves the impact work on the individual level where we become full of resentment blah blah blah. Maybe could you elaborate on the difference between Nietzsches will to truth and Deleuzes transcendence?

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I understand what your saying but i find it difficult to see them as that different. First,

Turanli, 03 (The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University).

 

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle"

 

 

 

And then,

 

Smith ’07 (Daniel W. “Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward and Immanent Theory of Ethics”. Parrhesia, No. 2. Pg 66-78)

 

What an ethics of immanence will criticize, then, is anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting—and what separates us form our power of acting are, ultimately, the illusions of transcendence. (We should immediately point out that the illusions of transcendence go afar beyond the transcendence of God; in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had already critiqued the concepts of the Self, the World, and God as the three great illusions of transcendence; and what he calls the “moral law” in the second critique is, by Kant’s own admission, a transcendent law.) When Spinoza and Nietzsche criticize transcendence, their interest is not merely theoretical or speculative—exposing its fictional or illusory status—but rather practical and ethical. 10 This is no doubt the point that separates Deleuze most from the ethical thinking of Emmanuel Levinas the great philosopher of transcendence, insofar as the Other is the paradigmatic concept of transcendence—as well as Jacques Derrida, who was much closer to Levinas than Deleuze on these matters. The ethical themes one finds in transcendent philosophies like those of Levinas and Derrida—an absolute responsibility for the other that I can never assume, or an infinite call to justice that I can never satisfy—would be, from the Deleuzian point of view of immanence, akin to imperatives whose effect is to separate me from my capacity to act. From the viewpoint of immanence, in other words, transcendence, far from being our salvation, represents our slavery and impotence reduced to its lowest point: the demand to do the impossible (a frequent Derridean theme) is nothing other than the concept of impotence raised to infinity. But this is precisely why the question of desire is linked with the theme of an immanent ethics, and becomes a political question. For one of most difficult problems posed by an immanent ethics is the following: if transcendence represents my impotence (at the limit, my power reduced to zero), then under what conditions can I have actually been led to desire transcendence? What are the conditions that could have led, in Nietzsche’s words, to “the inversion of the value-positing eye”—that is, to the whole history of nihilism that Nietzsche analyses (and nihilism, for Nietzsche, is nothing other than the triumph of transcendence, the point where life itself it given a value of nil, nihil)? This is the fundamental political problem posed by an immanent ethics: How can people reach a point where they actually desire their servitude and slavery as if it were their salvation—for those in power have an obvious interest in separating us from our capacity to act? How, in other words, can we desire to be separated from power, from out capacity to act? As Deleuze writes, following Reich: “The astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike” (AO 29). In other words, whereas other moral theories see transcendence as a necessary principle—the transcendence of the moral law in Kant, for instance, or the transcendence of the Other in Levinas—for Deleuze transcendence is the fundamental problem of ethics, what prevents ethics from taking place, so to speak. So we’ve developed two aspects of an immanent ethics: it focuses on the differences between modes of existence, in terms of their immanent capabilities or power (active versus reactive, in Nietzsche; active versus passive, in Spinoza), and it poses, as one of its fundamental problems, the urge toward transcendence that effectively “perverts” desire, to the point where we can actually desire our own repression, a separation from our own capacities and powers.

 

 

 

Both of these arguments use different word choices however they are very similar. For instance, the turanli card discusses the drive for a truthful world as being based off transcendence. The smith card discusses desiring repression through transcendence. My understanding of these two cards anyway (not to say that is the way D&G would argue it) is that smith links transcendence to desiring repression (resentment) where we channel our view of existence through the state where it becomes a war machine, Nietzsche leaves the impact work on the individual level where we become full of resentment blah blah blah. Maybe could you elaborate on the difference between Nietzsches will to truth and Deleuzes transcendence?

 

The war machine doesn't form from the state, first of all; it forms in smooth space and can be appropriated by the State for violence, etc. I suppose transcendence vs the Will to Truth is probably similar, but I think that the main difference (from my standpoint at least) is at the impact level. Ressentiment is a hatred of the world you live in, Oedipus/repression is a fear of it. Oedipus can probably lead to ressentiment, but ressentiment couldn't lead to Oedipus, from what I can tell. However, I'm writing this on two hours of sleep and some coffee, so my opinion could possibly/probably change later.

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The correct interpretation is whichever one gets the judge to vote for you.

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Why can't hatred lead to fear mr. dustin?

 

After waking up more, I realized it probably could, but I see a stronger internal from Oedipus to ressentiment than from ressentiment to Oedipus; we fear difference, and because we hate that we can't get rid of it we begin to hate the fact that it exists and thus hate the world we live in. It seems like more of a logical progression than hatred -> fear.

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The Nietzsche stuff might not be as good of an idea; the concept of Oedipus, to me at least, seems to differ from the Real vs Apparent World. The drive for the Real World is created by a desire for an end to suffering, and while Oedipus is also a desiring for an end to suffering, Deleuze and Guattari put a lot of emphasis on how the subject, instead of taking action to achieve their Real World, looks to the State to do so at any cost (repression).

In this sense those Nietzsche cards about ending suffering being a drive to find the real world are probably an internal link into Deleuze and Guattari's arguments.

 

Deleuze forms the distinction between the actual and virtual in his arguments about radical or transcendental empiricism. Too often systems of thought and governance place a kind of limit on the real or the truth, Anti-Oedipus illustrates this with all the arguments about schizophrenia; why do schizophrenics get so fucked up by Oedipus? Probably because it tries to piece together the partial objects of their identity into some sort of complete whole (there's a lot of discussion of this in one of the first sections of AO, i can't remember which right now). In this way we all seduced into sitting on the analysts couch praying to transcendence to piece together what we view as an incomplete identity; we walk into the analyst's office, hand them--our deity--money--which we have now invested our desire in--and sit down on the couch and proceed to wait there to be fixed, only involving ourselves as much as we are prompted. We come to view our mind as engaging in some sort of unreal activity (seeing visions w/ schizophrenia), and therefore repress our desires in the name of removing them. This is why Deleuze and Guattari's argument is kind of masochistic (see how to make yourself a body without organs), cause you're going to have to take an active role, you're going to be forced to walk freely through the world, even if it means getting shot at and hated for your identity; you'll have to live with your demons because they are part of you, and changing your demons will require changing the way you participate in the world.

 

In a debate round, if you're reading the argument that the prevention of suffering results in an endless search for some sort of truth to the world then you've got the internal link into the arguments about piecing together meaning through the belief in a transcendent arbiter (ie. the plan/the judge/the state). Think of it this way, the affirmative demands the state--which they invest their desire in--to fix their lives, all the while failing to realize that the only reason the state has any power over their identities is because they have come to place their belief it.

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The war machine doesn't form from the state, first of all; it forms in smooth space and can be appropriated by the State for violence, etc. I suppose transcendence vs the Will to Truth is probably similar, but I think that the main difference (from my standpoint at least) is at the impact level. Ressentiment is a hatred of the world you live in, Oedipus/repression is a fear of it. Oedipus can probably lead to ressentiment, but ressentiment couldn't lead to Oedipus, from what I can tell. However, I'm writing this on two hours of sleep and some coffee, so my opinion could possibly/probably change later.

 

Thats what i meant. Poor word choice on my part i was kinda in a hurry. And it seems that hatred of difference and fear of difference are similar if not almost one in the same but i get what your saying about oedipus -> resentment but prolly not the other way around.

 

Although you prolly could use resentment as an impact as well, it becomes moot when explaining both as different impacts because fascistic repression utilizes the war machine for the destruction of difference, creating essentially total war. Fascism might be more easily explainable in a debate i think.

 

Also i think saying the Turanli card is an internal link might be a better way to understand it becomes where Nietzsche saw morality as being the justification for a "true" world, Deleuze asks how morality or justice etc, are socially constructed, if i understand it right.

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I have another question on this. Pretty much, how is the DnG ego competitive with the Aff. Couldn't the aff just read perm; to the K then the plan?

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I have another question on this. Pretty much, how is the DnG ego competitive with the Aff. Couldn't the aff just read perm; to the K then the plan?

Well, that's one of the most abusive timeframe perms that work on many K's.

 

Ex. Perm: destroy cap and then do the plan

Caps gone, then we do the plan, everything's all good!

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