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NDT 2008

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First of all, congrats to both teams. The other finalist team, Dartmouth, is also an incredible team. Josh Kernoff and Kade Olsen are both excellent debaters, and having debated with Josh in high school I'll say his improvement has been unbelievable.

 

As for the debate. Dartmouth went for an "Add a condition" CP and Wake went for theory.

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will there be a documentary released for this at some point?

 

 

No

 

Also, here is the finals of CEDA from this year. From edebate.

 

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-5390665162595544147&q=ceda+2008+towson&total=2&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=0

 

Edit: I just watched this round, and its fucking phenomenal. Great job guys. Both Kansas and Towson made a bunch of really smart and relevent arguments. Anyone interested in minority participation in debate should definatly take a close watch at the video. Also, does anyone else think this round is similar to the 2002 CEDA finals?

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Not the round itself, but I found Alex and Seth's thank-you speeches on youtube in my search.

 

Alex

Seth

 

Anyone have any luck finding any video of the round itself?

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Here's the 1AC from the final round.

 

Contention 1 – Terrorism

 

Al Qaeda has regenerated and is gearing up for attacks on the U.S.

Michael McConnell, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, “Al Qaeda Remains Dangerous”, Media Newswire, 2-5-2008, http://media-newswire.com/release_1060466.html

Al Qaeda continues to pose significant threats to the United States at home and abroad, and al Qaeda’s central leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous component, McConnell told the sentaors. In July, a national intelligence estimate said al Qaeda has been able to regenerate the operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks in the United States. The group used safe havens in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal area to regroup and plan for new attacks. “The FATA serves as a staging area for al Qaeda’s attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as a location for training new terrorist operatives, for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States,” McConnell said. “It has lost many of its senior operational planners over the years, but the group's adaptable decision-making process and bench of skilled operatives have enabled it to identify effective replacements.” Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri continue to lead the terror group and focus on their strategic vision of confronting the United States and its allies with mass casualty attacks around the globe, McConnell said. “Although security concerns preclude them from the day-to-day running of the organization, bin Laden and Zawahiri regularly pass inspirational messages and specific operational guidance to their followers through public statements,” he explained. The director said al Qaeda is identifying, training and positioning operatives for an attack in the United States. “While increased security measures at home and abroad have caused al Qaeda to view the West, especially the United States, as a harder target, we have seen an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006,” McConnell said. “We assess that al Qaeda’s homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population.” McConnell said conventional explosives probably will be the most probable al Qaeda attack scenario. “That said, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are attempting to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials,” he added. “We assess al Qaeda will continue to try to acquire and employ these weapons and materials; some chemical and radiological materials and crude weapons designs are easily accessible, in our judgment.”

 

1AC

 

Its try or die – catastrophic terrorism is inevitable

Graham Allison, Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Professor of Government, and Faculty Chair of the Dubai Initiative – Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, “Symposium: Apocalypse When?”, The National Interest, November / December 2007, Lexis

MUELLER IS entitled to his opinion that the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is "exaggerated" and "overwrought." But analysts of various political persuasions, in and out of government, are virtually unanimous in their judgment to the contrary. As the national-security community learned during the Cold War, risk = likelihood x consequences. Thus, even when the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon was small, the consequences were so catastrophic that prudent policymakers felt a categorical imperative to do everything that feasibly could be done to prevent that war. Today, a single nuclear bomb exploding in just one city would change our world. Given such consequences, differences between a 1 percent and a 20 percent likelihood of such an attack are relatively insignificant when considering how we should respond to the threat. Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb who Enrico Fermi once called "the only true genius I had ever met", told Congress in March that he estimated a "20 percent per year probability [of a nuclear explosion-not just a contaminated, dirty bomb-a nuclear explosion] with American cities and European cities included." My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn has created a model in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent-identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005. My book, Nuclear Terrorism, states my own best judgment that, on the current trend line, the chances of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view that my work may even underestimate the risk. Warren Buffet, the world's most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that nuclear terrorism is "inevitable." He stated, "I don't see any way that it won't happen." To assess the threat one must answer five core questions: who, what, where, when and how? Who could be planning a nuclear terrorist attack? Al-Qaeda remains the leading candidate. According to the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Al-Qaeda has been substantially reconstituted-but with its leadership having moved from a medieval Afghanistan to Pakistan-a nation that actually has nuclear weapons. As former CIA Director George J. Tenet's memoir reports, Al-Qaeda's leadership has remained "singularly focused on acquiring WMDs" and that "the main threat is the nuclear one." Tenet concluded, "I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives want to go." What nuclear weapons could terrorists use? A ready-made weapon from the arsenal of one of the nuclear-weapons states or an elementary nuclear bomb constructed from highly enriched uranium made by a state remain most likely. As John Foster, a leading U.S. bomb-maker and former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, wrote a quarter of a century ago, "If the essential nuclear materials are at hand, it is possible to make an atomic bomb using information that is available in the open literature." Where could terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb? If a nuclear attack occurs, Russia will be the most likely source of the weapon or material. A close second, however, is North Korea, which now has ten bombs worth of plutonium, or Pakistan with sixty nuclear bombs. Finally, research reactors in forty developing and transitional countries still hold the essential ingredient for nuclear weapons. When could terrorists launch the first nuclear attack? If terrorists bought or stole a nuclear weapon in good working condition, they could explode it today. If terrorists acquired one hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium, they could make a working elementary nuclear bomb in less than a year. How could terrorists deliver a nuclear weapon to its target? In the same way that illegal items come to our cities every day. As one of my former colleagues has quipped, if you have any doubt about the ability of terrorists to deliver a weapon to an American target, remember: They could hide it in a bale of marijuana.

 

1AC

 

This will occur within a decade

FP, Foreign Policy, “The Terrorism Index”, A Non-Partisan Survey of More Than 100 Foreign Policy Experts, September/October 2007, Lexis

To find out, FOREIGN POLICY and the Center for American Progress once again turned to the very people who have run the United States' national security apparatus during the past half century. Surveying more than 100 of America's top foreign-policy experts--Republicans and Democrats alike--the FOREIGN Policy/ Center for American Progress Terrorism Index is the only comprehensive, nonpartisan effort to mine the highest echelons of the nation's foreign-policy establishment for its assessment of how the United States is fighting the war on terror. First released in July 2006, and again last February, the index attempts to draw definitive conclusions about the war's priorities, policies, and progress. Its participants include people who have served as secretary of state, national security advisor, senior White House aides, top commanders in the U.S. military, seasoned intelligence professionals, and distinguished academics. Eighty percent of the experts have served in the U.S. government--including more than half in the Executive Branch, 32 percent in the military, and 21 percent in the intelligence community. The world these experts see today is one that continues to grow more threatening. Fully 91 percent say the world is becoming more dangerous for Americans and the United States, up 10 percentage points since February. Eighty-four percent do not believe the United States is winning the war on terror, an increase of 9 percentage points from six months ago. More than 80 percent expect a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 within a decade, a result that is more or less unchanged from one year ago.

 

1AC

 

Terrorists will use WMDs and cyber weapons – risking extinction

Yonah Alexander, Professor and Director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28-2003, Lexis

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."

 

Nuclear terrorism is likely and causes global nuclear war

Patrick Speice, JD Candidate, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, February 2006, Lexis

Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. n49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. n50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. n51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, n52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

 

1AC

 

Even an unsuccessful attack triggers this

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, political analyst, August 26 – September 1, 2004, Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm

We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences. A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

 

Bioterror causes extinction

John Steinbrenner, Senior Fellow – Brookings, Foreign Policy, 12-22-1997, Lexis

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

 

1AC

 

Terrorists will target the food supply

James D. Zirin, LLP – Sydney Austin and Staff – Council on Foreign Relations, Washington Times, 12-27-2004, Lexis

The food supply is an attractive terrorist target. Food production accounts for 13 percent of gross domestic product; the food industry employs 18 percent of all U.S. workers; and agricultural exports are twice the total of other industries at $140 billion a year. The economic, not to say human, impact of an agro-attack could be devastating. As a stark reminder of our vulnerability, when just one Holstein in Washington came down with mad cow a year ago, 30 nations promptly banned importation of U.S. beef. The potential for disruption, panic and erosion of confidence in the government is self-evident. Such an attack, moreover, is relatively easy to accomplish. According to a Rand Institute report to the defense secretary published earlier this year, there is a large smorgasbord of freely available agents to choose from. The Office International des Epizooites lists at least 15 pathogens with the potential to cripple agricultural production or trade. None are the focus of U.S. livestock immunization programs. Unlike bioterrorism, agroterrorists take very little risk handling the pathogens, which generally are not harmful to humans. Very little training is required to prepare or administer the disease agent and no special wizardry to weaponize it. Indeed, because of our agricultural concentration, a small amount of pathogen could have a high terror yield. As the Rand report notes, "no issue of weaponization ... needs to be addressed because the animals themselves are the primary vector for pathogenic transmission." Finally, it is virtually impossible to trace an act of agroterrorism to the perpetrator unless it is admitted. The very fact the infection was intentional, as opposed to an accident, may be unprovable.

 

Agro-terrorism destroys genetic diversity

JP Dudley, Institute of Arctic Biology – U Alaska Fairbanks, and M.H. Wolford, Not Kurt, Chair – Office International des Epizooties Working Group on Wildlife Diseases, Portugal, Bioweapons, Bioterrorism, and Biodiversity, 2002, http://www.oie.int/eng/publicat/rt/2101/J.P.%20DUDLEY.pdf

Military and terrorist applications of biotechnology are threats to more than just human lives and human societies; certain bioweapon diseases present a very real danger to agricultural ecosystems, wildlife faunas and wildlife habitats. Genetically modified zoonotic and epizootic diseases (plague, tularemia, anthrax) and cultivated diseases of livestock (foot and mouth disease IFMD], rinderpest, brucellosis) are potentially very serious threats to livestock, wildlife and endangered species populations. There are concerns that plant diseases developed for use against cereal crops, opium poppies (Papaver somnferum), and coca (Eiythrnxylon spp.) (e.g. Fusarium spp. and Pleospora papaveraceae) might infect and proliferate among non-target plant species (35). The genetic diversity of local crop varieties and traditional livestock breeds is a critically important asset of global agriculture that may be subject to severe damage from deliberate or accidental bioweapon releases.

 

1AC

 

Genetic diversity prevents extinction

Cary Fowler and Pat Mooney, Rural Advancement Fund International, Shattering: Food, Politics, and the Loss of Genetic Diversity, 1990, p. ix

While many may ponder the consequences of global warming, perhaps the biggest single environmental catastrophe in human history is unfolding in the garden. While all are rightly concerned about the possibility of nuclear war, an equally devastating time bomb is ticking away in the fields of farmers all over the world. Loss of genetic diversity in agriculture—silent, rapid, inexorable—is leading us to a rendezvous with extinction—to the doorstep of hunger on a scale we refuse to imagine. To simplify the environment as we have done with agriculture is to destroy the complex interrelationships that hold the natural world together. Reducing the diversity of life, we narrow our options for the future and render our own survival more precarious. It is life at the end of the limb. That is the subject of this book. Agronomists in the Philippines warned of what became known as southern corn leaf blight in 1061.' The disease was reported in Mexico not long after. In the summer of 1968, the first faint hint that the blight was in the United States came from seed growers in the Midwest. The danger was ignored. By the spring of 19701 the disease had taken hold in the Florida corn crop. But it was not until corn prices leapt thirty cents a bushel on the Chicago Board of Trade that the world took notice; by then it was August—and too late. By the close of the year, Americans had lost fifteen percent of their most important crop—more than a billion bushels. Some southern states lost half their harvest and many of their farmers. While consumers suffered in the grocery stores, producers were out a billion dollars in lost yield. And the disaster was not solely domestic. U.S. seed exports may have spread the blight to Africa, Latin America and Asia.

 

Terrorism crushes the global economy

Craig Colluci, Captain – U.S. Army, Military Review, 5-1-2007, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-163680156.html

Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff asserts that "another atrocity on the scale of September 11 would wreak havoc on energy prices, stock markets, and consumer confidence, slamming the brakes on today's global economic recovery." (44) The economic impact of antiterrorism efforts can have a significant negative effect on the American and global economy. The hindered free flow of goods, services, and individuals across international borders can slow economic growth.

 

Global nuclear war

Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 1992, p. 30

The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's.

 

1AC

 

Cyber-terrorism causes accidental nuclear war

Stephen Cimbala, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, Summer 1999, Armed Forces & Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal

The nuclear shadow over the information age remains significant. The essence of information warfare is in subtlety and deception: the manipulation of uncertainty. The essence of nuclear deterrence lies in the credible and certain threat of retaliation backed by an information environment accepted and trusted by both sides in a partly competitive, partly conflictual relationship. Nuclear assets may themselves become the targets of cyberwarriors. Triumphalism about the RMA in high technology conventional weapons overlooks asymmetrical strategies that might appeal to U.S. opponents. Among these might be the reciprocal use of information warfare to deny U.S. access in time of need to a timely nuclear response or to a credible nuclear threat. But even more problematic is the potential collision course between intentional information warfare and unintended side effects when cyberwar is waged against a nuclear armed state, especially one with a non-Western culture. Neither the status of nuclear forces in the new world order, nor all of the military implications of the information revolution, are apparent now. There are reasons to suppose that the strategies and technologies of information warfare will develop along one track, whereas efforts to control nuclear weapons spread and to establish the safety and security of existing nuclear arsenals will involve a different community of specialists and attentive publics. Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds to be concerned that a too successful menu of information strategies may contribute to a failure of nuclear deterrence in the form of accidental/inadvertent war or escalation. Unplanned interactions between infowarriors and deterrers could have unfortunate byproducts.

 

Accidents escalate – killing billions

Lachlan Forrow, MD, et al, “Accidental Nuclear War – A Post-Cold War Assessment”, New England Journal of Medicine, 1998, iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20625/acciden_nuke_war.pdf

Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the need for care would completely overwhelm the available health care resources. Most of the major medical centers in each urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The number of patients with severe burns and other critical injuries would far exceed the available resources of all critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's 1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already occupied). The danger of intense radiation exposure would make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local and regional transportation, communications, and energy networks would make it almost impossible to transport the severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived. From Danger to Prevention Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable. The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.

 

1AC

 

Terrorists will target nuclear reactors, causing meltdowns that risk extinction

Harvey Wasserman, Senior Editor – The Free Press, “America’s Self-Imposed Terror Threat”, The Earth Island Journal, Spring 2002, http://www.earthisland.org/eijournal/new_articles.cfm?articleID=457&journalID=63

As US bombs and missiles began to rain on Afghanistan, the certainty of terror retaliation inside the US has turned our 103 nuclear powerplants into potential weapons of apocalyptic destruction, just waiting to be used against us. One or both planes that crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11 could have easily obliterated the two atomic reactors now operating at Indian Point, about 40 miles up the Hudson River. Indian Point Unit One was shut long ago by public outcry. But Units 2 and 3 have operated since the 1970s. Reactor containment domes were built to withstand a jetliner crash but today's jumbo jets are far larger than the planes that were flying in the 1970s. Had one of those hijacked jets hit one of the operating reactors at Indian Point, the ensuing cloud of radiation would have dwarfed the ones at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed. Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse operating in the US. They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

 

1AC

 

Terrorism sparks U.S. retaliation globally

Nicole Schwartz-Morgan, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada, 10-10-2001, “Wild Globalization and Terrorism,” http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm

The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted." But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because the enemy has been named in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these benevolent sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other side, no matter how profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists.

 

Extinction results

Jerome Corsi, Expert in Antiwar Movements and Political Violence, Atomic Iran, 2005, p. 176-8

The United States retaliates: 'End of the world' scenarios The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy–Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations – would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. So, too, our supposed allies in Europe might relish the immediate reduction in power suddenly inflicted upon America.

 

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Signaling a hard line on terrorism is key to U.S. global leadership

Thomas Henriksen, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, PhD from Michigan State University, February 1999, Hoover Essays in Public Policy, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay

Meaningful statecraft hinges on power as well as wise policy. Now that the global financial crisis has crippled the belief that economic development alone would guarantee a democratic and peaceful world, America's continued global primacy rests on how it handles renegade states. In the absence of U.S. leadership, anarchy will grow, paving the way for still greater disorder and extremists on the world scene. This essay explores some policies for dealing with those states that pose the greatest immediate threat. Terrorist rogues throw up deadly challenges to the United States. But we can call on ample examples of past actions for guidance. Lessons can be gleaned from encounters with Iraq, North Korea, Serbia, Iran, Libya, and Cuba over the past few decades. Although history does not set down hard-and-fast principles on statecraft, it does offer analogies and perspective. Tough remedies short of war, in combination, can advance American interests. The Emergence of Rogue States as Serious Threats Rogue regimes have always existed in some form or other throughout history. What has changed is the seriousness of their potential threat in the new international disorder. The United States in its earliest days, as one illustration, had to face assaults by the Barbary Coast powers who held U.S. shipping hostage for ransom. James Madison freed American commerce in the Mediterranean from the degrading practice of paying tribute by dispatching sufficient naval forces there. The cold war also witnessed pariah states, forerunners to today's rogue nations. Because of their extreme diplomatic isolation, questions of their legitimacy, and international opprobrium, these pariahs looked to their own defense, striving to obtain nuclear weapons. In the late 1970s, South Africa, Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea felt their strategic vulnerability and moved to acquire nuclear bombs to redress their weakness. Pressed hard by Washington, Taiwan, South Africa, and South Korea came off the atomic pariah listing when they ceased pursuing their own nuclear weapons agendas. Other states that met some of the standards of a pariah in the previous era included Rhodesia, Chile, Uganda, and Cuba. But with changing circumstances, they also slipped from this categorization, with the exception of Cuba.(2) Contemporary rogue states, like some of their cold war predecessors, receive diplomatic backing from major power patrons. China and Russia sell advanced technology and weapons to Iraq and Iran. Sudan, in turn, receives financing from Iran for terrorist activities. Serbia gets Russian support. The major players have their own ends in mind. Russia makes common cause with Iran, for example, to offset Turkish gains in Central Asia and to garner hard currency for its technology exports. France has commercial interests in mind when it bucks U.S. resolutions on Iraq in the United Nations. So while being largely independent actors, rogue states can still serve the agenda of greater powers. Unlike the cold war era, however, rogue regimes are now more technologically independent of the major powers as well as politically freer. A diffusion of scientists and engineers means that advanced industrial states no longer have exclusive capabilities in advanced weapons systems. Third world regimes now have access to expertise from their own Western-trained scientists or from expatriates who have left post-Soviet Russia in search of jobs. They also can readily attain the equipment and materials needed to manufacture weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Iran's advances in mid- and long-range missiles and Iraq's strides in developing nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities bear witness to the changed global circumstances. Likewise, North Korea, one of the world's poorest and most isolated nations, possesses both nuclear and missile capabilities that threaten its neighbors. Pyongyang raised apprehensions afresh in the summer of 1998 with its three-stage rocket launch over Japan to put a satellite into orbit. Not all ruthless regimes pose a danger to Americans or to U.S. interests, however. There are, in fact, gradations of bad behavior. One group could be dubbed diplomatic outcasts. This designation arises from these states' flouting international norms, making them unwelcome diplomatically in the world community. They are known for their human rights abuses, repressive governments, and lack of political reform. But they do not endanger their neighbors or threaten regional stability. Such states include Cambodia, Myanmar (formerly Burma), Belarus, Nigeria, and Kenya. Others pursue foreign policies that inflict damage on neighbors and thwart crucial U.S. initiatives. Rwanda and Uganda fall into this category because of their military invasion supporting Congolese Tutsi insurgents against the central Congo government. A second category of troublesome nations has developed from failed states. With a relaxation of the East-West tensions, the phenomenon of intrastate anarchy captured international attention. Marked by civil war, political anarchy, and the breakdown of civil authority, the states of Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti, and Rwanda fragmented or plunged into mass slaughter. Each of these failed states required some form of international intervention to alleviate human suffering. Yugoslavia shared a similar downward spiral, but its breakdown acted as a vortex, dragging in neighboring states and dissolving Balkan stability. A few pundits have characterized India and Pakistan as democratic rogues for going ahead with nuclear tests in May 1998 in the face of international opposition. This mislabeling corrupts the understanding of the already vague term rogue, which, in the case of India and Pakistan, has been misapplied to states exercising assertive defense options. Neither meets the criteria of a rogue state in the way that, say, Iraq does. Both have democratically elected governments. But within both countries, domestic pressure as well as strategic interests overrode the anticipated damage of internationally imposed sanctions in their decisions to detonate fissionable material. The final category, and the subject of this essay, is the terrorist rogue state. This deadly manifestation in the emerging world order has captured Washington's attention. These nation-states fail to comply with the rules of international law. Their behavior is defiant and belligerent. They promote radical ideologies. They share an anti-Western bias, in general, and an anti-American hatred, in particular. Rogue political systems vary, but their leaders share a common antipathy toward their citizens' participating in the political process. They suppress human and civil rights as do diplomatic rogue states, but their international bellicosity is the key variable drawing our attention to them. Rogue nations often possess larger conventional military forces than their national defense warrants, sponsor international terrorism, and strive to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Violent acts toward nearby states are attributable to rogues such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba, Sudan, and North Korea, which are classified by the U.S. Department of State as terrorist states. Although Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have captured the lion's share of Washington's antiterrorist attention during the 1990s, the other states have supplied "passive" forms of support to terrorism in the form of training facilities and safe havens for subversive agents. Afghanistan's willingness to lend sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, the exiled Saudi Arabian businessman turned terrorist, makes it a terrorist-supporting state capable of inflicting harm on the United States and its citizens. The peril posed by rogues to Americans and U.S. interests has intensified with the dispersal of weapons of mass destruction following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Other threats have arisen from terrorist individuals or movements made up of Islamic fundamentalists or other ideologically charged cults such as Aum Shinrikyo, whose manufacture and lethal use of sarin nerve gas shocked Japanese society, or the militia movement within the United States. Attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Oklahoma federal building only confirmed suspicions of our vulnerability. Increasing the uneasiness felt in our country and other societies was that bomb-making information appeared on the Internet, open to anyone with a computer. When rogue governments aid paramilitary parties in the pursuit of terrorism, then the threat moves from the nonstate perpetrator to the government-sponsored category. The increased emphasis given to global economic issues after the end of the cold war gave birth to the fashionable notion that economic preeminence is more important than politico-military considerations in international politics. That nostrum ignores the fundamental fact that global markets depend on a secure international system. It is geopolitical power, of which economic well-being is one factor, that undergirds the global system. Rogue adversaries threaten the global equilibrium on which the United States and other nations base their commerce, access to resources and financial capital, human interchange, and security. Rogue assaults on accepted international conduct disrupts peace and stability. Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 went a long way toward unraveling European peace, in large part because the League of Nations failed to rally effective opposition. Saddam Hussein's military incursion into Kuwait likewise tossed the Persian Gulf states into turmoil and shattered the dawn of the post-Soviet order. But unlike Italy's prewar aggression, Iraq's was met, defeated, and turned back by an American-led coalition. This was the proper reaction to Baghdad's attack. Lawlessness feeds on itself if allowed to spread unchecked. America's Role in a Rogue World As the remaining superpower, the United States faces a unique political environment. It is both the world's reigning hegemon and sometime villain. America's economic, military, and technological prowess endows it with what Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has termed indispensability. Whatever the political upheaval or humanitarian crisis, other states expect the United States to solve the world's problems and to dispense good deeds. Those expectations arise from the fact that America has often come to the rescue in the past and that the United States is not a traditional nation. America is the embodiment of the idea that a free people share sovereignty, with rights and obligations, as set forth in a written constitution that has strengthened over the past two hundred years. Unlike most traditional nations, we do not share a common ancestry. Thus America seeks to advance ideals. Our national goals encompass more than geopolitical ends, which is why Americans are unsettled by the slaughter of innocents in faraway lands. American foreign policy debates and interventionist decisions usually include democratic values as well as our vital overseas interests. Overseas engagement, whether military, diplomatic or economic, has indeed steadily become an integral part of America's external policy during this century. Washington's leadership and power proved decisive from

 

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[Hendriksen Cont – No Text Removed]

World War I to the Persian Gulf war. In each of these major conflicts, the United States fought as member of an international coalition and its role has been pivotal. Despite domestic isolationist pulls, the United States, more than ever, is the key international player. No other state or global body commands similar world standing. The United Nations, on which so much optimistic expectation rested following World War II, is judged ineffectual in major crises. Even after the conclusion of bipolarism, the United Nations Security Council suffers from nationalistic divisions. The anticipation of a veto from one of the other four permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia) holds American initiatives hostage to a watered-down consensus. (Likewise, America's veto power works to constrain the ambitions of China and Russia in the Security Council.) Hard realities, not mere altruism, mean that America must act not like a policeman but like a sheriff in the old Western frontier towns, acting alone on occasion, relying on deputies or long-standing allies, or looking for a posse among regional partners. Or, in some cases, it may look for another sheriff, or regional power, to organize local forces.(3) It cannot allow desperadoes to run loose without encouraging other outlaws to test the limits of law and order. History instructs us that the U.S. withdrawal from world problems, leaving Europeans and Asians to their own devices in the 1930s, led to the rise of militarism and aggression. Aloofness from international politics is simply not a viable option. We benefit materially from a stable and peaceful world. Our economic and political health depend on cross-border trade and international stability. The percentage of our gross domestic product (GDP) based on foreign trade has doubled since 1970. In 1997, exports alone reached 12 percent of GDP and imports totaled 13 percent. Although exports and imports combined accounted for one-quarter of GDP, total trade accounted for more than one-third of the average U.S. national income per capita ($19,700). The United States, which accounts for about 14 percent of total world trade (exports and imports), is the world's largest exporter of goods and services, $933 billion in 1997. It is not in our interest to stand aside while rogue behavior unravels a region's trade, economic, and human networks. In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side, meaning that how the United States responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia. Political inaction creates vacuums, which can suck in states to fill the void. Although the United States does not want to be the world's sheriff, living in a world without law and order is not an auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the United States ought not intervene militarily in every conflict or humanitarian crisis. Indeed, it should pick its interventions with great care. Offering Washington's good offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing; dispatching armed forces to far-flung deserts, jungles, or mountains is quite another.

 

Global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, Losing The Moment? Washington Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, 1995, p. 84

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

 

 

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Credible signal of deterrence is key to sustain U.S. alliances

M. Elain Bunn, Senior Research Fellow – Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?”, Strategic Forum, 1-1-2007, Lexis

Deterrence, the hallmark of Cold War-era security, needs to be adapted to fit the more volatile security environment of the 21st century. The Bush administration has outlined a concept for tailored deterrence to address the distinctive challenges posed by advanced militarycompetitors, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and nonstate terrorist networks--while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. The goal of deterrence is to prevent aggressive action or WMD use by ensuring that, in the mind of a potential adversary, the risks of the action outweigh the benefits, while taking into account the consequences of inaction. Deterrence requires detailed knowledge of the society and leadership that we seek to influence. U.S. decisionmakers will need a continuing set of comprehensive country or group deterrence assessments, drawing on expertise in and out of government, in order to tailor deterrence to specific actors and specific situations. The capabilities needed for tailored deterrence go beyond nuclear weapons and the strategic capabilities of the so-called New Triad, tothe full range of military capabilities, presence, and cooperation, as well as diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. The clarity and credibility of American messages in the mind of the deterree are critical to tailoring deterrence threats. U.S. policymakers need mechanisms to assess how their words and actions are perceived, how they affect each adversary's deterrence calculations, and how they might mitigate misperceptions that undermine deterrence. North Korea's nuclear weapons test is only the latest illustrationof how dramatically the international security environment has changed over the last 15 years. Given the wider variety of actors that could inflict mass casualties upon the United States, its allies, or itsinterests, it makes sense to explore whether and how deterrence could be adapted, adjusted, and made to fit 21st-century challenges. In its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, the Bush administration set forth a vision for tailored deterrence, continuing a shift from a one-size-fits-all notion of deterrence toward more adaptable approaches suitable for advanced military competitors, regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) states, as well as nonstate terrorist networks, while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. (1) The QDR was the first official U.S. public document to use the term tailored deterrence. But the QDR did not explain in much detail what the newly coined term means or how it might be achieved. This has led to a number of questions: How does tailored deterrence differ from previous strategies? Whom is the United States trying to deter, from doing what, and in what circumstances? What does one need to know inorder to deter in each case? How should capabilities be tailored for deterrence? How can the United States tailor deterrence when, given global communications, messages tailored to one audience will be received by all? Deterrence aims to prevent a hostile action (for example, aggression or WMD use) by ensuring that, in the mind of a potential adversary, the risks of action outweigh the benefits, while taking into account the consequences of inaction. That said, there is nothing immutable about how the concept should be applied in the face of an evolving security environment. To comprehend the tailored deterrence concept fully and the challenges of implementing it effectively, three facets critical to assessing its viability must be explicated: * Tailoring to specific actors and specific situations: Some believe the primary contribution of the tailored deterrence concept is that the differentiation among deterrees would emphasize the need to understand each potential adversary's decision calculus. As one analyst put it, tailored deterrence is "context specific and culturally sensitive." (2) * Tailoring capabilities: Some draw attention to the need for clarity regarding what kinds of capabilities--either broadly or narrowly defined--would be needed for tailored deterrence, a question that raises potentially large programmatic (that is, new or modified weapons and platforms) and resource implications. The precise capabilities for any particular adversary and scenario would be tailored by choosing a particular mix among all those available. * Tailoring communications: Others focus on the distinctive problem of communicating intent--specifically the kinds of messages the United States would send in its words or actions that contribute to (or detract from) its efforts to deter specific actors, in both peacetime and crisis situations. The QDR was only one step in the hard work needed to flesh out the concepts and capabilities underlying tailored deterrence. Defense Department leaders have emphasized the need to reinvigorate intellectual debate on deterrence and dissuasion and to stimulate those outside of government to think through these issues. (3) This essay looks in greater detail at each of these three aspects: who is being deterred; what capabilities are needed in order to deter; and how messages are communicated for deterrence purposes. While specialists can and do give different weight to these variables, only by answering all three of these questions can the efficacy of the concept of tailored deterrence be judged. Past and Future The evolution of American thinking about deterrence can be characterized, in broad terms, as moving from deterring one actor during the Cold War to multiple actors now; and from an emphasis on deterrence by threat of punishment (imposing costs/risks) in the Cold War, to an emphasis today on deterrence by denial (denying the gains of the aggressive action) in addition to deterrence by the threat of punishment. In the Cold War, the main target of U.S. deterrence was a single actor, the Soviet Union. American deterrence policy focused on increasing the costs/risks of Soviet aggression through the threat of punishment--popularly understood to mean mutual assured destruction--and strategic deterrent forces were largely considered synonymous with nuclear weapons (although Cold War deterrence was actually more subtle and nuanced than that). (4) Beginning in the early to mid-1990s, some strategic analysts turned their attention to deterrence of WMD-armed regional adversaries. They argued that rogue states would try to deter U.S. intervention in their region, intimidate U.S. allies, and make intra war threats to limit American aims in case of war. They pointed out that regional deterrence is more problematic for the United States for several reasons: regional adversaries may be less risk-averse, and they may have considerable resolve because crises often involve their core interests, whereas U.S. interests are peripheral. After September 11, 2001, another set of players was added to the debate about deterrence: non state actors or terrorists. Initially, conventional wisdom was that terrorists were undeterrable. However, that view is evolving, at least to the point that those both inside and outside government are asking whether there may be ways to deter various parts of terrorist networks, either through increasing the costs or decreasing the gains. Although tailored deterrence is a new term, the concepts underlying it--the need to adjust deterrence to each of a wide range of potential opponents, actions, and situations, and a wider range of capabilities that contribute to deterrence--are not new and have been evolving for some time. (5) The most cogent current definition of deterrence is in the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC), (6) written in 2004 and revised in 2006. The DO JOC states that the objective of deterrence operations is "to decisively influence the adversary's decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests. (7) ... An adversary's deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of three primary elements": the benefits of a course of action; the costs of a course of action; and the consequences of restraint (that is, costs and benefits of not taking the course of action we seek to deter). (8) This definition returns to the basic principles underlying deterrence--before it was applied to the particular case of the Soviet Union and the application of the theory (and its emphasis in that particular case on increasing the risks through the threat of punishment, primarily with nuclear weapons) became conflated with the underlying theory of deterrence. What is needed is a reexamination of the underlying theory and a determination of how to apply it to modern cases of concern, without the irrelevant attributes of Cold War deterrence. During the Cold War, deterrence was the dominant goal of U.S. security policy. Now, while it remains an important goal, deterrence interacts closely with the equally important security policy goals of assurance, dissuasion, and defeat. The distinction between deterrence and dissuasion is often confused. If, as a proverb posits, the beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right name, then it may help illuminate the issue of deterrence to distinguish it from dissuasion. While deterrence is focused on convincing an adversary not to undertake acts of aggression, dissuasion is aimed at convincing a potential adversary not to compete with the United States or go down an undesirable path, such as acquiring, enhancing, or increasing threatening capabilities. (9) For instance, one deters WMD use but dissuades acquisition of WMD. More broadly, one deters aggression but dissuades acquisition (or improvement) of the means of aggression. However, both are focused on influencing the decisions of others, and both require "getting into the heads" of these others. The types of information and the understanding of a country or group and its leaders necessary for deterring that actor would also be useful for developing dissuasion strategies for that actor. Without influencing an opponent's decision, we could still try to prevent or disrupt his acquisition of threatening capabilities, or defeat or defend against use of them. But in those cases, we may have physically kept the potential aggressor from taking action, but we have not changed his mind; thus, our actions are not dissuasion or deterrence. That is not to say that the United States should stint on its efforts to prevent, deny, disrupt, or defeat; those are valuable capabilities in and of themselves, since some adversaries may not be dissuaded from acquiring or improving capabilities or deterred from using them. Indeed, U.S. ability to do those things (prevent, deny, defeat, disrupt) may well influence the calculations of the adversary and contribute to dissuasion and deterrence. Likewise, the United States must consider the requirements of extended deterrence in the evolving security environment: how to assure allies and friends that the United States will meet its security commitments to them, so they will not feel the need to develop their own nuclear weapons or other capabilities that the United States would view as counterproductive. Just as U.S. views on deterrence are evolving, so may those of our allies--including whom they are concerned about deterring, as well as the role of offenses and defenses, and the role of U.S. capabilities versus their own capabilities to underpin deterrence. Just as deterrence and dissuasion require tailoring, so too does assurance. What reassures one ally may frighten another. If U.S. allies are to be reassured, they need to have confidence in American judgment and reliability; if they do not, the specific capabilities do not really matter. Both assurance and deterrence are in the eye of the beholder.

 

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Alliance break-downs cause nuclear war

Douglas Ross, Professor of Political Science – Simon Fraser University, Winter 1998/1999, International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1, “Canada’s Functional Isolationism And The Future Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction”, Lexis

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.

 

Terrorism is the linchpin of ANZUS – perception of U.S. slighting collapses cooperation

Michael Horowitz, Ph.D. Candidate – Harvard and 2000 NDT Champion, “Don’t Take Canberra for Granted: The Future of the U.S.-Australian Alliance”, Orbis, 48(3), Summer 2004

Implications for U.S.-Australian Relations. Important as China and the war on terror are, neither is likely to completely break the U.S.-Australia alliance. Even Latham felt moved to clarify in a recent speech that he does not support severing the U.S. alliance with Australia., 21 However, given the strains in U.S.-Australian relations during much of the 1980s and 1990s, a more sustainable basis for cooperation than Howard’s political power must be devised. The alliance needs a more stable foundation than the personal rapport between Bush and Howard. Australia’s defense transformation is also imperiled, both politically and in the nation’s budget. The United States’ ties with Australia may appear to be the least of the Bush administration’s concerns right now, but the tensions in the Australian body politic that could threaten the vitality of the alliance are bubbling not far from the surface and may be exposed in the fall 2004 elections there. Howard’s position will become increasingly untenable if the U.S.-Australia FTA founders in Congress, if the issue of Australian nationals held at Guantanamo Bay goes unresolved, and if America is perceived as slighting Australian interests. Any reorientation of Australian priorities away from America would likely be toward a more independent foreign policy. At a minimum, Australian cooperation with U.S. missile defense plans, political and military support during future regional contingencies, and support for U.S. strategy regarding China could all be at risk. Staying the Course The rise of China and the war on terror—the very issues that critics of Howard’s vision for Australia cite—also highlight the risks involved if U.S.-Australian relations deteriorate and Australian defense transformation stalls. War on Terror. Terrorism represents the biggest threat to the Australian homeland. Australian deployments in the war against it, especially if the theater of conflict shifts closer to Australia, will be essential. While optimists might argue that the probability of a terrorist strike on Australian soil is low, the early-March train bombing in Madrid, apparently targeted at Spain in part due to its active military cooperation with the United States, demonstrates that the risk to Australia is higher than was previously suspected. The perceived success of the Madrid bombing in influencing Spain’s elections heightens the threat of a terrorist strike against other U.S. allies, such as Australia, that are holding elections this year. Australia’s counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia will provide the intelligence needed to defeat threats to its own homeland. Simultaneously, as Australian defense transformation proceeds, Australian forces will become increasingly capable of performing alongside U.S. soldiers in complicated missions aimed at defeating rogue states, stabilizing failed states, and/or uprooting terrorist cells., 22 Australia and the United States need each other to combat the threat of Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Though Australia continues to be perceived as an outsider by Southeast Asia, it does have economic and political weight in the region. For example, partly due to anti-Americanism in Malaysia, U.S. cooperation with the new counterterrorism center in Kuala Lumpur has been restricted. Australia and Malaysia, in contrast, have already begun deepening their counterterrorism cooperation., 23 These developments indicate that the United States and Australia can leverage independent sources of influence in Southeast Asia to create overlapping structures of counterterrorism activities that will be more effective than if either country goes it alone. Cooperation with the United States will also give Australia access to U.S. intelligence, helping it effectively handle peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations too politically sensitive for the active inclusion of American forces or when strictly Australian interests are at risk. The increasing cooperation between Australia and Southeast Asian countries seems to show that the purported tradeoff between cooperation with Asia and the United States is more apparent than real. Most Southeast Asian governments desire stronger cooperation with the United States notwithstanding popular anti-Americanism, Ross Terrill, a research associate at the Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research at Harvard and respected China scholar, has noted that Australia’s relations with countries in Asia have been steadily improving despite its cooperation with the United States in the war on terror., 24 Moreover, the Bush administration appears willing to take a backseat in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia, as evidenced by its agreement to back away from a public role in supporting the new Malaysian counterterrorism center. This shows that cooperating with the United States will not impede close ties between Australia and Asia and demonstrates the necessity of Australia’s engagement in the war on terror, given the impossibility of an active U.S. role in some cases. Closer ties with the United States, especially in the war on terror, can showcase Australia’s reliability as a partner, making future Australian promises in other areas more credible and helping it obtain the benefits of closer economic relations with dynamic Asian economies. Moreover, standing by America at this time will give Australia special influence in the United States, giving Australia an important voice in the U.S. decision-making process.

 

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U.S.-Australian relations are key to Asian stability

Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs. “The Australia-United States Alliance and East Asian Security,” Speech at the University of Sydney conference, 6-29-2001

I want to put to rest this evening a view we hear from time-to-time in the media and elsewhere which argues that the ANZUS Treaty and the alliance is no longer relevant to Australia's interests with the end of the Cold War, or that it somehow imposes unacceptable trade-offs in Australia's relations with the Asia Pacific region. Nothing could be further from the truth. Forging and maintaining strong relations with one country or region does not mean neglecting any other country or region. To suggest that the depth and strength of our alliance with the US somehow weakens or compromises our ties with the Asia Pacific is nonsense. In fact, ANZUS was seen from the outset as a means of enhancing our ties with the region: Percy Spender, who pushed so strongly to conclude the ANZUS Treaty, did so with a clear and expressed conviction that Australia’s destiny was bound up with Asia. He saw the Australia – US alliance as a linchpin for stability in the region. On the eve of his departure for the Colombo Conference in January 1950, Spender said that “Australia and the United States of America are the two countries which can, in co-operation one with the other, make the greatest contribution to stability and to democratic development of the countries of South-East Asia.” This was 13 months before the crucial Canberra negotiations at which the fundamentals of ANZUS were hammered out.

 

Asian conflict causes global nuclear war

Paul Dibb, Prof – Australian National University, Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads, Naval War College Review, Winter 2001, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Winter/art2-w01.htm

The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia’s security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

 

Contention 2 – Aid Now

 

Increases across-the-board

UPI, “Bush budget would bring record deficits”, 2-5-2008, Lexis

The record $3.1 trillion budget proposed by President Bush on Monday would produce eyepopping federal deficits, despite his attempts to impose politically wrenching curbs on Medicare and eliminate scores of popular domestic programs. The Pentagon would receive a $36 billion, 8 percent boost for the 2009 budget year beginning Oct. 1, even as programs aimed at the poor would be cut back or eliminated. Half of domestic Cabinet departments would see their budgets cut outright. Bush's overall request for defense spending in 2009 is $588.3 billion, compared with $670 billion this year. But it includes only $70 billion for initial war costs in Iraq and Afghanistan, $119 billion less than has been projected for this year. That $70 billion is almost certain to increase. Slumping revenues and the cost of an economic rescue package will combine to produce a huge jump in the deficit to $410 billion this year and $407 billion in 2009, the White House says, just shy of the record $413 billion set four years ago. But even those figures are optimistic since they depend on rosy economic forecasts and leave out the full costs of the war in Iraq. The White House predicts the economy will grow at a 2.7 percent clip this year, far higher than congressional and private economists expect, and the administration's $70 billion figure for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is simply a placeholder until the next president takes office. Bush's lame-duck budget plan is likely to be ignored by Congress, which is controlled by Democrats and already looking ahead to November elections. His long-term projections are mostly academic since he's leaving office next January. The president forecasts a $48 billion surplus by 2012, keeping a promise he made two years ago when strong revenue predictions made it look far easier. Now, he's relying on spending cuts ? for everything from transportation to Medicare and Medicaid to nonprofit groups that help the poor ? to do the job in order to keep his signature 2001 and 2003 tax cuts intact instead of expiring at the end of 2010. "Our formula for achieving a balanced budget is simple: create the conditions for economic growth, keep taxes low and spend taxpayer dollars wisely or not at all," Bush said in his budget message. Democrats said the forecast of a budget surplus in 2012 was based on flawed math that included only $70 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009 and no money after that. The budget plan also fails to include any provisions after this year for keeping the alternative minimum tax, originally aimed at the wealthy, from ensnaring millions of middle-class taxpayers. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that fixing the AMT in 2012 would cost $118 billion, more than double the surplus Bush is projecting for that year. Jim Nussle, the White House budget director, said the softening economy, continuing war costs and the deficit-financed economic stimulus measure soon to clear Congress were responsible for the worsening deficit picture. And he said that the deficits experienced during the Reagan years and Bush's father's administration were far worse when compared to the size of the economy. "It's a manageable deficit ? it isn't the largest in history by any stretch of the imagination ? and it's one that can be managed if we get economic growth back on track," Nussle said. Bush is leaving his successor an enormous fiscal dilemma. The deficit numbers will mean pressure to allow some tax cuts to expire, especially the 35 percent bracket for wealthy taxpayers, which will revert to 39.6 percent at the end of 2010 unless renewed. Pressure from Wall Street to trim the deficit may cause even Democrats to go after the spiraling growth of Medicare and the Medicaid health care program for the poor and disabled. "There was an assumption that in the short term that the budget would start to correct and that we could balance in the short term," said Sen. Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, top Republican on the Budget Committee. "But with the stimulus package and with the continuing war costs, that's not going to happen. In fact it's going to get very serious when you're hitting $400 billion deficits." "We've been able to close the deficit gap with good economic growth, therefore good revenue growth. Those days are coming to an end, and we're going to have to do it the old fashioned way, through real spending discipline," said top House Budget Committee Republican Paul Ryan of Wisconsin. Bush proposes killing or cutting back sharply 151 programs to save $18 billion next year. Many of those cuts have been proposed and rejected by Congress before, such as moves to eliminate community services grants to nonprofit groups that help the poor, a food program aimed at low-income seniors and grants to help states keep illegal immigrants convicted of felonies in jail. Lawmakers will surely restore proposed cuts to clean water grants, funding for local law enforcement and homeland security grants to states and local governments. "Today's budget bears all the hallmarks of the Bush legacy ? it leads to more deficits, more debt, more tax cuts, more cutbacks in critical services," said House Budget Committee Chairman John Spratt, D-S.C. Overall, Bush proposes a five-year freeze on domestic programs funded by Congress each year. For 2009, that means just a 1 percent boost in a universally supported food program for poor pregnant women and their children, despite rapidly rising food costs. Health research funded by the National Institutes of Health would be frozen, which is likely to mean fewer research grants. Some of Bush's proposals are hopelessly unrealistic, such as cutting veterans' medical programs for four years in a row after awarding them a small increase next year. Their costs have nearly doubled during Bush's tenure. Bush's budget does contain some increases, for abstinence education, Pell Grants for college students from low-income families and grants to school districts. The Food and Drug Administration would get a larger-than-average budget increase to send staff overseas to inspect food and drugs imported into the United States. Foreign aid would grow by 10.3 percent, to $22.7 billion, with big increases for HIV/AIDS programs, anti-drug and -crime programs in Mexico and Latin America, development aid, and security packages mainly for Israel, Egypt, Colombia and Lebanon.

 

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Afghan aid increasing

Jim Lobe, Staff – Inter-Press Service, “Congress Clears More Funds for Both War and Relief”, 12-20-2007, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40563

Racing to adjourn for the year, the U.S. Congress this week approved a 560- billion-dollar omnibus 2008 appropriation that includes 70 billion dollars more for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and sizable increases in development, refugee, and disaster assistance. The bill, which President George W. Bush is expected to sign into law later this week, provides for a nearly 50 percent increase -- to 4.66 billion dollars -- in spending on fighting diseases, such as AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, that particularly afflict developing countries. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, a multilateral facility to which the administration has been reluctant to contribute, will get a record 845 million dollars, 120 million dollars more than last year’s appropriation. At the same time, Congress approved 1.7 billion dollars for U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKOs) next year. While that was 600 million dollars more than Bush had requested, it still fell far short of the 2.3 billion dollars that Washington is supposed to pay as its share of the world body’s 10- billion-dollar regular and PKO budget. As a result, U.S. outstanding arrears to the U.N. will rise more than 1.5 billion dollars, according to the Washington-based U.N. Foundation (UNF) whose president, former senator Timothy Wirth, noted that Washington’s failure to honour its treaty obligations "undermines the U.N., short-changes key allies, and does not help advance America’s reputation in the world." Both the administration and the opposition Democrats compromised in order to finish work on the 2008 appropriations bill before breaking for the Christmas holidays. While Democrats prevailed on a number of key domestic priorities -- such as funding for health care and heating subsidies for poor people, repairing transportation infrastructure, and strengthening the Freedom of Information Act -- Bush did much better on foreign policy. His top agenda item was the 70 billion dollars in unrestricted funding for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because that amount fell short of the 200 billion dollars the administration has said it needs to finance the two wars through next September when the fiscal year ends, Bush will have to get supplemental funding from Congress some time next spring. The fact that the majority Democrats failed to muster enough support to impose tough conditions on the aid, let alone a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq as they tried unsuccessfully to do several times over the last ten months, marked a major political victory for Bush. The administration’s position was boosted by the widespread impression that their controversial "Surge" strategy has succeeded in substantially reducing sectarian violence. On less controversial foreign-aid issues, however, Democrats made headway in moving policy into line with their priorities. The 2008 appropriation was their first opportunity to re-shape the foreign-aid budget since they reclaimed control of both houses of Congress in the mid-term elections of Nov. 2006. As a result, Congress not only sharply increased funding for Washington’s global health initiatives, but also provided about 1.8 billion dollars for child- survival and maternal-health programmes -- a boost of nearly seven percent over the 2007 appropriation and almost 300 million dollars more than what Bush had requested. At the same time, however, a veto threat by Bush succeeded in persuading the Democratic leadership to drop language that had been approved by both houses that would have eased the so-called Mexico City policy that bans any U.S. health-related aid from going to family-planning groups overseas that provide or promote abortion. On bilateral development assistance, the 2008 appropriation provides 1.6 billion dollars, nearly an eight percent increase over the 2007 level and 600 million dollars more than what Bush had requested. The biggest winner within the development assistance account was basic education programmes for which 400 million dollars of the total was earmarked. For all foreign-aid accounts, basic education in developing countries netted 700 million dollars. For international disaster assistance, Congress approved a total of some 430 million dollars -- nearly a 20 percent increase over the level approved for 2007 and more than 30 percent above what Bush had requested. Congress also increased the migration and refugee account by a similar percentage -- to just over 1.0 billion dollars -- or almost 200 million dollars more than the 2007 level, in part as a result of growing concern about the plight of refugees from Iraq. Much of the additional money for health, development, and humanitarian relief came at the expense of one of Bush’s signature programmes, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which is designed to reward countries that are committed to U.S.-favoured political and economic reforms with higher aid levels. Bush had requested 3.0 billion dollars for the MCA in 2008, but Congress, which has expressed disappointment with lengthy delays in the programme’s disbursement of past funding, approved barely half that amount -- 200 million dollars less than it had appropriated for the MCA last year. As for specific countries, Israel (2.4 billion dollars) and Egypt (1.3 billion dollars), will once again receive the bulk of the 4.6 billion dollars appropriated for military aid overseen by the State Department. The Pentagon has its own aid accounts. The appropriation calls on Bush to withhold 100 million dollars of 412 million dollars in economic aid earmarked for Egypt until it improves its human- rights performance and proves that it is not aiding Islamist militants in Gaza. Congress also imposed new restrictions on U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan, which has received some 10 billion dollars in official U.S. aid since 2001 as an incentive for co-operation with Washington’s "war on terror." Of the 650 million dollars earmarked for military and security assistance, 50 million dollars would be withheld until the administration certified that Islamabad had restored democratic rule and was co-operating fully in counter-terrorism efforts. In addition, none of the 350 million dollars in economic aid authorised for Pakistan next year could take the form of cash transfers which lawmakers worried were being used as a slush fund for President Pervez Musharraf and the army. The aid instead will have to be allocated to specific projects monitored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The bill provides nearly 540 million dollars in emergency economic aid for Afghanistan, but requires the administration to first certify that the government of President Hamid Karzai is co-operating in efforts to eradicate poppy fields.

 

 

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Palestine

AFP, Agence France Presse, “UN Gets 148 Million Dollars In US Aid Pledge For Palestinians”, 3-5-2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ivOnO8aX5B0Nc9vGPRjqL9I514TQ

The US government has pledged 148 million dollars this year to the UN refugee agency to aid Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and neighboring countries, both said Wednesday. The UN Relief and Works Agency said the amount includes 91 million dollars to UNRWA's fund for refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria as well as 57 million dollars to its 2008 West Bank and Gaza emergency appeal. The statement on the UNRWA website follows a similar one on the US State Department's website. "This support is essential for improving the daily lives of Palestine refugees who face hardship in the region," UNRWA's Commissioner-General Karen Abu Zayd said in a statement of gratitude to the US government. The US contribution to the general fund will support UNRWA's "provision of basic and vocational education, primary health care and relief and social services to over 4.4 million registered Palestinian refugees" in the region. The 57 million dollar contribution to the emergency appeal "will allow UNRWA to provide food assistance to 895,000 Palestinian refugees in Gaza and the West Bank, create approximately 190,000 temporary jobs and provide temporary shelter and shelter repair to refugees where needed," UNRWA said. "Every year UNRWA educates approximately 490,000 children in more than 650 schools, hosts nine million patient visits in 127 health clinics and one hospital, and provides special hardship assistance to 250,000 of the most vulnerable refugees," it said. "UNRWA's tolerance education program promotes human rights, conflict resolution and tolerance in every UNRWA school," it added. "Since the inception of its microfinance program in 1991, UNRWA has awarded 126,000 loans to help Palestinian refugees become self-sufficient and to promote private sector growth," it said. UNWRA said the United States is its single largest donor.

 

Egypt

AFP, Agence France Presse, “US Releases Egypt Aid, Seeks Democratic Reforms”, 3-4-2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jka78Zd8UYA_yKWYmpUqRRVuyxVg

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on Tuesday that she had released 100 million dollars in aid to Egypt that had been made conditional on doing more to prevent arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip. Rice told journalists in Cairo that she had exercised her waiver right to free up the funds which the US Congress froze in January pending action on smuggling tunnels and progress with Egyptian democratic reform. "I've exercised the waiver," she told a joint press conference with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit. "We believe that this relationship with Egypt is an important one and that the waiver was the right thing to do." She made no mention of what progress Egypt had made but stressed "the importance that the United States attaches to democracy and reform in Egypt and the importance that we attach to progress on those fronts." The aid freeze created a furore in Egypt, with Abul Gheit repeatedly rejecting conditions being placed on US aid. Egypt is the second largest recipient of US aid, after Israel, receiving around two billion dollars a year.

 

Pakistan

Khalid Hasan, Staff, Citing the Congressional Research Service, “Much of US aid to Pakistan since 2001 for services provided”, The Daily Times, 3-7-2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C03%5C07%5Cstory_7-3-2008_pg7_53

Pakistan has received a total of $10.69 billion from the United States since 2001 in direct overt assistance and military reimbursements, much of it compensation for services provided in the “war against terrorism”. According to the Congressional Research Service, Pakistan received $92 million in 2001, made up of food aid ($88 million) and narcotics control and border security ($4 million). In 2002, the figure went up to $2.1 billion made up of Coalition Support Funds (CSF): $1.17 billion; Economic Support Funds (ESF): 625 million; Foreign Military Financing (FMF): $75 million; narcotics control and border security (91 million), with the rest of the money going to miscellaneous heads. In 2003, the total received was $1.76 billion with the following breakdown: CSF ($1.25 billion); ESF ($188 million); FMF ($225 million), the rest being for miscellaneous uses. In 2004, the total received was $1.12 billion with the following breakdown: CSF ($705 million); ESF ($200 million); FMF ($75 million); narcotics control and border security ($32 million), the rest being miscellaneous. In 2005, Pakistan received $1.68 billion,, the breakdown being: CSF ($964 million); ESF ($298 million); FMF ($299 million), the rest being for miscellaneous uses. In 2006, Pakistan was given $1.69 billion with the following breakdown: CSF ($862 million); ESF ($297 million); FMF ($297 million), the rest representing miscellaneous heads. In 2007, Pakistan received $1.41 billion with the following breakdown: CSF ($612 million); ESF ($284 million); FMF ($297 million), with the rest being for other uses. The estimated figure for 2008 is $929 million with the following breakdown: Pakistan Frontier Corporation training and equipment ($75 million); ESF (407 million); FMF ($298 million), the rest being for other uses. The estimated total figure for 2009 is $826 million with the following breakdown: ESF ($453 million), FMF ($300 million) with the rest being for other uses.

 

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Lebanon

Alfred B. Prabos, Congressional Research Service, “Lebanon”, CRS Reports and Issue Briefs, 7-1-2007

In December 1996, the United States organized a Friends of Lebanon conference, which resulted in a U.S. commitment of $60 million in U.S. aid to Lebanon over a five-year period beginning in FY1997 and ending in FY2001 (i.e., $12 million per year mainly in Economic Support Funds (ESF)). Congress increased this amount to $15 million in FY2000and $35 million in FY2001, reportedly to help Lebanon adjust to new conditions following Israel's withdrawal and cope with continuing economic strains. U.S. economic aid to Lebanon has hovered around $35 million in subsequent years, rising to $42 million in FY2006. The Bush Administration initially requested $41.2 million in aid for Lebanon in FY2007, including $35.5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), $4.8 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $935 thousand in International Military Education and Training (IMET). Since the Hezbollah-Israel fighting in mid-2006, however, the United States and its allies have been vying with Iran and Hezbollah in an effort to win "hearts and minds" of Lebanese citizens who have suffered from the war's devastation. Both the U.S. Administration and Hezbollah have promised or provided significant relief and reconstruction packages. For FY2007, President Bush requested $770 million in supplemental aid from Congress for Lebanon. H.R. 1591, the House-passed FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill, would have fully funded the Administration's request for aid to Lebanon; however, it would have required the Administration to certify to Congress that before the aidis disbursed, the Lebanese government and the Administration had fulfilled certain conditions placed on assistance. A Senate-approved supplemental bill, S. 965, would also have fully funded the President's request but would have required the Secretary of State to certify that U.S. military assistance to Lebanon is not provided to U.S.-designated foreign terrorist groups. Conference report H.Rept. 110-107 was filed on April 24, 2007, and agreed to by the House by 218-208, 2 voting present, Roll. no. 265 on April 25. The conference report in Section 1803© retained the provision in the Senate bill to ensure that no military assistance goes to terrorist groups. The Senate accepted the conference report on April 26, 2007, by 51 to 46 with three not voting (Record Vote No. 147). However, President Bush vetoed the bill on May 1, because it contained a time table for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and the House failed to override the veto by 222 to 203 (Roll no. 276). Subsequently, the President did sign a new supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 2206, on May 25, 2007 as P.L. 110-28. Like H.R. 1591,H.R. 2206 fully funded the President's requested supplemental aid to Lebanon but did not include a time table for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Section 3802(d) of H.R. 2206 requires the Secretary of State to submit to the congressional appropriations committees within 45 days a report on Lebanese actions to implement Section 14 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. (See above.) Section 14 of the resolution calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and prevent the entry of unauthorized arms or related material. (For more information, see CRS Report RL33933, U.S. Foreign Aid to Lebanon: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp.) U.S. Reconstruction and Economic Assistance. The battle for political primacy in Lebanon waged by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's March 14 government coalition and its U.S., European, and Saudi supporters against Hezbollah, their sympathizers, and their foreign patrons in Syria and Iran is being fought on a number of different fronts, including in the economic arena. The summer 2006 war and the opposition's campaign to obstruct the government have placed enormous financial strains on the Lebanese economy, and Prime Minister Siniora has called on the international community to provide financial backing to his fragile government. The United States has committed several hundred million dollars to Lebanon's rebuilding efforts. President Bush announced on August 21,2006, that the United States would provide an immediate $230 million to Lebanon (an additional $175 million on top of an earlier pledge $55of million) during a conference in Stockholm designed to raise funds for Lebanese reconstruction. At a January 2007 donors' conference in France, dubbed "Paris III," Secretary of State Rice pledged an additional $250 million in cash transfers directly to the Lebanese government. This U.S. economic aid was requested in the FY2007 supplemental request under ESF assistance and may be tied to certain benchmarks that the Siniora government would be required to meet. To assuage donors' fears that foreign assistance would be mismanaged, Prime Minister Siniora has developed an economic reform plan designed to lower Lebanon's crippling $41 billion public debt (which costs nearly $3 billion a year in interest payments or nearly 40% of the national budget),decrease public subsidies, privatize the electricity and telecommunications sectors, and increase the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 10% to 12%. The opposition has countered with a populist campaign to thwart these reforms, accusing Siniora of adopting Western-backed liberalization schemes that hurt Lebanese workers. One opposition slogan found in Beirut reads "'No to the government of VAT' and 'No to the government of seafront properties.'" (51) Military Assistance. For the first time since 1984, the Administration requested Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Lebanon in the FY2006 foreign affairs budget. Originally, it sought $1approximately .0 million in FMF for FY2006 and $4.8 million for FY2007 to help modernize the small and poorly equipped Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) following Syria's withdrawal of its 15,000-person occupation force in 2005. However, the summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war spurred Western donors to increase their assistance to the LAF. Drawing from multiple budget accounts, the Administration ultimately reprogrammed an estimated $42 million to provide spare parts, technical training, and new equipment to the LAF, including 25 five-ton trucks and 285 Humvees to enhance the LAF's border patrol operations. (52) The Administration's FY2007 emergency supplemental request $220 includes million in FMF for Lebanon, a significant increase from previous levels. U.S. military assistance may be used for expanded personnel training by private U.S. contractors or the provision of spare parts and ammunition for Lebanese forces. According to the U.S. State Department, U.S. security assistance would "promote Lebanese control over southern Lebanon and Palestinian refugee camps to prevent them from being used as bases to attack Israel. The U.S. government's active military-to-military programs enhance the professionalism of the Lebanese Armed Forces, reinforcing the concept of Lebanese civilian control. To foster peace and security, the United States intends to build upon welcome and unprecedented Lebanese calls to control the influx of weapons." (53) The Administration also has requested $60 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds primarily to train and equip Lebanon's Internal Security Forces (ISF). (54) For more background on aid to Lebanon, see CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2007 Request; CRS Report RL33933, U.S. Foreign Aid to Lebanon: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

 

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Tons of quid pro quos with Lebanon now

Hicham Safieddine, Lebanese Canadian Journalist, “US Aid Dependency: The Road To Ruin”, Electronic Lebanon, 10-5-2007, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article9024.shtml

The history and present trend of US economic aid to Lebanon mirrors to a great degree that of its military aid. Again, the turning point for an astronomical increase of the aid (much of it remains a pledge) was the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon and not the assassination of Hariri. Prior to the 2006 war, American economic aid to Lebanon reached its zenith in the first half of the '80s (around $53 million in 1983). Between 1986 and 2006, it ranged between $8 and $15 million. The annual aid package then jumped to about $35 million between 2000 and 2006 (the increase was partly an incentive for the Lebanese army to deploy in the south following the withdrawal of Israeli troops in 2000). In the wake of the 2006 war, Washington allocated about $180 million in emergency aid and later requested $300 million in supplemental aid. (Most of this aid was in the form of grants.) The aid is ostensibly earmarked for post-war reconstruction, declared Washington. But the release of the funds is conditional on the the Siniora government successfully implementing a bundle of economic "reforms." Indeed, even before Congress approved the aid package, Siniora declared his government's intention to cut social security programs, privatize the electricity and telecommunications sectors, increase value added tax by two percent, and implement other measures he claimed were aimed to reduce Lebanon's $40 billion national debt. Siniora's effort to push through these measures however were met with strong popular resistance inside Lebanon that led him to reconsider the timing and strategy of implementing the "reforms." American economic aid to Lebanon was and remains part of neoliberal American policies across the globe that aim to construct an unregulated market-based economy by weakening the economic role of the very governments it purports to support.

 

Contention 3 – U.S. Credibility

 

In 2005, Germany paroled Mohammed Hammadi, a terrorist who hijacked TWA Flight 847 and murdered a U.S. soldier. Instead of extraditing him to the U.S., they returned him to Lebanon. The U.S. has remained silent – sending a global signal of appeasement

Debbie Schussel, JD and MBA – University of Wisconsin, “Germany Releases U.S. Patriot's Hezbollah Murderer”, Front Page Magazine, 12-20-2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx? GUID=DFE9498E-A0EC-4797-89FD-F4EA3EA9B084

The German government captured Hamadi in 1987. (Stethem's other three murderers--Imad Fayez Mugniyeh, Hasan Izz-Al-Din, Ali Atwa--remain free, and are believed to be in Lebanon, Iran, or Syria.) Hamadi was carrying explosives that were the same kind use in previous terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, Hamadi--who remains under indictment in the U.S.--was tried by the German government, not our. He was given life in prison without the possibility of parole. But there was always an understanding that Hamadi would be extradited to the U.S. to face justice, if the Germans ever released him. Germany kept none of its promises and showed the world that it really has no resolve in fighting terrorism. The Stethem family learned Friday that Hamadi was released to freedom. Despite life without parole, Hamadi was up for parole twice and served only 16 years in prison. And unlike all other extraditions sought by the U.S. under an extradition treaty with Germany, Germany violated the extradition treaty and Hamadi's extradition was not granted. Reportedly, Germany did this for two reasons 1) to gain the release of a female German hostage, Susanne Osthoff (a German convert to Islam), from terrorists in Iraq (apparently, the Germans do negotiate with terrorists, and they trade terrorists for hostages); and Hezbollah has a strong connection with the ones in Iraq); and 2) in retribution for reported CIA terrorist camps in Europe. This is an outrage. What's worse is that Germany released Hamadi clandestinely and provided armed security to escort him to freedom in Lebanon, where his two brothers and other family members are high-ranking Hezbollah officers. Hezbollah-dominated and Syrian-controlled Lebanon--where Hamadi is a hero for murdering Stethem--will never extradite Hamadi to the U.S. to face justice. The Stethem family is very upset. And all of us should be, too. Germany is supposed to be our ally in the War on Terror. But actions like freeing Hamadi clearly demonstrate otherwise. The fact that the U.S. government is not making a big deal out of this also speaks volumes. Before 9/11, Hezbollah murdered more Americans than any other terrorist group. Both the Wall Street Journal and New York Times have confirmed that Hezbollah is a component of the Al-Qaeda network and is training Al-Qaeda terrorists at camps in Lebanon. Both have also reported that Hezbollah is training insurgents who murder our troops in Iraq. British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently reported that Qaeda explosives used in Iraq bear the trademarks of Hezbollah "craftsmanship." But instead of publicly denouncing the actions of the Hezbollah and the German government in allowing a Hezbollah terrorist and murderer go free, our government is making nice with the enemy. Top ranking federal officials--U.S. Attorney Stephen Murphy III, FBI Special Agent in Charge for Michigan Daniel Roberts, ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) Special Agent in Charge for Michigan and Ohio Brian Moskowitz, Citizenship and Immigration Services official Carol Jenifer--recently broke pita at the Detroit-area mosque of one of Hezbollah's and Iran's top agents in the United States. They laughed with him about Hezbollah being on the State Department terrorist list, seeming to scratch their heads as to why it's on the list. They clapped enthusiastically when he described what's going on in Southern Lebanon as "resistance, not terrorism." It's not rocket science to make correct predictions like we make on this site--that Hamadi would be set free or that Islamic Jihad frontman Sami Al-Arian would be acquitted. Clueless, spineless appeasers like Murphy, Roberts, Moskowitz, and Jenifer, and the German government are running the show--and that makes the prospect of terrorists going free very predictable.

 

 

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Inaction on Hammadi shattered the global perception of U.S. resolve and credibility in the war on terrorism – the status quo will degenerate into chaos and perpetual attacks

GRP, Grand Rapids Press (Michigan), “Steely Resolve Against Terror”, 2-7-2006, Lexis

Terrorism and hostage-taking should never be rewarded. The recent release of five Iraqi women detained by the U.S. military may have sent the wrong message to the kidnappers holding an American reporter. If it emboldens the abductors, every American will be at added risk. The U.S. Detention Command in Iraq says the prisoner release was unrelated to the demands of kidnappers threatening to kill journalist Jill Carroll. And true, prisoners are released regularly, but the timing in this case is suspect. It certainly would give the hostage-takers reason to believe their demand for the release of all female Iraqi detainees might be met. The United States was believed to have nine Iraqi women in custody at the time it released the five, along with more than 400 other prisoners. Two other women were detained after the prisoner release two weeks ago. Most of the world's leaders understand the importance of refusing to bow to hostage-takers' demands. The world would descend into chaos if acquiescence was the standard reply. Early in the Iraq War, the world's resolve against such kidnappers was resolute. Nation after nation refused to be bullied into withdrawing troops from Iraq or releasing al-Qaida prisoners, despite the capture and subsequent beheadings of some hostages by Muslim militants. But as the occupation has worn on, terrorists and kidnappers throughout Iraq are finding that hostage-taking can pay. -- Militants in Iraq were emboldened in July 2004 when the Philippines withdrew its 51 peacekeepers to save the life of a kidnapped Filipino truck driver. -- A Kuwaiti company paid a $500,000 ransom in September 2004 for the release of seven kidnapped employees. -- France and Italy reportedly have paid ransoms in the millions to get high-profile journalists and other citizens released. -- A German hostage was released in December 2005, shortly after Germany freed Lebanese hijacker Mohammed Ali Hammadi. He had been jailed for life for the 1985 murder of a U.S. Navy diver. The government claimed the two events were unrelated. -- Though it gets little coverage by the foreign news media, hundreds of Iraqis -- businessmen, doctors, politicians and their relatives -- have been kidnapped and ransomed. -- Even if all Ms. Carroll's kidnappers get is the release of five Iraqi women, it may contribute to the idea that such actions can pay off, even with the United States. Meeting the demands of those who use innocent civilians as pawns will only lead to an increase of such tactics. Kidnapping has become a cottage industry in some Latin American countries because ransoms are routinely paid and perpetrators rarely brought to justice. In Iraq, approximately 250 foreigners have been kidnapped since the war began in March 2003. Most have been released, but about 40 have been killed, according to Associated Press reports. The fate of Ms. Carroll, who grew up in Ann Arbor and was snatched Jan. 7, is unknown. She was last seen in a videotape aired Jan. 30 by Al-Jazeera television station. The United States and the rest of the world must redouble their resolve to stand fast against kidnappers, hostage-takers and other merchants of terror. In the present case, it might have been wiser for the United States to keep the five women, or some of them, in custody longer to avert the appearance of appeasement. Steely resolve will no doubt sometimes seem heartless and be tragic, but it is nevertheless the right choice.

 

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The perception of U.S. weakness makes terrorism inevitable

James Phillips, Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Davis Institute for International Studies, Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Allison Center, January 31, 2007, Executive Memorandum #1019, “Nine Essential Points for Talking About the War on Terrorism,” http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/em1019.cfm

2. Reject calls for appeasement. Believing that concessions will stem transnational terrorism would be a grave mistake. Osama bin Laden, for example, has promoted attacks by arguing that the West is a "paper tiger" with little stomach for prevailing in a long war. Appeasement would only reinforce this belief. One act of appeasement is the failure to call this conflict "war." Terrorists believe that they are at war with us. From their perspective, our failure to acknowledge this fact is an act of cowardice and weakness. Refusing to recognize that we are at war only encourages the enemy to be more warlike. 3. Acknowledge that there is no single enemy. Various terrorist networks pose different kinds of local, regional, and glo¬bal threats. For instance, while al-Qaeda is the most well known of the terrorist groups, many differ¬ent terrorist networks are at work around the world, including ter¬rorist groups in the Indian sub¬continent, which have carried out attacks in India and Pakistan, and Hezbollah, which has killed hun¬dreds of Americans and struck in Europe and Latin America as well as in the Middle East. The distinct threats posed by different terrorist groups require a differentiated U.S. policy custom-made for each group, not a one-size-fits-all approach. Wars and words should be used to divide, weaken, and defeat terrorist groups. 4. Understand that poverty is not the "root cause" of terrorism. Many poor countries do not produce terrorists. In fact, many terrorists come from middle-class backgrounds and were indoctri¬nated and trained in Western Europe. Terrorists purport that violence is an appropriate way to solve societal ills. Discrediting that belief is the first and most essential task in addressing the root causes of terrorism. At the same time, the U.S. and its allies need to offer alternatives to terrorism that are real, credible, and achievable means of making people free, safe, and prosperous. 5. Accept that a Palestinian–Israeli peace deal will not defuse the terrorist threat. An enduring peace is clearly in the interest of all peoples in the Middle East, but terrorists are opposed to Israel's very existence as a sovereign state, not simply to making peace with it. Additionally, many use the conflict as an excuse to push their own political agendas or to condone escalating violence. Their arguments only obscure the reality that a Palestinian–Israeli accord will not stop transnational terrorism. 6. Acknowledge that elections alone will not bring freedom and democracy—the long-term political antidotes to terrorism. Elections alone are not democracy; they are the promise of democracy. Achieving peace and freedom takes years of effort and commitment. As the U.S. has relearned from Iraq’s difficult transition to a demo¬cratic society, free and fair elections do not guaran¬tee freedom from terrorist attacks. Democracy comes from building the institutions that foster a resilient civil society, including freedom from cor¬ruption, upholding human rights, protecting free¬dom of the press and religious practice, and ensuring equality of opportunity. 7. Avoid religious terminology that terrorists use to justify their actions. Terrorists use religious terminology to legitimize their inexcusable acts. For instance, they use the word "jihad," which is derived from the Arabic word jehada and literally means "to strive," to justify what they claim is a "holy war." Using "jihad" or any other religious term to describe terrorists and their actions only helps to legitimize an ideology that the war on terrorism seeks to defeat. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda advocate a totalitarian Islamic ideology that manip¬ulates religious words and ideas but does not repre¬sent traditional Islam. Many terrorists have never received legitimate religious educations. 8. Remind audiences that many terrorist groups are revolutionary organizations that seek to impose their totalitarian ideology on Mus¬lims, as well as non-Muslims, through violence. Although Osama bin Laden seeks to provoke a clash of civilizations, he also promotes a clash within Islamic civilization. Al-Qaeda has killed many thousands more Muslims than non-Muslims. Muslims have a major stake in defeating al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups because they are among the chief victims of its attacks and pay a heavy price when forced to live under terrorist regimes. 9. Not give up on moderate Muslims. Many Muslims reject terrorism, even in countries where the official rhetoric seems disturbingly warlike. Many Islamic scholars argue that terrorism—the intentional murder of innocents to achieve politi¬cal goals—is completely illegitimate. In some cases, moderate voices receive little notice in West¬ern media. In other instances, individuals are fear¬ful to speak out too loudly because of the threat from terrorists and their supporters. The U.S. should encourage Muslim political, religious, and social leaders to denounce terrorism and cooperate in defeating terrorist groups. Conclusion. Winning the war on terrorism will require understanding the enemy, delegitimizing its view of the world, offering a credible alternative, and demonstrating the will to prevail in the long war. Using the right words and ideas can help to speed the course to victory.

 

 

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The U.S. should condition assistance on Lebanon extraditing Hammadi – they’ll say yes

Fred Fry, Former Navy Service Member, “Make Lebanon 'Aid' Conditional to Turnover of TWA-847 Hijacker Hamadei”, 2-2-2007, http://fredfryinternational.blogspot.com/2007/02/make-lebanon-aid-conditional-to.html

President Bush recently announced that the US will be giving Lebanon millions in aid money: Over the last week, the Western-backed Lebanese government and Hezbollah protesters engaged in bloody clashes. Meanwhile, in Paris, France, an international donors' conference raised some $7.6 billion (€5.9 billion) to help rebuildLebanon's economy, which was ravaged during last summer's 34-day war between Hezbollah and Israel. "I am deeply disappointed by the recent violence and bloodshed on the streets of Lebanon," Bush said. "It is all the more troubling that the violence occurred while Lebanon's legitimate leaders and friends were gathered in Paris to help secure a peaceful and prosperous future for the country." Bush said that total U.S. support to help bring peace and development to Lebanon will be roughly $1 billion (€770 million) in less than six months should Congress support his funding request. The United States pledged $230 million (€178 million) at aLebanon pledging conference last August in Stockholm, Sweden. - IHT I say that's a great idea! (Lets just forget that Lebanon is at the start of a 'civil war', much more so than Iraq. Which should mean that Congress will not want to get involved with Lebanon.) However, before we make the money transfer, there is at least one open issue that Lebanon needs to clean up first. That is extraditing terrorist and convicted TWA flight 847 hijacker Mohammed Ali Hamadei who is currently hiding in Lebanon. There is no extradition treaty between Lebanon and the US. That's fine, but for a couple hundred million dollars, I bet that the Lebanese Government will find a way to make this happen, or see that something unfortunate happens to him, as this guy can only be a liability to the Government. Even worse, he is surely to be an asset to Hizbullah. And that is the last thing the Lebanese Government needs at the moment. Just in case you don't know what this guy is wanted for, here is what the US would like to charge him with: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT AIRCRAFT PIRACY, TO COMMIT HOSTAGE TAKING, TO COMMIT AIR PIRACY RESULTING IN MURDER, TO INTERFERE WITH A FLIGHT CREW, TO PLACE A DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE ABOARD AN AIRCRAFT, TO HAVE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES ABOUT THE PERSON ON AN AIRCRAFT, AND TO ASSAULT PASSENGERS AND CREW; AIR PIRACY RESULTING IN MURDER; AIR PIRACY; HOSTAGE TAKING; INTERFERENCE WITH FLIGHT CREW; AND PLACING EXPLOSIVES ABOARD AIRCRAFT; PLACING DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES ABOARD AIRCRAFT; ASSAULT ABOARD AIRCRAFT WITH INTENT TO HIJACK WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON AND RESULTING IN SERIOUS BODILY INJURY; AIDING AND ABETTING - FBI These charges stem from the hijacking of TWA 847 and the execution of US Navy diver Robert Stethem: He was returning from an assignment in Nea Makri, Greece aboard TWA Flight 847 when it was hijacked by members of the Lebanese terrorist organization Hizbullah. They demanded the release of 435 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. When their demands were not met, Stethem was singled out. The hijackers learned he was a member of the U.S. military. They beat and tortured him. Then, they shot him and dumped his body on the tarmac at the Beirut airport. - Wikipedia This man deserves to be behind bars, in the United States. He was behind bars in Germany until the Germany Government stuck it to us and let him go, to a country they knew we could not extradite him from. Current and former American officials said they had pushed for two decades to gain custody of Hammadi and try him in a U.S. courtroom, but they ran into political and legal resistance from Germany. U.S. prosecutors originally sought Hammadi's extradition after he was arrested at the Frankfurt airport in 1987, but Germany denied the request and put him on trial locally instead. Victoria Toensing, a former Justice Department official in the Reagan administration who oversaw efforts to extradite Hammadi in 1987, said German authorities threw obstacles in the way of U.S. prosecutors at that time and only reluctantly cooperated. "They were not open at all," she recalled. "We knew he would be released early, way back then." - Washington Post Just because the Germans gave this guy a free pass does not mean that we should let Lebanon do the same. Since we are getting ready to assist Lebanon, now is the perfect time to get our hands on this one terrorist. To do so, we need to tell them that they will not see a dime of aid money until Hamadei is handed over. As a bonus, the Lebanese Government could then collect on the (up to) $5 million that the US's Rewards for Justice Program is offering for him: June 13, 1985: Terrorists hijack TWA Flight 847, killing Navy Diver Robert Stethem and dumping his body onto the tarmac. To bring these murderers to justice, the United States Government is offering a reward of up to $5 million. The money is available under a program to obtain information that helps punish those responsible for past international terrorist acts against U.S. persons or property and prevent future such acts. - RFJ Nobody is forcing Lebanon to take US Aid. However, if they do, they should be forced to do it on our terms. We should have at least this one precondition. Here is a letter written by the brother of Robert Stethem to President Bush upon the release of his brother’s murder by the German authorities. I think the letter makes the point of why it is so important to get this guy. Date: January 8, 2006 4:15:57 PM PST To: president@whitehouse.gov Cc: vicepresident@whitehouse.gov Subject: ROBERT DEAN STETHEM Mr. President, I would like to provide you with an explanation as to why Muhammed Ali Hammadi's recent release by Germany, and your Administration's lack of any attempt to prevent it, is so upsetting to our family and to Americans everywhere. I am not writing you out of grief or anger but out of a hope that his example will inspire you to follow act on your own words and the dictates of your conscious in this War on Terror. Robert Dean Stethem was singled out, beaten beyond recognition and tortured in order to make him scream into a transmitter (so that the tower would send a fuel truck). Not a cry was heard to come from him, despite the brutal beating he endured. Instead he chose to remain silent and endure the beatings because he knew that the only way a rescue attempt could be conducted by U.S. forces was if the aircraft remained on the ground. After Robert was beaten and tortured and bleeding from puncture wounds all over his body, he was placed next to a 16-year old Australian girl. As bad as Robert was beaten, he had the courage and strength to comfort and console her. He told her that, "She would be okay and that she would get out of here alive." When she tried to return the comfort, he said, "No, I don't think so. I am the only one in my group that is not married and some of the guys have children, too." Some time later, Robert was again taken up to the cockpit and tortured in order to get the fuel. But it didn't work, he would not give in to them. One of the hijackers, Muhammed Ali Hammadi, was so enraged that he dragged Robert to the door, pulled a trigger and shot Robert in the head. Then he dumped Robert's body onto the tarmac. While Robert was being dragged to the door, he knew that all he had to do in order to live was to cry into that transmitter, but he wouldn't do it. He would not give in to the demands of the terrorists. He would not allow the honor and dignity of America to be intimidated by the fear and pain that Hammadi and terrorists everywhere represent. Robert sacrificed his life in order to protect our liberty and defend our way of life. You have rightly said, "Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done." You have truly said that "We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them." Robert lived by them. Robert also died by them. The motto of the USS SSTETHEM (DDG-63), named in Robert's honor, is "Steadfast and Courageous." I hope that his example, and the example of other heroes like him can inspire you to understand why allowing Germany to release Hammadi was a wrong. Justice was not done, Robert was not honored and Americans are not safer by allowing Hammadi to return toLebanon and Hezbollah. You know this, we know this and the American people know this. The Stethem family - NRO Mr. Hamadi was the triggerman. Our Government should not hand over hundreds of millions in aid until he has been turned over.

 

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Extraditing Hammadi reverses the precedent of caving to terrorists

Richard Chesnoff, Senior Correspondent – US News & World Report, “Freed Terrorist is One Too Many”, Daily News (New York), 1-30-2005, Lexis

This namby-pamby liberation of convicted terrorists must end. If not, Hammadi's release will serve as a dangerous precedent, a thumbs-up to the murderous terrorists, a license to continue slaughtering the innocent as they did on 9/11, as they did in Madrid and London. Germany's season of stupidity seems to have inspired another here in the U.S., where at least one attorney thinks we should feel sorry for convicted terrorists and traitors. The attorney for John Walker Lindh - the privileged Californian who converted to Islam while a teenager and ended up in Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban - is petitioning President Bush to commute the 24-year-old's sentence because he's being treated "unfairly." Captured during the Afghan war, Lindh faced charges that could have sent him to prison for life. Among them: conspiring to kill Americans abroad. He plea-bargained - admitting to one count of providing services to the Taliban and another of carrying explosives during a felony. He was sentenced to 20 years in a medium-security federal prison. Even Hollywood is soft on terrorists. Steven Spielberg's "Munich" is his version of what happened when Israeli hit teams meted out punishment for the 1972 slaughter of 11 Israeli Olympic athletes by Palestinian terrorists. Spielberg tries to convince us that violent responses to terrorism often promote more violence, that somehow terror is but a reaction to injustice and that in many ways victim, perpetrator and avenger are all in the same moral boat. That's nonsense! Terror must be fought unwaveringly. I'd bet money the White House turns down Lindh's request. As for Hammadi, we owe it to Rob Stethem to demand that the Lebanese turn him over. If they refuse, maybe we should take a lesson from the Israelis and find him ourselves. At least it might give Spielberg a plot for another film.

 

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Even if Lebanon says no, the plan projects an image of resolve that deters terrorism

Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., Fellow – Heritage Foundation, “Germany Capitulates to Terrorism”, Human Events, 12-23-2005, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=11081

The United States must send a clear message that Hammadi’s release is unacceptable, and that immediate action will be taken to ensure that this brutal terrorist will be brought to justice. Both the House and the Senate should pass resolutions condemning the release of Mohammad Ali Hammadi. Congress and the Bush Administration should call on Lebanon to hand over Hammadi for trial in the United States to face justice under American law. If Lebanon does not comply with this request, the U.S. should hunt down and seize Hammadi under its policy of ‘rendition’ of terror suspects. Hammadi, a Shiite militant from Lebanon, was convicted by a German court in 1989 of the brutal killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem in the June 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome by Hezbollah terrorists. Stethem, who was singled out because he was an American serviceman, was savagely beaten before being executed and dumped by the terrorists on the tarmac of Beirut International Airport. Stethem was posthumously awarded the Bronze Star and Purple Heart, and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery. His killers all escaped from the scene of the hijacking. Hammadi was subsequently arrested at Frankfurt Airport in 1987 carrying liquid explosives in his luggage. He was sentenced to life in prison in Germany (after German refusals to hand him over for trial in the United States), but was released last week and flown back to Lebanon after serving just 18 years behind bars. Hammadi was freed in the face of strong opposition from the U.S. Government, and returned to his home country despite a long-standing American request for his extradition to the United States. The decision to release Hammadi was taken without consultation with the family of Robert Stethem, who were not even informed in advance that their son’s killer was about to be freed. The timing of Hammadi’s release was significant. It came just a couple of days before the release in Iraq of German hostage Susanne Osthoff, an archaeologist who was held captive for several weeks after being kidnapped in the north-western region of the country. The German government is firmly rejecting any suggestion that Hammadi’s release was part of an agreement to free Osthoff. However, Hammadi’s exit from Germany raises major concerns over how exactly the Germans secured Osthoff’s freedom, especially in light of an alleged secret deal between the Italian government and Iraqi insurgents to gain the release of two Italian hostages in August this year. The release of Mohammad Ali Hammadi is a deeply insensitive as well as dangerous move by the German government. It projects an image of cowardice and weakness in the war on terror, and sends a powerful signal to terrorist groups such as Al-Qeada and Hezbollah that continental European leaders lack the stomach for the fight. It will embolden the West’s most vicious enemies, and will only encourage more acts of terror on European soil by Islamic terrorists. It will also sow the seeds of further division between the United States and Europe, a stated policy goal of the wide array of terrorist groups who threaten international security. It is imperative now that the United States does everything in its power to ensure that Hammadi and his fellow hijackers, who were never caught and are still at large, are captured. If nothing is done, Hezbollah will claim victory, and their murderous cohorts will be emboldened to strike again. A clear message must be sent that the brutal murder of American servicemen or civilians will neither be tolerated nor forgotten.

 

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Perception of resolve is vital to a successful war on terror – signaling strength causes global populations to tip toward the U.S.

Bradley R. Gitz, William Jefferson Clinton Professor of International Politics – Lyon College, “Perception as Destiny”, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), 1-14-2007, Lexis

Muslim majorities will eventually reject Islamism only if it is perceived as being effectively and resolutely resisted, as is happening at present in the horn of Africa. They will accommodate themselves to Islamism regardless of their personal preferences if they feel it is the stronger force and represents their reluctant future. Osama bin Laden would be the first to agree that what we are engaged in is a struggle for the hearts and minds of the world's Muslims and that the single most important variable influencing that struggle is perceptions of who is stronger, the Islamists or us. To the extent that Islamist fanatics appear to be winning because we in the West lack the necessary resolve to use our superior power to resist their advances, our superior values will never get the chance to prove their appeal. The appropriate analogy here comes from the urban war zones of America, where the willingness of law-abiding residents to cooperate with the police in their struggle against drug dealers and street gangs is contingent upon which side they feel can hurt or protect them more. Such people constitute the vast majority of the residents of those neighborhoods and almost certainly want the same things for their children that those living in the affluent suburbs want, but they can only afford to "do the right thing," i.e., help the police identify and arrest the criminals, if they can do so without risking their lives and those of their children. Just as the "good guys" (the police) can prevail in crime-ridden neighborhoods only by receiving the help of the people living there and the people living there will help only if they believe that the police are stronger than the bad guys, moderate Muslims around the world will only reject the terrorists and their governments will cooperate with ours in the struggle against those terrorists only if they believe that we, not the terrorists, will win. Such a struggle is playing out in miniature inside Iraq at present and features almost exactly the same incentive system for ordinary Iraqis. We can build a stable democracy in Iraq only if we can overcome the terrorists and the sectarian militias, but to overcome the terrorists and diminish the appeal of the sectarian militias we must first win the support and confidence of the Iraqi people. The people of Iraq would almost certainly prefer to actively cooperate with us and with the government most of them stood in long lines to elect, but will do so only if it doesn't mean jeopardizing themselves and their families. If the people of Iraq believe that the insurgents are stronger and our will to prevail is too weak, they will accommodate the insurgents who control their neighborhoods and punish those who defy them. If they believe that we are about to throw up our hands and withdraw in frustration, they will find protection wherever they can, most obviously among Iraq's heavily armed sectarian militias. In Vietnam, we lost primarily because the villagers of South Vietnam feared the Viet Cong to a greater extent than they trusted either their army or our soldiers to protect them. Most of them didn't want the kind of oppressive future that communism promised, but then most Muslims don't want to be ruled by the Taliban or al-Qa'ida, either. Thus, what we should never forget when discussing our options in Iraq and elsewhere is that the strength of the other side will be determined by perceptions of our strength and resolve.

 

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Even if some terrorism is inevitable, resolve deters the worst attacks

Robert F. Trager, Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University, and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, Ph.D. candidate, political science, Columbia University, Winter, 2005, "Deterring Terrorism; It Can Be Done," International Security, p. lexis

Our analysis leads to several conclusions for U.S. counterterrorism policy. First, when adequate resources are devoted to deterrence, traditional targeting of nonpolitical ends can sometimes deter critical elements of terrorist networks from participating in terrorist enterprises. Significant resources should therefore be devoted to pursuing all elements of terrorist systems responsible for attacks after the fact to demonstrate the capability and will to do so and thereby increase the likelihood of future deterrence success. This implies a higher level of resource commitment than would be the case if the policy objective were merely to bring individuals responsible to justice. n102 Particular emphasis should be placed on terrorist financiers because they have targetable assets (nonpolitical ends) that stand a reasonable chance of being found. n102. On the effects of demonstrations of force on conventional deterrence, see Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, pp. 254-258. Second, even the most highly motivated terrorist groups can be deterred from certain courses of action. Of principal importance to the U.S. campaign against al-Qaida and like-minded groups is the ability to prevent them from cooperating with each other to achieve synergies. As in the case of the MILF, groups that are primarily focused on local concerns can be coerced into denying sanctuary (and other assistance) to members of more dangerous groups. n103 n103. Denying terrorists sanctuary is a key recommendation of The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 365-367. When the United States moves beyond a deterrence posture and becomes even more deeply involved in local conflicts, it will confront a number of important costs and risks. As Robert Pape and others have shown, U.S. presence abroad can promote the spread of extremist ideologies. n104 The use of military force, in addition to carrying direct costs in lives and resources, can become a critical source of disagreement between allies, as the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war showed. Similar disagreements in the future could jeopardize critical U.S. efforts to maintain a broad antiterrorist coalition. Further, the use of force against terrorists and insurgencies often fails to achieve political objectives (as the Abu Sayyaf case shows), and as Martha Crenshaw warns, "may radicalize the whole movement or some splinter faction." n105 n104. Pape, Dying to Win. See also Evan Eland, "Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record," Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 50, December 17, 1998, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb50.pdf; U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, Department of State Publication 10535 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, April 1998), http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html, p. 2; "Professor Chaos: Consultant Brian Jenkins Deconstructs Terrorism's Big Picture," Washington Post, June 1, 2003; and Christopher Marquis, "World's View of U.S. Sours after Iraq War, Poll Finds," New York Times, June 4, 2003. n105. "How Terrorism Ends," special report no. 48 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 25, 1999). See also Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1988), pp. 110-124. The application of force, and other aggressive policies, against a set of adversaries can also create powerful common interests, driving them to cooperate. n106 For instance, in apparent reaction to being branded a terrorist group and having its foreign assets frozen by Western governments, the communist New People's Army of the Philippines announced it would combine forces with the MILF. n107 In fact, the very effectiveness of local antiterrorism efforts may even turn a local movement into a global one. When primary local goals are put out of reach, militants may shift their focus to secondary global goals. Thus, Egypt's effectiveness in eliminating the threat posed by Islamic Jihad may have been a reason militants such as Ayman al-Zawahiri refocused their efforts on new targets, n108 linking up with bin Laden and al-Qaida. n109 n106. For the opposite argument, see James S. Robbins, "Freedom Eagle," National Review, January 18, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/contributors/robbins011802.shtml. n107. Erin Prelypchan, "Manila's Twin Nightmare," Newsweek, March 24, 2003, p. 36. n108. The founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zawahiri allegedly played a key role in the 1988 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. He is believed to continue to serve as a doctor and close adviser to Osama bin Laden. n109. Nimrod Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi' Al-Zawahiri: The Making of an Arch-Terrorist," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 1-22. In choosing among policy options, decisionmakers must bear these costs in mind. This is not to say that the United States should not consider strong measures, such as the use of military force, in the war on terror. By holding at risk the local agendas of local groups, however, the United States can often more effectively achieve its ends of preventing cooperation between groups and denying sanctuary to those against which force will have to be used. Because this sort of deterrence strategy is also less resource intensive, and less likely to cause disagreements among U.S. allies, spread extremism, and drive terrorist groups together, it is often likely to prove more effective. Third, most terrorist groups can be deterred from cooperating with al-Qaida because it is not the archetypal terrorist group. The breadth of its reach, the fanaticism of its members, and the sweeping nature of its goals make it the exception rather than the rule. Policymakers should not assume that the experience of the fight against al-Qaida is transferable to other groups. Fourth, the focus of applied resources in the antiterrorist campaign should be narrowly on al-Qaida and its few current and potential allies whose ideological affinity is so strong or whose gains from cooperation so great that they cannot be deterred. The threat that groups that target the United States directly will develop or acquire the means of causing mass casualties far outweighs all other terrorist threats the United States faces. Because of the magnitude of the resource commitment required to achieve U.S. objectives against these groups, and the gravity of the threat they pose, no resources should be unnecessarily squandered on less essential tasks (except perhaps for purposes of demonstrating capability and resolve in the event of deterrence failure). By deterring other groups from cooperating with those judged most dangerous, the United States can significantly decrease the capacity of groups such as al-Qaida, while still preserving its resources for use against al-Qaida directly. Fifth, deterrence by denial strategies decrease the coercive leverage of terrorist tactics and therefore the motivation to carry out attacks. The United States should apply such strategies against groups that directly target it. Soft terrorist targets should be hardened, and resolve not to back down in the face of anti-U.S. terrorism should be demonstrated whenever possible. n110

 

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Reducing the magnitude of terrorism prevents U.S. lash-out

Lt Col Harry W. Conley, Chief of the Systems Analysis Branch, Directorate of Requirements, Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC), Langley AFB, Virginia. Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2003, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html

The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the most important variable in determining the nature of the US reprisal. A key question here is how many Americans would have to be killed to prompt a massive response by the United States. The bombing of marines in Lebanon, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 each resulted in a casualty count of roughly the same magnitude (150–300 deaths). Although these events caused anger and a desire for retaliation among the American public, they prompted no serious call for massive or nuclear retaliation. The body count from a single biological attack could easily be one or two orders of magnitude higher than the casualties caused by these events. Using the rule of proportionality as a guide, one could justifiably debate whether the United States should use massive force in responding to an event that resulted in only a few thousand deaths. However, what if the casualty count was around 300,000? Such an unthinkable result from a single CBW incident is not beyond the realm of possibility: “According to the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 100 kg of anthrax spores delivered by an efficient aerosol generator on a large urban target would be between two and six times as lethal as a one megaton thermo-nuclear bomb.”46 Would the deaths of 300,000 Americans be enough to trigger a nuclear response? In this case, proportionality does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. Besides simply the total number of casualties, the types of casualties- predominantly military versus civilian- will also affect the nature and scope of the US reprisal action. Military combat entails known risks, and the emotions resulting from a significant number of military casualties are not likely to be as forceful as they would be if the attack were against civilians. World War II provides perhaps the best examples for the kind of event or circumstance that would have to take place to trigger a nuclear response. A CBW event that produced a shock and death toll roughly equivalent to those arising from the attack on Pearl Harbor might be sufficient to prompt a nuclear retaliation. President Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki- based upon a calculation that up to one million casualties might be incurred in an invasion of the Japanese homeland47- is an example of the kind of thought process that would have to occur prior to a nuclear response to a CBW event. Victor Utgoff suggests that “if nuclear retaliation is seen at the time to offer the best prospects for suppressing further CB attacks and speeding the defeat of the aggressor, and if the original attacks had caused severe damage that had outraged American or allied publics, nuclear retaliation would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made.”48

 

Plan 1AC

 

Plan –

 

The United States Federal Government should offer the government of Lebanon a substantial increase in financial aid if the government of Lebanon agrees to extradite Mohammed Ali Hammadi to the United States.

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I've heard that Wake read evidence in semis about why broad topics are bad(or something to that effect) does anyone have the cites for those cards?

 

 

thanks

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I've heard that Wake read evidence in semis about why broad topics are bad(or something to that effect) does anyone have the cites for those cards?

 

 

thanks

 

Why don't you try emailing them? I doubt many people from Wake are checking this thread, especially at this point.

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Not the round itself, but I found Alex and Seth's thank-you speeches on youtube in my search.

 

Alex

Seth

 

Anyone have any luck finding any video of the round itself?

 

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