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Problems with any alternative to Foucault/Biopolitics

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The second is a more general thought. If all biopolitics isn't bad, whats the point of the criticism. To me, it only seems if you perform a REAL geneology that you actually figure out if its a positive biopolitics or not. And all of that begs the question of your ethical/decision framework in the first place.


The problem I have is that it seems that science that says tobacco is kills you, kills children, and is generally toxic is called biopolitical, while conservatives who merely assert "global green house is a myth" get off the hook.


Your alternative leaves a vacuum for worse alternatives

How does the criticism solve for myth, conjecture, hyperbole, misrepresentation. Its almost as if these aren't biopolitical on face (even if they would be terribly biopolitical in practice)--ie they would be used to victimize those who don't know. [i realize there is a place of myth].


And, even if you solve your own myths, isn't it the case that some people have evil intents and evil deeds and wont care what the K says and will exploit anyone for their own advantage.


The Social Service Topic in Focus: Poverty, Foucault, and Representation of Poverty


In the case of poverty you have:

• moral judgments about poverty. poverty is evil.

• blame game (they're responsible for it--which probably links to very few affs)

• data about poverty

• surveillance of clients + general government mechanations/enforcement

• services provided


• the impact debate = biopolitics and fear (links to the K too--the impact card)

• forcing them to be free (bogus link--they consent)

• judgments between people in poverty (people living in poverty vs. those living outside poverty)--but this seems like an arg for more services.




Representations of poverty in the SQ

• All of that

• Survival of the fittest narratives and tokenistic american dream narratives by conservatives

• Cycles of depression, exploitation, otherization, and dependency. Cycles of alienation, loneliness, and being treated as a second class citizen.

• Cycles of criminal labeling, stigma, demonization, dehumanization, and imprisonment (legal sanctions on homeless)

• Silence (including Henry A. Giroux and the Katrina metaphor and biopolitical/neo-liberal exploitation: The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics)

• The critique of TANF (I think impacted in every ims known) (see footnote)

• Fear narratives around poverty--immigration, health care disaster, economy


Of course their are citizenship arguments on both sides (perhaps civic engagement, freedom, and democracy as well)....and arguments of place on both sides.


You have no alternative for a decision calculous in terms of determinging good vs. bad biopolitics--or good vs. bad state power (or at least thats what the perm would seem to indicate)


Wither Good Intents, Dignity, and Concern for the Other

And if I deploy values like virtue, compassion, how am I culpable/responsible for their misapplication????? Or when I respect dignity of the individual or act to avoid dehumanization or genocide???? (incidently the impact calc often of the criticism) Certainly they can be exploited. Does this just get back to a generic rejection of macro-politics?


Science is always already imperfect (thats why you have peer review), but in the abscence of a re-prepresentation its impossible to compare--its even impossible to tell if a particular deployment of science is a biopolitical one or not. This gets back to without a (semi-extensive) geneology...I think the K is almost entirely insolvent--or it gets exactly what it tries to avoid inevitably.


It also seems without a "full/complete" geneology--that the criticism really does become totalizing. In the case of PO Boxes....how is giving po boxes to homeless individuals biopolitical??? There has to be a difference between PO Boxes and the zero point of the holocaust (Dillion).... Or in the case of Spanos...Vietnam.


It seems to me the burden of proof (certainly a degree of code word, but not really) falls on the critiquer to prove its biopolitical. Even then--a later reapplication of the principle seems bunk. (ie some boogeyman in the future (or the past) has devilish plans for your rhetorical strategy. they will steal your narrative for their own purposes. guess what, they'll steal anyone's narrative for their devious plans)


The criticism seems like an attempt at authenticity/ethical purity that it attempts to decry. The nature of progress seems like imperfection and messiness. Especially given that, while not intrinsically evil, some people create hate, anger, alienation, scarcity, and violence. Being a happy/unhappy plato...doesn't seem to help or get us closer to truth.


Isn't it just an FYI that information could be used for good or bad....arguably that surveillance could be used for good or bad. In the case of micro loans (not run on the topic, but an interesting lense on the topic), keeping the borrowers accountable for their loans ensures that more people get loans and are pulled out of poverty.


Isn't Foucault's own study of the prison social science?


If I'm responsible for my reps getting misused, aren't you responsible for the K being commodified (in commerce and inevitably in ways which speak to the "care of the self" and disciplining subjects) or even used by the right--wherever they be--in the US or Europe or whatever to serve evil ends. (arguably Zizek's use of Hollywood imagery serves this purpose--you don't think he's shifted our collective thoughts to spend millions more at the box office--although thats limited to his arguments about those metaphors. Arguably I'm being unfair--and I acknowledge that--but perhaps no more unfair than some shaddy K links)


Our Collective Hyper Addiction to Theory

On a random note...I read a bunch of feminist theory yesterday and told a friend--they asked what I learned about womyn and how they think..... And while the question might miss the point--I think the theory question may leave us with a representation thats even worse than social science. Or at least not helpful in solving ethical or practical questions with respect to friends, family, coworkers, and others.


Which reminds my of what one of my grad professors (at UT grad ps) said with respect to critiques of capitalism. If the person singing at the olympics was white vs. non-white....how would that change the argument of the critic? While this alone perhaps doesn't invalidate the criticism--I think it gives us some pause--especially in light of multiple narratives on poverty which most negatives will try to patch together and contrive.


Failure to think in terms of theory can be harmful--but if theory gets us off the hook for responsibility (Vetels, Derrida, Levinas), it can be harmful. If it doesn't provide decent representations that it claims to decry--prehaps its time to rethink theory. Theory says politics and life is political--it also says that theory is political. It all seems like a mobius strip (at least how its applied in debate)....that creates paralysis toward action that is anymore than thought. And if theory can't give us anything concerning an alt, besides reject I'm not sure what it provides.


What rhetorical/ethical hoops do I have to hop through to be talking about poverty in a constructive way? And am I really a realist by talking about poverty in an economic way? Do you think Gilligan and Mohammed Yunus on realists on par with Kristol, Kagan, and Cheney (arguably not a realist, but anyway)? How can we have a meaningful discussion of poverty without your information power/fear/surveilance disad clouding the scene? How can even someone in poverty make a call on government, without being accused of having ill intents?


I think particularly with poverty, where the ideologies of the left with respect to poverty and the right with respect to poverty seem seemingly radically different. One is of trust and affirmative, while the other is of fear.


I'm curious how either a) the criticisms accussations of totalism or the B) the critiques own totalizing theory (= solopsism and probably self-fulling prophesy)


Is There a Way Out of the Impasse???

So is there??? I think the practical alternatives to capitalism are genuinely a good idea: trading big economics for small economics. Even too much of that could be parochical and exclusionist. Perhaps an archimedian point of some sort is a better alternative. It seems to me that in the real world and academia--that the perm makes the most sense--combining aspects of the K and the aff--even if doing so is a timeframe perm in some respect.


Footnote Courtesy of John Turner

1. Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at Bryn Mawr College, 1995, words of welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty, pg. 163 “The postindustrial age…Contact With America”

2. See also other affs and critiques critiquing TANF courtesy of GA Forensics (see the welfare reform affirmative from Fellows + Kentucky) I think there is at least one more aff like this--feel free to leave a link below.

Edited by nathan_debate

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can't comment on all of this because some of it is in snippet-form and i don't understand some of the references (like 'p.o. boxes'?), but i'll try to address the main points below...

"If all biopolitics isn't bad, whats the point of the criticism[?]"

(i) just to be precise on the terminology: bio-power includes (1) the disciplining of the body and (2) the regulation of the species - and only (2) is biopolitics proper (strictly following foucault's usage).

(ii) not all power is bad, but bio-power is a specific kind of power - a historical configuration that has come to dominate our societies in the last few centuries. marx wouldn't say, for example, that all markets are bad, but one can't infer from this 'capitalism good'...

bio-power is bad. the way power is exercised over life today is coercive, cruel, traumatic, humiliating, exploitative, eugenical, and genocidal; it has resulted in mass violence, ever-expanding statism, ever-accelerating capitalism, and slavery by new names. so i'd say, yes, it's all bad - meaning unless you show that you're counter-bio-power (i.e., win a turn), you're probably bad bio-power (i.e., bite the link and impact).

(iii) point-blank: why would a criticism have to show that something is all bad in order to have a point? marx didn't say that capitalism was worse than feudalism and chattel slavery, for instance; he says that capitalism is the most revolutionary social form that has ever existed (except for communism). what in the love of satan is always all bad? sometimes economic depressions result in good music and art (e.g., the great depression and blues) - so does that mean depressions aren't all bad and negative teams should surrender the economy disadvantage? sometimes wars liberate oppressed peoples - so is it pointless to show that the affirmative plan leads to war?

"The problem I have is that it seems that science that says tobacco is kills you, kills children, and is generally toxic is called biopolitical, while conservatives who merely assert "global green house is a myth" get off the hook."

foucault is not anti-science; he's anti-pseudoscience - as i tried to show in this post.

refer to pages 224-227 of 'discipline and punish' for a useful discussion of this. very briefly, the empirical or natural sciences (along with that peculiar creature we call 'a fact') got their start during the inquisition. this is not foucault's criticism. what foucault says is, thankfully, the empirical sciences were able to separate themselves from the institutions from which they sprang. the question is, why haven't the human sciences done likewise? why are they still attached to asylums, prisons, schools, hospitals, and factories? why haven't they gained autonomy from the sites from which they sprang?

For, although it is true that, in becoming a technique for the empirical sciences, the investigation has detached itself from the inquisitorial procedure, in which it was historically rooted, the examination [on the other hand] has remained extremely close to the disciplinary power that shaped it. It has always been and still is an intrinsic element of the disciplines. Of course it seems to have undergone a speculative purification by integrating itself with such sciences as psychology and psychiatry. And, in effect, its appearance in the form of tests, interviews, interrogations and consultations is apparently in order to rectify the mechanisms of disciplines: educational psychology is supposed to correct the rigors of the school, just as the medical or psychiatric interview is supposed to rectify the effects of the discipline of work. But we must not be mislead; these techniques merely refer individuals from one disciplinary authority to another, and they reproduce, in a concentrated and formalized form, the schema of power-knowledge proper to each discipline... The great investigation that gave rise to the sciences of nature has become detached from its politico-juridical model; the examination, on the other hand, is still caught up in disciplinary technology.


why is this important?... because foucault isn't arguing 'science bad'. on the contrary, he's arguing the misuse of science is bad. pretending you're talking about something scientific when you're actually talking about something political masks power-moves as knowledge-claims. dreyfus and rabinow are cogent on this point,

Political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science. Once this is accomplished the problems have become technical ones for specialists to debate. In fact, the language of reform is, from the outset, an essential component of these political technologies. Bio-power spread under the banner of making people healthy and protecting them. When there was resistance, or failure to achieve its stated aims, this was construed as further proof of the need to reinforce and extend the power of the experts. A technical matrix was established. By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem. Once this matrix was established, the spread of bio-power was assured, for there was nothing else to appeal to; any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present merely technical problems. We are promised normalization and happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies the need for more of the same. Once the hold of bio-power is secure, what we get is not a true conflict of interpretations about the ultimate worth or meaning of efficiency, productivity, or normalization, but rather what might be called a conflict of implementations.


'a conflict of implementations' replaces 'a true conflict of interpretations'. the classic example is the prison: two centuries of so-called 'failures', they're still around, and we're still not even asking the substantive question of whether we could dispense with them. there are some important implications to this,

(i) this flips back the 'lack of a decision calculus'-argument: even when the affirmative plan fails to solve, it solves; so we have no real way of judging solvency - that is, solvency is the link, and even when plan fails, it solves by successfully extending bio-power. one more failure will only result in more attempts at a solution farther down the road. (by the way, this also means that the affirmative cannot concede 'no solvency' and claim they therefore do not link to the kritik, then affirm the plan as a philosophical idea. 'perms' which do this link just as heartily as the fiated plan, because whether plan solves or not, it still entrenches bio-power.)

(ii) this re-frames the alternative debate. if by 'alternative' you mean another 'implementation' (in the terms of the above card), then every foucault kritik should happily critique without an alternative. policymakers think that the only way to debate is the 'conflict of implementations' because they presuppose the technical matrix established by bio-power - that is, they reduce all political debate to purely technical problems. this paradigm outlaws in advance a conflict of interpretations. it's also wracked by a big, show-stopping problem, one it can't resolve within its own coordinates, and one we might call an interminability problem. bio-power will double down on every bet it loses, and never allows itself to take its money back; it thus becomes "an indefinite discipline" and "an interrogation without end" - "a file... never closed" (page 227 of 'discipline and punish'). consider the debate raging in the early 1800s over what kind of prison system to adopt in america - a debate between proponents of the auburn model and the philadelphia model, which had a big influence on prison systems worldwide...

The Auburn model drew on the monastery and the factory for elements of its solution. Hence, prisoners were assigned to sleep in separate individual cells but were allowed to eat and work together, although in both situations they were strictly forbidden to speak to one another. The advantage of the system, according to the Auburn reformers, was that it duplicated in a pure form the conditions of society - hierarchy and surveillance in the name of order - and hence prepared the criminal's return to social life. In contrast, the Philadelphia model of the Quakers stressed individual reform of conscience through isolation and self-reflection. Kept in continual confinement the criminal would supposedly undergo a deep and pervasive change in character, rather than a superficial alternation of surface habits and attitudes. The Quakers believed he would discover his moral conscience through the elimination of sociality.

Foucault has isolated two different models of implementation; two different models of society and the individual; two different models of subjection. Each is based on an implicit acceptance of the disciplinary technology per se. Advocates of either system agreed that there should be isolation and individualization of prisoners. The only conflict was how this individualization and isolation should be carried out.

"A whole series of different conflicts stemmed from the opposition between two models: religious (must conversion be the principle element of correction?), economic (which methods cost less?), medical (does total isolation drive convicts insane?), architectural and administrative (which form guarantees the best surveillance?). This, no doubt, was why the argument lasted so long. But, at the heart of the debate, and making it possible, was this primary objective of carceral action: coercive individualization by the termination of any relation that is not supervised by authority or arranged according to hierarchy."

The project itself was not a topic of dispute. It was the unquestioned acceptance of hierarchical, coercive individualization which made possible a wide range of techniques of implementation. Through these difference and these agreements (however tacit and embedded in practices), under the guidance of science and the law, normalization and discipline advanced.


that's dreyfus and rabinow, pages 196-7. for more on this, see jonathan simon's 'poor discipline: parole and the social control of the underclass, 1890-1990' (especially pages 25-31).

i underlined the "implicit acceptance"-sentence because this relates to what good kritiks are supposed to do - to root out what all sides in a given policy debate implicitly accept, to go to the heart of the debate by asking, 'what unquestioned tacit agreements embedded in our social practices make this conflict over implementation-proposals possible?'. if we don't ask this very important question then we'll be duped into believing we've substantially changed the system by giving prisoners cable television and flush toilets - that is, we won't recognize cosmetic reforms and won't recognize what all our reforms are being made to serve.

"Your alternative leaves a vacuum for worse alternatives[.] How does the criticism solve for myth, conjecture, hyperbole, misrepresentation."

well, first, foucault calls his position dechiffrement (decipherment) because it enables us to debunk myths, to expose conjecture, et cetera. he is not anti-enlightenment rationalism, and we do his work a great injustice to lump it in with adorno's, heidegger's, or agamben's. foucault has an abiding hatred for abstraction, and foucauldian debaters should ask very specific questions. if we can show that certain political technologies and disciplinary mechanisms are being used currently, that they operate as pernicious and meticulous 'rituals of power', we're right to ask, how will the affirmative plan confront these? how will the reform actually be carried out on the ground floor, at the level of actual bodies and populations? and not only, what does the policy you advocate really do?, but also, what effect does the discourse you use to advocate it have? so i'm in complete agreement on the necessity to conduct "a REAL genealogy".

that said, to problematize the terms of contemporary policy debates over a given topic serves a vital political function by confronting the interminability problem head-on. dreyfus and rabinow write on page 203,

The force of bio-power lies in defining reality as well as producing it. This reality takes the world to be composed of subjects and objects and their totalizing normalization. Any solution that takes these terms for granted - even if it is to oppose them - will contribute to the hold of bio-power.


so-called 'realist' policymakers ignore their role in constructing reality. one frequent hyperbole that the activity of policy debate should dispense with is the notion that if we don't act now, it will result in 'worse alternatives'. first because, obviously, 'fiat is illusory' - that is, since no actual plan is passed at the end of the round, we're weighing talk about reform versus talk about critique. but second, as i've tried to explain above, criticism only looks like doing nothing, like mere rejection, when appraised from the policy-making perspective. only when we define every alternative as another conflicting implementation, only once we've successfully turned what's essentially a political problem into a technical one, only once we've banned any conflict over interpretation and let bio-power define our reality and our discourses about reality, can we think such an argument is self-evident. and breaching this self-evidence is doing something.

...government is not just a power needing to be tamed or an authority needing to be legitimized. It is an activity and an art which concerns all and touches each. And it is an art which presupposes thought. The sense and object of governmental acts do not fall from the sky or emerge ready formed from social practice. They are things which have had to be - and which have been - invented. Foucault observed that there is a parcel of thought in even the crassest and most obtuse parts of social reality, which is why criticism can be a real power for change, depriving some practices of their self-evidence, extending the bounds of the thinkable to permit the invention of others.


that's the preface, written by graham burchell, colin gordon, and peter miller, to 'the foucault effect: studies in governmentality'. in that same book, on pages 82-5, foucault himself answers the argument that his work "creates paralysis toward action". he lampoons that as 'ministerial cabinet talk'. similarly, when it's argued that "You have no alternative for a decision calculus", i think this requires a false subject-position. you're a debater pretending to be a legislator; why not pretend to be a public intellectual instead or as well? as foucault says,

...one must avoid a trap in which those who govern try to catch intellectuals and into which they often fall: "Put yourselves in our place and tell us what you would do." It is not a question one has to answer. To make a decision on some question implies a knowledge of evidence that is refused us, an analysis of the situation that we have not been able to make. This is a trap.


that's page 52 of 'politics, philosophy, culture'. on page 155 of that same book,

To say to oneself at the outset: what reform will I be able to carry out? That is not, I believe, an aim for the intellectual to pursue. [Their] role... is to see how far the liberation of thought can make those transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and difficult enough to carry out for them to be profoundly rooted in reality. It is a question of making conflicts more visible, of making them more essential than mere confrontations of interests or mere institutional immobility. Out of these conflicts, these confrontations, a new power relation must emerge, whose first, temporary expression will be a reform. If at the base there has not been the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will [have remained] the same.


this is similar to what foucault had to say to chomsky in their debate on dutch television in 1971. chomsky is big on alternatives - his is anarcho-syndicalism. he defines an innate human need for creative work, then calls our society undemocratic because it represses this need, and advocates a total reconfiguration of our society based on this principle. in response to this, foucault demurs,

I would say to you that I am much less advanced in my way; I go much less far than Mr. Chomsky. That is to say that I admit to not being able to define, nor for even stronger reasons to propose, an ideal social model for the functioning of our scientific or technological society.


his reasons for this are profoundly ethical. he does not see himself as any kind of prophet, or what he calls a 'universal intellectual'. he also knows the history of the soviet union and communist china - how their programs for 'a new man' ended up sacrificing tens of millions of their own citizens. it's with this in mind that he says

one of the tasks that seems immediate and urgent to me, over and above anything else, is this: that we should indicate and show up, even where they are hidden, all the relationships of political power which actually control the social body and oppress or repress it.


this is an alternative both to chomsky's utopianism (generic kritiks) and to liberal reformism (generic plans). it's an urgent political task to attack bio-power by unmasking its professed neutrality. he goes on,

What I want to say is this: it is the custom, at least in European society, to consider that power is localized in the hands of the government and that it is exercised through a certain number of particular institutions, such as the administration, the police, the army, and the apparatus of the state. One knows that all these institutions are made to elaborate and to transmit a certain number of decisions, in the name of the nation or of the state, to have them applied and to punish those who don't obey. But I believe that political power also exercises itself through the mediation of a certain number of institutions which look as if they have nothing in common with the political power, and as if they are independent of it, while they are not. One knows this in relation to the family; and one knows that the university and in a general way, all teaching systems, which appear simply to disseminate knowledge, are made to maintain a certain social class in power; and to exclude the instruments of power of another social class. Institutions of knowledge, of foresight and care, such as medicine, also help to support the political power. It's also obvious, even to the point of scandal, in certain cases related to psychiatry. It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. This critique and this fight seem essential to me for different reasons: firstly, because political power goes much deeper than one suspects; there are centers and invisible, little-known points of support; its true resistance, its true solidity is perhaps where one doesn't expect it. Probably it's insufficient to say that behind the governments, behind the apparatus of the State, there is the dominant class; one must locate the point of activity, the places and forms in which its domination is exercised. And because this domination is not simply the expression in political terms of economic exploitation, it is its instrument and, to a large extent, the condition which makes it possible; the suppression of the one is achieved through the exhaustive discernment of the other. Well, if one fails to recognize these points of support of class power, one risks allowing them to continue to exist; and to see this class power reconstitute itself even after an apparent revolutionary process.


'social services for persons living in poverty' is often presented as if it had nothing in common with political power and class domination. it's foucauldian kritikers' job to prove otherwise.


Edited by Lazzarone

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First, I'd like to say this was one of your better posts in awhile, thanks.



(1) just to be precise on the terminology: bio-power includes (a) the disciplining of the body and (B) the regulation of the species - and only (B) is biopolitics proper (strictly following foucault's usage).



To be extra-precise, that isn't exactly true, either. I had hesitated to point this out before, because I wasn't sure if this division was philosophically productive (like Negri's intervention between potentia and potestas in Spinoza, even if, strictly speaking, that dichotomy is never strong in Spinoza's actual texts), but it seems to be a question of simple textual accuracy. In that world, you are both right and wrong. If we simply use the last chapter of the first volume of the history of sexuality, we find that Foucault does indeed deploy bio-politics and bio-power in the way you maintain (I don't think the division is particularly strong even in that text, but still). However, I don't know anywhere else he does that. If you look at the lectures in "Society Must Be Defended", for example, he clearly uses the terms interchangeably. To give one example, turn to page 243, first sentence of the first full paragraph, "What does this new technology of power, this biopolitics, this bio-power that is beginning to establish itself, involve?"

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yeah, i can accept some looseness in the terminology in most circumstances, especially given the interchangeable use in the secondary literature, but why not stick to the definition foucault gave us in one of his major texts, if not his most definitive and accessible one? i mean, he still offers us some wiggle-room as he explains this distinction not as a cut-and-dry 'division', but rather as two "poles" with a "whole intermediary cluster of relations" going on between them. they're "not antithetical" - not oil and water; they overlap. but nevertheless, i find a nice individual/collective-distinction can clear up an awful lot of fuzziness. why don't you think it's "particularly strong" in 'history of sexuality'? and why does his not making this distinction elsewhere matter? to ask an even sillier question, how many places would he have to keep up this distinction before it became valid? since i'd admit that the relevant standard is whether it helps us do good genealogy, i'd point out that even in 'discipline and punish' foucault has to formulate a similar (though obviously quite different) distinction between two "registers" (page 136),


The great book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on two registers: the anatomico-metaphysical register, of which Descartes wrote the first pages and which the physicians and philosophers continued, and the technico-political register, which was constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school, and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body. These two registers are quite distinct, since it was a question, on the one hand, of submission and use and, on the other, of functioning and explanation: there was a useful body and an intelligible body. And yet there are points of overlap from one to the other.


we also might relate this to the motif of 'individualization and totalization' foucault expounds upon at length elsewhere.


{...oh and on a quick google.books-search of 'society must be defended', it appears the word "bio-power" is only used once - the very instance you cite. it seems worth arguing, therefore, that foucault had yet to fully develop the concept and laid it down more (extra-extra-)precisely in 'history of sexuality'. the 'situating the lectures'-commentary written by alessandro fontana and mauro bertani and appended to the back of the english translation also confirms my preference,


...ever since the campaign against childhood onanism suddenly began in English in the first half of the eighteenth century, power over life has been exercised in the twin forms of the "anatomo-politics of the human body" and the "biopolitics of population." Both powers - that of bodily disciplines and that of the government of the population - are thus articulated around sexuality, and they support and reinforce each other.


- pages 278-9.}

Edited by Lazzarone

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