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Answers to Nietzsche?!?!?!?

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Nietzche (was too busy contemplating nothingness) ignores the order in chaos theory--proves there is purpose in the universe.

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chaos/

 

This is a springboard from more arguments on the truth of chaos theory--or chaos theory and ethics/chaos theory and morality. Its also possible that chaos theory may show the possibility of progress, which Nietzche might deny.

 

Second, Nietzche shares the same problem as Ayn Rand, but for the exact opposite reason. Rand deduces objectivity and rationality--if we're so rational, why do we need to be told in 600+ pages. Nietzche's other principles and rules seem to deny (or performatively contradict) his theory.

 

Third, the self is relational (not isolated)

www.sorenkierkegaard.nl/.../116.%20Sin,%20Despair%20and%20the%20Other.pdf

 

http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:bQQ-3QoOjq8J:www.sorenkierkegaard.nl/artikelen/Engels/116.%2520Sin,%2520Despair%2520and%2520the%2520Other.pdf+You+can%27t+get+something+for+nothing:+Kierkegaard+and+Heidegger+on+how+not+to+overcome+Nihilism&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (i hope one of those links works)

 

Fourth, I'm sure these links: http://www.sorenkierkegaard.nl/kierkegaard_links.html could be helpful.

(PS you can use Google translate or Bablefish to translate these pages--although the links themselves are in English on the right side of the page)

 

Search google and find this card

http://books.google.com/books?id=Y46u9mznPOMC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=From+Mussolini+and+Hitler+to+Stalin,+Mao,+Pol+Pot,+and+Saddam+Hussein,+the+last+eighty+years+have+been+riddled+with+so+called+political+geniuses+imagining+that+they+were+%E2%80%9Cbeyond+good+and+evil%E2%80%9D+and+free+of+any+moral+constraints.+One+has+to+ask+if+there+is+not+something+in+Nietzsche%E2%80%99s+philosophy+with+its+uninhabitable+cultivation+of+a+heroic+individualism+and+the+will+to+power,+which+may+have+tended+to+favor+the+fascist+ethos.&source=bl&ots=5l4otIxAv5&sig=RnJaekkMrTGJUuu-TXTQVbQKnlc&hl=en&ei=W2B2Su7SHoeCtgeV_PSWCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false

From Mussolini and Hitler to Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, and Saddam Hussein, the last eighty years have been riddled with so called political geniuses imagining that they were “beyond good and evil” and free of any moral constraints. One has to ask if there is not something in Nietzsche’s philosophy with its uninhabitable cultivation of a heroic individualism and the will to power, which may have tended to favor the fascist ethos.

 

Sixth, this overview of Nietzche's work looks interesting and potentially a source of criticism:

http://books.google.com/books?id=Q5kQGKWEOsIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false

 

Seventh, I don't know if this will be more pro or against the argument, but at least it might clarify some things. And Robert Solomon a prof. of U of T is pretty smart: What Nietzsche Really Said

http://www.amazon.com/What-Nietzsche-Really-Said-They/dp/0805241574

 

Eighth, interesting argument from the Brothers Karamazov:

"If you were to destroy in mankind the belief in immortality, not only love but every living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. Moreover, nothing then would be immoral; everything would be lawful, even cannibalism."

- Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov

 

Nineth, eugenetics and nietzche (i haven't checked for cards, but its something to research)

 

Tenth, power politics crushes creativity and freedom. Democracy, rights, and dignity are the pre-condition for creativity. I wonder if Maslow could help make this argument. The precide limit of Nietizchian ethics--if its to be effective and not to end in a mass orgy of violence in which life is "brutish, nasty, and short"--other peoples dignity and rights create a check for our creative militarism, violence, and domination.

 

Eleventh, euro-chic criticism is the latest idol in culture. the new herd morality is post-modernism and relativism--both in the academy and in debate. Or at least leveraging the ballot to create a movement around it. Also, egoism, selfishness, and exploitation is chic in international relations. Struggle against your urge to be selfish and hyper-individualistic--instead embrace the struggle of connecting with the other.

 

Twelth, and I think most telling is......according to Dreyphus at Berkeley "how many would want their lover to be a Nietzchian?"

 

Thirteenth--radical power inequalities results in conflict, war, and extinction. Both terrorism and Marxist theory prove. (i'm sure other people make this argument in a way thats more viable).

 

Fourteenth, of course their is the option to say power good, state good, realism good--and all this pity stuff--we're doing that for the power and survival of the state--so we can be the uberman of the world. Khalilizhad yo)

 

On the issue of ethics and values--framing in terms of how we come to those values or how we apply them--because both sides inevitably appeal to values and ethics.

 

On the issue of will to power--i'm curious if you can frame the debate over the push toward both criticism and transparency, rather than a philosophy that encourages conflict.

Edited by nathan_debate

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Dude...first you only dealt with 2 of the arguments. Just saying...

 

You're criticism was that it was intuition--you don't have an impact.

Also. Nietzsche is a romantic and driven by intuition (as opposed to reason).

 

Consumer capitalism is driven by the egoistic values--most all the pain, suffering, violence and anti-freedom is a result is a crushing of creativity.

 

You have to have some degree of order for creativity to function. If all that is happening is flight or flight--not much creativity going on. Thats from the author of Flow.

 

You may be right on chaos theory--but I haven't done any research on that issue. I'm just saying where

 

You said:

>>>Nietzsche just assumed chaos in the universe lead to no rules--I'm suggesting their are rules and the universe is ordered. This is probably the single most vulnerable part of Nietzsche's argument.

those “beasts of postmodernism” have wrought. Illegitimacy, divorce, crime, drug use, functional illiteracy, welfare dependency, and other negative social indicators have all increased in the last few decades, most of them dramatically.

That is my favorite part about that card. Go ahead, respond to Nietzsche with "YOU MAKE PEOPLE SMOKE POT!" The lets be victorians response haha.

 

Hardly my argument. Smoke pot as you like as long as you don't hurt or kill anyone. Also, the above is a net turn to freedom and creativity.

 

And your cartoon is name calling and conjecture at best.

Edited by nathan_debate

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Herbert Dreyphus a professor of philosophy at Berkeley and an author on Heidegger and Nietzsche says your wrong. Thats my only contention.

 

Dude--it reads more like a poem than a legal argument--just calling a spade a spade.

 

Be like the skeptic and creative Socrates and use the letter of the law against itself.

(sorry don't have the Zizek letter of the law evidence on me)

Edited by nathan_debate

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>>>What is the relation between post modernism and murder? Yea, the "better" society you seem to conclude also had un told violence against women, child labor, and rampant racism?

 

Fair enough, but I bet if we had crime statistics as a function of time over history from the 1930s on to 2009 that the net # of crimes goes up.

 

Second, ethics at least gives us a language to talk about those claims in terms of human rights.

 

Third, given the above--you can use the letter of the law against itself. MLK and womyns rights proves. Also those are the preconditions for your K.

 

Fourth, the root cause of what most everyone would agree are our core 3 problems are egoism: a) health care B) environment/tragedy of the commons c) corruption and selfishness that caused the economic downturn.

 

Fifth, you can make new meaning--without destroying the core of moral values.

 

>>The willingness to stand in solitude, to face what Nietzsche calls the "abyss" of human thought to date (14) >>and, rather than succumbing to its persistent nihilism, to erect new edifices or even worlds of >>meaning--this uncompromising self-making alone is what should command respect.

http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-30377877_ITM

 

What happened to who cares about violence?

Edited by nathan_debate

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are you kidding me? R-r-really? Like, Nietzsche has passages wherein he praises logic, and praises intuition. The two are only mutually exclusive in a world wherein the affirmative makes them exclusive.

 

So either Nietzsche was off his rocker(probable)

Or they aren't mutually exclusive, at least not in the sense that he was talking about.(Very likely.)

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I'm not entirely sure what Dreyfus is saying. But fair enough he values reason and intuition.

 

I don't think they are condractory necessarily--but if you do:

http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/grd/resguides/nietzsche/understanding.html

 

>>Consequently, any interpretation of Nietzsche needs to confront the problem of Nietzsche’s many contradictory views.

 

Also,

 

>>The French Nietzscheans, e.g., Foucault, Derrida, Kofman, Deleuze, and their followers, by contrast, tend to resist this effort to unify his thought, arguing that Nietzsche’s shifting meanings and contradictions resist systematization.

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I'm not entirely sure what Dreyfus is saying. But fair enough he values reason and intuition.

 

I don't think they are contradictory necessarily--but if you do:

http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/grd/resguides/nietzsche/understanding.html

 

>>Consequently, any interpretation of Nietzsche needs to confront the problem of Nietzsche’s many contradictory views.

 

Also,

 

>>The French Nietzscheans, e.g., Foucault, Derrida, Kofman, Deleuze, and their followers, by contrast, tend to resist this effort to unify his thought, arguing that Nietzsche’s shifting meanings and contradictions resist systematization.

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Why do human rights matter?

Dignity.

 

Why is violence bad?

Suffering.

Violence can escalate to death.

 

Also, both lack of violence and human rights make it easier to be creative, instead of focusing energy and resources on survival needs.

 

I don't understand why be socrates vs. be nietzsche makes the most sense.

 

I forgot that the link to egoism/selfishness = capitalism was idolization of greed, materialism, money, and power. That internal link turns the argument. Also, the net result is unfreedom--because commodified choices are a rigged game.

Edited by nathan_debate

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I'm trying to summarize Nietzsche's argument:

 

-no purpose in the world/no purpose to life

-create purpose and meaning

-animal instinct good (?)/ overman argument [self-over coming +self-mastery bad]

-suffering good (=growth)

-pity bad (multiple args)

-criticism of christian morality as being anti-life/slave morality creates oppression/ ressentiment

-will to power = truth + other power good arguments

 

-altruism is a slaver morality of unfreedom

-avoid convention and conformity (BGE 212)--good phil. avoid the philosophies of their time.

-"good" philosophers live weirdly, like rogues

-isolation trumps herd morality

-can make the argument that political/educational institutions are bad because they create singularity instead of individuality (Nietzsche and the Political) due to focus on anonymity and efficiency.

-Also the decadence and corruption of late modernity corrupts institutions

-moral perfectionism good--creates meaning for citizenry (?) (become what you are)

-shame creates better philosophers (humans?)/fortified soul good (SE 6)

-pick only moral obligations that will perfect ones character/personal moral obligations good (doing "right" can help with self-preservation, power, and individual character)

-your soul and your ethics = treasure (quite valuable)

-personal conflict (w/ friends) can help create moral perfectionism

-romanticism

-perhaps the perm argument: must say yes or no to all life (probably cross apply suffering good, pity bad, power good)

 

-the role of creative destruction/struggle and growth and ethics

-self-overcoming creates new self

-be original/style to ones character/create oneself anew/selfexperimentation/create own destiny

 

-self-overcoming = apollonian, but also dionyesian

-criticizes voluntary self-improvement

-fatum (fate) in personality

Edited by nathan_debate

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Note: I can only take credit for the first card and I did add the Ketels card in, the rest are John Turner--from the "backfiles" section of PD. You may also want to check out the 5 or so other Nietzsche bad cards in the this discussion thread.

 

History proves--rejection of Nietzsche's values critical to freedom and creativity. Morality critical to human flourishing, creativity, and achievement. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/#4, downloaded: 08/02/09)

 

Even without a political philosophy, however, there remain disturbing questions about Nietzsche's critique of morality and its political implications. For example, when Nietzsche objects that morality is an obstacle to “the highest power and splendor possible” to man, one is tempted to object that this gets things perversely backwards. For surely it is the lack of morality in social policy and public institutions — a lack which permits widespread poverty and despair to persist generation upon generation; that allows daily economic struggle and uncertainty to define the basic character of most people's lives — that is most responsible for a lack of human flourishing. Surely, in a more moral society, with a genuine commitment to social justice and human equality, there would be far more Goethes, far more creativity and admirable human achievement. As Philippa Foot has sharply put it: “How could one see the present dangers that the world is in as showing that there is too much pity and too little egoism around?” (1973, p. 168).

 

this article may be informative, without any cards--plus some args might contract the perm)

Nussbaum, Martha. 1997. “Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5: 1-13.

 

Struggle to protect humanity critical to avoid death of the human spirite and extinction. Questioning humanistic values ensures the repitition of the holocaust and the annihilation of the planet Ketels 96’

Violet B. Ketels, associate professor of English at Temple University, where she formerly directed the Intellectual

Heritage Program, “REMEMBERING FOR THE FUTURE: "Havel to the Castle!" The Power of the Word”.

November 1996.

Even though, as Americans, we have not experienced "by fire, hunger and the sword" 19 the terrible disasters

in war overtaking other human beings on their home ground, we know the consequences of human

hospitality to evil. We know about human perfidy: the chasm that separates proclaiming virtue from acting

decently. Even those of us trained to linguistic skepticism and the relativity of moral judgment can grasp the

verity in the stark warning, "If something exists in one place, it will exist everywhere." 20 That the dreadful

something warned against continues to exist anywhere should fill us with an inextinguishable yearning to do

something. Our impotence to action against the brutality of mass slaughter shames us. We have the historical

record to ransack for precedent and corollaries--letters, documents, testaments, books--written words that

would even "preserve their validity in the eyes of a man threatened with instant death." 21 The truths

gleanable from the record of totalitarian barbarism cited in them may be common knowledge; they are by

no means commonly acknowledged. 22 They appear in print upon many a page; they have not yet--still not

yet--sufficiently penetrated human consciousness. Herein lies the supreme lesson for intellectuals, those who

have the projective power to grasp what is not yet evident to the general human consciousness: it is possible to

bring down totalitarian regimes either by violence or by a gradual transformation of human consciousness;

it is not possible to bring them down "if we ignore them, make excuses for them, yield to them or accept their way of playing the game" 23 in order to avoid violence. The history of the gentle revolutions of Poland, Hungary, and [*51] Czechoslovakia suggests that those revolutions would not have happened at all, and certainly not bloodlessly, without the moral engagement and political activism of intellectuals in those besieged cultures. Hundreds of thousands of students, workers, and peasants joined in the final efforts to defeat the totalitarian regimes that collapsed in 1989. Still, it was the intellectuals, during decades when they repeatedly risked careers, freedom, and their very lives, often in dangerous solitary challenges to power, who formed the unifying consensus, developed the liberating philosophy, wrote the rallying cries, framed the politics, mobilized the will and energies of disparate groups, and literally took to the streets to lead nonviolent protests that became revolutions. The most profound insights into this process that gradually penetrated social consciousness sufficiently to make revolution possible can be read in the role Vaclav Havel played before and during Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution. As George Steiner reflects, while "the mystery of creative and analytic genius . . . is given to the very few," others can be "woken to its presence and exposed to its demands." 24 Havel possesses that rare creative and analytic genius. We see it in the spaciousness of his moral vision for the future,

distilled from the crucible of personal suffering and observation; in his poet's ability to translate both experience

and vision into language that comes as close as possible to truth and survives translation across cultures; in the

compelling force of his personal heroism. Characteristically, Havel raises local experience to universal relevance.

"If today's planetary civilization has any hope of survival," he begins, "that hope lies chiefly in what we understand as the human spirit." He continues: If we don't wish to destroy ourselves in national, religious

or political discord; if we don't wish to find our world with twice its current population, half of it dying of

hunger; if we don't wish to kill ourselves with ballistic missiles armed with atomic warheads or eliminate ourselves with bacteria specially cultivated for the purpose; if we don't wish to see some people go desperately hungry while others throw tons of wheat into the ocean; if we don't wish to suffocate in the global greenhouse we are heating up for ourselves or to be burned by radiation leaking through holes we have made in the ozone; if we don't wish to exhaust the nonrenewable, mineral resources of this planet, without which we cannot survive; if, in short, we don't wish any of this to happen, then we must--as humanity, as people, as conscious beings with spirit, mind and a sense of responsibility--somehow come to our senses. 25 Somehow we must come together in "a kind of general mobilization of human consciousness, of the human mind and spirit, human responsibility, human reason." 26

 

Nietzsche's philosophy results in rape and domination, which impact turns his alternative--and indicts its core values.

Ross in 2003 (Kelly Ross, philosophy at Los Angeles Valley College, 2003 (http://www.friesian.com/nietzsch.htm)

 

A great part of the pleasure that we get, according to Nietzsche, from injustice to others is simply the pleasure of inflicting suffering. In this it is worth recollecting the feminist shibboleth that rape is not about sex, it is about power. Nietzsche would heartily concur. So much the better! And what is more, the value of rape is not just power, it is the chance to cruelly inflict suffering. The rapist who beats and mutilates, perhaps even kills, his victim, has done no evil, he is instead one of the heroes of true historic nobility. And people think that the droit de seigneur represents some "abuse" of power! No! It is the truly noble man as heroic rapist! Nietzsche would turn around Susan Brownmiller, who said that all men are rapists. No, it is just the problem that they are not. Nietzsche would regard most men as virtual castrati (domestic oxen, geldings) for not being rapists.

 

(this is from a huge card about nazism)

 

Nietzsche’s philosophy inherently favors the fascist ethos

Jacob Golomb, professor of philosophy at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Robert S. Wistrich Neuberger Professor of Modern European and Jewish History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 2k1

(“Nietzsche’s Politics, Fascism, and the Jews.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies. V.30. p.305-321.)

Nietzsche was clearly an elitist who believed in the right to rule of a “good and healthy aristocracy”, one which would if necessary, be ready to sacrifice untold numbers of human beings; he sometimes wrote as if nations primarily existed for the sake of producing a few “great men”, who could not be expected to show consideration for “normal humanity”. Not suprisingly, in the light of the cruel century which has just ended, one is bound to regard such statements with grave misgivings. From Mussolini and Hitler to Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein, the last 80 years have been riddled with so-called political geniuses, imagining that they were “beyond good and evil” and free of any moral constraints. One has to ask if there is not something in Nietzsche’s philosophy with its uninhibited cultivation of a heroic individualism and the will-to power, which may have tended to favor the fascist ethos. Musssolini, for example, raised the Nietzschean formulation “live dangerously” (vivipericolosamente) to the status of a fascist slogan. His reading of Nietzsche was one factor in converting him from Marxism to a philosophy of sacrifice and warlike deeds in defense of the fatherland. In this mutation, Mussolini was preceded by Gabriele d’Annunzio, whose passage from aestheticism to the political activism of a new more virile and warlike age, was greatly influenced by Nietzsche. Equally, there were other representatives of the First World War generation, like the radical German nationalist writer, Ernst Jünger, who would find in Nietzsche’s writings a legitimization of the warrior ethos.

 

(file has 2 more of these cards)

 

PERM: DO THE PLAN AND ALL PARTS OF THE ALT THAT AREN’T “VOTE NEG”

 

NIETZSCHE ADVOCATES A COMBINATION OF OUR NORMATIVE DESIRES AND CREATIVE FREEDOM- PESSIMISTIC NIHILISM LEADS TO ORGIASTIC SELF-ANHILIATION. OUR LIBERALISM IS NOT A SLAVE MORALITY, RATHER IT SERVES AS A THE ONLY CHECK AGAINST OVERBEARING TYRANNY. Hatab in 2002

Lawrence J. Hatab “Prospects For A Democratic Agon: 
Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24, 2002 132-147

It is a mistake, however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-creation. First of all, even Nietzsche's early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an anti- or extra-political gesture. In BT 21, Nietzsche insists that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the former is specifically connected with the political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward "ecstatic brooding" and "orgiastic self-annihilation."

Those who read Nietzsche as resisting "normalization" and "discipline" (this includes most postmodern readings and Appel's as well ), are not on very firm ground either. For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders, because universal unrestricted freedom would cause havoc. Moreover, even selective creative freedom is not an abandonment of order and constraint. Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones. Shaping new forms requires formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of production. Accordingly, creativity is a kind of "dancing in chains" (WS 140). Creative freedom, then, is not an abandonment of constraint, but a disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures from the norm.

Those who take Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of GM II,11, where Nietzsche offers some interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable conceptions of justice and injustice are established by the historical force of human law. Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish infirmities. Legal arrangements are "exceptional conditions" that modulate natural forces of power in [End Page 136] social directions, and that are not an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes. Surprisingly, Nietzsche attributes the historical emergence of law not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that check and redirect the "senseless raging of revenge," and that are able to reconfigure offenses as more "impersonal" violations of legal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries. Here Nietzsche analyzes the law in a way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for destruction. A legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and more productive directions.

Finally, those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator should heed TI ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 39), where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a repudiation of institutions as a form of decadence. Because of our modern faith in a foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and modes of authority that healthy institutions require.

The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its "modern spirit" so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end.

In the light of these remarks, a Nietzschean emphasis on power and agonistics offers significant advantages for political philosophy. In some respects we are freed from the modern project of "justifying" the force of social institutions because of a stipulated freedom from constraint in the "state of nature." With a primal conception of power(s), we can retrieve an Aristotelian take on social institutions as fitting and productive of human existence. Forces of law need not be seen as alien to the self, but as modulations of a ubiquitous array of forces within which human beings can locate relative spheres of freedom. And an agonistic conception of political activity need not be taken as a corruption or degradation of an idealized order of political principles or social virtues. Our own tradition of the separation of powers and an adversarial legal system can be taken as a baseline conception of the nature, function, and proper operation of government offices and judicial practice. The founders of the Constitution inherited from Montesquieu the idea that a division of powers is the best check on tyranny. In other words, tyranny is avoided not by some project of harmony, but by multiplying the number of power sites in a government and affirming their competition through mutual self-assertion [End Page 137] and mistrust. 16 Our common law tradition is agonistic in both conception and practice. Most procedural rules are built around the idea of coequal competition in open court before a jury who will decide the outcome, where the judge in most respects plays the role of an impartial referee. And the presumption of innocence is fundamentally meant to contest the government's power to prosecute and punish. 17 I think that both notions of separation of powers and legal adversarialism are compatible with Nietzsche's analysis of the law noted previously—that a legal order is not a means of preventing struggle, but "a means in the struggle between power-complexes" (GM II,11).

 

 

THE AFF ADVOCATES AN EMPATHETIC APPROACH TOWARDS AID. THE CLAIM THAT “ALL FORMS OF MORALITY ARE PURLY RESSENTIMENT” IS JUST AN EXCUSE NOT TO DEAL WITH MORE COMPLEX VERSIONS OF MORALITY. A 100% SHIFT TO COLD STOCISM IS IMPOSSIBLE, ONLY THE AFF PROVIDES THE VIABLE MIDDLE GROUND. Stocker in 2002

 

Susan S. Stocker, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Goucher College, “Scientific Contribution: Facing disability with resources from Aristotle and Nietzsche” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5: 137–146, 2002.

 

Many of us are familiar with the experience of how when we lose a friend or family member to death, some people can easily console us over our loss, whereas others evidently feel awkward or even paralyzed about what to say. So they avoid us or else the topic of our loss. The same pattern occurs with serious or chronic illness. In some people one discovers new depths of understanding and a ready compassion that enlarges both of us while others cannot find a way to enter into the situation comfortably. Visible disability triggers peoples’ fears that they could end up the same way. Consequently, the disabled have to negotiate not just their own but these very real fears of others. Such is our human vulnerability, that disability is one minority anyone might join without a moment’s notice. If my experience is any indication, you can’t count on who will come through with an empathic generative response. This can be because some people have already given you and everyone else too much of them- selves. When someone is either not inclined or else already overtaxed, the other’s needs look and feel like a demand, an enforced requirement of morality, rather than an enlargement of our own sphere, the way empathy is. This matters because, as Amélie Rorty observes, “ethics without psychology is science fiction.” Psychologist Judith Jordan points out that self-boundaries must be intact, neither too rigid nor too diffuse, to be able to experience empathy. If too rigid, the other person’s experience remains rather remote. But if self-boundaries are too diffuse, there can be an “uncontained merging” or the other is used as “a narcissistic extension of self.” Upon hearing that one is facing illness, these people are fearful that they will be “drawn in.” This is because they rightly feel that their own resources are already taxed to the limit. Others, whose boundaries are intact, can respond with a healthy empathic engagement. I innocently asked one friend, whom I now know was evidencing the classic symptoms of co- dependence (only feeling comfortable when giving, anticipates your every need) to pick up something for me from a location I knew she was going to. When she brought it by, I asked what I could do for her. With some heat, she replied, “you can take care of yourself, so that I don’t have to.” I was stung by her words. I imagined saying things like, I’ve always been so supportive of you, why can’t you help me when I really need it? Initially I was angry and disappointed. But our illnesses or conditions do not create these situations; they simply reveal them for what they are. It is futile to seek for help here. In fact, it is a mark of mental health not even to try, to accept the limits of the situation and be grateful for having seen these constraints, not to resent them. Thank you, Nietzsche. It took me awhile but I finally figured out that on those occasions when I saw this person, when asked how I was doing, I could say, “not so good, but there is nothing you can do about it.” This freed us both to have what we could have together. In fact, there is no one on whom you can always count. So there’s a skill needed here, to discern on whom one may rely at any given time. To accept the situation for what it is, is expressive of a Nietzschean sensibility, which frames the situation from a realistically protective stance. Nietzsche’s own ill health – among other symptoms, he frequently suffered debilitating hallucinatory migraines – clearly had an appreciable influence on his philosophy. The external good of health, once lost, had to be interpreted as what really was not his “own.” This turn towards a fresh evaluation of what one really needs in order to make life worthwhile is characteristic of those facing disability. It is immensely life-affirming to let go of one’s imperiled expectations for near-perfect or even “normal” embodiment. However, his Stoicism overshoots the mark. No matter how much mind control we muster, we cannot make ourselves as invulnerable to external goods as all this. I also worry that Nietzsche’s Stoicism delegitimizes all moral indignation as life-denying reactive ressentiment, for this can also be just a fancy escape route from uncomfortable moral claims. Moreover, definitional intrusion is not the only thing to which we are vulnerable. We are also vulnerable to indifference, neglect, and disconnection; some- times we need others and when we do and when genuine mutuality is possible, I can think of nothing more generative and enlarging. This is what I mean when I say that ethical thinking is actuated by particular conceptions of vulnerability. We are not always the solitary Stoic souls Nietzsche envisions. But neither can we always count on empathic connection. When we find ourselves among people who cannot or will not take up our own good as our own, Nietzsche teaches us that we can preserve as an emotional and moral option our sufficiency unto ourselves, free of either a malingering self-pity or a hankering for pity from others.

Aristotle teaches us that friendships and other relationships where others are able to take up our own good as their own are needful – both emotionally and as an indication of moral engagement. Empathic connection is empowering for both parties. Whenever this happens, as Jordan puts it, there is both an affirmation and a transcendence of the self, “a sense of the self as part of a larger relational unit.” 30 With those friends and family members who came through for me, we are closer than ever. Aristotle observes that significant losses deserve our empathy and then distinguishes between those reverses that the virtuous person would nonetheless face with the greatest equanimity and those that are so severe as to ruin the happiness of even the best person. If the reverses are severe enough, they may even threaten our virtue. In these cases, we can learn from Sherlock Holmes, for he is both empathic and graciously lenient with good people whose circumstances have conspired to press them into despicable acts in response to venality. For him, nothing is so blameworthy as those whose vices imperil the virtue of others. Having both Aristotle and Nietzsche in our repertoire allows us to respond to the variousness of situations in a morally attuned life-affirming way. When empathic enlargement is available, we can respond joyfully. When it is not available, we can respond with the vitality of what is our own, with strength and without seeking pity.

 

 

ONLY THE AFF TAKES US DOWN A DEEPLY PERSONAL JOURNEY DOWN A PATH TOWARDS TRUE EMPATHY FOR THE OTHER, WHICH IS A PREREQUISITE TO EMPOWERMENT. THE COMBINATION OF EMPATHY AND THE DENIAL OF PITY SOLVES FOR THE DAILY, DEHUMANIZING DISRESPECT THAT DOCTORS GIVE TO PATIENTS IN CURRENT MEDICAL PRACTICES. Stocker in 2002

 

Susan S. Stocker, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Goucher College, “Scientific Contribution: Facing disability with resources from Aristotle and Nietzsche” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5: 137–146, 2002.

 

James Baldwin states that we must both accept injustices as commonplace and fight them with all our strength. To Aristotle, suffering unjustly calls forth our empathy; for Nietzsche, it calls forth our acceptance of what is and our refusal to be pitied. Whereas empathy can be for both parties ennobling, pity is enfeebling. Those of us who are dealing with illness or disability become especially attuned to the difference between a pity that is given or sought out of a demoralized ressentiment and a generative empathy that genuinely takes up the other’s good as one’s own. Relational issues are never felt so acutely as when one’s physical health or embodiment is threatened. The usual able-bodied assumptions are that life is really only for the well, and that disability couldn’t happen to me. What happens when sudden disability strikes? Following the initial denial, there is often a period of self-pity, for one’s future horizons feel jeopardized. We have falsely assumed something is “our own,” which is not any longer; that illusory sense of control over one’s world is dashed. Adaptation involves getting past our resistance to the truth of our own vulnerability. With support and adjustment, we learn from Nietzsche that maybe bodily integrity is not as all-important as we thought. In the rehab hospitals I went to, there were images displayed everywhere depicting people who have “overcome” various disabilities, such as amputees riding motorcycles, climbers or runners with mechanical feet or knees. But to get to this point, I believe we need empathy from others and self-empathy for the difficulties involved. The achievement of empathic connections helps patients to move past their sense both of isolation and of self-pity, which is what enables them to shun the colonizing pity that might be directed towards them. That is, because we are vulnerable both to isolation and to definitional intrusion, we can benefit from what both Aristotle and Nietzsche have to teach us, even though they fundamentally disagree, even about whether there are common goods. Whereas Nietzsche’s dismissal of common goods is expressive of our independence from others’ opinions, Aristotle’s affirmation of common goods bespeaks our need for friendships. Nietzsche teaches us how to face tragedy by plumbing our self- sufficiency; Aristotle teaches us the importance of connection. Life, it seems, usually affords us both opportunities. In rotating between these two moral schemes, I am implementing Amélie Rorty’s insight that different moral frameworks should be used as “checks-and-balances” for each other. Finally, what are the implications of all this for medical practitioners? In general, I am advocating that medical practitioners participate in this kind of ethically engaged “checks-and-balances” in their dealings with patients. They need strong enough self- boundaries to refuse pity; they need strong enough self-boundaries to welcome empathic engagement. To cultivate in medical practitioners such a psychologically informed approach to ethics, I suspect that we need to use pedagogical methods for teaching medical students that are very different from those that seem to work well for insisting on mastery of scientific material. As a philosophy professor, my own medical crisis brought home for me how teaching theoretical ethics (on which students can be tested for their mastery) is not the same thing as cultivating moral voice or empowering moral agency. This is because morality is not simply a cognitive achievement, the way it has traditionally been framed. We need to know how, as Aristotle puts it, both to think and to feel in the right way, at the right time, in the right amount, and towards the right person. This involves the avoidance of demeaning pity, while being morally present to patients both cognitively and affectively. Such an ethic can also be explored through stories – the stories of people who know the role of the patient from the inside. Jody Heymann, for instance, wrote a lovely illness memoir in which she describes how she graduated from Harvard Medical School one week and then found herself in the ICU the next week, having bled into her brain. All she remembers is having gone to sleep next to her husband. The next thing she knows, she is unable to move because she is strapped down to a table in a brightly-lit room with strange men milling about. She calls for her husband but at first no one responds. She assumes that he, too, has been kidnapped. After a long period of sheer terror, she calls out so loudly that a doctor comes over and tells her he’s not here. Finally, after still more calling, one agrees to bring him in. When he is brought in to visit with her, her husband is the one who tells her where she is and what has happened to her. In her book, Equal Partners: A Physician’s Call for a New Spirit of Medicine, she writes, This book is not the story of exceptional transgressions. Rather, it tells stories of doctors’ daily denials that patients are equals and of routine actions that regularly cause patients’ care to suffer ...Many of the insults are small – doctors not giving local anesthesia for temporarily painful procedures or nurses not calling a doctor when a hospitalized patient grows sicker and asks to be seen – but taken together, these regular wrongs are a stronger indictment of our current system than the less frequent acts of malpractice or rare acts of malevolence. 31 This paper attempts to redress these “regular wrongs” of medical practice by adding psychology to ethics, that is, by disclosing something of the lived psychology behind our responses. Heymann goes on pointedly to say, Doctors give all sorts of reasons for not honestly and fully apprising patients and their families, whether about the side affects of medications or the complications they may have from surgery. Some physicians do not understand how patients can be equal partners when patients know less about microbiology, physiology, and pharmacology. It does not occur to them that they know less than patients about what disease symptoms are like, how to live with chronic illness or medical treatments, how to survive acute life-threatening illnesses or injuries, how disease affects work and families, what values patients weigh in making choices, and many other aspects of living with illness and acute chronic conditions. 32 Patients know. Stories provide more than a background in theoretical ethics. They provide a practical way to explore the nuanced interplay between a mutual celebration of empathy that connects and a life-affirming refusal of a pity that undermines. Moral agency in medical practitioners can be fostered both by profoundly listening to patients’ experiences and by reading their first-person literature, the so-called genre of “autopathography.” 32 In this literature the themes of empathy vs. pity are vividly played out; their narrative accounts report the disconnection and definitional intrusion to which we are all vulnerable. Oedipus was able to solve the previously impenetrable riddle of the Sphinx precisely because he walked with a staff. Similarly, the experience of the disabled can provide insight for the non-disabled, particularly those who have the privilege and responsibility of working with them.

 

AT: State link

 

Nietzsche endorses state action to preserve individual autonomy. Golomb in 2001

Jacob Golomb, professor of philosophy at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Robert S. Wistrich Neuberger Professor of Modern European and Jewish History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 2k1

(“Nietzsche’s Politics, Fascism, and the Jews.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies. V.30. p.305-321)

However, once this legitimate (and “natural”) creation changes its nature and becomes a manifestation of extreme nationalism that seeks to hinder free and spontaneous creativity - Nietzsche vehemently opposes it and wishes to curb its destructive effects. He rejected the totalitarian state which functions as “a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine” (GM II 17) and called such a totalitarian State (perhaps under Hobbes’ influence) “das kälteste aller kalten Ungeheuer” (“the coldest of all cold monsters”) (Za I, Vom neuen Götzen, KSA 4, p. 61). However, when the state is enlisted to serve the interests of the individual person who is its only raison detre, its focus and end in order to shape and form cultural identity and personal authenticity, then it becomes a “wonderful means”.

 

 

The State which is conducive to life’s aspirations is a vital element in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Golmb in 2001

Jacob Golomb, professor of philosophy at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Robert S. Wistrich Neuberger Professor of Modern European and Jewish History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 2k1

(“Nietzsche’s Politics, Fascism, and the Jews.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies. V.30. p.305-321)

Nietzsche abhored the state only and insofar as it becomes a goal in itself and thereby ceases to function as a means among other means for the sake of advancement and education of the autonomous and creative human beings. Thus, for example, in a series of his lectures “Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten” (from 1872) Nietzsche claimed that that the modern national State demands the expansion of educational institutions. However, the highest aim of education is not the “man in himself” but something external to him, the State: its prosperity and security (BA 1, KSA 1, pp. 651-671). Also in his lectures about “Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen” from the same period, Nietzsche sought to present before the young generation, as an heuristic and viable ideal, the culture of the ancient Greek polis instead of the prevalent ideal of the nationalistic State. Nietzsche brings forward such examples as the “ancient Greek polis or Venice” (BGE 262, KSA 5, p. 214), and in another place (GM I 16) he refers to the historical examples of Rome and Renaissance - cultural patterns that never made national supremacy the cornerstone of their ideals or regarded the origin of its citizens as an a priori mark of creativity or superiority. On the other hand, there is nothing in his writings to prove that he objected in principle to “the political organization” of statehood insofar as it did not become an oppressing Leviathan that repressed genuine culture and authentic patterns of behaviour and thought.

In our view, due to reasons inherent in his general philosophy, Nietzsche could not reject the national-political social framework since it too was one of the legitimate (and even vital) manifestations of human spirit and its creative power (Macht). This exactly is what he claimed in chapter 26 in The Antichrist where he contrasts the unnatural “kingdom of God” and its “Jewish priesthood” and their “moral world order” to the Kingdom of Men and to its “often very bold figures in the history of Israel”. After drawing this contrast, Nietzsche refers to the “state” and to “judicial order, marriage, care of the sick and the poor” as a “natural custom … natural institution” that is “inspired by the instinct of life”.23 Since life and its and enhancement are the highest values in

Nietzsche’s teaching, the state which is conducive to life’s aspirations is a vital element in Nietzsche’s philosophy.

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This should work really well with the card from Standford University.

 

Your alternative can never solve and moves in the wrong direction.

 

We control the direction of the link--poverty and security both turn your alt.—only hope for creativity is voting affirmative. That’s the precondition for innovation and individualism—which makes up the negative’s decision calculus. Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96

 

(Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, professor in psychology at the University of Chicago, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p. 345)

But often the obstacles are internal. In a person concerned with protecting his or her self, practically all attention is invested in monitoring threats to ego. This defensiveness may have very understandable causes: Children who have been abused or who have experience chronic hunger or discrimination are less likely to be curious and interested in novelty for its own sake, because they need all the psychic energy they have simply to survive. Taken to the extreme, a sense of being vulnerable results in the form of neurosis known as paranoia, where everything happens is interpreted as a threatening conspiracy against the self. A paranoid tendency is on obstacle to the free deployment of mental energy. The person who suffers from it usually cannot afford to become interested in the world from an objective, impartial viewpoint, and therefore is unable to learn much that is new.

 

 

Selfishness is predictable and so very 200 BC--Excessive selfishness and egoism destroy creativity. Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96

(Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, professor in psychology at the University of Chicago, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p. 346)

It is difficult to approach the world creativity when one is hungry or shivering from cold, because then all of one’s mental energy is focused on securing the necessities one lacks. And it is equally difficult when a person is rich and famous but devote all of his or her energies to let go and divert some attention from the pursuit of predictable goals that genes and memes have programmed in our minds and use it instead to explore the world around us on its own terms.

Excessive or unchecked power and dominance doesn’t solve for creativity—only the affirmative can solve. Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96

(Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, professor in psychology at the University of Chicago, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p. 70-71)

 

This tendency toward androgyny is sometimes understood in purely sexual terms, and therefore it gets confused with homosexuality. But psychological androgyny is a much wider concept, referring to a person’s ability to be at the same time aggressive and nurturant, sensitive and rigid, dominant and submissive, regardless of gender. A psychologically androgynous person in effect double his or her repertoire of responses and can interact with the world in terms of a much richer and varied spectrum of opportunities. It is not surprising that creative individuals are more lively to have not only the strengths of their own gender but those of the other too.

 

 

PERM-Mere rebellion not enough--Traditionalism is the precondition of creativity. Only the permutation can solve your impact calc/ alternative. Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96

(Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, professor in psychology at the University of Chicago, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, )

 

Generally, creative people are thought to be rebellious and independent. Yet it is impossible to be creative without having first internalized a domain of culture. And a person must believe in the importance of such a domain in order to learn its rules; hence, he or she must be to a certain extent a traditionalist. So it is difficult to see how a person can be creative without being both traditional and conservative and at the same time rebellious and iconoclastic. Being only traditional leaves the domain unchanged; constantly taking chances without regard to what has been valued in the past rarely leads to novelty that is accepted as an improvement. The artist Eva Zeisel, who says that the folk tradition in which she works is ‘her home,’ nevertheless produced ceramics that were recognized by the Museum of Modern Art as masterpieces of contemporary design.

 

Hyperindividualistic creativity doesn't solve. Creativity should be accountable to democracy. Csikszentmihalyi in '96

(Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, professor in psychology at the University of Chicago, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, )

Yet, as we have seen earlier, we cannot ignore evolution. The culture that survives to direct the future of the planet will be one that encourages as much creativity as possible but also finds ways to choose novelty on the basis of the future well-being of the whole, not just separate fields. What is needed is a self-conscious effort to establish priorities and to use something like an "evolutionary impact analysis" as one of the bases for the social endorsement of new ideas.

A policy of this type should not result in any kind of philistine thought-policing. Artists should be encouraged to follow their muse, scientist should be respected for following a hunch wherever it leads them. On the other hand, why expect society to support novelties that are valued within the field but may harm the common wealth?

The greatest art, East or West, was not produced when the artists set the agenda, but when patrons insisted on certain standards that benefited them. Patrons wanted primarily to be admired by the public, so the art they demanded had to appeal to and impress the entire community. In this sense, medieval and Renaissance art, comissioned by popes and princes, was in reality more democratic than it has become since the art world gained the power to separate itself from the rest of society--as a field with its own peculiar tastes and criterion of selection.

Struggle to protect humanity and future generations--Creativity must be directed for survival--the precondition of your impact calc.

Csikszentmihalyi in '96

(Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, professor in psychology at the University of Chicago, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p.326)

For billions of years, evolution has proceeded blindly, shaped by random selective forces. We were created by chance. Now, however humans have beomce one of the most powerful, and therefore most dangerous, forces operating on the planet. Therefore, if we wish evolution to continue in a way that corresponds whith our interest, we must find ways to direct it. And this involves developing mechanisms for monitoring new memes, so that we can reject those that are likely to be harmful in the long run and encourage alternatives that are more promising.

 

Unchecked power creates a new idol and crushes creativity

Csikszentmihalyi in '96

(Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, professor in psychology at the University of Chicago, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p.336-337)

For many centuries European science, and knowledge in general, was recorded in Latin--a language that no one spoke any longer and that had to be learned in schools. Very few individuals, probably less than 1 percent, had the means to study Latin enough to read books in that lanaugage and therefore to participate in the intellectual discourse of the times. Moreover, few people had access to books, which were handwritten, scarce, and expensive. The great explosion of scientific creativity in Europe was certainly helped by the sudden spread of information brought about by Gutenberg's use of movable type in printing and by the legitimation of everyday languages, which rapidly replaced Latin as the medium of discouse. In sixteenth-century Europe it became much easier to make a creative contribution not necessarily because more creative individuals were born then than in previous centuries or because social supports became more favorable, but because information became more widely accessible and easier to add to.

The historical example is just one of many that have influenced the rate of creativity at different times. Often intellectual or power elites hide their knowledge on purpose, to keep to themselves the advantages that go with the information. To accomplish this they develop arcane languages, mysterious symbols, and secret codes that are meaningless to those not initiated into the guild. The priestly castes of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the Chinese bureaucrats, the clerical hierarchies of Europe were not particularly interested in sharing their knowledge with all comers. Thus they were not motivated to make the representation of their knowledge transparent.

Some of this desire for exclusive control or knowledge survives. And even those who have the most selfless and democratic views about the information they control often unwittingly make what they know inaccessible by using a lauguage, style, or a method of exposition that a layperson cannot understand. Sometimes such obsurantism is inevitable, but often it is an unneccessary habit left over from the past, or a shortcut that makes one's thoughts more accessible to the initiated while putting them out of anyone else's reach.

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Compassion is critical to stopping atrocities like the Holocaust—their denial of humanist intervention authorizes genocide. Ketels in 96

Violet B. Ketels, associate professor of English at Temple University, in 1996

[“The Holocaust: Remembering for the Future: ‘Havel to the Castle!’ The Power of the Word,” The Annals of The

American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, 1996]

 

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined

the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence.

We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the

disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of

the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one

step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of

peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large. 2

In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the

unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem

more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human

experience.

"Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," 3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not

only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of

hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," 4 monstrous progeny

of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that

there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge. 5

Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [*47] humanist soul," 6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we

are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading

as facts." 7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain

power. We are embarrassed by virtue.

Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we

forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and

confront what is wrong here and now.

The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective,

deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. 8

Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to

get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world

or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying.

Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our

sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words

must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition

of cryogenic dubiety?

Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on

linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread

calamity across the planet. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not

merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by

Turks in 1389! 9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and

returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian

people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs.

to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosovo is the Serbianized [*48] history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." 10

 

Agonistic practices would limit out the possibility of authoritarian violence. The overall practice teaches individuals to rid themselves of the traditional notion of democracy and instead, recognize different ideas and notions as equally important. Hatab 2002

(professor at Old Dominion University, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Project Muse)

Assuming that politics should not be restricted and reserved for an elite, but open to the participation of all citizens, can we retain a sense of respect and political rights in appropriating Nietzsche for democracy? I

think so. In fact, Nietzschean conceptions of agonistics and nonfoundational openness can go a long way toward articulating and defending democratic practices without the problems attaching to traditional principles of equality. If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of

others, an agonistic model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of

equality or even something like "equal regard." I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a

fundamentally social phenomenon. Since the self is formed in and through tensional relations with others, then

any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. Radical agonistics, then, discounts the idea of

sheer autonomy and self-constitution. Such a tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of the

Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom. Moreover, the structure of an

agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an

Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able

opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So

I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they

have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair

contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include

active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. 25 In addition,

agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the

question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an

ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression,

pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an

atmosphere of civil political discourse. 26

 

The will to power re-creates the slave morality it intends to criticize – both are attempts to make up for a lack in the self, the only truly ethical action is to view oneself as distinct from the world and view the self as interconnected to all other beings. Loy in '96

Loy prof phil @ Bunkyo U, Japan 1996 (David, “A Buddhist critique of Nietzsche” Asian Philosophy Vol. 6, No. 1, March

http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/loy.htm)

The will-to-power cannot be separated from its sublimation (or 'spiritualisation'), for Nietzsche discovered them together. He

was one of the first classicists to realise that the original Olympic games were a sublimated form of war. Nietzsche contended that Greek

civilisation was noble and sublime precisely because it had been so cruel and bloodthirsty; the 'golden age' was created by bringing this

original ferocity under control. "The thought seems to be: where there is 'the sublime' there must have been that which was made sublime -- sublimated -- after having been for a long time not sublime." [14] Having detected this phenomenon in ancient Greece, Nietzsche began to notice sublimated 'base' impulses in many kinds of activity; for example, Wagner's ferocious will sublimated into the Bayreuth festival. This makes Nietzsche the first, as far as I know, to undertake a systematic study of repression. Nietzsche sees the sublimity of Greek culture as the sublimation of its original ferocity, yet here perhaps the genealogist of morals does not trace his genealogy back far enough. What makes man so ferocious? Can even the will to power, irreducible for Nietzsche, be deconstructed? What, after all, does power mean to us? All power is in essence power to deny mortality. Either that or it is not real power at all, not ultimate power, not the power that mankind is really obsessed with. Power means power to increase oneself, to change one's natural situation from one of smallness, helplessness, finitude, to one of bigness, control, durability, importance. (Becker)

[15] We feel we are masters over life and death when we hold the fate of others in our hands, adds Becker; and we feel we are real when

the reality of others is in our hands, adds Buddhism. From that perspective, however, desire for power is little different from the slave

morality Nietzsche criticises. Both become symptoms of our lack, equally frustrating inasmuch as we are motivated by something that cannot be satisfied in the way we try to satisfy it. No wonder Nietzsche's will-to-power can never rest, that it needs to expand its horizons, and that for most of us morality has been a matter of collecting religious brownie points. In both cases we think that we have found the way to get a grip on our eligibility for immortality -- or being. The whole basis of the urge to

goodness is to be something that has value, that endures... Man uses morality to try to get a place of special belongingness and perpetuation in the universe... Do we wonder why one of man's chief characteristics is his tortured dissatisfaction with himself, his constant self-criticism? It is the only way he has to overcome the sense of hopeless limitation inherent in

his real situation. (Becker) [16] When I realise that I am not going to attain cloture on that diabolical part of myself, it is time to project it. "The Devil is the one who prevents the heroic victory of immortality in each culture -- even the atheistic, scientific ones." [17] As long as lack keeps gnawing, we need to keep struggling with the Devil, and as we all know the best devil is one outside our own group. Evil is whatever we decide is keeping us from becoming real, and since no victory over any external devil can yield the sense of being we seek, we have become trapped in a paradox of our own making: evil is created by our urge to eliminate evil. Stalin's collectivisation programme was an attempt to build a more perfect socialist society.

The Final Solution of the Nazis was an attempt to purify the Earth of its vermin. The Buddhist critique of such ressentiment includes

understanding the self-deception involved in such dualistic thinking, when I identify with one pole and vainly try to eliminate its interdependent other. [18] Buddhism gets beyond good and evil not by rebaptising our evil qualities as our best, but with an entirely different perspective. As long as we experience ourselves as alienated from the world, and society as a set of separate selves, the world is devalued into a field-of-play wherein we compete to fulfill ourselves. That is the origin of the ethical problem we struggle with today: without some transcendental ground such as God, what will bind our atomised selves together? When my

sense-of-self lets-go and disappears, however, I realise my interdependence with all other phenomena. It is more than being

dependent on them: when I discover that I am you, the trace of your traces, the ethical problem of how to relate to you is

transformed. [19] Of course, this provides no simple yardstick to resolve knotty ethical dilemmas. Yet more important, I think, is that

this absolves the sense of separation between us which usually makes those dilemmas so difficult to resolve, including the

conceit that I am the one who has privileged access to transcendental principles, or who embodies more fully the will-topower.

Loss of self-preoccupation entails the ability to respond to others without an ulterior motive which needs to gain something from that encounter. Buddhist ethical principles approximate the way of relating to others that nondual experience reveals. As in Christianity, I should love my neighbour as myself -- in this case because my neighbour is myself. In contrast to the 'Thou shalt not -- or else!' implied in Mosaic law, the Buddhist precepts are vows one makes not to some other being but to one's to-be-realised-as-empty self: "I vow to undertake the course of training to perfect myself in nonkilling," and so forth. If we have not developed to the degree that we spontaneously experience ourselves as one with others, by following the precepts we endeavour to act as if we did feel that way. Yet even these precepts are eventually realised not to rest on any transcendental, objectively-binding moral principle. There are, finally, no moral limitations on our freedom -- except the dualistic delusions which incline us to abuse that freedom in the first place.

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Why do we let the christian post here again?

 

And do you read what you post?

 

"Agonistic practices would limit out the possibility of authoritarian violence. The overall practice teaches individuals to rid themselves of the traditional notion of democracy and instead, recognize different ideas and notions as equally important."

 

Really? Really?

Edited by Enterprise
Why not?
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Nietzsche's philosophy contains the seeds of its own destruction. When you speak to the issue of democracy--with Nietzsche (and without democracy) people in power would horde power, resources, and education/information, which would tank creativity. We would live singular lives and have singular, one-dimensional dreams [by comparison].

 

All ideology is a herd morality (aka Nietzsche links too). At the very least Stoicism is just another herd morality. And a herd morality might just be preferable to herd everything--where the boot and barrel of a gun control everything.

 

And Nietzsche gets rid of a language for creating a better society except re-invention, re-invention, re-invention.

There's nothing intrinsically good with the old or the new. He destroys history--which is critical to identity.

 

For someone so concerned about using a ideological hammer to encourage others to live lives of freedom and re-invention, why was he a professor all his life. Why not choose another profession? Was he caught in the enlightenment dream he himself decried?

Edited by nathan_debate

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Nietzsche's philosophy contains the seeds of its own destruction. When you speak to the issue of democracy--with Nietzsche (and without democracy) people in power would horde power, resources, and education/information, which would tank creativity. We would live singular lives and have singular, one-dimensional dreams [by comparison].

Are you listening to yourself? Read deleuze, moron.

 

 

All ideology is a herd morality (aka Nietzsche links too).

 

What if I had an ideology that I only possessed? Not all ideology is a herd mentality.

 

At the very least Stoicism is just another herd morality. And a herd morality might just be preferable to herd everything--where the boot and barrel of a gun control everything.

This is really retarded. Nietzsche wasn't a stoic, and if you want to be part of a herd, go join a religion(OH WAIT, I C WHAT YOU DID THURR.)

 

 

And Nietzsche gets rid of a language for creating a better society except re-invention, re-invention, re-invention.

You're assuming society will last forever, or that people will-- besides, not everybody can be an overman.

 

 

There's nothing intrinsically good with the old or the new. He destroys history--which is critical to identity.

Cause identity politics are really nietzsche's favourite thing, you know? Nietzschean ideal>identity politics

 

And besides, you haven't read deleuze.

 

For someone so concerned about using a ideological hammer to encourage others to live lives of freedom and re-invention, why was he a professor all his life. Why not choose another profession? Was he caught in the enlightenment dream he himself decried?

ad hom, and as I explained to my portly friend last night, he was arrogant, and bombastic, but in no way did he view himself as a philosopher of the future, as referenced in BG&E...

 

He wasn't the overman, nor did he view himself as such.

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He's the philosopher of the future--oh my!

 

>>>He wasn't the overman, nor did he view himself as such.

 

If not him than who???? Irrespective--the overman is a herd morality--its a new idol.

 

>>And Nietzsche gets rid of a language for creating a better society except re-invention, re-invention, re-invention.

 

>>You're assuming society will last forever, or that people will-- besides, not everybody can be an overman.

 

Not sure you answered my arg here.

 

I have a feeling more people could be overmen than a world of Nietzche would allow--in other words there would be a radically big skills gap--at least in terms of generating new ideas.

 

Exactly what wisdom will deleuze impart upon me?

Edited by nathan_debate

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"Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn't that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense. Talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows, so why is it unjust to deprive you of the right to speak?"

You seriously need to read Nietzsche's books if you want to be taken seriously.

 

"If not him than who???? Irrespective--the overman is a herd morality--its a new idol."

You are completely missing his point. Before you post anything else dealing with his philosophies, you should start reading what he actually wrote.

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"Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn't that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense. Talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows, so why is it unjust to deprive you of the right to speak?"

You seriously need to read Nietzsche's books if you want to be taken seriously.

 

"If not him than who???? Irrespective--the overman is a herd morality--its a new idol."

You are completely missing his point. Before you post anything else dealing with his philosophies, you should start reading what he actually wrote.

 

Wow, somebody who agrees with me..

.

Nathan, I'm going to make this easy and simple for you. You are worse than me. I am a troll. I know I am a troll. But unlike you, I am not an idiot. You are an idiot who thinks he's the shit, while in fact being a moron. Go read nietzsche and reconsider your stance on God.

 

Thanks you.

Gtfo.

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"Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn't that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense. Talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows, so why is it unjust to deprive you of the right to speak?"

You seriously need to read Nietzsche's books if you want to be taken seriously.

 

"If not him than who???? Irrespective--the overman is a herd morality--its a new idol."

You are completely missing his point. Before you post anything else dealing with his philosophies, you should start reading what he actually wrote.

 

chairman mao ftw

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If greed is good--you are serial and herd morality of the hils, Paris Hiltons and every other celebrity you hate and its. A society like that would die on the vine along with destroying self-development.

 

>>>Dignity- question begging on why this matters, assumes community ethics and obligations, one word answers get you virtually no where.

 

You can make arguments that power destroys the individual (see also depression) or that selfish striving is counterproductive.

 

Our argument isn't reason--its intuition or empathy or faith.

 

>>>Suffering-You can't solve suffering, resentment is the impact game over. Oh yea, suffering is good.

 

The suffering good vs. egoism argument seems to contradict.

 

>>>Death inveitable.

 

This and greed inevitable is a non started for an argument. In your framework, death ends power and suffering--each day alive is a chance to act on those 2 anti-values.

 

>>>Also, both lack of violence and human rights make it easier to be creative, instead of focusing energy and resources on survival needs.

 

>>>Really? Violence doesn't produce creative art?

 

Blood sport--whether in Rwanda or of the Jews isn't my idea of creativity--its a lack of creativity. You can solve for that violence without the impact in Hollywood.

 

>>>"I forgot that the link to egoism/selfishness = capitalism was idolization of greed, materialism, money, and power. That internal link turns the argument. Also, the net result is unfreedom--because commodified choices are a rigged game."

 

This is dumb, you can't go for arguments that say reason good, we should care about others etc. and cap bad.

 

And idol is an idol is an idol. Nietzche is a repugnant idol, but an idol. I've never made a reason good argument. Derrida and Levinas made arguments for the other outside the field of reason.

 

Why is reason so terrible? Why is suffering so good? Way above I made the argument that I don't solve suffering--you don't have an argument that each and every instance of suffering is good. If you do the judge should vote aff to make you suffer. Also, suffering doesn't intrinsically lead to growth. Also, if that suffering kills you--you can't develop or grow or be innovative--if you are dead.

 

>>Links you into community args that are impact turned, no reason why we need to be worried about what others do, all of that is inevitable, Nietzsche exists out there in literature means there is no unique impact to this argument. Glamorization of greed happening now, Hermit behavior also explains Nietzsche but doesn't link.

 

All your inevitability claims are irrelevant. I don't understand what Nietzche in the lit gets you or answers. Hermit behaviour means Nietzsche doesn't link? What?

 

Group the Csikszentmihlyi:

 

>>>Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96 1. question begging=community obligation 2. This concludes negative, you are the paranioa about soceity and its need for variance.

Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96 round 2-1. Fuck other people.

Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96 round 3 - this card doesn't say anything relevant.

Csikszentmihalyi in ‘96 round 4- only asseritions no reason any of that is true.

r5- dumb, forces victims of abuse, and those rejected by society to be scapegoated. Art before its time is worthwhile fuck democracy and what other people think.

r6-Another example of high schoolers just not knowing how to tag a card, so they say it has to deal with your impact claim.

 

I don't need to win community obligation to win these arguments (just the last 2). My argument is that egoism screws itself + it destoys the terminal impact to Nietzche. Its an individual obligation--we're made for community--we're born into families.

 

>>>I got bored reading the terrible evidence. None of this should ever win a debate ever. What does winning "aff is creative!" get you? Or "Aff doesn't stop creativity/allows creativty!"

 

>>The entire point of Nietzsche is that it doesn't matter what is going on inside of the world that you can do shit regardless. NONE OF THIS HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE IMPACT CLAIM TO THE NIETZSCHE K.

 

If you don't care about the outside world you screw yourself. Thats what especially the later two point to--means you screw your ability to be top dog and to be truly innovative. Otherwise you are consigned to a serial life. We're all interdependent. Tragedy of the commons and all that.

 

>>Stop approaching this argument with "We solve your alt!" You won't, Nietzsche doesn't solve anything so it doesn't get you anywhere.

 

We solve your alt--we solve your impact calc--whatever.

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Read Nietzsche is a sorry excuse for a non-argument.

 

Suffering good + resentment are rather bold assertions.

 

Power destroys your terminal impact of freedom + growth.

 

Greed destroys your terminal impact of freedom + growth.

 

The metaphor that comes to mind for a Nietzschian somewhere between Kurt Cobain and Paris Hilton.

 

Will to truth/Will to power-That still leaves all truth on the same level. Whats the alternative?

 

Also, Nietzsche is a bad academic. Anyone who understands truth--whose spent anytime in the academy understands that truth is communal as much as if not more than its individual. Thats why peer review exists. See also Hegel.

 

Glorification of the German and the Greek is another communal morality and identity politics. Also, his german cultural influence proves hes just one more modernism.

 

God is dead is jingoism. He's not dead, he's sleeping--and you're too blind to see him. But Nietzsche has created a "Gods eye point of view" on psychology, ethics, and all human action.

 

Perspectivism (ie all truth is just will to power and equally viable) is just bad juju and a failure to really struggle to determine and compare. An intellecutal weakness. In this world, we might as well just have a boxing match to determine a winner.

 

To affirm ethics you don't have to affirm a) reason B) universalism. For instance perspective taking of those in poverty. Affirm contingent ethics.

 

Do the critique in all other instances but human dignity. The disad to your interp is that the critiquer and Nietzsche has never known true suffering like living on $2 a day, living in Aushwitz or the after math of Hiroshima, or lived with a severed limb from a landmine.

 

Whatever dogmatism, idol, or herd morality you prove we subscribe to by dignity---we'll win that your're just as dogmatic in your adoption of the Nietzschian canon A to Z.

 

Nietzschian assume human nature and intent is bad, with little warrant and even less qualification. That undergirds the entirety of his philosophy.

 

The end point of your argument normative and ethical values like fairness are bad (perhaps even a rigged game). They have zero argument why you shouldn't reject the value of fairness and vote for us.

 

The pity argument is terribly weak. Its conspiracy theory. Nietzsche to my knowledge has zero knowledge of psychology and never did any research to determine. You're right Mother Tereasa was trying to exploit the poor--that makes zero sense. At the very least, your deployment of the criticism and Nietzsche's writing this is the intellectual equivalent. And the notion that this keeps power relations in place is hardly fair. Empirically people who go to college go on to earn more. [even if you win its a link to will to power, which according to Nietzsche is good]

 

All suffering isn't intrinsically good. The distinction between fatal and non-fatal suffering is important. When suffering is fatal, we should reject it, especially in a world of nuclear weapons. Also examples like genocide, child sex slavery, rape, and intentional drowning leave psychic scars which often wreck lives both those of the exploiter and victim.

 

And no one has answered the Hateb or any of the other evidence.

 

Nietzsche's noble ethics destroys itself--its just an internal industriousness, which his critique takes issue with. Its an attempt at control, which he decries. Its also just a mirror image of

 

Mirror images--Nietzsche is just the mirror image of a fundamentalist preacher of his age. Ethics in the contexts of relative values has advanced a great deal since Kantian notions he takes issue with--which avoids its universalism. He's a criticism of fundamentalist Christian moralism of his age--not post-modern ethics. (in fact he attempts to create an ethics based on power, ego, and nobility)

 

Nietzsche amounts to wild west of power politics--thats not reality. It amounts to the state of nature where life is "nasty, brutish, and short."

 

If the other team really believed the K they would wage it with bats, knives, and guns and not words. Both would result in maximum suffering, power, and ego-gratification for them.

 

All Nietzchian arguments like suffering good are based on the results--which makes him a Utilitarian and another slave morality in drag. If not--there is a double bind--which allows us to make ends based arguments.

 

Intuition says this philosophy is 100% bankrupt. We'll take the pepsi challenge--You probably wouldn't want anyone in your life to be a Nietzschian--not your nurse, doctor, police person, the military, your president, your teachers, your parents and family, or your lover.

 

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are right. Nietszche, however, gets it wrong when he doesn't fully answer Schopenhauer. Nietzsche proves that some people can have bad intentions. His burden of proof is to prove everyone has bad intentions all the time--and that they overwhelm the good that they do. Any risk that Schopenhauer is right means you vote aff. (pity is inevitable--to act on it is compassion....although probably just making the pity/compassion distinction as made in many pieces of ev--is probably a better argument)

 

Hermits/Nomadism Disad. The social experience creates more often than not helps provide multiple perspectives for us. This can create reflection and understanding of our suffering--without this suffering is an isolating experience which erode the individual and his/her mind. (more to be added)

 

Nietzsche is incomplete. First he conflates ethics, modernity, and Christianity--they are interdependent, but still independent ideas. Creates a category mistake in his analysis. He provides a geneaology of ethics and values, but it stops in the 1890's. He doesn't include the last 100+ years of ethical theory. Which means 100% no link. He doesn't assume all the counter examples which have happened in the mean time.

 

We ask you to vote against the criticism based on your personal experience with oppression. Wherever you've experienced dehumanization, exploitation, or otherwise have instincts.

 

We're not mutual exclusive with becoming, joy, or embracing struggle in life.

 

Destroy and struggle against Nietzschian over-generalizations, platitudes, solipsism, and debate trendy herd morality.

 

We only take issue with lower order immediacy. We don't destroy all immediacy and experiential learning.

 

How do two Nietzchians resolve conflict? Do they just duke it out to the death? My seventh grade fight on the playground didn't exactly add meaning to my life. Do boxers live more meaningful lives than us?

 

Nietzche is a combination of the worst aspects of anarchy and totalitarianism.

 

Recognition of the fatality of the human conditions doesn't mean giving up--it means struggling. And it certainly doesn't mean giving up all language to make comparative decisions with or to resolve conflicts.

 

Multiple forms of truth best (reason and experience and intuition)--the check each other. (or Unchecked instinct disad/or reason good.)

 

Will to power doesn't destroy truth or truth seeking. Like saying the risk of hiring bad employees means you throw up your hand and never hire anyone. Gravity always is acting on objects on earth. 2 + 2 = 4. The movement of the planets follow a pattern. Nietzsche doesn't find purpose in the universe--because he's not looking for it.

 

Be a struggling and courageous compassionate like JFK.

 

If there's no purpose in the world, why are we supposed to follow our dictums or destiny. This attempt to follow our dictum, is yet another subtle herd morality.

 

Our model of life is debate + basketball and theirs is boxing, the battle field, and the colesium (and possibly da daism). [or perhaps the olympic race track vs. the fire]

 

Nietzchian Criticisms To Be Added Later

Stoicism disad. to be added later.

 

Also perhaps a sophology alternative as a third option. It seems more wholistic than Nietzsche. Other forms of knowledge/ethics/truth that Nietzche fails to take into account. Or perhaps just defend wisdom (a la Barry Swartz in this Wired Interview on "practical wisdom") as a better alternative than mere faith or instinct or rule-based morality.

 

1. PRIMACY OF CHOICE. Every self-conscious person judges some acts, some beliefs, some chosen values as better than others. Wisdom is whatever it is that guides such choices.

2. THREE DIMENSIONAL MAN. All human choices involve at least three complex contexts within which all persons live, and within which each orients himself. These orienting horizons of a person are body, mind, and soul. A simple characterization of these would be as follows: My body is where I am. My mind is how I know where I am. My soul is how I know where I am is home.

3. PERSONAL WISDOM. Because humans are not born wise but grow in wisdom, sophology is concerned with the development of the soul's character. To study wisdom is to set out to make rational sense of the unfolding of a personal story. This gives sophology its immediate, primary datum.

4. HISTORICAL WISDOM. The assembly of received judgements concerning the unfolding of the personal stories of people throughout the ages constitutes the subject matter that is recognized collectively as the wisdom of mankind. This is an historical study.

5. REASON, EXPERIENCE, IMAGINATION. These primary data can and must be studied, empirically, speculatively and imaginatively, using the tools of insight and reason, but not limited by them. They cannot be completely divorced from stories.

6. PUBLIC ACCESS. Neither the rational study of personal story nor the personal story of rational study, are the exclusive province of academic departments of language and literature, psychology and psychoanalysis, sociology and cultural anthropology, philosophy or religion. They are the common concern of all men as civic and self-conscious entities. They are in the public domain.

 

Perhaps a radical individualism metaphysics disad.

 

Probably a narcissism, nobility, power disad

 

Maybe a democracy disad. (to defend constructivist ethics) May instead opt for an ethics in line with Butler.

 

Master/slave, decadence (to be added later)

 

Pragmatic skepticism???

 

Articles, Chapters, and Books to Check out Later

Living and Value Toward a Constructive Post Modern Ethics, Frederick Ferre (intuitive argument for an ethic grounded in otherness and connection)

 

Criticism of Will to Power (2 core criticisms of will to power)

 

Suffering and Moral Responsibility by Jamie Mayerfeld (Oxford University Press)

 

Anti-Foundationalism, Deliberative Democracy, and Universal Human Rights. (20 page or so PDF defense of human rights in an anti-foundationalist world--also a critique of the misapplication of anti-foundationalism)

 

Brothers Karasmosov

 

After Virtue (a defense of Aristotle contra Nietzsche on Google Scholar--this is hard to read as a debater)

 

Kierkegaard Reader

 

The Existentialists (just the chapter on by Robert Solomon on Nietzsche that compares him to Aristotle)

 

The Philosophy of Nietzsche (perspectivalism aka will to truth does not destroy all truth--p.114 and some args elsewhere like p.116. Also points to the value Nietzsche places on truth between "true vs. false" later in the chapter on logic)

 

Antifoundationalism Old and New (p. 151 and 153 and perhaps elsewhere p. 154 and 157...all the way to 164) Pragmatism provides a foundation for truth (I think better than Rorty, because he seems to imply ignoring pomo and the process of truth) Unfortunately, this text doesn't have all the pages--so getting a full copy of chapter p. 151 to 164 would be helpful.)

 

Open Society and Its Enemies by Karl Popper (a criticism of Philosopher-kings and elitism)

 

Dangerous Nietzsche (about decadence in Nietzsche) ok cards--not sure it amounts to more than an ad hom

 

Education, knowledge, and truth: Beyond the Postmodern Impasse (i think similar titles...along with books from a scientific perspective can help yield solutions to truth after the assertion of the "will to truth")

 

Also found some arguments against Nietzsche and anti foundationalism in Power Value and Conviction: Theological Ethics in a Postmodern Age (many of these reference Iris Murdoch) [note: link goes to Amazon] I think the Ferre and Suffering and Moral Responsibility are better in terms of debate evidence. Thankfully all three are accessible (not super dense).

Edited by nathan_debate

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Step 1. Stop trolling cross-x.

Step 2. Acquire "The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia," by Darrell J. Fasching

Step 3. Read and cut cards

 

His argument is that Nietzsche's philosophy is unfit for the technological age, and that only ethics can mediate existential crises, namely nuclear weapons use. This book does not have a good handle on Rasch/Schmitt, so you'll have to look elsewhere to answer those links.

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